JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate along with Ms. Smriti Pandey, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The instant second appeal under Section 100 CPC arises out of the judgment and decree dated 07.04.2010 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Court No.3 (Fast Track) Gonda in Civil Appeal No.42/2006 whereby it has reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in R.S. No.84/2006 by which the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 3. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the above second appeal are being noticed hereinafter. 4. The plaintiff-appellants had instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Gonda, which was registered as R.S. No.54/1986 seeking recovery for a sum of Rs.1,53,198/-. The averments in the complaint were that the plaintiff has been running his business of distribution and sale of fertilizers in the name and style of Deep Trading Company. The plaintiff had obtained a cash credit loan from the Bank of India and as per the terms and conditions of the Bank, the shop and the stocks were to be compulsory insured against all perils vis-a-vis fire, riot, theft etc. The plaintiff had proposed to obtain an insurance cover from the defendant No.1-the respondent herein, for a general insurance cover for fire, riot, theft, etc., for a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-. Thereafter, completing all the formalities regarding the procurement of the insurance cover, a policy was issued in favour of the plaintiff styled as "MPI Policy No.7413300952". 5. It was specifically pleaded in the plaint that on 31.10.1984 at around 05:00 PM, after the news of the assassination of late Prime Minister broke out, the plaintiff like others, closed his shop which was situated at Mohalla Maliviya Nagar, Gonda. On account of the ensuing events which took place, thereafter, the shop of the plaintiff remained closed on the next day as well. However, on 01.11.1984, it was pleaded that some anti-social elements got their chance and looted the shop of the plaintiff while the market was deserted. The alleged persons forcibly entered into the shop of the plaintiff by pushing and opening the doors and looted the stocks of fertilizers, cash and also damaged the furnitures and fixtures. It is also stated that the District Administration clamped a curfew on 02.11.1984. The alleged persons forcibly entered into the shop of the plaintiff by pushing and opening the doors and looted the stocks of fertilizers, cash and also damaged the furnitures and fixtures. It is also stated that the District Administration clamped a curfew on 02.11.1984. The plaintiff on account of the aforesaid curfew could not move out of his house, however, once the same was relaxed, the plaintiff lodged an FIR in Nagar Kotwali, Gonda on 04.11.1984 under Section 395 IPC, wherein it was asserted that the stocks of fertilizers worth Rs.1,80,000/- and a cash box containing Rs.8,000/- besides other articles have been looted. 6. The plaintiff also informed the insurance company of the aforesaid incident and in furtherance thereof, the Company deputed its surveyor namely Shri P.K. Khanna. The plaintiff had to pay the fee of the surveyor amounting to Rs.3,198/-and the surveyor also submitted its report, however, the same was not accepted by the insurance company and thereafter by means of the letter dated 29.03.1985, the insurance company repudiated the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that it was not covered under the policy. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the suit came to be filed. 7. The defendant insurance company filed its written statement bearing Paper No.Ka-11. The insurance company admitted that the Police No.7413300952 was issued to the plaintiff, however, it justified the repudiation of the claim on the ground that the plaintiff did not take adequate measures for protecting his shop from the mob violence in between 01.11.1984 to 04.11.1984. It was also pleaded that the incident which took place wherein the stocks of the plaintiff was looted was an outcome of the riotous situation and as such it was not a case of theft or dacoity rather it was a case of mob fury and as such the insurance policy did not cover the risk. 8. In paragraph-21 of the written statement, it was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff did not suffer any loss by fire or theft and the risk of riots or loss by mob fury was not covered by the policy, hence, the insurance company did not accept the plaintiff's case and accordingly the suit was liable to be dismissed. 9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed four issues. 9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed four issues. It was primarily Issues No.1 and 3 which were the soul of the controversy involved in between the parties. The Issue No.1 related to the fact whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover a sum of Rs.1,50,000/-along with interest and damages and Issue No.3 was to the effect whether the suit of the plaintiff was maintainable in light of the defence taken in Paragraph-22 of the written statement. 10. The parties filed their documentary evidence and the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 and Shri Pramod Kumar Mishra was examined as PW-2 whereas Shri Shyam Sundar Pandey was the sole witness of the defendant insurance company. 11. The trial court after considering both the oral as well as documentary evidence by means of its judgment and decree dated 11.05.2006 decreed the suit of the plaintiff by recording a finding that since the policy in question duly covered the case of theft and in the facts and circumstances, it was established that certain persons had forcibly entered into the premises and had committed theft, hence, it was a clear case of theft which was covered by the policy in question. It also held that so far as the riots is concerned it had not occurred on the date of theft. 12. Since, the issue regarding the maintainability of the suit was raised by the defendant in Paragraph-22, the same became redundant inasmuch as initially the plaintiff had sought recovery of money by asking for a relief of mandatory injunction, while, during the pendency of the suit, it was amended and the plaintiff amended his relief clause seeking recovery after paying the requisite court fee, accordingly, the Issue No.3 was decided in the said terms. 