JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Nigamendra Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank. 2. The petitioner assails an order of dismissal dated 17 September 2012. A challenge is also laid to the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 8 January 2013 affirming the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner prays for the setting aside of the aforesaid orders and for the grant of all consequential benefits including arrears of pay from the date of dismissal till he would have attained the age of retirement on 31 May 2013. The present petition represents the second foray of the petitioner before this Court. Earlier the respondents had dismissed the petitioner on 4 December 2000. That order was challenged by way of Writ-A No. -1019 of 2002, Shant Deo Tripathi Vs. Dy. General Manager/Appellate Authority S.B.I. & Others. A learned Judge of the Court by a detailed judgment allowed that writ petition and quashed the orders of dismissal and that passed by the Appellate Authority. The Court left it open for the respondents to conduct a disciplinary enquiry afresh commencing from the stage of oral enquiry and after filing of documents by the employer. The learned Judge while allowing the writ petition noted that out of the 22 charges which were levelled against the petitioner, Charges (vii) to (xxii) also formed part of a criminal prosecution that was launched against the petitioner and in which he had been ultimately acquitted. Noticing the similarity in the charges that formed part of the departmental enquiry and the criminal prosecution, the learned Judge observed thus: “43. The technical difference in charge was not relevant but what was relevant is that the charges are based on the same set of facts. It has been admitted by respondents that charges no.7 to 22 are based on the same facts as were involved in criminal case pending against petitioner. In this case, besides the general principles of law, as discussed above, statutory provision binding upon both the parties also contemplate that departmental enquiry shall stand deferred when criminal proceedings commenced but the said provision has been given a complete go by. In this case, besides the general principles of law, as discussed above, statutory provision binding upon both the parties also contemplate that departmental enquiry shall stand deferred when criminal proceedings commenced but the said provision has been given a complete go by. I am therefore constrained to hold that continuance to proceed with the departmental enquiry in respect to charges no.7 to 22 in this matter was not legal and valid and besides the exposition of law, as laid down in Noida ntrepreneurs Assn (supra), the same was in the teeth of para 521 of Shastry Award and to this extent, it is vitiated in law.” The learned Judge then proceeding to deal with the validity of the enquiry which was held rendered the following observations: “53. The procedure prescribed in para 521 contemplates an adequate opportunity of defence. Here is not a case where the petitioner had accepted his guilt, therefore it was incumbent upon department to prove charges against the petitioner and only thereafter he could have been required to place his defence to disprove the charges. Except of filing documents before Enquiry Officer, the Presenting Officer did not take any further step for proving charges. If the charges are such which stood proved from bare perusal of documents, in such a case no formal proof or overt act on the part of the department is necessary since Enquiry Officer can peruse the documents and find out whether charges stood proved or not. In such a case onus would shift upon delinquent employee to disprove the charges. It is quite plausible and permissible but the question would be whether it is so in the case in hand. Let us examine the manner in which the Enquiry Officer had discussed the documents.” Insofar as Charge No. I (iv) is concerned, the Court held thus: “58. In respect to charge no. 4 again Enquiry Officer held that to petitioner's defence "Presenting Officer did not offer any comment." "The petitioner alone cannot be held responsible for such act." Yet he has held the entire charge proved which is beyond comprehension. In respect to charge no. 4 again Enquiry Officer held that to petitioner's defence "Presenting Officer did not offer any comment." "The petitioner alone cannot be held responsible for such act." Yet he has held the entire charge proved which is beyond comprehension. Once no evidence is found that there was no other officer available in the Branch to sign the draft and therefore under instructions of Branch Manager, petitioner signed the draft, unless the Bank could have shown that Bank Manager himself acted illegally, compliance of his direction by petitioner cannot constitute a misconduct on his part. Therefore, it is also difficult to hold charge no. 4 proved.” It was ultimately observed by the learned Judge that the enquiry had not been conducted fairly and in a manner consistent with the principles of nature justice. The aforesaid conclusions stand recorded in paragraphs 65-66 which are extracted herein below: “65. No person from the Bank appeared and could show that signatures of petitioner on various documents were unauthorised since he was not permitted to do so. With respect to charges no. 7 to 22, on the basis of mere language of the charges contained in the charge sheet, Enquiry Officer held the same proved, since petitioner did not/could not adduce any defence for the reason that the same may cause prejudice to him in criminal proceedings pending against the charges involving same set of facts at that time. 66. In totality of the circumstances, I am clearly of the opinion that departmental