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2020 DIGILAW 673 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Deepakkumar M. Kahar

2020-08-07

A.C.RAO, BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2020
JUDGMENT : A.C. RAO, J. 1. This appeal is at the instance of the State of Gujarat under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) questioning the legality and validity of the judgement and order of acquittal dated 17.05.1994, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, in the Sessions Case No.142 of 1992. The Sessions Court has acquitted all the respondents – accused from the charges levelled against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 302 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”). 2. At the outset, it may be noted that the respondent No.2 – Chhanabhai Makanbhai Retiwala, having expired pending the appeal, the appeal stood abated qua the said respondent No.2, as per the order passed by the Court. 3. The facts leading the present appeal are that, the respondent/accused No.1 - Deepakkumar was the husband of the deceased – Hemu. Both had married 10 months before the alleged incident. The respondent/accused No.2 – Chhanabhai was the father of the respondent No.1. The respondent/accused No.3 – Jashvantbhai Mangubhai Pardiwala is brother-in-law of the respondent No.1 and the respondent/accused No.4 – Veenaben Pravinchandra Retiwala is the maternal aunt-in-law of the deceased Hemu. It was alleged in the complaint inter alia, that all the respondents – accused used to make demand of TV, Fridge and cash from the deceased daughter of the complainant, and used to harass the deceased Hemu for the dowry. It was also alleged that in collusion with each other, the daughter of the complainant was done to death by the respondents by applying pressure on her mouth and nostrils, and thereafter she was hanged. 3.1 The complaint was lodged in the Athwalines Police Station, Surat vide I-C.R. No.111 of 1992. The Investigating Officer, after carrying out investigation and collecting sufficient evidence against the respondents – accused had laid the charge-sheet in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Surat where the case was registered as Criminal Case No.5981 of 1992. The case being triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Sessions Court under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., and it was registered as the Sessions Case No.142 of 1992. 3.2 The Sessions Court had framed the charge against all the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B, 498A read with Section 114 of the IPC. 3.2 The Sessions Court had framed the charge against all the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B, 498A read with Section 114 of the IPC. The respondents – accused having denied the charges levelled against them, the trial was conducted by the Sessions Court. The prosecution, to prove the guilt of the accused, had examined as many as 13 witnesses, and had also produced several documentary evidence. After the evidence of the prosecution was over, the further statements of all the respondents - accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., wherein they had denied the allegations levelled against them and further stated that the deceased Hemu had committed suicide as she could not adjust with the respondent – accused No.1. The Sessions Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, has acquitted all the respondents – accused from the alleged charges vide impugned judgement and order. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant – State of Gujarat has filed the present appeal. 4. Heard Ms. Maithili D. Mehta, learned APP for the appellant, Mr. K.B. Anandjiwala, learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Vishal K. Anandjiwala, learned advocate for the respondent No.1, Ms. Kruti M. Shah, learned advocate for the respondents Nos.3 and 4. 4.1 PW-1 – Narsibhai (complainant) in his deposition at Exh.-15 inter alia, stated that his daughter was married to the respondent No.1 - Deepak and they were residing with Pravinbhai - maternal uncle of the respondent No.1 at Nanpura, Surat, which was 150 feet away from the house of the complainant. He has stated that after three months of their marriage, his deceased daughter – Hemu had visited her parental house and told him that her husband – Deepak had demanded one gold chain and wrist watch and that she was beaten for the said demand. The complainant anyhow managed for gold chain and wrist watch for his son-in-law. After about one and a half month, his daughter-Hemu had again visited his house and told him that her husband - Deepak and her maternal auntie-in-law - Veenaben (respondent No.4 herein) were demanding a T.V. and a Fridge as dowry. She was also taunted and beaten for the said dowry. But the complainant assured her daughter that he would arrange money from his business and fulfill their demand of a T.V. and a Fridge. She was also taunted and beaten for the said dowry. But the complainant assured her daughter that he would arrange money from his business and fulfill their demand of a T.V. and a Fridge. Again after one and a half months, his daughter – Hemu had come to him and told him that her husband – Deepak is now demanding Rs.1 Lac to buy a Truck. At that time also she was beaten by her husband and respondent No.4 – Veenaben, but the complainant had told her that he was not able to arrange such a big amount, and he sent her back to her matrimonial house. Thereafter, 3-4 days before the alleged incident, her daughter – Hemu had again visited him and told him that the old wall clock, which was given to her in dowry, was broken and therefore, new wall clock may be given to her. His daughter had repeatedly complained him about the mental and physical torture committed on her by the respondent No.1 and 4. As regards the incident in question, he further stated that on the date of incident i.e. on 13.03.1992, when he was at the office of his nephew – Mansukhbhai, his nephew asked him to go home as his daughter was lying in the house of Thakorebhai and was not speaking anything. When he reached there, his elder son – Jitendra informed him that the respondents had killed Hemu and created a show as if she had committed suicide by hanging herself. Thereafter, she was taken to the Mission Hospital, where she was declared dead. He had seen fresh abrasions on the mouth, over the right eye and on the right hand of his daughter. He had, therefore, filed complaint before the Athwalines Police Station at about 8.00 p.m. in the evening on the day of incident. In the cross-examination, he admitted that when he reached home at about 4.30 p.m., Thakorebhai, his wife and his children were present and Jitu had informed him that Hemu was killed. He had not discussed this information with his family