JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J.:— By way of instant petitions filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, challenge has been laid to common judgment dated 5.10.2018 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 5ASJ-II/10 of 2017/15 and Criminal Appeal No. 12ASJ-II/10 of 2015, whereby appeal having been filed by the respondent-wife against the judgment dated 23.12.2014 passed by learned judicial magistrate 1st class, Solan, District Solan, H.P., in complainant No. 14/3 of 2012 came to be partly allowed and appeal filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the pleadings available on record are that marriage inter se petitioner-husband and respondent-wife was solemnized on 7.6.2000 as per Christian Rites and Customs at Solan. Parties to the lis cohabited together as husband and wife cordially for some time and during this period one daughter was born out of their wedlock. But since after some time of marriage certain differences cropped up interse parties, respondent-wife started living at her parent's house. In the month of January 2012, respondent-wife filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, praying therein for maintenance order under Section 20, residence order under Section 19 and to provide maintenance for education and marriage of children. Aforesaid complaint was decided on 23.12.2014 by learned judicial magistrate 1st class, Solan, whereby learned Court below while directing the petitioner-husband to provide accommodation consisting of two room, kitchen, bath room and toilet to the respondent-wife also held her entitled to monthly maintenance of Rs. 2000/-. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment passed by learned judicial magistrate 1st class, Solan, both the parties preferred criminal appeals under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, which were ultimately came to be disposed of vide common judgment dated 5.10.2018, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, District Solan, H.P. Vide aforesaid judgment, learned Appellate Court though dismissed the appeal having been filed by the petitioner-husband, but partly allowed the appeal filed by respondent-wife, whereby maintenance granted by learned Court below came to be enhanced from Rs. 2000/- to Rs. 10,000/- per month. 2000/- to Rs. 10,000/- per month. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-husband filed two criminal Revisions bearing No. 19 of 2019 and 20 of 2020 respectively, laying therein challenge to aforesaid judgment passed by learned appellate Court, praying therein to quash and set-aside the aforesaid judgments passed by learned trial court as well as appellate Court. 4. Since both the revision petitions arise out of the common judgment dated 5.10.2018, both were clubbed together for hearing. 5. Having taken note of the nature of controversy interse parties, this Court at first instance referred the matter to the mediation, but parties were unable to settle their dispute amicably before the learned Mediator and as such, matter again came back to court for hearing on merits. However, on 28.6.2019 this Court thought it proper to make another effort towards amicable settlement and as such, summoned both the parties to the Court. On 19.7.2019, both the parties appeared before the Court and after having discussed the matter with each other, sought 10 days' time to ponder over the matter. 6. On 9.8.2019, learned counsel representing the parties on instructions of their respective clients, who are present in Court, informed that parties have resolved to settle their dispute amicably interse them, whereby petitioner-husband has agreed to pay sum of Rs. 30.00 lac to the respondent-wife towards permanent alimony. Sum of Rs. 10 lac was agreed to be paid by way of cheque on the same date i.e. 9.8.2019, whereas remaining amount of Rs. 20.00 lac was agreed to be paid within a period of two months. Having taken note of aforesaid information given to this Court, this Court with a view to ascertain the correctness and genuineness of compromise, if any, arrived interse parties, also recorded the statements of both the parties on oath. Both the parties categorically stated before this Court that they of their own volition and without there being any external pressure have entered into the compromise, whereby both have resolved to settle their matter for all times to come. Petitioner-husband stated that he has paid sum of Rs. 10 lac to the respondent-wife in the Court today, whereas remaining amount of Rs. 20.00 lac shall be paid by him within a period of two months. Besides above, petitioner-husband also undertook before this Court that in addition to Rs. 30.00 lac, he would also pay sum of Rs. Petitioner-husband stated that he has paid sum of Rs. 10 lac to the respondent-wife in the Court today, whereas remaining amount of Rs. 20.00 lac shall be paid by him within a period of two months. Besides above, petitioner-husband also undertook before this Court that in addition to Rs. 30.00 lac, he would also pay sum of Rs. 2.50 lac to his daughter. While acknowledging factum with regard to receipt of sum of Rs. 10 : 00 lac by way of cheque, respondent-wife stated before this Court that as and when entire amount agreed to be paid to her as permanent alimony is received by her, she shall withdraw all cases filed by her against the petitioner-husband. After having recorded aforesaid statements of the parties, this Court with a view to ensure that remaining sum of Rs. 20.00 lac is also paid to the respondent-wife adjourned the matter for two months, as prayed for. 7. On 23.12.2019, one cheque amounting to Rs. 10.00 lac was paid to the respondent-wife towards part payment by the petitioner-husband with further undertaking to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 12.50 lac on or before 31.1.2020. On 3.3.2020, though cheque amounting to Rs. 12.50 lac, dated 25.2.2020 was paid to the respondent-wife, but same on the account of some technical hitch could not be encashed and as such, petitioner handed over two cheques amounting to Rs. 10.00 lac and Rs. 2.50 lac, drawn at State Bank of India, the Mall Solan, Himachal Pradesh respectively, on account of balance payment. Though, matter was ordered to be listed on 31.3.2020 for further orders, but on account of Covid-19 parties could not come present and finally on 31st August, 2020, learned counsel representing the respondent-wife on instructions stated at bar that in terms of the amicable settlement interse parties, entire sum of Rs. 32.50 lac towards permanent alimony stands paid to the respondent-wife. Learned counsel representing the parties also informed this Court that now on account of final settlement arrived interse parties, steps are being taken for filing appropriate application under Section 28 of Special Marriage Act for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent and as such, matter came to be adjourned on their request for today's date i.e. 5.10.2020. 