enquiry, in the case in hand, has not been conducted fairly, impartially and in a manner consistent with the Principles of natural justice and also the procedure prescribed in para 521 of Shastry Award.” The respondent Bank assailed the decision of the learned Judge by way of Special Appeal No. 58 of 2012, Deputy General Manager, Appellate Authority, S.B.I. & Ors. Vs. Shant Deo Tripathi. The Division Bench however recorded the statement of the respondents that they were ready to reinstate the petitioner and to hold a fresh enquiry. Vs. Shant Deo Tripathi. The Division Bench however recorded the statement of the respondents that they were ready to reinstate the petitioner and to hold a fresh enquiry. In light of the statement so made the appeal was disposed of on 21 March 2012 in the following terms: “Having considered the submissions advanced and in view of the statement given by the learned counsel for the parties the appeal stands disposed of with the observations that the appellant Bank would abide by the directions contained in the judgment of the learned Single Judge except to the extent that the direction for payment of the arrears of subsistence allowance for the period from the date of termination till reinstatement would remain stayed in the meanwhile and would abide by the final decision that may now be taken by the Disciplinary Authority after fresh inquiry.” 3. Consequent to the liberty so granted, the respondents proceeded to conduct the departmental enquiry afresh. Upon conclusion of that enquiry, the Enquiry Officer in terms of his report of 27 August 2012 concluded that Charges No. I (i) to Charges No. I (iii), Charge No. I (v), Charge No. I (vi) and Charge No. II did not stand proved. He however recorded that Charge No. I-(iv) and Charge No. I (vii)-(xxii) stood proved. The Disciplinary Authority upon due consideration of that report and taking into consideration the gravity of the charges which stood levelled reiterated the original decision of the Bank and inflicted upon the petitioner the penalty of dismissal. It was further observed that the period of suspension will be treated as such and that no further salary or allowance would be payable other than the subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner. That order of the Disciplinary Authority was affirmed in appeal where after the present writ petition came to be preferred. 4. The order of dismissal insofar as Charges I (vii)-(xxii) are assailed principally on the basis of the judgment of acquittal which was rendered by the Criminal Court on 24 September 2002. According to the learned counsel since those charges were identical to those which formed part of the criminal prosecution, once the petitioner had been acquitted it was not open to the respondent Bank to inflict the punishment of dismissal. According to the learned counsel since those charges were identical to those which formed part of the criminal prosecution, once the petitioner had been acquitted it was not open to the respondent Bank to inflict the punishment of dismissal. Insofar as Charge No. I (iv) is concerned, learned counsel submits that in light of the findings which were returned interpartes by the learned Judge on the earlier writ petition it was impermissible for the Enquiry Officer to have held the petitioner guilty of that charge. Learned counsel submits that in light of the categorical findings returned in the earlier decision that the petitioner alone could not be held responsible for the act, that charge could not have been held to be established against the petitioner. In view thereof, it was submitted that both the Disciplinary as well Appellate Authority clearly committed a manifest illegality in holding the petitioner guilty of the misconduct alleged and forming part of Charge I (iv). Insofar as the findings returned in respect of Charges I (vii)-(xxii) are concerned, they are assailed on the principles elucidated by the Supreme Court in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 . larned counsel contends that once the charges in the criminal prosecution and the disciplinary enquiry are found to be identical, an acquittal in the criminal trial clearly denudes the respondents from the right to inflict the punishment of dismissal in respect thereof. Reliance was placed on the following principles that were laid down in G.M . Tank: “30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same with out there being any iot a of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case[ (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 5. Refuting those submissions Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, would contend that acquittal in the criminal case cannot ipsofactolead to the employer being deprived of the right to try those charges in a disciplinary enquiry. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed.” 5. Refuting those submissions Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, would contend that acquittal in the criminal case cannot ipsofactolead to the employer being deprived of the right to try those charges in a disciplinary enquiry. According to Sri Chaturvedi since the standard of proof in both proceedings is different and in a departmental enquiry the respondents are not obliged to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, a judgment of acquittal cannot in all circumstances be held to have concluded the issue nor can it be recognized as divesting the employer of the right to try those charges independently. Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel then took the Court through the judgment handed down by the criminal court in some detail to establish that the same cannot to be appreciated without bearing in mind the backdrop in which it came to be rendered. It was highlighted that most of the account holders who were complainants and produced as prosecution witnesses had turned hostile during the course of trial, the prosecution there had failed to produce the relevant documents in support of the charge and also failed to produce the Cashier and other relevant witnesses. According to Sri Chaturvedi, the criminal court acquitted the petitioner since the prosecution had failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt and consequently it cannot be viewed as a judgment exonerating or acquitting the petitioner on merits. Taking the Court through the enquiry report it was highlighted that to the contrary in the enquiry proceedings the respondent Bank had produced the Cashier and other crucial witnesses to prove the charges that were levelled against the petitioner. Viewed in that light Sri Chaturvedi submitted that the impugned order clearly did not merit any interference. Sri Chaturvedi further submitted that the petitioner was an employee of a financial institution against whom serious charges of financial misconduct and failure to abide by the policies and procedures formulated by the Bank was laid. Sri Chaturvedi submitted that the conduct of an employee in a financial institution is liable to be tested against strict standards of conduct and the imperative need of such employees being held liable to adhere to codified practices and procedures formulated. Sri Chaturvedi submitted that the conduct of an employee in a financial institution is liable to be tested against strict standards of conduct and the imperative need of such employees being held liable to adhere to codified practices and procedures formulated. Viewed on the strength of those standards, it was submitted that the orders impugned did not merit interference by this Court. 6. Seeking to distinguish the principles laid down in G. M. Tan k, Sri Chaturvedi placed reliance upon the following decisions. He drew the attention of the Court firstly to the judgment rendered in Commissioner Of Police, New Delhi and Another Vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 to submit that a judgment of acquittal which comes to be rendered in the backdrop of witnesses turning hostile cannot be accepted as an acquittal on merits and consequently departmental proceedings can be justifiably taken even though the employee or officer may have been acquitted. Sri Chaturvedi placed reliance upon paragraphs 24, 25, 26 of the decision rendered in Mehar Singh which read thus: “24. We find no substance in the contention that by cancelling the respondents’ candidature, the Screening Committee has overreached the judgments of the criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-relation between a criminal case and a departmental inquiry does not directly arise here, but, support can be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in connection with it because the issue involved is somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile. Such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR1964 SC 787] this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this Court in S.Samuthiram. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR1964 SC 787] this Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. 25. The expression “honourable acquittal” was considered by this Court in S.Samuthiram. In that case this Court was concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4 of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [ (1994) 1 SCC 541 ], where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a bank’s action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. This Court expressed that when the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 26. In light of above, we are of the opinion that since the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to keep persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of moral turpitude, out of the department, if found necessary, because they pollute the department, surely the above principles will apply with more vigour at the point of entry of a person in the police department i.e. at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the Screening Committee that the person against whom a serious case involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on technical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a disciplinary force because public interest is involved in it.” 7. Reliance was then placed upon another decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Inspector General of Police Vs. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 and more particularly paragraphs 23 to 26 thereof, which are extracted hereunder: “23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the Prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over PWs 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the Prosecution had not examined Head Constables Adiyodi (No. 1368) and Peter (No. 1079) of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with PWs 1 and 2, husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (complainant husband) is found in Ext.P-1 complaint. Further, the Doctor PW8 has also clearly stated before the enquiry officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined. Honourable Acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 . Honourable Acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 , it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari[1972 SLR 44 (SC)], this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168 which is as follows: “8...The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.” 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.” 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.” 