members or with anybody. He admitted that he could reach Athwalines Police Station within 3 – 4 minutes on his scooter and Nanpura Police Chowki within 2 minutes. He had not discussed this information with his family members or with anybody. He admitted that he could reach Athwalines Police Station within 3 – 4 minutes on his scooter and Nanpura Police Chowki within 2 minutes. He has stated that he had waited for one and half hour for the PSI to arrive and after the PSI had come, his complaint was taken. The inquest was carried out at his house. He had not met the parents of the respondent No.1 after his daughter’s marriage. He had not complained to anybody that his daughter was beaten by the respondents Nos.1 and 4 and she was not taken to doctor. He had not told anybody about the dowry demanded by he respondent No.1. He has denied that he had not given any wall-clock to his daughter. He has stated that when her daughter complained about her harassment on 11.03.1992 his wife was present. But, he had not thought it fit to file a complaint before the police. He had not stated in his complaint that his daughter was taunted for TV and Fridge. The PSI had informed him that Ishwarbhai had also given complaint. He has denied that his daughter was not ready to marry respondent No.1. The parents of the respondent No.1 were the residents of Navsari and they were residing at Navsari. He has admitted that before the death of his daughter, he had not complained to anyone. 4.2 PW-2 – Jamnaben, the mother of the deceased Hemu, examined at Exh.-17 had identified the clothes and ornaments of her deceased daughter – Hemu. She had stated that she had two daughters and both the daughters were given dowry as per the custom of their caste. According to her the respondent No.1 used to reside with his maternal uncle from his childhood. The parents of the respondent No.1 had attended marriage. The respondent No.1 used to visit their house once or twice in a week with her deceased daughter. She has totally supported the case of the complainant and narrated the same facts. Her daughter had told her not to talk about her harassment to anybody and therefore, she had not told anything to the respondent No.1 or anybody about the harassment to her daughter. She had neither visited business place of his father nor Ishwarbhai for the harassment of her daughter. Her daughter had told her not to talk about her harassment to anybody and therefore, she had not told anything to the respondent No.1 or anybody about the harassment to her daughter. She had neither visited business place of his father nor Ishwarbhai for the harassment of her daughter. In her cross-examination she has stated that she did not know whether there were a TV and a Fridge in the house of Pravinbhai (husband of respondent No.4 herein). She denied that one or two days after the marriage, her daughter had not consumed “baygon”. She had seen her daughter before two days of the incident. She was cross-examined at length but nothing material has surfaced. 4.3 PW-3 – Jitendrakumar, was the brother of the deceased Hemu. According to his deposition, when he was at his house on the day of incident, at about 4 o’clock in the evening, two children came to his house and informed him that her sister Hemu had hanged herself. He immediately rushed to Pravinbhai’s house, where his sister Hemu was residing with the respondent No.1. When he reached Hemu’s bed-room, he saw Ishwarbhai Pravinbhai, Chhanabhai, Jashwant Mechanic, Gulab Borsalliwala, Pravinbhai’s brother – Suresh, all were present there. His sister-Hemu was lying on the bed. Chhanabhai was checking her pulse; he could not understand, whether Jashwantbhai and Pravinbhai were tying or untying the dupatta from the fan. He had asked Ishwarbhai to call doctor but he had not given any response. Thereafter, Raju, Vinod and Pushpa had also arrived at Pravinbhai’s house and they altogether took Hemu to the Mission Hospital in auto-rickshaw. Nobody had accompanied them from the side of in-laws of her sister-Hemu. His sister-Hemu was declared dead by the doctor of the Mission Hospital. He had seen injury marks of nail on the face and right hand of his deceased sister. According to him, the injury marks were fresh. After marriage, his sister Hemu used to visit his house once or twice in a week. His sister used to complain that the respondents Nos.1 and 4 and her in-laws were demanding a TV, a Fridge and one lac rupees as dowry and she was also being taunted and beaten by them. The respondent No.1 had also demanded gold chain, wrist-watch and wall-clock, which were given to him. Before 3 to 4 days of the incident, his sister was beaten and harassed for dowry. The respondent No.1 had also demanded gold chain, wrist-watch and wall-clock, which were given to him. Before 3 to 4 days of the incident, his sister was beaten and harassed for dowry. In his cross-examination he has admitted that his father had not informed him that he was going to file the complaint. 4.4 PW-4 – Rahimabibi – a panch witness, was the neighbour of the deceased Hemu. She has given her deposition at Exh.-21. She has stated in her deposition that she had seen some abrasions on the face, over the right eye and right hand of the deceased. She could not remember whether the police had taken measurement of the neck and the length of the body of the deceased or not. 4.5 PW-5 – Dineshbhai, was also a panch witness. He has given his deposition at Exh.-22. He has also supported the case of the prosecution. 4.6 PW-6 – Mohanbhai, was the Medical Officer of Old Civil Hospital at Surat, who had examined the respondent No.1, his deposition is at Exh.-25. He has stated that when he asked the respondent No.1, the respondent No.1 had stated that his wife had assaulted him 2 days before the date of incident. The doctor had found abrasions on both the hands of the Respondent No.1. According to his opinion, these injuries could be inflicted with nail and hands. He has produced the injury certificate at Exh.-26. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that in his certificate, he had not stated who had given the history. He had recorded the history of the patient, the police were not present in the room but they were outside the room. According to him, if someone rubs his hands on an uneven surface, he could sustain such injuries. If someone is beaten by the police and he tries to defend himself by raising his hands before his body, such type of injuries are possible. The injury marks were not forming half-circle. If someone falls down accidentally and he is pushed on land, he could sustain such types of injuries. The police had not given the history about the injuries. The police had not suggested about how the injuries were sustained. In his opinion such types of injuries could be inflicted with nail and hands. He could not recognize the patient. The injury certificate is produced at Exh.