JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. I.A. No. 2363 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 17 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. Heard. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the averments made in the interlocutory application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2363 of 2019 is allowed and delay of 17 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 691 of 2018 The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 19.09.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 4392 of 2017, whereby and whereunder, the decision of the authority dated 03.12.2015 denying the claim of appointment on compassionate ground, has been refused to be interfered with. 2. The brief facts of the case are required to be referred herein, which reads as hereunder:- The mother of the writ petitioner was an employee under the management of Central Coalfields Limited (in short C.C.L.) and was posted at Amlo Project on the post of Ex-T.R. (Amlo). The mother of the writ petitioner, namely, Baso Devi, died in harness on 18.05.2014. The writ petitioner, after death of his mother, represented vide letter dated 22.01.2015 before the respondents authorities claiming for appointment on compassionate ground in place of his deceased mother under the provisions of National Coal Wage Agreement (in short N.C.W.A.) but the same has been rejected vide order dated 03.12.2015. The authorities have taken adverse decision on 03.12.2015 on the ground that the writ petitioner being the son of one Jagni Devi who happens to be concubine of one Laldeo Turi, husband of Baso Devi, the deceased employee and as such, the writ petitioner has been held to be ‘step son’ and under the National Coal Wage Agreement, there is no reference of ‘step son’ in the category of dependant of deceased employee. According to the writ petitioner, the aforesaid ground is absolutely incorrect and without any application of mind as because in the service excerpts i.e. Form PS-3 and Form PS-4 contain the name of writ petitioner in the category of dependant in the capacity of son of late Baso Devi, the deceased employee as also the Family Membership Certificate has been issued by the concerned Block Development Officer, Bermo on 08.04.1995 categorically mentioning therein the writ petitioner as the son of late Laldeo Turi. It is further on the ground that the writ petitioner was granted a sum of Rs. 9,70,586/- against the death-cum-retiral benefits considering him as the son of deceased employee and as such, there is no reason to deny the appointment on compassionate ground but this fact has not properly been appreciated by the learned Single Judge, hence, the instant appeal. 3. Mr. Kumar Harsh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has relied upon the provision of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 as also Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. He has further relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 479 and Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Others, (1980) 1 SCC 63 . 4. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-C.C.L. has submitted by defending the order passed by the learned Single Judge that under the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement, there is no reference of ‘step son’ under the category of dependant and since the appointment is to be made on compassionate ground on the basis of terms and conditions mentioned in National Coal Wage Agreement and as such, the appointment is only to be provided if the applicant is found to be under the category of dependant as per the conditions contained in National Coal Wage Agreement. According to the learned counsel, since the writ petitioner is a ‘step son’ as such, the learned Single Judge by accepting the reason for denying the claim of appointment on compassionate ground as available in the impugned decision, if not interfered, it cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. According to the learned counsel, since the writ petitioner is a ‘step son’ as such, the learned Single Judge by accepting the reason for denying the claim of appointment on compassionate ground as available in the impugned decision, if not interfered, it cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. He further contends that there cannot be an application for Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, since getting an appointment on compassionate ground cannot be termed as a right to inherit the property rather the appointment under the National Coal Wage Agreement is to be provided if one or other candidates fulfill the condition contained in the National Coal Wage Agreement is only to be considered, while considering the case of one or the other dependants of the deceased employee who has died in harness for providing appointment. 5. This Court having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 6. This Court deem it fit and proper before further proceeding to the legality and propriety of the impugned decision to refer certain undisputed facts in this case which are available on record. Admittedly, the writ petitioner is seeking appointment under the provision of Social Security Measure as provided under the National Coal Wage Agreement in a situation of death of one Baso Devi who has died in harness on 18.05.2014 while working as Piece Rated Worker under the Respondent-C.C.L. at Amlo Project. It is further admitted that the said deceased employee, namely, Baso Devi, wife of late Laldeo Turi, who has got appointment on compassionate ground after the death of her husband, namely, Laldeo Turi, in harness. It is also admitted fact that the writ petitioner is the son of one Jagni Devi, who happens to be concubine of late Laldeo Turi, since during the subsistence of his first marriage with Baso Devi, the writ petitioner has taken birth from Jagni Devi and as such, the writ petitioner is biological son of late Laldeo Turi and Jagni Devi, meaning thereby, late Baso Devi, deceased employee, was not the mother of the writ petitioner. It is also admitted that Jagni Devi was alive on the date of making an application for appointment on compassionate ground. It is also admitted that Jagni Devi was alive on the date of making an application for appointment on compassionate ground. In view of these admitted facts, it cannot be denied and disputed that the writ petitioner is the step son of Baso Devi, however, he will be said to be illegitimate son of late Laldeo Turi but the writ petitioner is claiming appointment on compassionate ground on account of death of late Baso Devi, who has died in harness on 18.05.2014, meaning thereby, the writ petitioner in the capacity of step son of late Baso Devi, had made an application for getting appointment on compassionate ground. It is the further admitted case that the writ petitioner is seeking appointment under the Social Security Measure in pursuance to the National Coal Wage Agreement-VII, wherein, provision has been made to provide appointment to dependant on account of death of employee while in service, for ready reference, relevant provision as contained under Clause-9.3.0 is being referred herein, which reads as hereunder:- “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to dependants. 