8. Sri Chaturvedi then placed reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited represented by Managing Director (Administration And HR Vs. C. Nagaraju And Another, (2019) 10 SCC 367 where the principles laid down in G.M. Tank were noted and explained. It is these rival submissions that consequently fall for consideration. 9. Before dealing with the charges which also formed part of the criminal trial, it would be apposite to deal with Charge I (iv). That charge alleged that the petitioner had unauthorizedly signed a Draft for Rs.85,069/-thus jeopardizing the interest of the Bank. The case set up against the petitioner was that since he was a member of the award staff he was not authorized to sign that draft. That charge alleged that the petitioner had unauthorizedly signed a Draft for Rs.85,069/-thus jeopardizing the interest of the Bank. The case set up against the petitioner was that since he was a member of the award staff he was not authorized to sign that draft. The petitioner in his defense had asserted that the draft was signed on the verbal instructions of the Branch Manager and since no other officer was present in the Branch on that date. The Enquiry Officer has held that charge proved by simply holding that since the petitioner had admittedly signed the Draft and had duly accepted having performed that act, the charge must be held to be proved. It becomes pertinent to recollect that dealing with that charge the learned Judge while allowing the earlier writ petition had unequivocally observed that once it was found that there was no other officer available in the Branch to sign the draft and that the same came to be done upon the verbal instructions of the Branch Manager, the petitioner could not have been held guilty. It was further observed that the mere act of the petitioner complying with the directive of the Branch Manager cannot constitute misconduct. It becomes relevant to note that upon remit the respondents neither assert nor did they lead any evidence to establish that the defense proffered by the petitioner was incorrect. The respondents did not lead any evidence that may have dislodged the explanation tendered by the petitioner namely that he had signed the draft on the verbal instructions of the Branch Manager and since no other officer was present in the Branch on that date. It was open to the respondents to produce the Branch Manager or other witnesses to establish that the explanation submitted was factually incorrect. However they chose not to do so. In that view of the matter as well as in light of the findings recorded in the earlier round of litigation in respect of this particular charge, this Court finds itself unable to countenance the finding of guilt as returned in this respect. 10. However, notwithstanding the conclusion recorded above, that still leaves the Court to consider the validity of the findings which were returned in respect of Charges I (vii)-(xxii). 10. However, notwithstanding the conclusion recorded above, that still leaves the Court to consider the validity of the findings which were returned in respect of Charges I (vii)-(xxii). As was noted earlier, the findings of guilt returned in respect of these charges are assailed solely on the basis of the findings returned by the criminal court. Dealing with this aspect, the Enquiry Officer observed as follows: a) During enquiry proceeding dated 20.07.2012 the EPA had given a letter dated 20.07.2012 indexed as D.Ex-2 demanding that PO should call upon all the complainants, on the basis of whose complaint the charge No.7 to 22 are framed, for cross examination. The PO advised during the same day enquiry proceedings (page no.4) that since the complainants are from general public and beyond control of the Bank, they can not be produced as witness, however, Shri S.K. Tripathi, Accountant Bidhuna branch, who is custodian of the documents, is available who can be cross examined by the EPA but the EPA not demanded for his (the Accountant's) cross examination during enquiry proceedings on date as well as on later dates of the proceedings. I observed that contention of the PO is justified as the complainants are from public, the Banks has no right over them to call upon for cross examination. Moreover the custodian of the documents was present for cross examination but the EPA had not shown any interest to cross-examine him during enquiry proceedings. Further, at any point of time during entire enquiry proceedings the EPA had not stated that he wants to produce any defence witness despite PO's consent in this regard shown during enquiry proceedings dated 20.07.2012 (page No.4). I, therefore, find that statement written in defence brief of the EPA that he was not given time to produce the complainants as defence witness, is incorrect. (b) I find that the PO stated during enquiry proceedings dated 20.07.2012 (page No.4) that the EPA can cross-examine the custodian of the documents Shri S.K. Tripathi, Accountant Bidhuna Branch but the EPA neither on that day nor during any point of time of entire enquiry proceedings has demanded to cross examine Shri Tripathi, therefore, his contention that the Branch accountant was not produced for cross examination is not tenable. (c) I find that the standard of proof in departmental proceedings is that of “preponderance of probabilities” and not of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. (c) I find that the standard of proof in departmental proceedings is that of “preponderance of probabilities” and not of “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. Therefore, opinion of hand writing expert not necessarily required to be taken, as EPA's handwriting/signature/initials available on P.Exs. are apparently matching with those on Bank's records.” 