JUDGEMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C. 2. The instant application has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing the impugned notice of premature retirement issued by the respondent No.5 vide its letter dated 11.01.2014 whereby the petitioner's date of birth has been changed from 05.08.1954 to 05.04.1954 and the petitioner has been directed to retire on 30.04.2014. The petitioner has further prayed for direction upon the respondent to record the correct date of birth as 05.08.1954 in all service record of the petitioner. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he was duly appointed by the respondent coal company as Draftsman on 21.12.1981 vide appointment letter dated17.12.1981 on the basis of his national trade certificate issued by the Government Industrial Training Institute. The petitioner is a Matriculate and the date of birth recorded in his Matriculation certificate issued by Bihar School Examination Board, Patna (herein after referred as BSEB) is 05.08.1954 and the said date of birth stands recorded in his National Trade Certificate [Annexure- 1(series) to the writ application]. The petitioner was also medically examined by the authorities of the respondent under Rule 29-B and a certificate was issued to him being Form 'O' thereof in which his date of birth has been mentioned as 05.08.1954. 4. The further case of the petitioner is that he became highly shocked and surprised to receive the notice of retirement vide letter dated 11.01.2014 issued by the respondent No.5, whereby the petitioner has been informed that he is going to superannuate on 30.04.2014 on attaining the age of 60 years. On enquiry, he came to know that the office of the respondent No.5 has issued a letter dated 20/22.02.2013 addressing to the Project Officer, Godhar Colliery asking for the date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the Form B register of Godhar Colliery, where the petitioner was initially posted. However, it has been reported that due to incident of fire concerned ‘Form-B’ register has been burnt and was not available. At this stage it is pertinent to mention here that ‘Form-B’ has been annexed by the respondent as Annexure- A to their counter affidavit. 5. Mr. P.K. Mukhopadhay, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent company has no legal right to suo motu change the date of birth of the petitioner and they are duty bound to accept the Matriculate certificate. 5. Mr. P.K. Mukhopadhay, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent company has no legal right to suo motu change the date of birth of the petitioner and they are duty bound to accept the Matriculate certificate. He further submits that it is not only the Matriculate certificate but also certificate granted by the Government Industrial Training Institute where the date of birth has been recorded as 05.08.1954 but for the reason best known to the respondent the respondents changed the date of birth as 05.04.1954. He further submits that Annexure 2 to the writ application is medical report in which also the date of birth of the petitioner has been recorded as 05.08.1954 and even in the service book his date of birth has been initially mentioned as 05.08.1954 but the same has been rectified as 05.04.1954. He contended that the unilateral correction and the decision is non-est in the eyes of law and the petitioner has been forced to retire 4 months prior to the original date of retirement. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kamta Pandey VS B. C. C. L. Through Chairman-Cum-Managing Director reported in 2007 3 JLJR 726 in which it has been held that Matriculation certificate has to be treated as authentic document. Para 10 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below: “10. The main contention urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that as per Instruction No. 76 of the National Coal Wage Agreement III dated 25.4.1988, the date of birth of the existing employee must be determined only on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Board and as such the said Matriculation Certificate, which has been issued in favour of the petitioner mentioning his date of birth as 1.7.1951, by the Bihar School Examination Board in the year 1968, obtained even before his appointment, has to be treated as authentic document and the date of birth as mentioned in the service register as 16.7.1948 is not correct one and it is wrongly mentioned as 23 years as on 16.7.1971 in the service register without any basis.” 7. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent are duty bound to accept the Matriculation certificate and as such the impugned notice deserves to be quashed and set aside and the respondent may be directed to correct the date of birth of the petitioner as 05.08.1954 instead of 05.04.1954. 8. A counter affidavit has been filed in this case wherein para 9 it has been categorically stated that the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded in the ‘Form-B’ register as 05.04.1954 which is duly signed by the petitioner and the said Form B has been annexed as Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. It has been further stated that at the fag end of service, the petitioner has raised the grievance for correction in his date of birth which is not permissible in the eye of law. In the said counter affidavit the respondents have categorically denied the medical examination certificate (Form 'O') which has been annexed as Annexure- 2 to the writ application by stating that there is no signature of any authority in the said Form 'O' as such, the same should not be taken into consideration. 9. Mr. Vijay Kant Dubey, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the petitioner has not come with clean hands and tried to mislead this Court by annexing medical examination certificate-Form 'O' which does not find signature of any authority as such, the same cannot be taken into consideration. He further submits that ‘Form-B’ register is the statutory register and the same has been duly acknowledged by the petitioner in which the date of birth mentioned as 05.04.1954. He further contended that the petitioner has no right to raise the grievance of the date of birth at the fag end of his service. Learned counsel further contended that the Matriculation certificate was never filed at the time of appointment for the reason best known to the petitioner. He concluded his argument by submitting that the instant writ application should be dismissed and relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Secretary and Commissioner Home Deptt. & others v. R. Kirubakaran reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155. 