13. The insurance company being aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court dated 11.05.2006 preferred a Regular Civil Appeal under Section 96 CPC before the District Judge, Gonda which thereafter was transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge (Fast Tack), Court No.3, Gonda for hearing. 14. The lower appellate Court did not find favour with the reasons given by the trial court and it accepted the contention of the insurance company and allowed the appeal reversing and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 11.05.2006 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. 14. The lower appellate Court did not find favour with the reasons given by the trial court and it accepted the contention of the insurance company and allowed the appeal reversing and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 11.05.2006 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. It is in this judgment and decree dated 07.04.2010, which has been assailed before this Court in the aforesaid second appeal. 15. This Court by means of the order dated 30.04.2019 admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law, which reads as under:- "Whether, the first appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal after having found that the insurance policy covered the risk of riot, which is mentioned in the policy itself, but was influenced by the reason behind the occurrence." 16. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties on the aforesaid questions of law as framed. The Court has also perused the record. 17. The submission of the learned Senior Advocate Shri V.R. Singh is that it is not in dispute in between the parties that the respondents-insurance company had issued a police which covered the risk of the theft and fire. It is also not in dispute that on the date of the alleged occurrence, the policy was in force. It is also not in dispute that after the occurrence of the incident at the first given opportunity, the plaintiff lodged an FIR and also informed the insurance company to depute a surveyor, who also submitted his report. After the report had been called for by the surveyor which also to some extent substantiated the case of the plaintiff coupled with the fact that on a bare reading of the policy itself it clearly indicated that the case of the plaintiff was squarely covered by the policy as being a case of theft. 18. It has further been submitted that what might have prompted the theft is a different circumstance altogether which cannot be said nor it can be substituted for the cause to trigger the incident. 18. It has further been submitted that what might have prompted the theft is a different circumstance altogether which cannot be said nor it can be substituted for the cause to trigger the incident. It has been submitted that the trial court had apprised both the oral as well as documentary evidence and had recorded a finding of fact that since certain persons, who had forcibly entered into the premises of the plaintiff and committed the act of theft that is in itself was clear evidence of the fact that the claim of the plaintiff deserved to be allowed. 19. It has also been submitted that the lower appellate Court finding that on account of assassination of late Prime Minister Ms. Gandhi riots had ensued and it is in furtherance thereof that the mob had looted the premises of the plaintiff. Thus, it reversed the judgment and decree and held that since it was a case of riot which was not covered under the policy, hence, the decree passed by the trial court was erroneous. 20. Learned Senior Advocate Shri V.R. Singh has strenuously urged that the first appellate court has relied upon the reason behind the incident rather the manner in which the incident occurred. It has been submitted that the lower appellate Court has failed to take note of the specific pleadings and evidence led by the parties to indicate that the alleged incident occurred on 01.11.1984 whereas the riots did not occur on the said date. Thus, the aforesaid incident could not have been a case of riot and was a clear case of theft. It has further been submitted that the policy clearly indicated the coverage and the incident of the theft was also explained with sufficient particularity and in light of Clause-1 of the policy which provided that where-ever certain words has been used with specific meaning, the same shall be read where-ever it may appear and thus, in the policy itself under coverage (A), the theft has been explained as "theft or any attempt thereat following upon or occasioned by an actual forcible and violent entry of the premises by the person/s committing such theft". 21. 21. It is in light of the aforesaid, the expression theft has been explained in the policy itself and surrounded by the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties, it was a clear case within the four corners as envisaged under the policy, hence, the lower appellate court has committed an error which has robbed the soul of the policy, resulting in sheer miscarriage of justice, hence, the appeal deserves to be allowed. 22. Per contra, Shri Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents-insurance company has urged that the aforesaid policy admittedly did not cover the risk of riots. It has been submitted that insofar as the question of theft is concerned, there must be an intention of the party to commit theft and unless such an intention is so proved, it cannot be treated to be a theft. It has further been urged that in the present facts, the unknown persons forcibly entered into the premises of the plaintiff, it was a act of mob fury coupled with the fact that it was a case of dacoity and loot and as such for the said reasons it can never be treated as a case of theft, hence, the insurance company rightly repudiated the claim and even the first appellate Court has considered this aspect of the matter and has dismissed the suit as the same is borne out from the record and requires no interference from this Court. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents-insurance company has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa Limited vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Anr., (2016) 15 SCC 315 and in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. M/s. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal, 2005 (1) CPR 64 (SC). On the strength of the aforesaid decisions it has been submitted that the policy in question has to be strictly construed. In the present case at hand, since a case of theft was not made out, consequently the trial court has erred in allowing the suit. Shri Srivastava has also submitted that in case of M/s. