ORDER : 1. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned orders dated 19.9.2015 and 30th September, 2015 bearing 1st No.RRT/2/N(A)CR/4830809 issued by the respondent Special Deputy Commissioner Annexures M and N. 2. It is the case of the petitioners that the land in question bearing Sy.No.36 measuring 2 acres situated at Vaderahalli village, Yalahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk was granted in favour of vendors in the year 1986 and thereafter, the petitioners purchased the said property under the registered Sale Deed dated 5.10.2000 and were paying the land revenue of the said property to the State Government. Subsequently, on 18.3.2003 the name of the petitioners were entered in the mutation records. On 4.9.2007, Press Release was made by the BDA for acquisition of land for Dr.Shivarama Karant Layout and accordingly, Preliminary Notification under Section 17(1) and (3) of the Bangalore Development Act, 1976 was issued. On 18.8.2010, a notice was issued by the BDA in respect of acquisition of Sy.No.36 calling upon the petitioners to appear for enquiry and to file objections, if any, by producing documents on 2.9.2010. As per mutation Extract from Bhoomi Land Records On lineSy.No.36/p93 belonged to them and their names were found in the mutation entries. 3. When the things stood thus, the respondent Special Deputy Commissioner initiated proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and proceeded to pass the impugned orders without issuing any notice and providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and thereby the land was vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances. Therefore, the petitioners are before this Court for the relief sought for. 4. The State Government has not filed any statement of objections. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis. 6. Smt. Sumana Baliga, learned Counsel for the petitioners mainly contended that the impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner vesting the land with the State Government free from all encumbrances is in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. The Special Deputy Commissioner has neither issued any notice nor has provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and as such, on that ground also, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. The Special Deputy Commissioner has neither issued any notice nor has provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and as such, on that ground also, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. Though the grant was made in the year 1986, proceedings were initiated in the year 2015 and hence, there is unreasonable and inordinate delay in initiating proceedings where Special Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders. Accordingly, she sought to allow the writ petition for the relief sought for. 7. Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents while justifying the impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner contended that as per the impugned orders, though several notices were issued to the petitioners from 25.6.2012 to 19.9.2015, the petitioners have remained absent and the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that sufficient opportunity was not provided to them before passing the impugned orders cannot be accepted and therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 8. Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, it is the case of the petitioners that when the land being granted to the vendor in the year 1986, property in question was purchased by them under the registered Sale Deed in the year 2000 and their names being entered in the revenue records, the BDA has initiated proceedings to acquire the land and the Special Deputy Commissioner without issuing notice and providing an opportunity of being heard, has proceeded to pass the impugned orders. 9. Though the learned Government Advocate justified that notice was issued before the impugned orders by the Special Deputy Commissioner, but on careful reading of the entire order, AnnexureG and the original records produced before the Court, it depicts that infact notice has not been received by the petitioners. Mere issuing of notice does not amount to service and infact, receipt of notice by the affected party amounts to service of notice. In the present case the Government has not produced any records to show that notice has been served on the petitioners. In the absence of the same, the impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is in utter violation of principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. On that short ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 10. In the absence of the same, the impugned orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is in utter violation of principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained. On that short ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in identical circumstances in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another –vsD. Narsing Rao and Others (2015)3 SCC 695 relying upon the dictum in the case of State of Gujarat –vsPatil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 while considering the provisions of Section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 held that: “Though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court considering the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale reported in (2009)9 SCC 352 at para11 has held that: “It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a lapse of long time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. In the said case, the reasonable period within which the power of revision would be exercised was three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. In the said case, the reasonable period within which the power of revision would be exercised was three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and legally not correct.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act in the case of State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363 in page 367, at paragraph 11 has held that: “A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. The revisional jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. 13. Admittedly in the present case, after the lapse of more than 28 years, the Special Deputy Commissioner initiating the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. My view is also fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. 13. Admittedly in the present case, after the lapse of more than 28 years, the Special Deputy Commissioner initiating the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Act is unreasonable and cannot be sustained. My view is also fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71 while considering the provisions of Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 has held that though the said section does not prescribe for any time limit for initiation of proceedings, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time and at paragraphs1 and 2 it is held as under: “1. The appellant by two registered sale deeds dated 11121972 and 28121972 purchased from the respondent Survey Plot No. 53 measuring an area of Ac.3.06 gunts and Survey Plot No. 372/1+2 measuring an area of Ac.3.18 gunts. On the basis of aforesaid purchase the name of the appellant was mutated in the record of rights on 1421973. It appears that in September 1976 the Mamlatdar of the area concerned initiated a suo motu enquiry under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as applicable to the State of Gujarat, (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”) in respect of the validity of the aforesaid sale deeds. On 2941977 the Mamlatdar held that the sales in question were invalid as the appellant was not an agriculturist belonging to the State of Gujarat. The appeal, revision and the writ petition filed against the aforesaid order have been dismissed. 2. Although Mr Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the appellant took a stand that under Section 63 of the Act aforesaid, there should not be any discrimination amongst the agriculturists with reference to the State to which such agriculturist belongs. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But according to him even without going into that question the impugned order can be set aside on the ground that suo motu power has not been exercised within a reasonable time. Section 84C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah [Spe. WA No. 2770 of 1979] disposed of on 131990, where in connection with Section 84C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha[ (1969) 2 SCC 187 : (1970) 1 SCR 335 ] and in the case of Ram Chand v. Union of India[ (1994) 1 SCC 44 ] has impressed that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018)12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be taken within reasonable time, where no period of limitation is specified. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. No costs.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018)12 SCC 527 has held that actions must be taken within reasonable time, where no period of limitation is specified. Even while dealing with beneficial legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be ignored lightly where no period of limitation prescribed and actions initiated after delay, and at paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 it has been held as under: “9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court held that in a motor accident which took place on 18121989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 21-1-1995, after limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court held that there could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the claim petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of subsection (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. 10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., “reasonable time” is explained as follows: “That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer.” Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve rights and advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses. 11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows: “The auction sale took place in 1942, the application for restoration of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986. Such a long settled position could only be upset for some very compelling reasons and on making out an extremely strong case for restoration of the appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest anything remotely like that. Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the appeal even without any notice to the appellant writ petitioners was clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act.” The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken. 12. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao[Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC OnLine AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para ‘17’ of the judgment reads as follows: (D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17) “17. … that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law.” Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention. 13. … that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law.” Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention. 13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights. 14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand [Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340 ] . 15. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders dated 19.9.2015 and 30.9.2015 passed by the 1st respondent Special Deputy Commissioner are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration strictly in accordance with law. 16. The petitioners are directed to appear before the Special Deputy Commissioner and file objections along with relevant documents within a period of two weeks. On such filing of objections, the Special Deputy Commissioner shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with law. 17. All the contentions raised by both parties are left open to be urged before the Special Deputy Commissioner. Ordered accordingly.