JUDGMENT Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. - Three ladies are claiming themselves to be the legally wedded wives of late Sh. Prem Chand and therefore entitled to his service benefits. Suit filed by one of them and opposed by the other two, has been decreed by the learned Trial Court. This decree has been affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court. Aggrieved, the other two ladies are before this Court by way of second appeal and cross objections. 2. The second appeal and the cross objections were admitted on 18.4.2013 on following substantial questions of law:- "1. Whether the Courts below have misconstrued and misinterpreted the pleadings and evidence in holding that plaintiff No.1 is the legally wedded wife of deceased Prem Chand and plaintiffs No.2 and 3 are the children of plaintiff No.1 from deceased Prem Chand? 2. Whether the Courts below have misconstrued and misinterpreted the pleadings and evidence in holding that the defendant No.3 and defendant No.7 are not wife(s) of deceased Prem Chand and defendants No.4, 5 and 6 are not children of Prem Chand?" The parties hereinafter are being referred to as they were before the learned Trial Court. 3. Since both the questions of law are essentially based on pleadings & evidence led by the parties, therefore, the same is being discussed hereinafter:- 3(i) It was asserted in the plaint that late Sh. Prem Chand s/o Sh. Gurdass was husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiffs No.2 and 3. He, while serving as Chowkidar under defendants No.1 & 2 at IPH Division Padhar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh died on 21.10.2005. Plaintiffs thereafter requested his employer for release of service benefits including gratuity, pension etc. in their favour being his only legal representatives. The employer directed them to produce his succession certificate from the competent court of law. Plaintiffs on 14.12.2005, applied for grant of succession certificate under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act before learned Civil Judge, Senior Division Mandi. Their prayer was opposed by defendants No.3 to 7, who also claimed themselves to be the legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. In view of objections of defendants No.3 to 7, plaintiffs did not pursue the matter further as the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division directed them to file civil suit for declaration in the competent Court of law. Their prayer was opposed by defendants No.3 to 7, who also claimed themselves to be the legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. In view of objections of defendants No.3 to 7, plaintiffs did not pursue the matter further as the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division directed them to file civil suit for declaration in the competent Court of law. 3(ii) Civil suit was instituted thereafter by the plaintiffs (Respondents No.1 to 3 herein) for declaration that the plaintiffs are the only legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. Plaintiff No.1 is his legally wedded wife and plaintiffs No.2 and 3 are his children. Defendant No.3 and her sons defendants No.4 to 6 (respondents No.4 to 7 in the instant appeal/cross objectors) as well as defendant No.7 (appellant in the instant appeal) are not legal heirs/successors of late Sh. Prem Chand. Therefore, mandatory decree for directing defendants No.1 and 2, the employer of late Sh. Prem Chand, was also prayed for releasing his service benefits in favour of plaintiffs. The suit has been opposed by defendants No.3 to 6 as well as by defendant No.7. Defendants No.3-6 and 7 in their separate written statements while denying the plaintiff's claim have in-turn projected themselves to be the legally wedded wives & sons of late Sh. Prem Chand. The parties also led evidence in support of their respective contentions. 3(iii) Claim of defendant No.7 Defendant No.7 appeared as DW-4 in the witness box and stated that she was married to late Sh. Prem Chand about forty years ago. After marriage, the couple remained at Shimla, Chopal and Padhar. She further stated that at the time of Prem Chand's death, she being at Bhuntar, could not attend his funeral. She heavily relied upon entry of her name as nominee in the service record of late Sh. Prem Chand. She admitted that in her alleged marriage with late Sh. Prem Chand, no Pandit was engaged. She also stated that no entry was there in any of the contemporary record reflecting her marriage with late Sh. Prem Chand. Defendant No.7 examined her uncle PW5 Amarnath, who stated that late Sh. Prem Chand had solemnized marriage with Defendant No.7. 3(iv) Claim of defendants No.3 to 6:- Defendant No.3 appeared in the witness box as DW2 and claimed that her marriage was solemnized with late Sh. Prem Chand. Defendant No.7 examined her uncle PW5 Amarnath, who stated that late Sh. Prem Chand had solemnized marriage with Defendant No.7. 3(iv) Claim of defendants No.3 to 6:- Defendant No.3 appeared in the witness box as DW2 and claimed that her marriage was solemnized with late Sh. Prem Chand in accordance with Hindu rites and customes at village Jejo Dawaba, Hoshiyarpur. From this wedlock, the couple had three sons i.e. defendants No.4 to 6. After ten years of marriage, late Sh.Prem Chand alongwith his family members migrated to Mandi. She further stated herself to be working as Sweeper in the Health Department at Padhar. During her cross-examination, she admitted that she could not place on record any documentary evidence reflecting her as wife and her children as sons of late Sh. Prem Chand. Rather she admitted that she had not lodged any complaint against one Rattan Chand, who working as Sweeper in HRTC Mandi and had reflected her as his wife and defendants No.4 to 6 as his sons in his service record Ext.PW3/A. In support of her claim, defendant No.3 examined her mother as DW-3, who supported the claim of defendant No.3. 