11. In order to test the veracity of the submission addressed on the strength of the judgment handed down by the criminal court it becomes necessary to analyse that decision in some detail. On a careful consideration of the judgment rendered by the criminal court, the Court notes that apart from one complainant Rajjak (P.W.-1) all the other account holders who are alleged to have made complaints against the petitioner had turned hostile. The prosecution did not produce the Cashier and other crucial witnesses. Only a Clerk (P.W.-2) was produced. The documents on the basis of which the charges could have been established were also not proved. Dealing with the evidence of P.W.-8, it was noted that his statement had also not established the charges levelled clearly and completely. The criminal court then noted the contention addressed at the behest of the petitioner accused in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act on the basis of which it was contended that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges on the basis of the best evidence which was available. It was in the aforesaid backdrop that a judgment of acquittal came to be entered. 12. On the contrary in the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiry Officer noted that the charges were established on the strength of documentary evidence which was introduced and the oral statements of witnesses including the Branch Accountant. It has also come to be recorded that despite adequate opportunity being available for the petitioner to cross-examine the Branch Accountant, he chose not to do so. The Branch Accountant crucially was the custodian of the record. The charges were also established on the basis of voluminous internal records which do not appear to have been exhibited or introduced during the criminal trial. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the impact of the judgment of acquittal is liable to be evaluated. 13. In BHEL Vs. M. Mani, (2018) 1 SCC 285 the Supreme Court dealing with an identical question held as follows: “22. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the impact of the judgment of acquittal is liable to be evaluated. 13. In BHEL Vs. M. Mani, (2018) 1 SCC 285 the Supreme Court dealing with an identical question held as follows: “22. This Court has consistently held that in a case where the enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in criminal court is of no avail. It is held that even if a person stood acquitted by the criminal court, domestic enquiry can still be held - the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry, it is the preponderance of probabilities. (See Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. M.G. Vittal Rao- (2012) 1 SCC 442 ) 23. In the light of this settled legal position, the Labour Court was not right in holding that the departmental enquiry should have been stayed by the appellant awaiting the decision of the criminal court and that it is rendered illegal consequent upon passing of the acquittal order by the criminal court. This finding of the Labour Court is, therefore, also not legally sustainable.” 14. In South Bengal State Transport Corpn. Vs. Sapan Kumar Mitra, (2006) 2 SCC 584 , the Supreme Court reiterated the legal position that it would be open to an employer to remove a delinquent employee notwithstanding his acquittal in a criminal case. The Court deems it apposite to extract paragraphs 9 and 10 of that decision which read thus: “9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also examined the relevant records of this case. Although the Division Bench had not categorically said that the departmental proceeding could not be continued and punishment could not be imposed on the delinquent employee when the criminal case ended in acquittal, even then the learned counsel for the respondents sought to argue this ground before us. In our view, this ground is no longer res-integra. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and Ors., [ (1992) 4 SCC 711 ] a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed at paragraph 5, as follows: "5. In our view, this ground is no longer res-integra. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India and Ors., [ (1992) 4 SCC 711 ] a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed at paragraph 5, as follows: "5. So far the first point is concerned, namely, whether the disciplinary proceedings could have been continued in the face of the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case, the plea has no substance whatsoever and does not merit a detailed consideration. The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding. Besides, the Tribunal has pointed out that the acts which led to the initiation of the departmental disciplinary proceeding were not exactly the same which were the subject-matter of the criminal case." (Emphasis supplied) 10. Similarly in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, v. A. Gopalan, [ (1997) 11 SCC 239 ] the view expressed in Nelason Motis v. Union of India was fully endorsed by this Court and similarly it was held that nature and scope of proof in a criminal case is very different from that of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and the order of acquittal in the former, cannot conclude departmental proceedings. This Court has further held that in a criminal case charge has to be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceeding the standard of proof for proving the charge is mere preponderance of probabilities. Such being the position of law now settled by various decisions of this Court, two of which have already been referred to earlier, we need not deal in detail with the question whether acquittal in a criminal case will lead to holding that the departmental proceedings should also be discontinued. That being the position, an order of removal from service emanating from a departmental proceeding can very well be passed even after acquittal of the delinquent employee in a criminal case. In any case, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not base their decisions relying on the proposition that after acquittal in the criminal case, departmental proceedings could not be continued and order of removal could not be passed.” 