10. He concluded his argument by submitting that the instant writ application should be dismissed and relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Secretary and Commissioner Home Deptt. & others v. R. Kirubakaran reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the records of the case it appears that the issue involved in the instant case with regard to correction in date of birth is highly disputed question fact inasmuch as Form 'O' which is medical examination report (Annexure 2 to the writ application) has been denied by the respondents by contending that the same has not been signed by any of the authority. Further, the petitioner’s contention that there is no ‘Form-B’ register also appears to be incorrect inasmuch as the respondents have annexed ‘Form-B’ as Annexure- A to their counter affidavit. It further transpires that the respondents have categorically denied to the statement of the petitioner that there was cutting in the service record in his absence, by stating that on the basis of ‘Form B’ which is the mother record there is cut in the date of birth and the same was rectified and the signatures were put in by both the workman and the authorized concerned. I find no denial of this specific statement by the petitioner by way of rejoinder. 11. It is true that Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kamta Pandey (Supra) has held that the Matriculation certificate issued by the Board has to be treated as authentic document for date of birth. However, the facts of the said case is not similar to the present one as in that case the respondents have repeatedly verified the veracity of the Matriculation certificate which has not been done in this case. The fact remains that the certificate issued by the BSEB, Patna in 1971 was not produced at the time of appointment of the petitioner and the petitioner after knowing fully well the contents of Form-B has signed the same wherein the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 05.04.1954. Further, “Form 'O'” which is alleged to be the medical examination report (Annexure 2) has been categorically denied by the respondent as the same does not bear signature of any of the authority. Further, “Form 'O'” which is alleged to be the medical examination report (Annexure 2) has been categorically denied by the respondent as the same does not bear signature of any of the authority. In the recent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Others versus Shyam Kishore Singh reported in 2020 SCC online SC 126 it has been held that if the date of birth entered in the service register requires any change, the same cannot be entertained at the fag end of service after accepting the same to be correct during the entire service. In Para 7 and 8 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 7. In the above background it is to be noticed as to whether the consideration as made by the High Court is justified. The learned counsel for the respondent with specific reference to para 10 in the order of the learned Single Judge referred to the aspect wherein the learned Single Judge has taken note of the representation made by the respondent in the year 2009 and the verification that was secured by the appellants from the Bihar School Examination Board. Though such reference is made, in our opinion, the same was not appropriate in the present facts when three decades had elapsed from the date of employment. The position is well established that if a particular date of birth is entered in the service register, a change sought cannot be entertained at the fag end of service after accepting the same to be correct during entire service. In the instant facts the position is that the respondent entered service on 01.03.1982. The date of birth entered as 04.03.1950 has remained on record from the said date. The requirement to submit the nomination form indicating the particulars of the family and the nominee was complied and it was submitted by the respondent on 25.05.1998. In the said Nomination Form the date of birth of the employee was required to be mentioned, wherein the respondent in his own handwriting has indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950. The requirement to submit the nomination form indicating the particulars of the family and the nominee was complied and it was submitted by the respondent on 25.05.1998. In the said Nomination Form the date of birth of the employee was required to be mentioned, wherein the respondent in his own handwriting has indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950. Apart from that fact, the learned Additional Solicitor General would also point out that since there was a change in the method of maintaining the service register, all the employees were provided an opportunity to verify and seek for change in the service record in the year 1987. At that stage also the respondent did not seek for any change. Therefore, in that circumstance, when the opportunity available at the first instance in 1987 had not been availed and thereafter on 25.05.1998 when the respondent himself in the Provident Fund Nomination Form had indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950 which corresponds to the date of birth entered in the service register as on the date of commencement of the employment, merely because a verification was made from the Bihar School Examination Board and even if it was confirmed that the date of birth was 20.01.1955 such change at that stage was not permissible. 8. This Court has consistently held that the request for change of the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not sustainable. The learned Additional Solicitor General has in that regard relied on the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble, (2010) 14 SCC 423 wherein a series of the earlier decisions of this Court were taken note and was held as hereunder: “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [ (2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 96]. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In this case, this Court has considered a number of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at the fag end of the service career. 17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber Dutt Semwal [ (2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief was denied to the government employee on the ground that he sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the decision after almost three decades. 19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be discouraged by the court. The relevant portion of the judgment in Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran [1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 449 : (1994) 26 ATC 828] reads as under: (SCC pp. 158-59, para 7) “7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may lose their promotion forever. … According to us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book.” 12. As a matter of fact the issue involve in this case is now no more res integra that the issue of date of birth cannot be raised at the fag end of service for the obvious reason that during the entire service the employee gets several opportunity to see the service book and/or other documents and he could raise his grievance much earlier and not just before the date of his retirement. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the judicial pronouncement, the instant application is dismissed.