3(v) Claim of the plaintiffs To substantiate their claim of being legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand, plaintiff No.1 as PW2 stated that she was married to late Sh. Prem Chand. Out of this wedlock plaintiffs No.2 and 3 were born. She also placed on record the affidavits (Ext. PW4/A and PW4/B) executed by late Sh. Prem Chand & plaintiff No.1 which were attested by the Executive Magistrate, Tehsil Padhar, District Mandi Himachal Pradesh In these affidavits, the executants admitted their marriage with each other and wanted the same to be entered in the Panchayat record. Plaintiffs have also placed on record the Legal Heirs Certificate (Ext. PW5/A) issued by Sub-Divisional Officer, Civil Padhar, reflecting them as legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. Copy of Pariwar Register (Ext. RPW1/A) reflecting plaintiff No.1 as wife and plaintiffs No.2 and 3 as sons of late Sh. Prem Chand has also been produced. In support of their claim, plaintiff No.1 also placed on record the copy of jamabandi for the year 2001-2002 (Ext.PW2/B), wherein plaintiffs No.1 has been shown as wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Plaintiffs also produced one Sh. Ravi Kumar, who appeared as PW-1 and testified that plaintiff No.1 had married Sh. Prem Chand has also been produced. In support of their claim, plaintiff No.1 also placed on record the copy of jamabandi for the year 2001-2002 (Ext.PW2/B), wherein plaintiffs No.1 has been shown as wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Plaintiffs also produced one Sh. Ravi Kumar, who appeared as PW-1 and testified that plaintiff No.1 had married Sh. Prem Chand and he had taken their marriage photographs (Ext.PW1/A to PW1/D) negatives whereof are Ext.PW1/E to PW1/H. PW-6 Gurdev, who was working as clerk in the I & PH Department alongwith late Sh. Prem Chand also supported the case of the plaintiffs that Prem Chand had married plaintiff No.1 in year 1991 and thereafter they lived as husband and wife. Durga Dutt as PW-7 stated that he was engaged as Pandit and had performed the marriage of plaintiff No.1 with late Sh. Prem Chand. 4. After going through the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced by them, both the learned Courts below, held that plaintiffs were able to prove themselves as legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand and accordingly decreed their suit. Entry of defendant No.7 in service record of late Sh. Prem Chand was declared null & void. Defendants No. 3 to 7 were not held as legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. Plaintiff No.1 was held to be the only legally wedded wife of late Sh. Prem Chand & plaintiffs No.2 & 3 his sons. Defendants No.1 & 2 were directed to release service benefits of deceased Prem Chand in their favour. 4(i) Learned counsel for defendant No.7/appellant argued that copy of Pariwar Register Ext.RPW1/A was not worthy of credence as it was proved by RPW/1 Subash Chand, who had deposed that there was another concerned entry in the original record, which was not incorporated in RPW1/A. This argument has been raised only to be rejected as RPW/1 had testified that left out entry from the original record was that of late Sh. Prem Chand, who had died and his name stood deleted from the Pariwar Register. Ext. RPW1/A was a copy of Pariwar Register reflecting plaintiff No.1 as wife and plaintiffs No.2 & 3 as sons of the late Sh. Prem Chand and had been proved in accordance with law, therefore the same was justifiably relied upon by the learned Courts below. Reliance has also been placed upon service particulars of late Sh. Ext. RPW1/A was a copy of Pariwar Register reflecting plaintiff No.1 as wife and plaintiffs No.2 & 3 as sons of the late Sh. Prem Chand and had been proved in accordance with law, therefore the same was justifiably relied upon by the learned Courts below. Reliance has also been placed upon service particulars of late Sh. Prem Chand reflecting defendant No.7 as his nominee. It is settled law that merely by being a nominee of some one in his General Provident Fund (GPF) account, a person can not acquire the status of his legal heir much less status of his legally wedded wife. 4(ii) Learned counsel for defendants No.3-6/cross objectors relied upon school leaving certificates of defendants No.4-6 to contend that in school record they were shown as sons of late Sh. Prem Chand and therefore are legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. However, these documents have not been proved in accordance with law. 5. XXX XXX XXX 5(a) It is not in dispute that late Sh. Prem Chand died in harness on 21.10.2005. Non-reflection of his name in the copy of Pariwar Register (Ext.RPW1/A) will not make the document dubious. Plaintiffs No. 1-3 have been reflected in Ext.RPW1/A as his wife & sons respectively. The document has been proved in accordance with law by Subash Chand RPW/1. 5(b) Plaintiffs have also placed on record the Legal Heir Certificate (Ext. PW5/A) issued by Sub-Divisional Officer, Civil Padhar, showing them as legal heirs of late Sh. Prem Chand. Affidavits Ex.PW4/A and PW4/B sworn by late Sh. Prem Chand & plaintiff No.1 respectively and attested on 4.5.2001 by the Executive Magistrate Padher also support plaintiffs' case. Object of these affidavits as mentioned therein is to get the marriage of plaintiff No.1 with late Sh. Prem Chand entered in the Panchayat record. 5(c) Copy of jamabandi (Ext. PW2/B) for the year 2001-02, reflecting plaintiff No.1 as wife of late Sh. Prem Chand has also been placed on record. 5(d) Photographs of marriage of plaintiff No.1 with late Sh. Prem Chand, Ext. PW1/A to PW1/D alongwith their negatives as Ext. PW1/E to PW1/H have been proved by Ravi Kumar (PW-1). 5(c) Copy of jamabandi (Ext. PW2/B) for the year 2001-02, reflecting plaintiff No.1 as wife of late Sh. Prem Chand has also been placed on record. 5(d) Photographs of marriage of plaintiff No.1 with late Sh. Prem Chand, Ext. PW1/A to PW1/D alongwith their negatives as Ext. PW1/E to PW1/H have been proved by Ravi Kumar (PW-1). 5(e) PW-6, a clerk working in the IPH Department, PW-7 a Pandit, who solemnized the marriage between plaintiff No.1 & late Prem Chand as well as PW1 Ravi Kumar have also supported the case of the plaintiffs and have deposed that marriage was solemnized between plaintiff No.1 and late Sh. Prem Chand. 