-26 while Yadi is produced at Exh.-27. The police had not given the history about the injuries. The police had not suggested about how the injuries were sustained. In his opinion such types of injuries could be inflicted with nail and hands. He could not recognize the patient. The injury certificate is produced at Exh.-26 while Yadi is produced at Exh.-27. 4.7 PW-7 – Nasiruddin (Exh.-28) and PW-8 – Mohammad Rafiq (Exh.-29), were the panch witnesses who had turned hostile. 4.8 PW-9 – Rajnikant, was a gold-smith, who had weighed the ornaments. He deposed at Exh.-30 supporting the case of the prosecution. 4.9 PW-10 – Ramdev, was a Police Inspector of Athwalines Police Station, who had recorded statements of the witnesses and prepared panchnama and arrested the accused – Deepakkumar. He had written a Yaadi to the City Mamlatdar to prepare map of the place of incident. He had identified his signature on the complaint. He had found injuries on the hands and face of the respondent No.1. He had also prepared inquest panchnama of the victim. In his cross-examination he admitted that he had not inquired from any person residing near the place of incident that there was any quarrel going on between the deceased and the accused - respondent No.1 herein for dowry. He has denied that in the opinion of the doctor, the deceased had committed suicide. 4.10 PW-11 (Exh.-39) – Bhataram, was a doctor, who had performed the post-mortem of the victim. He had found linear scratch on the outer neck of the deceased. He had also found scratch marks on the left cheek of the deceased. In his opinion, the cause of death was asphyxia due to pressure on mouth and nostrils followed by hanging. He had also found bruises, abrasions and scratches on the mouth and hands of the deceased. In his cross-examination he admitted that due to nose-ring there could be injury on the nostril. He also admitted that if someone broke open the glass window and pieces of glass fell on the body, the injuries stated in the column no.17 were possible and that if someone pressed his lips with his teeth, then also such injuries were possible. He also admitted that if a person was hanged and somebody tried to bring him down, then also such injuries were possible. However, he denied that such injuries might be self-inflicted injuries. He also admitted that if a person was hanged and somebody tried to bring him down, then also such injuries were possible. However, he denied that such injuries might be self-inflicted injuries. He admitted that the ligature marks were anti-mortem and the ligature marks were followed by hanging. Ordinarily, hanging is of a suicidal nature. He has agreed that homicidal hanging is found in rare cases. He had not taken nail clippings of the deceased. From the nail clippings, the evidence about the blood and pieces of flesh could be collected, but in the present case, there was no such evidence. If a person applies pressure on mouth and nose, then the person on whom such pressure is applied may get exhausted. The resistance of victim would depend on the situation of the person on whom the pressure is applied. If more pressure is applied then the finger-prints could be found on the face and the abrasion marks would be on the back side of the neck. It is not necessary that the back side of neck and scull would sustain injuries in many cases. He has admitted that he has not stated the location of injury No.10. According to his opinion if a person could not breath for five minutes, he would die. If someone hangs himself, he would survive for some time. If someone is killed after applying pressure on the neck and thereafter he is hanged, such type of hanging is called post-mortem hanging and in such cases, ligature marks be considered as a post-mortem marks. The injury No.6 in column No.17 is possible due to the knot of dupatta. The injury on the lips was inflicted before 48 hours. According to him while cleaning nose, the injury No.1 was possible. According to his opinion whether the injuries are anti-mortem or post-mortem can be decided only on the basis of edge and bleeding of the injuries and no microscopic examination is required. Microscopic examination of victim was not carried out. He had not performed biochemistry histochemistry test. He had not mentioned age of injuries, bleeding, swelling, clotting of blood, etc. in the post-mortem note. The abrasions could be caused by biting insects or ants. He agreed with the opinion of Dr. Microscopic examination of victim was not carried out. He had not performed biochemistry histochemistry test. He had not mentioned age of injuries, bleeding, swelling, clotting of blood, etc. in the post-mortem note. The abrasions could be caused by biting insects or ants. He agreed with the opinion of Dr. K.S. Narayan Reddy who had opined in his 11th Edition of “The Irential of Forensic Medicines and Toxicology” that “Abrasions produced slightly before or after death cannot be distinguished even by a microscopic examination.” He did not agree with Modi’s jurisprudence, wherein it is stated that “it must be remembered that ants sometimes attack a dead body lying on the ground, and produce marks which stimulate anti-mortem abrasions.” The injuries shown in the certificate at Exh.-26 could be caused if the hands of the person are tied with a rope. Ordinarily, the person who wants to commit suicide, would select a lonely place and he would try to hand himself with anything that is available to him at that time. If there are variations in the menstruation cycle of a female, she might think of committing suicide. In a young women, there are more chances of variations in her menstruation cycle. In some cases, if a person has hanged himself, the dead body would lie in the opposite direction of the knot. If someone hangs himself, then there is much pressure on the salival lane. He has not agreed that due to such pressure more saliva would come out from the mouth. He has stated that it is not necessary to look into the type of note before giving any opinion about the ligature marks. 