15. In any case, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did not base their decisions relying on the proposition that after acquittal in the criminal case, departmental proceedings could not be continued and order of removal could not be passed.” 15. In view of the decisions cited and noted above, it would be pertinent at this stage to advert to the salient principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the context of a judgment of acquittal and an identical charge being tried in disciplinary proceedings. As is evident from the principles propounded in the decisions aforenoted, it must firstly be recognised that a judgment of acquittal does not necessarily result in an identical charge not being tried in departmental proceedings. This because the Courts have consistently recognised and emphasised the distinct standards of proof which apply to criminal prosecutions and disciplinary proceedings. While in the former, the charge must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, in disciplinary proceedings the standard which applies is a preponderance of probabilities. While in disciplinary proceedings it may be open to the authorities to hold the charge as proved if evidence accurately tends to establish the correctness of the misconduct alleged, in a criminal trial the same charge would have to be proved in accordance with law and placed beyond the realm of any doubt. A finding of a charge as being proved in a departmental enquiry may still be accepted provided the finding recorded in its respect is not wholly perverse and there is some evidence which may support the ultimate conclusion arrived at. To the contrary, findings recorded in a criminal trial are not to be tested on principles of perversity. A finding of guilt in a criminal trial must come to be recorded where the Court is convinced beyond any degree of uncertainty that the evidence unwaveringly establishes the commission of the crime. It is based on certainty of conviction. 16. The second aspect which Courts have recognised are those connected with the vagaries of a criminal prosecution. Very often, a judgment of acquittal comes to be rendered on account of a prosecutional failure to lead the best evidence available, where material witnesses are not produced or where witnesses produced turn hostile. In such situations Court have held that an acquittal granted in such circumstances cannot be viewed as “honourable”. Very often, a judgment of acquittal comes to be rendered on account of a prosecutional failure to lead the best evidence available, where material witnesses are not produced or where witnesses produced turn hostile. In such situations Court have held that an acquittal granted in such circumstances cannot be viewed as “honourable”. In Samuthiram the Supreme Court explained that expression to mean a decision of acquittal rendered upon “full consideration of prosecution evidence” and where it has “miserably failed to prove the charge”. As a necessary corollary, a judgment which hinges upon a failure on the part of the prosecution to bring home the charge conclusively or upon witnesses turning over during the course of trial cannot be viewed as an irrefutable or categorical certification of innocence. 17. There may also be situations where a failure of the prosecution stemming from either adequate evidence not being led or witnesses retracting from their original statements may be made good during the departmental enquiry. In such circumstances it would be wholly incorrect to hold the disciplinary authority denuded of the right to try the charge independently and be held obliged to accept the judgment of acquittal rendered on a technicality as a fait accompli. 18. The sheet anchor of the petitioner’s case is the decision of the Supreme Court in G.M. Tank. The ratio of that decision was explained by the Supreme Court in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited as under: “9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different. 10. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different. 10. As the High Court set aside the order of dismissal on the basis of the judgments of this Court in M. Paul Anthony and G.M.Tank, it is necessary to examine whether the said judgments are applicable to the facts of this case. Simultaneous continuance of departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on the same set of facts was the point considered by this Court in M. Paul Anthony’s case. This Court was of the opinion that departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar. However, it is desirable to stay departmental inquiry till conclusion of the criminal case if the departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact. On the facts of the said case, it was found that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts and the evidence before the criminal court and the departmental inquiry was the same. Further, in the said case the departmental inquiry was conducted ex parte. In such circumstances, this Court held that the ex parte departmental proceedings cannot be permitted to stand in view of the acquittal of the delinquent by the criminal court on the same set of facts and evidence. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial against Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the Criminal Court on the ground that the prosecution could not produce any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other hand, the complainant and the other witnesses appeared before the Inquiry Officer and deposed against Respondent 1. The evidence available in the Departmental Inquiry is completely different from that led by the prosecution in criminal trial. 11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed. The evidence available in the Departmental Inquiry is completely different from that led by the prosecution in criminal trial. 11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a judgment of this Court in G.M. Tank whereby the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 was allowed. In the said case, the delinquent officer was charged for an offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read with Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was honourably acquitted by the criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove the charge. Thereafter, a departmental inquiry was conducted and he was dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was upheld by the High Court. In the appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this Court was of the opinion that the departmental proceedings and criminal case were based on identical and similar set of facts. The evidence before the criminal court and the departmental proceedings being exactly the same, this Court held that the acquittal of the employee by a criminal court has to be given due weight by the disciplinary authority. On the basis that the evidence in both the criminal trial and departmental inquiry is the same, the order of dismissal of the appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case are entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due to non-availability of any evidence before the criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the basis of a report of the inquiry officer before whom there was ample evidence against Respondent 1. 12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v .Akhil Bhartiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [ (2004) 8 SCC 200 ] this Court was concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of workmen after acquittal by the criminal court. Dealing with a situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal was due to lack of evidence before the criminal court and sufficient evidence was available before the Labour Court, this Court was of the opinion that the judgment in M. Paul Anthony case cannot come to the rescue of the workmen. 13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. 13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.” 19. G.M. Tank was a decision which came to be rendered where on facts it was found that the evidence and material collected and utilized during the criminal trial and disciplinary proceedings was one and the same. The Supreme Court found on facts that charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances were identical in both sets of proceedings. It was also noted that the witnesses in the criminal and disciplinary proceedings were identical. In the aforesaid background and upon the Supreme Court finding that there was no “iota of difference” between the criminal and disciplinary proceeding that it was held that the distinction which is accepted to exist between departmental and criminal proceedings would not be applicable in the facts of that case. It becomes significant, therefore, to note that G.M. Tank is neither an authority for the proposition nor can its ratio be recognised to be that a judgment of acquittal must necessarily lead to the employer being held to be divested of authority to try a similar charge in disciplinary proceedings. It also does not lay down an absolute proposition of a judgment of acquittal necessarily resulting in an employee being exempted or freed from the specter of facing departmental action. It also does not lay down an absolute proposition of a judgment of acquittal necessarily resulting in an employee being exempted or freed from the specter of facing departmental action. It would ultimately depend upon the nature of the decision rendered by the criminal court, whether the acquittal was honourable as also whether the evidence led in the two sets of proceedings was identical and indistinguishable. 20. As this Court reverts to the facts of the present case, it becomes apposite to recollect that in the criminal trial best evidence was never produced, documentary evidence available with the respondents in support of the charge was not introduced, material and crucial witnesses were never examined and most of the prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The judgment of acquittal in that sense cannot be viewed as being one exonerating the petitioner conclusively. It essentially came to be handed down on account of a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. This was not a decision honourably acquitting the petitioner. To the contrary, in the disciplinary proceedings which were undertaken the respondents produced voluminous material in support of the charge and also examined material witnesses on whose testimony the charges were held to be proved. The petitioner not only chose not to cross-examine those witnesses, he failed to lead any oral evidence in support of his innocence. The facts as obtaining clearly place the present case within the set of circumstances noted in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation. The petitioner consequently is held disentitled to relief. Bearing in mind the gravity of the charges which stood proved, the Court is unconvinced that the ultimate punishment inflicted warrants interference. Petition is dismissed.