8. 8. Today i.e. on 5.10.2020 both the parties who are present in Court alongwith their counsel again stated on oath before this Court that they have filed an application under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, praying therein for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent. They stated on oath before this Court that since entire sum of Rs. 32.50 lac towards permanent alimony stands paid/received, they shall have no objection in case prayer made on their behalf by way of an application filed under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent, is accepted. Statements made by the parties are on record. In the aforesaid background, learned counsel representing the petitioner-husband on instructions stated that since parties to the lis have entered in to the compromise in the instant proceedings, judgments passed by the learned courts below may be quashed and set-aside. Learned counsel representing the respondent-wife is not averse to the aforesaid request and accordingly, same is allowed. 9. Consequently, in view of the above, the judgments passed by the learned courts below are quashed and set-aside alongwith pending applications, if any. CMPMO NO. 391 of 2020 10. By way of instant petition filed under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, joint prayer has been made on behalf of the parties for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent on account of their amicable settlement arrived interse them in Cr. Revision No. 19 of 2019 and Cr. Revision No. 20 of 2019, respectively. Since facts in detail with regard to circumstances which led to separation between the parties to the lis and subsequent amicable settlement arrived interse them stands mentioned/recorded in the earlier part of the judgment, this Court sees no necessity to narrate the same again. 11. In the instant application, parties while jointly praying for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent have averred that they are living separately from each other for the last many years at their respective addresses mentioned in the memo of the parties and during this period there has been no cohabitation and as such, there is no relationship of husband - wife between them. It has been further averred in the application that the parties have mutually agreed for their marriage to be dissolved because there is no likelihood of their cohabiting in future and their marriage has been broken beyond repair. It has been further averred in the application that since entire amount of Rs. 32.50 lac agreed to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent towards permanent alimony and maintenance towards minor child stands received by the respondent, it would be in the interest of justice in case their prayer for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent, is accepted. Statements given by both the parties on oath acknowledging therein factum with regard to payment and receipt of entire sum of Rs. 32.50 lac towards permanent alimony and maintenance of child are on record, perusal whereof further reveals that both the parties, who have been living separately for more than seven years, have no objection in case their marriage is also ordered to be dissolved by way of mutual consent. 12. Having taken note of the facts and circumstances of the case as have been discussed in detailed hereinabove as well as averments contained in the joint application having been filed by the parties under Sections 28 of the Special Marriage Act as well as statements given by them on oath before this Court, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made in the application. 13. Having perused the averments contained in the joint application filed under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act as well as statements made by both the parties on oath, there appears to be no possibility of rapprochement or conciliation interse parties and as such, it would be in the interest of both the parties, if prayer having been made on their behalf for dissolution of their marriage by way of mutual consent is considered by this Court. 14. Accordingly, for the reasons and circumstances discussed hereinabove coupled with the fact that both the parties are living separately for so many years and they have been litigating with each other, statutory period of six months as envisaged under the Act for grant of divorce by way of mutation consent, can be waived of, especially when there is no possibility of rapprochement of the parties and marriage has broken beyond repair. In this regard, it would be apt to take note of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Veena v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2011) 14 SCC 614 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:— 12. “We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and talked to the parties. The appellant has filed a divorce petition under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, being HMA No. 397/2008 which is pending before the Court of Sanjeev Mattu, Additional District Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we deem it appropriate to transfer the said divorce petition to this Court and take the same on Board. The said petition is converted into one under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act and we grant divorce to the parties by mutual consent.” 15. Reliance is also placed on a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Priyanka Khanna v. Amit Khanna, (2011) 15 SCC 612 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:— “7. We also see form the trend of the litigations pending between the parties that the relationship between the couple has broken down in a very nasty manner and there is absolutely no possibility of a rapprochement between them even if the matter was to be adjourned for a period of six months as stipulated under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. 