4.11 PW-12 – Vishwas Rao was the PSI in charge of Athwalines Police Station on the date of incident and before whom Ishwarbhai Chhanabhai had declared about death of the deceased – Hemu. He had made entry in the accidental death Register. He had visited the place of incident and prepared the panchnama of the place of incident. He had also recorded complaint of the father of the deceased – Hemu and had also signed the complaint. In his cross-examination he had admitted that when he visited the place of incident, he had not asked about the parents of the deceased and at that time, no one had complained that the deceased had been murdered because of dowry. He had also recorded complaint of the father of the deceased – Hemu and had also signed the complaint. In his cross-examination he had admitted that when he visited the place of incident, he had not asked about the parents of the deceased and at that time, no one had complained that the deceased had been murdered because of dowry. If someone had complained, he would have written it. No one had complained that the deceased was killed for dowry. The complaint was completed at about 11.30 p.m. He admitted that when he was at the place of incident, neither Narsibhai nor his wife or any of his sons Jitu or Rajesh had contacted him. He did not know whether other police persons had asked anything to Narsibhai or his family members. At the time of inquest, the dead-body was recognized by the mother and brothers of the deceased. When he was inquiring about accidental death, he had visited Narsibhai’s house and had inquired Jamnaben about the incident. At the time of inquest, he had also inquired Jitu, Rajesh and others but no one had told him that the deceased – Hemu was murdered due to dowry. He stated that at about 00.00 hours P.I. Odedra had taken over inquiry from him and thereafter, he had not done any inquiry. He had collected pieces of glass as well as cement stones and dupatta from the place of incident. He had not inquired about how the abrasions appeared on the dead-body. When he had prepared the inquest panchnama, there were 25 persons in the room. He had not asked anybody as to who was the father of the deceased. The complainant Narsibhai had not stated in his complaint that the abrasions on the dead-body were fresh. 5. At the time of arguments, Ms. Maithili Mehta, learned APP, appearing on behalf of the appellant – State of Gujarat, has contended that PW-1 i.e. the complainant Narsibhai has clearly stated that there was demand of dowry. She has contended that the trial court has failed to see that there were injuries on the person of the deceased, which clearly ruled out the possibility of committing suicide. The trial court has also failed to appreciate the medical evidence and come to conclusion that the accused had first strangled the deceased and thereafter made a show that the deceased had committed suicide by hanging herself. The trial court has also failed to appreciate the medical evidence and come to conclusion that the accused had first strangled the deceased and thereafter made a show that the deceased had committed suicide by hanging herself. The trial court has wrongly brushed aside the medical evidence of the post-mortem note on the ground that some of the injuries were not found at the time of inquest. It is contended that as per the opinion of the medical officer, because of applying pressure on the mouth and nostrils, the injuries were found on the body of the victim and this evidence suggested that the deceased could not have hanged herself. It is contended that the trial court has seriously erred in not believing the evidence of the prosecution witness as to demand of dowry. The trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witness on this aspect. It is contended that the trial court has brushed aside the evidence of demand of dowry and ill treatment on the ground that it was not disclosed to the police immediately at the time of inquest. It is contended that the incident had taken place at 4.30 p.m., the inquest was completed at 8.45 a.m. and the complaint was filed at 11.35 p.m. at night hours. Thus, there was no delay in filing the complaint. Further, the complainant was a layman and when the police was performing its duty, he may not think it fit to complain about the ill treatment on account of demand of dowry. It is contended that the trial court has failed to consider the fact that the complaint was filed within six hours of the alleged incident. The trial court has failed to consider that the daughter of the complainant had died within a short span of 10 months of her marriage life and therefore, the complainant must be in a great shock. The trial court has erred in coming to the conclusion that the independent witnesses are not examined by the prosecution to prove ill treatment and taunting to the deceased for dowry. The trial court has failed to consider that torture and taunting takes place inside the house and neighbours may not be aware of such incident. The trial court has erred in coming to the conclusion that the independent witnesses are not examined by the prosecution to prove ill treatment and taunting to the deceased for dowry. The trial court has failed to consider that torture and taunting takes place inside the house and neighbours may not be aware of such incident. The trial court totally ignored the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act read with Section 304-B of the IPC as the death had taken place within 7 years of the marriage life. The trial court wrongly concluded that there was no evidence connecting the accused with the alleged offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It is contended that the order of acquittal is even otherwise erroneous, improper and illegal and therefore, the same may be quashed and set aside and the accused be convicted for the offence for which they were charged. She has relied upon various judgements of the Supreme Court to buttress her submissions, which shall be dealt with hereinafter at appropriate stage. 6. On the other hand, the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has contended that there was a delay in filing the complaint. Pointing out the discrepancies, it was contended that only 5 injuries were described in the inquest, while in the post-mortem report, there were 10 injuries on the person of the deceased. It is contended that the history written by the doctor treating the accused is not admissible in evidence. It is contended that the doctor might have written the history from the policed Yaadi. It is contended that though the complainant and the deceased were residing nearby to the police station, there was no previous complaint about dowry. It is contended that a TV and a Fridge were already there in the house of respondent No.1 – Deepak (husband of the deceased) and therefore, there cannot be any demand of a TV and a Fridge. It is contended that the respondent No.1 had tried to save the deceased by breaking the glass of the window and he himself had sustained injuries. It is contended that the trial court has rightly acquitted the respondents – accused from the charges levelled against them and therefore, the judgement and order of the trial court does not require any interference. 7. It is contended that the trial court has rightly acquitted the respondents – accused from the charges levelled against them and therefore, the judgement and order of the trial court does not require any interference. 