JUDGEMENT : Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C. 2. The instant application has been preferred by the petitioner challenging the impugned order dated 15.12.2012 passed by the respondent No.3 (Annexure-3 to the writ application), whereby the claim of the petitioner for back wages for the period 01.02.2003 to 31.01.2009 along with other consequential benefits, gratuity on revised pay scale including pension and other fringe benefits has been denied. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was duly appointed as Clerk-cum- Godown keeper on 10.07.1973. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of Accountant on 08.12.1980. He was further promoted to the post of Assistant Manager on July, 1982 and to the post of Manager (Scale – II) on July, 1991. The further case of the petitioner is that in the month of May 1994, while he was posted as Branch Manager, Kishoreganj Branch, Ranchi, on the basis of a complaint, a criminal case being RC 13 (A) of 1994 (R) was registered upon First Information Report under Sections 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereafter, on 19.12.2002 the trial court convicted the petitioner under Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in the said case. As a result thereof, on 31.12.2002 a show cause notice was issued by the Bank proposing to impose penalty under Regulation-4 of the Punjab National Bank Officers Employees (D&A) Regulation, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulation) and within a period of one month i.e. on 29.01.2003, major punishment of dismissal from service under Regulation -4 (J) read with Regulation-11 of the Regulation was imposed upon the petitioner. Thereafter an appeal was preferred by the petitioner within time. However, on 20.03.2003 the Appellate Authority also affirmed the order of punishment and even the Reviewing Authority rejected the departmental review petition on 20.06.03. Further case of the petitioner is that on 31 01.2009 he completed 60 years of age to attain the age of superannuation and just after that on 03.11.2010, this Court while allowing Cr. Appeal No.29 of 2003, set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial court in R.C.139A) of 1994 (R). Thus, the very ground for punishment i.e. ‘conviction in criminal case’ for imposing major punishment of dismissal from service was set aside by this Court. Appeal No.29 of 2003, set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial court in R.C.139A) of 1994 (R). Thus, the very ground for punishment i.e. ‘conviction in criminal case’ for imposing major punishment of dismissal from service was set aside by this Court. Pursuant to that, the petitioner filed a representation before the respondent Bank on 18.11.2010 for setting aside the punishment order in view of subsequent event of his acquittal in the appeal by this Court and he also made a prayer for consequential benefits with back wages and post retiral benefits. When nothing was done on the representation, the petitioner filed a writ application before this Court which was registered as W.P.(S) No.4711 of 2012. On 11.09.2012 the said writ application was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to take a decision on representation of the petitioner within a period of 90 days. However, the representation of the petitioner was dismissed. 4. It is a specific case of the petitioner that on 16.08.2010, Pension Fund Department Circular No.8/2010 was issued by the Bank and as per Clause 3(B), the same was applicable to the petitioner. As per the said Circular No.10/10, a pension scheme was announced by respondent bank and as per that the employee who wishes to have the benefits of the said scheme will have to opt for the same. On 06.10.2010, the petitioner opted in terms of Circular No.10/10 and copy of such option was duly received in the office of the Chief Manager, Ranchi and Circle Head, Circle Office, Ranchi on 19.10.2010 i.e. much prior to the cut-off date which is 24.10.2010. Even copy of the option was sent to DGM, New Delhi through speed post. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that clause 4 of Regulation deals with penalties and clause (f) to (j) deals with major penalties. Regulation -11 deals with special procedures in certain case, but speaks about any of the penalties specified in regulation 4, if the officer employee has been convicted on a criminal charge. Relying upon the aforesaid clauses learned counsel submits that even if the conviction of the petitioner is the ground for taking resort to Regulation-11, the disciplinary authority would have imposed any of the penalties described as major penalty in clause (f) to (j) and clause (j) was not the only penalty. Relying upon the aforesaid clauses learned counsel submits that even if the conviction of the petitioner is the ground for taking resort to Regulation-11, the disciplinary authority would have imposed any of the penalties described as major penalty in clause (f) to (j) and clause (j) was not the only penalty. In other words the punishment of dismissal as contained in clause (j) was not the only option with the bank; rather they could have imposed any other penalty in terms of Regulation -11. 6. Learned counsel further contended that the impugned order refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vrs. Jaipal Singh reported in “2004 ( 1) SCC” wherein the Supreme Court inter alia held that the respondent has to be reinstated in service, but without back wages. Admittedly, conviction being the sole ground for imposing penalty of dismissal inasmuch as the order of punishment was imposed within a period of one month from the date of show-cause without holding full fledged departmental proceedings following the principles of natural justice but the said conviction did not exist on the date of the impugned order i.e. on 15.12.2012 as such, following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the respondents could have denied the claims of back wages, but they could not have denied reinstatement and since the petitioner crossed the age of superannuation prior to the date of acquittal by this Court, he should have been given all the benefits of retirement. Further, circular No.10/10 dated 16.08.2010 puts a cut-off date of 24.10.2010 for option and the petitioner had already opted on 06.10.2010 i.e. within the cut-off date and therefore, the pension could not have been denied by the bank due to non transfer of the amount which he offered several times including through his letter dated 20.01.2011 and such belated offer in respect of other similarly situated persons have been acted upon by the Bank. The petitioner has relied following judgments: (i) 2002 (3) JLJR -299 (Bihar State Electricity Board versus Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board) (ii) 2006 (5) SCC-446 (G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Others) (iii) 2008(1) JLJR- 530. (Dhirendra Prasad Mandal Versus State of Jharkhand And Deputy Commissioner) 7. The petitioner has relied following judgments: (i) 2002 (3) JLJR -299 (Bihar State Electricity Board versus Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board) (ii) 2006 (5) SCC-446 (G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Others) (iii) 2008(1) JLJR- 530. (Dhirendra Prasad Mandal Versus State of Jharkhand And Deputy Commissioner) 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently oppose the submissions of the petitioner and submits that there was cessation of all legal relationships as an employee and employer between the petitioner and the respondent bank in accordance with law and service regulations governing the parties. He further submits that in view of the admitted fact that the petitioner had already passed the age of superannuation, he lost his right for reinstatement back into the services of