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal (supra) where it was a case of theft but the policy did not include burglary. In the present case at hand, since a case of theft was not made out, consequently the trial court has erred in allowing the suit. Shri Srivastava has also submitted that in case of M/s. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal (supra) where it was a case of theft but the policy did not include burglary. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the provisions has held that the terms of the policy are to be given primacy and in case if the burglary is not included in theft, the same cannot be expanded to give the benefit to the insured. 24. The Court has considered the submissions as well as the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. 25. In the case of Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa (supra), the plant and machinery was insured for burglary and housebreaking. The scope of insurance cover has been reproduced in Para-4 of the said report. The submission raised before the Apex Court was that forcible and violent entry was not necessary for making a valid claim under the policy. In light of the backdrop, the Apex Court held that from a plain reading of the policy, it would show that forcible entry should precede the theft and unless the same is proved, the claim cannot be granted. In the same context, the Apex Court also considered the case of M/s. Harchand Rai Chandan Lal (supra) and after considering the scope of policy in M/s. Harchand Rai case, held that even while being liberal, the Court cannot substitute a word used in the policy. It further held that burglary means theft but as per the policy unless that theft is preceded by force and violence, the insured cannot claim the amount from the insuer. 26. Thus if the ratio of the aforesaid judgments are applied to the present case at hand, it would indicate that the same does not help the respondent for the reason that in the present case at hand, the word theft has been expressed in the policy itself which has been reproduced hereinabove first in the body of the judgment. The same also indicates that forcible entry must precede the theft. The same also indicates that forcible entry must precede the theft. The facts of the present case also indicates the same and for the said reason, this Court finds that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents actually do not help the respondents rather it supports the case of the appellant. 27. From the perusal of the record, what this Court finds, is that the policy which has been brought on record contained certain relevant clauses which are being reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:- "1. This Policy and the Schedule shall be read together as one contract and any word or expression to which a specific meaning has been attached in any part of this policy or of the Schedule shall bear such specific meaning wherever it may appear." "COVERAGE 'A' RIOT & STRIKE AND THEFT (CONTENTS) INSURANCE (1) any of the property described under Coverage 'A' in the Schedule hereto belonging to the insured whilst on the Premises shalal be lost or damaged by (a) Fire, (b*) Riot & Strike or (c*) theft or any attempt thereat following upon or occasioned by an actual forcible and violent entry of the premises by the person/s committing such theft or (2) any damage falling to be borne by the insured shall be caused to the Premises by theft following actual forcible and violent entry or any attempt thereat. then the Company will indemnify the Insured against such loss or damage to the extent of the intrinsic value of the property so lost or damaged but so far as each item referred to in the Schedule is concerned not exceeding the sum insured thereon and not exceeding in the aggregate the Total Sum Insured under Coverage 'A' in the period of insurance. * If described as covered under item (b) and (c) respectively of Coverage 'A' of the Schedule attached hereto EXCEPTIONS The Company shall not be liable under this Coverage in respect of: 1. Loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence of explosion but loss or damage by explosion of gas used for illuminating or domestic purposes in a building in which gas is not generated and which does not form part of any gas works will be deemed to be loss by the fire within the meaning of this coverage. 2. 2. Loss or damage to any electrical machine apparatus fixtures or fittings (including electric fans, electric household or domestic appliances, wireless sets Television and ratio) or any portion of the electrical installation arising from the occasioned by over running excessive pressure short circuiting arcing self-heating or leakage of electricity from whatever cause (lighting included) provided that this exemption shall apply only to the particular electrical machine apparatus fixture or portions of the electrical installation which may be lost or damaged by fire so set up. 3. Loss or damage by theft: (a) Where any inmate or member of the insured's household or of his business staff or any other person lawfully in the premises is concerned in the actual Theft of or Damage to any of the Articles or premises or where such Loss or Damage has been expedited or in any way assisted or brought about by any such person or persons. (b) If the premises be left uninhabited by day and night for seven or more consecutive days and nights. 4.(a) Gold or Silver Articles, Watches, Jewellery, Precious Stones Medals, Coins, Curious Sculptures, Manuscripts, Rare Books Plans, Patterns, Moulds and Designs. (b) Deeds, Bonds, Bill of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Money or Securities for Money, Stamps, Business books or documents, Unless specifically mentioned in the Policy Schedule. Note:-This Coverage is also subject to Standard Conditions Nos.1 to 15, 16 to 22 of the Policy." 28. In the aforesaid case, it would be found that the plaintiff had made a clear pleading that he had closed his shop on 31.10.1984 at around 05:00 PM. It was further stated that on 01.11.1984 while the market was deserted, certain anti-social elements forcibly entered into the premises and decamped with the entire stocks of fertilizers along with cash box and also damaged the furnitures and fixtures. This particular incident as to the fact have not been denied by the denied in their written statement except that it has been submitted that it was a case of mob fury which followed the assassination of late Prime Minister and was not a case of theft. The fact remains that in order to ascertain whether it was a case of theft, the parties and the Court thereafter had to rely upon the material available on record. 