5(f) Defendant No.7 is entered as wife of one Sh. Dorje in Ext.RPW3/A, a certificate issued by Pradhan Gram Panchayat Tegu Behar and her name has been recorded there as Punni Devi. Defendant No.7 while appearing in the witness box, admitted that the document (marked at that time as Mark-D) bore her photograph. She also admitted that her alleged marriage, was neither performed by any Pandit nor the couple took any 'Pheras'. Defendant No.7 could not produce any documentary evidence in support of her claim of being legally wedded wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Mere entry of her name in the service record as nominee to receive GPF of late Sh. Prem Chand will not make her as legal representative or wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Object of nominating a person in the GPF account is only to facilitate disbursal of General Provident Fund (GPF) amongst entitled legal representatives. There is no document on record to show that defendant No.7 was legally wedded wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. 5(g) The document obtained by plaintiff Ext.PW3/A dated 31.10.1995 falsifies claim of defendants No.3 to 6. In this document defendants No.3 to 6 have been reflected as wife and sons of one Rattan Chand s/o Gurdass, working as sweeper in HRTC, Mandi. Defendant No.3 has admitted that she has not lodged any complaint against the said Rattan Chand or requested the employer of Rattan Chand for deletion of her name and that of her sons as legal heirs of Rattan Chand. Defendants No.3 to 6 are entered as wife and sons respectively in the name of one Rattan Chand. Defendant No.3 could not produce any documentary evidence in support of her being legal wedded wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Defendants No.3 to 6 are entered as wife and sons respectively in the name of one Rattan Chand. Defendant No.3 could not produce any documentary evidence in support of her being legal wedded wife of late Sh. Prem Chand. Plaintiffs have been able to prove themselves as legal heirs i.e. plaintiff No.1 as legally wedded wife and plaintiffs No.2 & 3 as sons of late Sh. Prem Chand. 6. Hon'Ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.2843/2844/2010 titled Nazir Mohamed Vs. J. Kamala & ors decided on 27.08.2020, held that a second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. It is not open to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or re-appreciate evidence in a second appeal. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure restricts the right of second appeal only to those cases, where a substantial question of law is involved. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment read as under:- "25. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal. 26. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended, restricts the right of second appeal, to only those cases, where a substantial question of law is involved. The existence of a "substantial question of law" is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC." A question of law must arise from the pleadings. It becomes substantial question of law, if it is debatable, not previously settled by law of land or any binding precedent, must have a material bearing on the decision of the case. A pure finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal even if appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous & finding of fact incorrect. "29. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. "29. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1 , where this Court held:- "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion,be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal 2 , this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. 31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out hereinbelow:- "21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, (1928) AIR PC 172 [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : ] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed inthe last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case, (1962) Supp3 SCR 549 [ : AIR1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, (1951) AIR Madras 969 [ : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case, (1962) Supp3 SCR 549 [: AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] , SCR p. 557) "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law." 32. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable,not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way. 33. To be a question of law "involved in the case", there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. 34. To be a question of law "involved in the case", there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. 34. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra Goswami . 35. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari . 36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam .An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus : (i)An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of adocument is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. 7. All the aspects raised in the instant second appeal and cross objection are purely factual. No question of law much less any substantial question of law arises in this appeal or cross objections. The concurrent factual findings of both the learned Courts below are based upon correct appreciation of pleadings & evidence led by the parties. No other point has been urged. In view of the above discussions, the impugned judgments and decrees concurrently passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity. The concurrent factual findings of both the learned Courts below are based upon correct appreciation of pleadings & evidence led by the parties. No other point has been urged. In view of the above discussions, the impugned judgments and decrees concurrently passed by the learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity. Accordingly, the appeal and the cross objections are dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.