7. It cannot be gainsaid that the judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. The Apex Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Of course, wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate Court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for. In the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Home Department v. Abdul Mannan [ (2011) 8 SCC 65 ], the limitation upon the powers of the appellate Court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal and reverse the same is elaborately discussed. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under : "12. As is evident from the above recorded findings, the judgment of conviction was converted to a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. Thus, the first and foremost question that we need to consider is, in what circumstances this Court should interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Against an order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is maintainable to this Court only with the leave of the Court. Thus, the first and foremost question that we need to consider is, in what circumstances this Court should interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Against an order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is maintainable to this Court only with the leave of the Court. On the contrary, if the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is set aside by the High Court, and the accused is sentenced to death, or life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than 10 years, then the right of appeal of the accused is treated as an absolute right subject to the provisions of Articles 134(1)(a) and 134(1)(b) of the Constitution of India and Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In light of this, it is obvious that an appeal against acquittal is considered on slightly different parameters compared to an ordinary appeal preferred to this Court. 13. When an accused is acquitted of a criminal charge, a right vests in him to be a free citizen and this Court is very cautious in taking away that right. The presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the fact of acquittal of the accused under our criminal jurisprudence. The Courts have held that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, then the one favourable to the accused, may be adopted by the Court. However, this principle must be applied keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a case and the thumb rule is that whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has succeeded in discharging its onus, and the error in appreciation of evidence is apparent on the face of the record then the Court can interfere in the judgment of acquittal to ensure that the ends of justice are met. This is the linchpin around which the administration of criminal justice revolves. 14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. This is the linchpin around which the administration of criminal justice revolves. 14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial are twin safeguards available to the accused under our criminal justice system but once the prosecution has proved its case and the evidence led by the prosecution, in conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to have occurred, if, points irresistibly to the conclusion that the accused is guilty then the Court can interfere even with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of acquittal might be based upon misappreciation of evidence or apparent violation of settled canons of criminal jurisprudence. 15. We may now refer to some judgments of this Court on this issue. In State of M.P. v. Bacchudas, the Court was concerned with a case where the accused had been found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC by the trial Court; but had been acquitted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was dismissed by this Court, stating that the Supreme Court's interference was called for only when there were substantial and compelling reasons for doing so. After referring to earlier judgments, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 138-39, paras 9-10) "9. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, State of Punjab v.Karnail Singh, State of Punjab v. Phola Singh, Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. 10. When the conclusions of the High Court in the background of the evidence on record are tested on the touchstone of the principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference." 16. In a very recent judgment, a Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. C. P. Rao decided on 16-5-2011, discussed the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal and while reiterating the view of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Court held as under: "13. In coming to this conclusion, we are reminded of the well-settled principle that when the Court has to exercise its discretion in an appeal arising against an order of acquittal, the Court must remember that the innocence of the accused is further re-established by the judgment of acquittal rendered by the High Court. In coming to this conclusion, we are reminded of the well-settled principle that when the Court has to exercise its discretion in an appeal arising against an order of acquittal, the Court must remember that the innocence of the accused is further re-established by the judgment of acquittal rendered by the High Court. Against such decision of the High Court, the scope of interference by this Court in an order of acquittal has been very succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 212. At SCR p. 129, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) culled out the principles as follows: 9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate Court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as (i) "substantial and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons", and (iii) "strong reasons", are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the Court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified'." 17. Reference can also be usefully made to the judgment of this Court in Suman Sood v. State of Rajasthan, where this Court reiterated with approval the principles stated by the Court in earlier cases, particularly. Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka. Emphasising that expressions like "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, the Court stated that such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with the acquittal. are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal, the Court stated that such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with the acquittal. Thus, where it is possible to take only one view i.e. the prosecution evidence points to the guilt of the accused and the judgment is on the face of it perverse, then the Court may interfere with an order of acquittal." 