JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. 1. The sole appellant has faced the trial on the charge under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code for committing dowry death of Arti Devi, his wife. In Sessions Trial No. 303 of 2009, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to RI for life and fine of Rs. 10,000/- under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant was married to Arti Devi in the year 2001 and from the wedlock two children were born. The appellant had bad drinking habit and about two years after the marriage he started harassing and torturing his wife in connection to demand of dowry. About 3-4 years back, Arti Devi brought Rs. 27,000/- from her father and gave to her husband, however, he further demanded Rs. 40,000/- from her father and because his demand was not fulfilled he continued to abuse his wife. In the afternoon of 10.03.2005 there was a quarrel between the appellant and his wife regarding the demand of money and when his wife protested he poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. On hearing cries of Arti Devi the neighbours assembled there and admitted her at Patratu Hospital and for her better treatment she was brought to Bokaro Hospital by her brother and mother. She has given her fardbeyan, which was recorded by Ramanand Prasad Singh, ASI at Sector IV, Bokaro on 15.03.2005 in BGH Burning Ward, Room No. IV. 3. Subsequently, the statement of Dilip Choudhary, who is the father of Arti Devi was also recorded on 16.03.2005 by Ramanand Prasad Singh, in which he has stated that his son-in-law was working as Porter at Patratu Railway Station, was a habitual drinker and was demanding dowry from his daughter. He has further stated that he gave Rs. 27,000/- to him about 3-4 years back but the appellant further demanded Rs. 40,000/- which could not be fulfilled by him and for this reason, the appellant has committed murder of his daughter. 4. A First Information Report was lodged on 03.04.2005 on the basis of the statement of Dilip Choudhary recorded by ASI Ramanand Prasad Singh on 16.03.2005. 5. Arti Devi died on 16.03.2005 and her father had also died before he could be examined during the trial. 6. During the trial, the prosecution has examined seven witnesses. 4. A First Information Report was lodged on 03.04.2005 on the basis of the statement of Dilip Choudhary recorded by ASI Ramanand Prasad Singh on 16.03.2005. 5. Arti Devi died on 16.03.2005 and her father had also died before he could be examined during the trial. 6. During the trial, the prosecution has examined seven witnesses. The brother of Arti Devi and her mother have deposed in the Court about demand of dowry and harassment of Arti Devi at the hands of the appellant. Md. Firoz PW-2 has stated that his statement was not recorded by the police during investigation and Ganesh Singh PW-3 has been declared hostile at the instance of the prosecution. Mr. Srinivas PW-6 and Pankaj Kr. Jha PW-7 are Investigating Officers of the case; PW-7 has conducted major part of the investigation and PW-6 has submitted the charge-sheet. However, Ramanand Prasad Singh who has recorded the statement of Arti Devi and her father was not produced during the trial. The minor daughter of the couple, namely, Riya Kumari, who was aged about three years at the time of incident, has been examined as PW-4. The prosecution has projected her as an eye-witness. 7. The learned District and Additional Sessions Judge-I, Hazaribag has found testimony of PW-4 reliable and trustworthy and raising a presumption under section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act the learned Judge has held that the prosecution has successfully proved the charge under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. 8. After arguing for some time and referring to the judgments in Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 and Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 16 SCC 769 , Mr. Pratyush Lala, the learned counsel for the appellant has confined his submission only to the question of sentence. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that infliction of maximum punishment of RI for life upon the appellant for the offence punishable under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code is not proper, for in view of the mitigating circumstances which appear from the prosecution records but have not been considered by the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge-I, Hazaribag, the order of sentence dated 06.03.2014 warrants interference of this Court. 10. 10. The expression “but which may extend imprisonment for life” in sub-section 2 to section 304-B reflects intention of the legislature that maximum punishment cannot be awarded as a matter of course. Under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, the maximum punishment provided is R.I for life though the minimum sentence shall not be less than seven years. But, before sentence is inflicted upon an accused the court is required to weigh aggravating vis-a-vis mitigating circumstances. The appellant when he was sentenced to maximum punishment of R.I for life was aged about 23 years. This definitely is a circumstance leaning towards the appellant and the order of sentence reflects that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has failed to discuss the mitigating circumstances which are appearing from the prosecution's evidence [Refer: Amit vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 93 ]. 11. In Hem Chand vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court has observed: “7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that: “Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani PW-6 and Dr. Indu Lalit PW-7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead-body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr. Dalbir Singh PW-13 who also examined the dead-body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.” 12. On this issue, in State of Punjab vs. Manjit Singh and Others, AIR 2009 SC 2888 , the Supreme Court has observed as under: “12. With regard to the quantum of punishment to be awarded to persons found guilty of offences dealt with in the IPC, the Code confers a wide discretion on the court in the matter of awarding appropriate punishment by prescribing the maximum punishment and in some cases both the maximum as well as the minimum punishment for the offence. Though no general guidelines are laid down in the Code for the purpose of awarding punishment, generally the judicial discretion of the court is guided by the principle that the punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence having regard to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances vis-a-vis an accused in each case. In such situation, the obligation of the court in making the choice of death sentence for the person who is found guilty of murder becomes more onerous indeed.” 13. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, the judgment of conviction of the appellant, namely, Basant Mandal under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code dated 05.03.2014 passed by the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge-I, Hazaribag in Sessions Trial No. 303 of 2009 is affirmed, however, the order of sentence passed against the appellant under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code dated 06.03.2014 passed by the learned District and Additional Sessions Judge-I, Hazaribag in Sessions Trial No. 303 of 2009 is set-aside. 14. The appellant, above named, is convicted under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 10000/-. The fine amount shall be deposited in the name of the daughter and son of the appellant. 15. Mr. Ram Prakash Singh, the learned APP states that the appellant, namely, Basant Mandal, who is in jail, has remained in custody for more than eleven years. 16. Accordingly, the appellant, named-above, shall be set free forthwith, if not required in connection to any other criminal case. 17. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 238 of 2014 is partly allowed, in the aforesaid terms. 18. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith. 19. Let a copy of the judgment be communicated to the trial court and the concerned Jailor through FAX, who shall act on that basis.