the respondent bank coupled with the fact that the petitioner was not honorably acquitted by the Court of appeal. He contended that pursuant to the termination of the petitioner on 29.01.2003 by the respondent bank, he has been paid the entire provident fund including the petitioner’s own contribution and that of the Bank’s contribution as well. Relying upon the aforesaid submissions he prayed for dismissal of the instant writ application since the petitioner cannot claim arrears of salary from the period 01.02.2003 to 31.01.2009 as the petitioner was terminated from service in accordance with law upon conviction by criminal court upon the prosecution being launched by an impartial agency (CBI) and the respondent bank cannot in any way be held responsible for keeping the petitioner out of service. Thus, on the principle of no work no pay, the said prayer of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to law. Learned counsel for the respondents further relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Union of India and others versus Jaipal Singh reported in 2004 (1) SCC 121 wherein the law has been laid down in para 4 & 5 as under : “4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefore it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned, was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 5. The respondent will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for the purpose of denying the respondent actual payment of back wages, that period also will be counted as period of service, without any break. The reinstatement, if not already done, in terms of the order of the High Court will be done within thirty days from today.” 8. The reinstatement, if not already done, in terms of the order of the High Court will be done within thirty days from today.” 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the materials available on record it appears that the conviction was the sole ground for imposing major penalty upon the petitioner however the said conviction did not subsists because for the obvious reason that the petitioner has been acquitted by this Court in Cr. Appeal. At this stage, it is necessary to refer the finding of this Court passed in the said appeal; Cr. Appeal No.29 of 2003 which will clearly transpire that the petitioner was acquitted honorably. The relevant portion of the Judgment is referred to as under: “14………….……. The complainant himself admitted that his loan money was reduced to Rs.50,000/- and as such, he was only required to deposit to Rs.2,500/- only and when he went on the date of occurrence to deposit Rs.2,500/- in the chamber of the Branch Manager at 4 P.M., the transaction of the Bank was closed and the money could not be deposited on the same day and so the Manager thinking it to be margin money, kept the same in his table drawer for depositing the same on the next day and as such, it cannot be said that he accepted the bribe money. In that view of the matter, prosecution case is doubtful and failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is given benefit of doubt and acquitted from the all charges. 9. From perusing the aforesaid part of the Judgment passed in the Criminal Appeal it would transpire that the prosecution has failed to prove its case and the petitioner was acquitted. It is also informed to this Court that the judgment of acquittal passed by this Court has not been challenged. It is also an admitted case that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner was exactly on the same charge and on the same set of facts and the order of dismissal was passed within a period of one month from the date of conviction in which though the petitioner was initially convicted by the trial court but was acquitted by this Court. In the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat (supra) the appellant was charged for the offence of acquisition of moveable and immovable property disproportionate to his known source of income. After holding departmental proceeding, he was dismissed from service. Against the dismissal order, appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed. The said order was also affirmed by the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal. The appellant then moved to Supreme Court. A Criminal complaint was also lodged against the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption Act which was based on the same set of facts, charges, evidences and witnesses. The Criminal Court acquitted the appellant of the said offence holding that prosecution failed to prove the charges leveled against the appellant. The said order of the trial Court was not further challenged by the State and it became final. The main contention of the appellant before the Supreme Court was that there was no evidence against him to hold him guilty and his acquittal by the trial Court during pendency of challenge to his dismissal order was brought to the notice of the Division Bench but it was not considered by it. Allowing the appeal, the Hon’ble Apex Court after considering its earlier judgments has observed in para 30 and 31 in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 as under: “30. The judgments relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case lunched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s residence, recovery of articles therefrom. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant’s residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the courts below, when there was an honorable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 10. In the instant case admittedly, conviction being the sole ground for imposing major penalty of dismissal and the order of punishment was imposed within a period of one month from the date of show-cause without holding full-fledged departmental proceedings following the principles of natural justice but the said conviction converted into acquittal by the judgment of this Court; as per the settled law as laid down in the case of Union of India vrs. Jaipal Singh (supra) wherein the Supreme Court inter alia held that the respondent has to be reinstated in service, but without back wages, in my considered opinion the petitioner shall not be entitled for any back wages but since the petitioner has already retired on 31.01.2009 he shall get the benefit of increments which was not given to him pursuant to order of punishment. The petitioner shall also get the benefits of other retiral dues including pension as per the Circular No.10/10 dated 16.08.2010 because admittedly, the cut-off date was 24.10.2010 for opting the benefits of pension scheme and the petitioner opted on 06.10.2010 duly received by the respondent bank within the cut-off date and therefore, the pension could not have been denied by the bank due to non transfer of the amount which he offered several times including in his letter dated 20.01.2011. 11. For the reason stated hereinabove this writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.12.2012 passed by the respondent No.3 (Annexure-3 to the writ application), is hereby set aside. The petitioner is directed to file a representation raising his claim before the respondent no.3 raising his grievance of pension and other retiral benefits except the back wages. If any such representation is filed, the respondent no.3 shall take a decision and pass a reasoned order in view of the aforesaid observation within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of such representation. The respondent Bank will be at liberty to issue any demand letter to the petitioner which may be required to be deposited by the employee to get the benefits of the pension scheme since the bank has already returned the amount to the petitioner after dismissal as per the scheme. 12. With the aforesaid directions, the instant writ application is disposed of.