8. Now we proceed to consider the question regarding homicidal death or suicidal death from altogether a different perspective. For the time being, we proceed on the footing that the case in hand is one of homicidal death. To put it in other words, for the time being, we proceed on the footing, as alleged by the prosecution, that the accused appellants strangulated the deceased to death with a Dupatta and thereby they committed the murder of the deceased. The question, which we pose in this regard, is what is the evidence on record to indicate that the accused appellants strangulated the deceased to death? Even if we believe the presence of all the appellants in the house on the fateful day of the incident, the same, by itself, would not be sufficient to draw an inference that they altogether killed the deceased. In our opinion, there is no evidence worth the name in this regard. 9. At the time of arguments, learned APP Ms. Mehta, has relied on the judgement of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mavjibhai Ramjibhai Taviyad vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2013 (0) GLHEL-HC 229029, wherein, the dead-body of the deceased wife was found hanging in the house of the appellant and in the said case the Court has held that it was not the case of suicide but, it was a case of murder. The Court has relied on the injury marks stated in paragraph 8.1, which reads as under : “It may be conspicuously noticed that symptoms like congested face, bleeding from ear, horizontal ligature mark in continuous round around neck, abrasions on the neck around ligature mark, fracture of hyoid bone, dislocation of cervical vertebrate, etc. are noticed.” 10. The Court has relied on the injury marks stated in paragraph 8.1, which reads as under : “It may be conspicuously noticed that symptoms like congested face, bleeding from ear, horizontal ligature mark in continuous round around neck, abrasions on the neck around ligature mark, fracture of hyoid bone, dislocation of cervical vertebrate, etc. are noticed.” 10. She has also relied on the judgement of Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in the case of Amar Iqbal Singh vs. State of Punjab decided on 3rd March, 2009 in Criminal Appeal No.684-SB of 1996, wherein also, the court has held that it was not the case of hanging but, it was a murder. In the said case, it was observed as under : “Therefore, presence of ligature mark on the front of neck at the level of thyroid cartilage will rule out hanging in the instant case.” 11. But in the case on hand, the PW-11 – Dr. Bhataram who had carried out the post-mortem had recorded that the cause of death was asphyxia due to pressure on mouth and nostrils followed by hanging and that hanging ordinarily is of suicidal nature, and that homicidal hanging is found in rare cases. At the same time, he had denied the suggestion that the injuries mentioned in the column no.17 of the P.M. note were self-inflicted injuries. 12. The learned APP to emphasis her contention that the deceased could not have committed suicide has also taken us through the Panchnama of the scene of offence and submitted about the measurement of the body and height of the roof and contended that the end of the dupatta was about 58.5 inches from the floor of the room. Further, she has taken us to the inquest panchnama and according to the length of the dead-body from the toe to neck was 56 inches and contended that it was not possible for the deceased to hang in a room with such a small height and therefore, it was not the case of hanging but, it was a case of murder. 13. Now, having regard to the submissions made by the learned APP in the light of the medical evidence, we find it difficult to accept her contention that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was murdered. 13. Now, having regard to the submissions made by the learned APP in the light of the medical evidence, we find it difficult to accept her contention that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was murdered. It may be noted that there is no explanation offered by the prosecution about discrepancies in the injuries found in post-mortem note and in the inquest panchnama. There is no evidence, much less cogent evidence to show that the respondents had killed the deceased – Hemu. In any case, even if we give the benefit of the above mentioned doubt to the respondents that she was not murdered and that she had committed suicide, then also the respondents cannot escape from the charge under section 304B, IPC which creates a legal fiction. In our considered opinion, all the ingredients of section 304B are satisfied in the instant case, inasmuch as the death of Hemu had occurred within seven years of her marriage; the death had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances and the deceased Hemu was subjected to harassment which amounted to cruelty within the meaning of section 498A, IPC. For ready reference, Section 304- B of the Indian Penal Code is reproduced which reads as under:- "304- B. Dowry death.- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub- section, 7 "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 14. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub- section, 7 "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 14. A legal fiction has been created in the said provision to the effect that in the event it is established that "soon before the death", the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relative; for or in connection with any demand of dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. The Parliament has also inserted Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act by Act No.43 of 1986 with effect from 1.5.1986 which reads as under :- "113-B- Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, "dowry death", shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 15. From a conjoint reading of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, it will be apparent that a presumption arising thereunder will operate if the prosecution is able to establish the circumstances as set out in Section 304- B of the Indian Penal Code. It will be appropriate to take note of what is meant by expression "Dowry". It will be appropriate to take note of what is meant by expression "Dowry". The definition of "Dowry" under Dowry Prohibition Act is as follows:- "In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - - (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before [or any time after the marriage] [in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II - The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)". 16. One another provision which is relevant in this context is sec. 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under : "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty Whoever being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation : For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or any person related to her to meet such demand." 