29. The fact remains that in order to ascertain whether it was a case of theft, the parties and the Court thereafter had to rely upon the material available on record. 29. It will be relevant to notice that a contract of the controversy is not to be seen in the context of holding somebody guilty for the offence of theft as defined under Section 378 IPC. All that is required to be seen is whether as per the policy conditions, the aforesaid incident was covered or not. 30. It will also be relevant to notice that a contract of insurance is like any other contract and it is necessary that while interpreting the same, a strict construction has been imported based on the terms of the policy without adding or subtracting or substituting the words used in the policy. It is not disputed that the expression theft has been explained under the policy itself which has been quoted hereinabove for convenient perusal. It is in light of the pleadings and the evidence led by the parties that it is to be ascertained whether it was a case of theft or not. 31. The record would also indicate that document bearing Paper No.Ga-49/2 was a certificate from the District Magistrate to indicate that riots did not take place and there was clear pleadings that the riots do not occur in the District Gonda which had engulfed various parts of the country after the assassination of late Prime Minister. It has also borne out from the record that in the present case, the police had imposed the curfew on 02.11.1984. 32. Be that as it may on the date of the occurrence, the stocks of the plaintiff were looted from his shop by making forcible entry. The aforesaid had also lodged the FIR and the evidence led by the plaintiff by way of oral and documentary was very clear and specific regarding the narration of the alleged incident. 33. On the other hand the defendant had examined Shri Shyam Sunder Pandey as the sole witness who admitted that the policy in question was duly issued by the company and it covered the case of theft. Once, the aforesaid factual matrix were not in dispute, the only question was whether in the facts and circumstances, the correct interpretation was given to the policy conditions or not by the lower appellate court. 34. Once, the aforesaid factual matrix were not in dispute, the only question was whether in the facts and circumstances, the correct interpretation was given to the policy conditions or not by the lower appellate court. 34. The trial court while considering the evidence found it to be a case of theft whereas the first appellate Court has reversed the said findings and it has recorded its own reasons which indicated that it was swayed by the circumstances such as the death of late Prime Minister which culminated in the riots. The first appellate court did not advert to the circumstances that the alleged occurrence which was reported to have taken place on 01.11.1984 might have been triggered on account of particular circumstance but whether that incident itself amounted to a riot or theft has not been taken note of by the lower appellate Court. 35. It can be seen from the record that there was no evidence before the court to indicate that any riotous situation had occurred except for the said incident on 01.11.1984. The circumstance prevailing in other parts of the States or the country may have triggered a reaction but that particular incident was solitary in itself in the chain of circumstance and it could not be treated as a case of riot. Even otherwise as per the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents-insurance company that it was a case of loot, dacoity, even if that is to be considered it would be found that in the aforesaid circumstances, it is not disputed that the goods were stolen from the premises of the plaintiff and exact number of persons have not been mentioned. The words loot, dacoity and theft, as per the legal parlance have certain similarities but on account of slight difference, have been made punishable under different sections as per the Indian Penal Code, 1860. However, having said that it will be relevant that in the entire policy, it nowhere indicates that the expression which has been used in the policy is to be read in context with the definition or explanation of the aforesaid words as mentioned in the IPC. 36. However, having said that it will be relevant that in the entire policy, it nowhere indicates that the expression which has been used in the policy is to be read in context with the definition or explanation of the aforesaid words as mentioned in the IPC. 36. In view of the aforesaid, the manner in which the word has been expressed in the policy if taken note of, would indicate that as per the version given by the plaintiff which was duly pleaded in his plaint and also substantiated by his evidence to which there was no contrary evidence from the side of the insurance company, this Court finds that the lower appellate court has been influenced by the external factors while arriving at a conclusion that the incident as alleged was triggered by the assassination of the late Prime Minister and was a case of riot which was not covered by the police. It did not consider the incident as per the record and for the said reasons, the findings reversed by the lower appellate court is not borne out from the record. It has also not met with the reasons given by the trial court while reversing the findings. 37. For all the reasons aforesaid, this Court is satisfied that the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court is not in consonance with the pleadings and the term of the policy as well as the evidence available on record, the question is answered accordingly. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court dated 07.04.2010 passed by the Third Additional District Judge (Fast Track) Court No.3, Lucknow is set aside. The judgment and decree dated 11.05.2006 passed in R.S. No.84/2006 is restored. 38. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 39. The record of lower court be remitted to the court concerned within two weeks from today.