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disable permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows: 9.3.2. Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service. In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by Para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependent for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4. The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. 9.3.4. The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” It is evident from the provision as contained under Clause 9.3.3 that the dependant for the purpose to provide appointment on account of death of the employee in harness, would be provided to wife/husband, as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased, may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. It is, thus, evident that all categories of dependants included in Clause 9.3.3 have a valid and legal relationship with the employee. Wife/husband/daughter/son or legally adopted son are in the category of direct dependants while brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law who reside with the deceased and were wholly dependant upon the earnings of the deceased, may be considered as dependants if no such direct dependant is available for employment. It requires to refer herein that the provision of National Coal Wage Agreement is a bipartite settlement arrived in between the management of Coal India Limited of which, the Central Coal Field Limited is one of the subsidiary and the Union representing the workmen as under the provision of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such, the nature of agreement is having its statutory fervor, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto vs. Central Coalfield Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 . In view of the fact that the National Coal Wage Agreement is having statutory fervor, the consideration to give any benefit by way of Social Security Measure is strictly to be governed on the basis of terms and conditions as provided under the bipartite settlement known as “National Coal Wage Agreement.” 7. In view of the fact that the National Coal Wage Agreement is having statutory fervor, the consideration to give any benefit by way of Social Security Measure is strictly to be governed on the basis of terms and conditions as provided under the bipartite settlement known as “National Coal Wage Agreement.” 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has tried to impress upon the Court by taking aid of provision of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 8. As has been observed by us hereinabove that National Coal Wage Agreement is having its statutory fervor and it has been provided therein to provide some benefits by way of Social Security Measure, as such, the matter pertaining to extend any benefit under the Social Security Measure is to be governed strictly on the basis of terms and conditions of the bipartite settlement. The question would be, as to whether the provision of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, can be made applicable in the matter of providing any benefit under the Social Security Measure, the answer of this Court would be absolutely in negative, for the reason that if any benefit is being sought for by any person under the conditions contained under a provision, the conditions contained therein are to be made applicable and there cannot be any interpretation by the Court of law by making an application of another statute. However, since the writ petitioner has raised the issue about applicability of aforesaid provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and Hindu Succession Act, this Court deem it fit and proper to answer the aforesaid issue about applicability of aforesaid provisions in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act provides a provision for maintenance of children and aged parents, as under the aforesaid provision, it has been provided that subject to the provisions of this Section, a Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children and his or her aged or infirm parents. Sub-Section (2) thereof speaks that a legitimate or illegitimate child may claim maintenance from his or her father or mother so long as the child is a minor, while sub-section (3) provides obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parent or a daughter who is unmarried extends in so far as the parent or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself out of his or her own earnings or other property. It is, thus, evident that section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 speaks about maintenance and not for appointment on compassionate ground and as such, if any right is for getting the right of maintenance under the provision, that cannot be made applicable for getting appointment on compassionate ground in the garb of getting maintenance. Further, in the facts of this case as has been provided under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the maintenance is to be extended to the legitimate or illegitimate children by mother or father but herein the biological father of the writ petitioner, admittedly, has died but his mother is alive and since he is claiming appointment on account of death of her step-mother namely late Baso Devi, being the son of late Baso Devi, he cannot claim any maintenance from late Baso Devi since she is not the mother of the writ petitioner rather she is step-mother of the writ petitioner and as such, the provision of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, is not at all applicable. So far as applicability of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is concerned, it requires to refer the provision of Section 15 which provides general rules of succession in the case of female Hindus, wherein, it has been provided that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16:- (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband. (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband. (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father. (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father. (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother. (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband. (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father. (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father. (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother. The writ petitioner in the capacity of step son of late Baso Devi since is not coming under the purview of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and as such, the said provision is not applicable. The provision of Section 15 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is also not applicable for the other reason, since here the dispute is not about a property rather the writ petitioner is claiming appointment on account of death of late Baso Devi in harness, meaning thereby, he is claiming appointment on compassionate ground and admittedly providing appointment on compassionate ground being in the teeth of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India cannot be termed as a right to hold by way of property. This Court further deem it fit and proper at this juncture to refer the judgment, upon which, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner in the case of Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Others (supra) but after going through the factual aspect, it would be evident from the said judgment that no ratio has been laid down rather the issue has not been decided and on the basis of compromise, the matter has been disposed of as would appear from para-8 of the said judgment and it is settled that applicability of the judgment is only if any ratio has been decided and is applicable on the facts of this case and therefore, in absence of no ratio laid down, according to our considered view, the judgment rendered in the case of Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Others (supra), is not applicable in the facts of this case. The other judgment upon which the reliance has been placed is a judgment rendered in the case of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat and Another (supra). Shakuntala Sawhney vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Others (supra), is not applicable in the facts of this case. The other judgment upon which the reliance has been placed is a judgment rendered in the case of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat and Another (supra). We have gone through the factual aspects involved in the case and found therefrom that the issue fell for consideration therein is, as to whether an adoptive mother can be included in the expression of “mother” wherein the difference in the mother and step-mother has been defined holding therein that there is inherent distinction between the status of a ‘mother’ and ‘step-mother’ and they are two distinct and separate entities and both could not be assigned the same meaning. The expression ‘mother’ clearly means only the natural mother who has given birth to the child and not the one who is the wife of one’s father by another marriage. In the said case, the step-mother preferred to claim maintenance only from the step son leaving out of her natural born son and husband who are well to do i.e. with a view to punish and cause harassment to her step son which has been held to be unjustified and in view thereof, the step-mother has been held not entitle to claim any maintenance from her step son. This Court after going across the factual aspect involved in the said case, is of the view that herein also the writ petitioner being the step son is claiming compassionate appointment on account of death of her step mother but the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case since is for maintenance as under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. the same is not applicable in the facts of this case. 9. 9. The further question that can any deviation be made from any statute or any provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement which has got statutory force, in this regard, it requires to refer about the cardinal rule of interpretation that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other manner, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Others, AIR (1964) SC 358, wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese and Others vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been at paragraphs 31 and 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor vs. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor who stated as under: “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” Reference to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court also needs to be made in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “.....it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and Others vs. Ambay Cements and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 368 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed.....” Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. vs. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No. 5138-40/2007) reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 14 as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand vs. Ambay Cements, it was held that: (SCC p. 378, para-26) 26....it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” It is the settled position of law that a thing is required to be done strictly in pursuance to the provisions of law, if any deviation, then ultimately the provision as contained under the statute will have no effect. 10. This Court is now proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned decision dated 03.12.2015 as has been taken by the competent authority of the Central Coalfield Limited, wherefrom it is evident that the writ petitioner is seeking appointment in the capacity of step son of one late Baso Devi, deceased employee only on the ground that his name has been referred in the list of dependants in the service book as contained in Annexure-I/1 annexed to the instant appeal but merely on account of reference having been made in the service book in the list of dependants, can writ petitioner will be held entitle for consideration of appointment on compassionate ground under the provision of N.C.W.A. if the writ petitioner is not coming under the category of dependants as provided under Clause-9.3.2, as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other manner, applying the said principle, we are of the view that since under the National Coal Wage Agreement, the step son has not been mentioned and therefore, there cannot be any deviation from the said provision bringing the writ petitioner in the capacity of step son under the category of dependant and, therefore, if the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion holding the writ petitioner not entitled for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground for the reasons as above, which according to us, cannot be faulted with. 11. 11. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove about the factual aspect vis-à-vis legal position, we are of the considered view that the judgment passed by the learned Single requires no interference. 12. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.