17. A careful analysis of sec. 304-B shows that this section has the following essentials : "(1) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (2) Such death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry." 18. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act lays down that if soon before the death such woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry, then the Court shall presume that such person has committed the dowry death. The meaning of "cruelty" for the purposes of these sections has to be gathered from the language as found in sec. 498-A and as per that section "cruelty" means "any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life etc. or harassment to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." As per the definition of "dowry" any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either at or before or any time after the marriage, comes within the meaning of "dowry". 19. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Jagjit Singh Versus State Of Punjab [ AIR 2018 SC 5719 ], wherein, in paragraph 15, it was held as under : “15. We need only to advert to a recent judgment rendered by a Bench consisting of three learned Judges in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2015 (6) SCC 477 only for the purpose of appreciating the words “soon before” occurring in Section 304-B IPC. This is what the Court has to see “24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304-B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.” [Emphasis supplied] 20. Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304-B.” [Emphasis supplied] 20. It may not be out of place to mention that "dowry" which is a deep-rooted social evil appears to be the cause of so many unfortunate deaths of young ladies. It is an offence brutal and barbaric. It is generally committed inside the house and more often with a circumstance to give an impression that it was a suicidal death. There will be all round attempt to cover up such offence by the family members rather than to expose it. The government has come forward with legislations from time to time to protect women and to punish those who commit atrocities on them. In 1961 the Dowry Prohibition Act (Act 28 of 1961 was passed prohibiting the taking or giving of dowry. By the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983 Ch. XX-A was introduced in the Penal Code with sec. 498-A creating a new offence of cruelty. It provides for punishment to husband or his relatives if they harass a woman with a view to coerce her to meet any unlawful demand for property. sec. 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code was also amended to secure post-mortem in case of suicide or death of a woman within seven years of her marriage. sec. 113-A has been introduced in the Evidence Act, 1872 raising presumption of cruelty as defined u/s. 498-A Indian Penal Code against the husband or his relative if the wife commits suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. These provisions reflect the anxiety of the representatives of our people to deal firmly with the menace of dowry deaths. Again, there are sweeping changes made in the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act. 1984. A new offence called 'Dowry death has been created by introducing sec. 304-B in the Penal Code. It raised presumption of culpability against the husband or relative hitherto unknown to our jurisprudence. Again, there are sweeping changes made in the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act. 1984. A new offence called 'Dowry death has been created by introducing sec. 304-B in the Penal Code. It raised presumption of culpability against the husband or relative hitherto unknown to our jurisprudence. It provides that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death'. 21. In Alamgir Sani v. State of Assam reported in AIR 2003 SC 2108 , one of the issues that came up for consideration before the Supreme Court on acquittal under Section 302 of IPC, was whether on account of acquittal under Section 302 of IPC, the accused could claim acquittal under Section 304B of IPC. It was clarified by the Court that the acquittal under Section 302 of IPC, will not lead to automatic acquittal under Section 304B of IPC. Even if an accused is acquitted under Section 302 of IPC, if there is evidence available so as to satisfy the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC, the accused can still be convicted under Section 304B of IPC, in case there is no rebuttal of presumption on the death as caused by the accused. To quote: "15. We also see no substance in the submission that merely because the appellant had been acquitted under Section 302, IPC, the presumption under Section 113- B of the Evidence Act stands automatically rebutted. The death having taken place within seven years of the marriage and there being sufficient evidence of demand of dowry, the presumption under Section 113- B of the Evidence Act gets invoked. There is no evidence in rebuttal." 22. So far as the present case is concerned, the trial court has failed to appreciate the deposition of PW-1 – the complainant, wherein he had clearly stated that the respondent No.1 – Deepak, husband of his deceased daughter-Hemu, had demanded one gold chain and wrist watch from the deceased and she was beaten for the said demand. So far as the present case is concerned, the trial court has failed to appreciate the deposition of PW-1 – the complainant, wherein he had clearly stated that the respondent No.1 – Deepak, husband of his deceased daughter-Hemu, had demanded one gold chain and wrist watch from the deceased and she was beaten for the said demand. He had also stated that the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.4 – Veenaben, maternal aunt-in-law of the deceased, were demanding T.V. and a fridge as dowry. She was also taunted and beaten for the said dowry. The complainant had further stated that the respondent No.1 husband had demanded Rs.1 Lac to buy a truck and she was also beaten by the respondent Nos.1 and 4. The complainant had stated that his daughter had repeatedly complained him about mental and physical torture committed on her by the respondent Nos.1 and 4. PW-2, who is the mother of the deceased, had also totally supported the deposition of PW-1 – the complainant. It is needless to say that Section 113-B of the Evidence Act lays that a presumption should be drawn on a dowry death, if there was any demand of dowry and the woman is subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry. Thus, this evidence is sufficient to invoke the presumption against the respondent Nos.1 and 4. The trial court has recorded thoroughly pervert finding misappreciating the evidence on record to the effect that the said evidence of harassment and cruelty against the respondent Nos.1 and 4 was required to be discarded as the complainant had not lodged any complaint in that regard. The view taken by the trial court cannot be said to be a correct view in a matrimonial dispute. There is a tendency of the parties to first resolve the dispute amicably and it would be a last stage to make a complaint to the police prior to incident. Otherwise, it would ruin the cordial relationship between two families. The trial court has miserably failed to appreciate this very vital social issue. 