8. We also see from the record that the first litigation had been filed by the respondent husband on 2.6.2006 and a petition for divorce had also been filed by him in the year, 2007. We therefore, feel that it would be in the interest of justice that the period of six months should be waived in view of the above facts.” 16. In the instant case also, statutory period of six months deserves to be waived keeping in view the fact that the marriage between the parties has broken beyond repair and there seems to be no possibility of parties living together. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 11158 of 2017 [arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20184 of 2017] titled as Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, decided on 12.09.2017, has held as under:— “13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 11158 of 2017 [arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20184 of 2017] titled as Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, decided on 12.09.2017, has held as under:— “13. Learned amicus submitted that waiting period enshrined under Section 13(B)2 of the Act is directory and can be waived by the court where proceedings are pending, in exceptional situations. This view is supported by judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini, AIR 1986 AP 167 (DB), Karnataka High Court in Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar Reddy, AIR 1994 Kar 12 (DB), Delhi High Court in Dhanjit Vadra v. Smt. Beena Vadra AIR 1990 Del 146 and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Kumar Shukla v. Smt. Neeta, AIR 2005 MP 106 (DB) Moorkkanatt. Contrary view has been taken by Kerala High Court in M. Krishna Preetha v. Dr. Jayan, AIR 2010 Ker 157 . 14. It was submitted that Section 13B(1) relates to jurisdiction of the Court and the petition is maintainable only if the parties are living separately for a period of one year or more and if they have not been able to live together and have agreed that the marriage be dissolved. Section 13B(2) is procedural. He submitted that the discretion to waive the period is a guided discretion by consideration of interest of justice where there is no chance of reconciliation and parties were already separated for a longer period or contesting proceedings for a period longer than the period mentioned in Section 13B(2). Thus, the Court should consider the questions: (i) How long parties have been married? (ii) How long litigation is pending? (iii) How long they have been staying apart? (iv) Are there any other proceedings between the parties? (v) Have the parties attended mediation/conciliation? (vi) Have the parties arrived at genuine settlement which takes care of alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties? 14. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were living separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts at mediation and reconciliation have been tried and have failed and there is no chance of reconciliation and further waiting period will only prolong their agony. 15. We have given due consideration to the issue involved. 14. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were living separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts at mediation and reconciliation have been tried and have failed and there is no chance of reconciliation and further waiting period will only prolong their agony. 15. We have given due consideration to the issue involved. Under the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the statutory law on the point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be dissolved by consent. The Act enabled the court to dissolve marriage on statutory grounds. By way of amendment in the year 1976, the concept of divorce by mutual consent was introduced. However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to divorce being granted before six months of time elapsing after filing of the divorce petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down to enable the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants divorce by mutual consent only if there is no chance for reconciliation. 16. The object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve a marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down and to enable them to rehabilitate them as per available options. The amendment was inspired by the thought that forcible perpetuation of status of matrimony between unwilling partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling off the period was to safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of differences being reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better option. 17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. 17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. This principle, as formulated in Justice G.P. Singh's “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (9th Edn., 2004), has been cited with approval in Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 as follows: “The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord Campbell said: ‘No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.’ “‘For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature’, points out Subbarao, J. ‘the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered’. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory.” 18. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory.” 18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following: (i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; (ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; (iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; (iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. 19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. 20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned Court. 21. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.” 17. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, application filed under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, is allowed and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances as enumerated hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the marriage between the parties is ordered to be dissolved by mutual consent. Registry is directed to draw a decree of dissolution of marriage by mutual consent accordingly. 18. Registry is directed to draw a decree of dissolution of marriage by mutual consent accordingly. 18. The instant petitions along with the application filed under Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.