JUDGMENT B.K. Shrivastava, J. - This order shall govern the disposal of application under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. filed on 11.05.2020 on behalf of (1) Rajni Puruswani wife of Shri Ashok Puruswani, and (2) Ashok Puruswani S/o late Shri Nanakram Puruswani. The applicants are under apprehension of their arrest in connection with the Crime No. 1014/2019 registered at Police Station, City Kotwali, District Rewa for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 498- A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 / 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. It is an admitted fact that the marriage of Jitendra @ Jitu Puruswani was solemnized with deceased Khushbu Gyanchandani @ Vanshika Puruswani on 29.06.2012. Out of their wedlock a daughter named Kavya was born on 11.11.2014. Applicant Rajni Puruswani is the Mother-in-law of the deceased and Ashok Puruswani is the father-in-law of deceased. The deceased Khushbu @ Vanshika committed suicide by hanging herself on 05.12.2019. Crime No. 1014/2019 was registered under Sections 498-A and 3 / 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. After investigation, the police filed the challan against Jitendra @ Jitu Puruswani under Sections 498-A, 306 of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. This challan was filed against husband Jitendra @ Jitu Puruswani by showing the present applicants as "absconded accused". The Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions and at present Sessions Trial No. 101/2020 is pending before the IX A.S.J. Rewa. 3. Both applicants moved an application for anticipatory bail before the IX ASJ, Rewa, but the same was dismissed by order dated 18.03.2020. 4. It is submitted by the applicant's counsel that the applicants have been falsely implicated in this case. When the deceased committed suicide by hanging, applicant Rajni Puruswani herself lodged the complaint to the police. All the allegations against the applicants are frivolous, false and vexatious. Only after the death of deceased, omnibus type allegations of demand of dowry, harassment and cruelty have been leveled by the family members of the deceased. The provisions of law have been mis-utilized for harassment to the applicants. The necessary ingredients of the offence alleged, are completely missing so far as the present applicants are concerned. The learned lower Court dismissed the application without appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case in proper perspective. The provisions of law have been mis-utilized for harassment to the applicants. The necessary ingredients of the offence alleged, are completely missing so far as the present applicants are concerned. The learned lower Court dismissed the application without appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case in proper perspective. It is also submitted that the Son of the applicants has filed an application under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court, Rewa on 09.10.2018 (Annexure A/3). No custodial interrogation is required. Therefore, the applicants are entitled to get the anticipatory bail. 5. On the other side, the State strongly opposed the application. It is submitted by the State that applicants are absconded since the date of commitment of trial. Challan has been filed in their absence by showing them as an absconded accused. Therefore, the learned trial Court rightly dismissed the application as not-tenable in the light of Sobran Batham Vs. State of M.P., (2018) 2 MPJR 252 . 6. It will be proper to mention that husband Jitendra Puruswani was arrested on 09.12.2019 and he was enlarged on bail by order dated 04.03.2020 passed by this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 03/2020. 7. It is transpired from the impunged order dated 18.03.2020, passed by the 9th A.S.J. Rewa, that without considering the facts on merit, he dismissed the application only upon the ground of tenability in the light of Sobran Batham v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2018) 2 MPJR 252 = 2017 Supreme (M.P.) 1139 [02.05.2017 ]. In the aforesaid case, the Single Bench of High Court (at Gwalior) considered the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) AIR SC 626 = [2014] 2 SCC 171 = [2013] 8 Supreme 699 and held in para 10 as under :- "10. In the aforesaid case, the Single Bench of High Court (at Gwalior) considered the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) AIR SC 626 = [2014] 2 SCC 171 = [2013] 8 Supreme 699 and held in para 10 as under :- "10. In the openion of this court, the issuance of proclamation under section 82 of Cr.P.C. is not very material but in fact the sprit of the law is that if a person is absconding and is running away from the law enforcement agencies and the court, than he is not entitled for anticipatory bail under section 438 of Cr.P.C. When the investigation is pending and if the person is running away from the Investigating Agency, then it can be said that he has a reasonable apprehension of his arrest and, therefore, during the pendency of the investigation, the application under Section 438 of CrPC for grant of anticipatory bail would be maintainable but once the charge-sheet is filed invoking Section 299 of CrPC and the Magistrate has issued the warrants against the accused, then in the considered opinion of this Court, the application for grant of anticipatory bail would not be maintainable in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) 2 SCC 171 ." 8. S. 438 of Cri. P.C. says: "When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail." 9. In the case of Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 73 0 , The Supreme Court considered the scope of granting relief under Section 438 vis-a-vis to a person who was declared as an absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under: "12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as "absconder". Normally, when the accused is "absconding" and declared as a "proclaimed offender", there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. In para 12, this Court held as under: "12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as "absconder". Normally, when the accused is "absconding" and declared as a "proclaimed offender", there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant had been issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail." 10. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) AIR SC 626 = [2014] 2 SCC 171 = [2013] 8 Supreme 699, Accused Pradeep Sharma moved an application for anticipatory bail by before the High Court which was rejected on 01.08.2012 on the ground that custodial interrogation is necessary in the case. On 26.08.2012, charge-sheet was filed in the court of C.J.M., Chhindwara against four person, whereas the investigation in respect of Pradeep Sharma, Sudhir Sharma and Gudda alias Naresh Raghuvanshi (absconding accused) continued since the very date of the incident. On 21.11.2012, arrest warrants were issued against Pradeep Sharma, Sudhir Sharma and Gudda alias Naresh Raghuvanshi but the same were returned to the Court without service. Since the accused persons were not traceable, on 29.11.2012, a proclamation under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code') was issued against them for their appearance to answer the complaint. Instead of appealing the order dated 01.08.2012, Pradeep Sharma filed another application for anticipatory bail before the High Court. Vide order dated 10.01.2013, the High Court granted anticipatory bail to Pradeep Sharma . Similarly, another accused- Gudda alias Naresh Raghuvanshi was granted anticipatory bail by the High Court vide order dated 17.01.2013. The only question was before the Supreme Court for consideration "whether the High Court was justified in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code to the respondents / accused when the investigation is pending, particularly, when both the accused had been absconding all along and not co-operating with the investigation". The Supreme Court in para 16 (of SCC), referred the para 12 of Lavesh Vs. The Supreme Court in para 16 (of SCC), referred the para 12 of Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 73 0 = (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1040 , and said that "it is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder / proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail". Again in para 17 the court said that :- ".....................warrants were issued on 21.11.2012 for the arrest of the respondents herein. Since they were not available / traceable, a proclamation under Section 82 of the Code was issued on 29.11.2012. The documents (Annexure-P13) produced by the State clearly show that the CJM, Chhindwara, M.P. issued a proclamation requiring the appearance of both the respondents / accused under Section 82 of the Code to answer the complaint on 29.12.2012. All these materials were neither adverted to nor considered by the High Court while granting anticipatory bail and the High Court, without indicating any reason except stating "facts and circumstances of the case", granted an order of anticipatory bail to both the accused. It is relevant to point out that both the accused are facing prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B read with Section 34 of IPC. In such serious offences, particularly, the respondents/accused being proclaimed offenders, we are unable to sustain the impugned orders of granting anticipatory bail. The High Court failed to appreciate that it is a settled position of law that where the accused has been declared as an absconder and has not co-operated with the investigation, he should not be granted anticipatory bail." 11. In Ghanshyam Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC-20105 / 2016 dt. 29-11-2016 [Jabalpur] the Objector had placed the order dated 6.10.2016 by which a proclamation U/s.82 of Cr.P.C. was issued by the C.J.M. The applicant on the other hand had challenged the said order by way of oral submissions stating that the said order was passed without even issuing notice requiring the presence of the applicant on the designated day before the Court without which such a proclamation U/s.82 cannot even be passed. The Single Bench said that 30 days period or proclamation requiring his presence at such specified place and time has not been given to the applicant therefore said order, prima-facie is not a proclamation as per law U/s.82 of the Cr.P.C. The Court observed as under :- "On perusing the said order, I find that the application to have the applicant proclaimed as an absconder U/s.82 was moved by the Police on 6.10.2016 itself and on the basis of the submission of the Police alone, on the same day, the learned Court below had issued the proclamation against the applicant and thereafter given him an opportunity of appearing before the Court to oppose the proceeding U/s.83 which relate to the attachment of the property of a person so absconding. Section 82 sub-section (1) is a pre-condition which has to be followed by the Court below before passing an order U/s.82 which would require the Court to publish a written proclamation requiring such an absconder to appear at a specified place at a specified time which would not be less than 30 days from the date of publishing the proclamation and if the absconder does not respond to the same then as per Section 82(4) the Court may, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce such a person as a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect. However, while going through the order, it is evident that 30 days period or proclamation requiring his presence at such specified place and time has not been given to the applicant herein. Under the circumstance, I am inclined to agree with the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicant that the said order, prima-facie is not a proclamation as per law U/s.82 of the Cr.P.C. Under the circumstances, the judgments of the Supreme Court in Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 73 0 and State of M.P. Vs. Pradeep Sharma, (2014) 2 SCC 171 , which prohibits the grant of anticipatory bail to proclaimed offender will not apply in the facts and circumstances of this case." 12. In the case of Om Prakash Agrawal Vs. The State of M.P., MCRC No. 9654 of 2016 decided by Indore Bench on 18.11.2016 The State opposes the application on the ground that the applicant was absconding. In the case of Om Prakash Agrawal Vs. The State of M.P., MCRC No. 9654 of 2016 decided by Indore Bench on 18.11.2016 The State opposes the application on the ground that the applicant was absconding. Even after filing of charge-sheet, he could not be arrested by the police and for this purpose, reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon'lbe Apex Court in case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep sharma, (2014) AIR SC 626 . The Court give the benefit of provision under section 438 of Cr.P.C., and observed that the respondent could not point out a single paper by which it is apparent that when any attempt was made to arrest the present applicant, he was not found by the arresting officer. He was never declared proclaimed offender by the competent court, and therefore, merely because the police did not arrest him during the investigation, it cannot be assumed that he was avoiding his arrest during this period . 13. In reference to section 438 of Cr.P.C., in Bharat Chaudhary and another Appellants v. State of Bihar and another, (2003) AIR SC 4662 =MANU/SC/0787/2003 = (2003) 8 SCC 77 [8.10.2003], the Apex Court has held in categorical terms that even after taking cognizance of complaint by the trial Court or after filing of charge-sheet by the Investigating Agency , a person can move an application for anticipatory bail and Section 438 of Cr.P.C., nowhere prohibits the Court concerned from grant of anticipatory bail in appropriate case . The Court observed in para 7 that :- "7. From the perusal of this part of S. 438 of the Cr. P.C., we find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power in a suitable case either by the Court of Sessions, High Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or charge-sheet is filed. The object of S. 