23. It is needless to say that there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. This presumption is rebuttable. Of course, when the accused has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. As held by the Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. 23. It is needless to say that there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. This presumption is rebuttable. Of course, when the accused has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. As held by the Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. Srimohan [2010] 11 SCC 441, in absence of compelling justifications reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden not a persuasive burden. When an accused has to rebut presumption under Section 113-B, the standard of proof for doing so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of harassment to the victim, the prosecution can fail. The accused in this regard can rely on the material submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and the accused may not lead to adduce evidence by his own. However, in the case on hand, there was no evidence adduced by the accused in rebuttal nor the accused had relied upon the evidence of the prosecution, to create a doubt in the versions stated by the prosecution witnesses. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the defence has failed to rebut the evidence adduced by the prosecution, as also failed to rebut the presumption available to the prosecution under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, read with Section 304B of the IPC. 24. In the aforesaid premises, the respondent Nos.1 and 4 - the husband and the maternal aunt-in-law of the deceased cannot escape from the clutches of Section 304B and Section 498A of the IPC. The deceased had committed suicide at her matrimonial home. There has got to be some reason for the deceased to commit suicide within ten months from the date of marriage. The concerned respondents - the husband and the maternal aunt-in-law were the best persons who could have explained as to in what circumstances the deceased took the extreme step of committing suicide. If the deceased had any problems relating to her health and was fed up with life, then the same could have been pointed by the husband and the maternal aunt-in-law with whom the deceased was residing. If the deceased had any problems relating to her health and was fed up with life, then the same could have been pointed by the husband and the maternal aunt-in-law with whom the deceased was residing. The silence of the husband and maternal auntie-in-law fortifies the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act read with the deeming provision contained in Section 304B of the IPC. The respondents – accused had also failed to explain the incriminating material brought to their notice while recording their further statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The twin objects of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. are to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating material which have surfaced on record and to elicit the truth. It is true that the conviction cannot be based on the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 and the prosecution has to prove all the circumstances independently beyond reasonable doubt, nonetheless non-explanation by the accused of the material circumstances which are within their special knowledge would be a factor relevant while weighing the entire evidence in toto. 25. We are also conscious of the fact that there has been a considerable delay in hearing the present appeal, however, a delay in hearing the appeal could not be a ground to acquit the accused as held by the Supreme Court in case of Shyam Babu Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2012 SC 3311 . Now, it is also well settled that the exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts. The paramount consideration of the court should be to avoid miscarriage of justice, which may arise by acquitting the guilty. 26. For the reasons recorded above, the present appeal deserves to be partly allowed and is accordingly partly allowed qua the respondent Nos.1 and 4. The impugned judgement and order dated 17.05.1994, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, in the Sessions Case No.142 of 1992 is quashed and set aside. The acquittal of the respondent/accused No.1 - Deepakkumar and respondent/accused No.4 - Veenaben Pravinchandra Retiwala, is set aside. Both of them are convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 498A read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and we propose to impose minimum sentence. The acquittal of the respondent/accused No.1 - Deepakkumar and respondent/accused No.4 - Veenaben Pravinchandra Retiwala, is set aside. Both of them are convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 498A read with section 114 of the Indian Penal Code and we propose to impose minimum sentence. As held recently by the Supreme Court in AIR 2019 SC 3031 Accused x Versus State of Maharashtra, in case the minimum sentence is proposed to be imposed upon the accused, the question of providing an opportunity under Section 235(2) would not arise. (See Tarlok Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 3 SCC 218 ; Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam, (2001) 5 SCC 714 ). The respondent Nos.1 and 4 are hereby sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 7 years for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC. They are also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and pay fine of Rs.5000/- EACH and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment of two months. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. No separate punishment is imposed for the offence punishable under Section 114 of the IPC. They shall surrender before the Sessions Court, Surat on or before 14/09/2020. 26.1 So far as the respondent/accused No.3 – Jashvantbhai Mangubhai Pardiwala is concerned, the present appeal stands dismissed qua him and the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court, Surat is hereby confirmed. The Registry is directed to provide certified copy at the earliest.