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a Court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the concerned Courts from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The object of S. 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a Court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a charge-sheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the concerned Courts from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial interrogation, but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the concerned Courts while entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or filing of chargesheet cannot by themselves be construed as a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the Courts i.e. the Court of Sessions, High Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory bail in non-bailable offences under S. 438 of the Crl. P.C. even when cognizance is taken or charge-sheet is filed provided the facts of the case require the Court to do so." The Court again refered the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 667 , and said in 9 :- "9. From a careful reading of the said judgment we do not find any restriction or absolute bar on the concerned Court granting anticipatory bail even in cases where either cognizance has been taken or a charge-sheet has been filed. This judgment only lays down a guideline that while considering the prima facie case against an accused the factum of cognizance having been taken and the laying of charge-sheet would be of some assistance for coming to the conclusion whether the claimant for an anticipatory bail is entitled for such bail or not." 14. In Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) AIR SC 1225 = (2010) 1 SCC 684 [15.12.2009], the High Court dismissed the application with the observations that in the facts and circumstances, the case of the petitioner cannot said to have improved with the filing of the challan against him when prima facie case has been found against the accused. But the Apex Court said that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. But the Apex Court said that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The application for anticipatory bail has been rejected without considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground that the challan has now been presented. The Apex Court in categorical terms held that anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested , meaning thereby maintainability of an application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. does not lie at the mercy of any Investigating Agency / Officer or any other consideration including provisions of Cr.P.C . as tried to be projected by the respondent. The Court said :- "8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in his 41st Report dated 24.09.1969. The recommendations were considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : ( AIR 1980 SC 1632 ) . Upon consideration of the entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested. When the application is made to the High Court or Court of Session it must apply its own mind on the question and decide when the case is made out for granting such relief. .........." The Apex Court further said in para 10 that the salutary provision contained in Section 438 Cr.P.C. was introduced to enable the Court to prevent the deprivation of personal liberty. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on technicalities such as "the challan having been presented anticipatory bail cannot be granted". The Court noticed the following observations made by Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh, (1980) AIR SC 1632 , Para 26 (supra) : "We find a great deal of substance in Mr. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on technicalities such as "the challan having been presented anticipatory bail cannot be granted". The Court noticed the following observations made by Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh, (1980) AIR SC 1632 , Para 26 (supra) : "We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi, (1978) AIR SC 597 , that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not to be found therein." 15. In Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi vs. The State, (1986) CriLJ 1303 , the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court also said in para 13 that filing of a charge sheet by the police and issuing of a warrant by the Magistrate do not put an end to the power to grant bail u/S.438(1). In Smt. Sheik Khasim Bi vs. The State, (1986) CriLJ 1303 , the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court also said in para 13 that filing of a charge sheet by the police and issuing of a warrant by the Magistrate do not put an end to the power to grant bail u/S.438(1). On the other hand, the High Court or the Court of Session has power to grant anticipatory bail u/S.438(1) to a person after the criminal court has taken cognizance of the case and has issued process viz., the warrant of arrest of that accused person. 16. In Nirbhay Singh and another Applicants v. The State of M.P., (1995) CriLJ 3317 , [Full Bench of M.P. High Court] the police registered a case against two accused on the information furnished by the complaint. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the two accused. Thereafter, the first informant filed a private complaint before the Court concerned alleging that he had laid information with the police against seven persons, but information was recorded only against two persons and this was done so to help the other persons to escape the process of law. The complaint was, therefore, directed against the remaining five persons. The learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statement of the complaint and the statement of other witnesses produced, took cognizance and directed issue of non-bailable warrant against the five accused under Sec. 204, of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (for short 'the code'). Thereafter, two among the five accused had filed the application under Section 438, Cr. P.C. The Full Bench held that anticipatory bail can be granted even after Magistrate issued process or at stage of committal of to Sessions Court or even at subsequent stage . An application under Section 438, Cr. P.C. would be maintainable even after the Magistrate issued process under Section 204 or at the stage of committal of the case to the Sessions Court or even at a subsequent stage, if circumstances justify the invocation of the provision. However, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code is to be freely exercised without reference to the nature and gravity of the offence alleged, the possible sentence may be ultimately imposed, the possibility of interference with the investigation or the witnesses and public interest. 17. In Balveer Singh Bundela Vs. However, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code is to be freely exercised without reference to the nature and gravity of the offence alleged, the possible sentence may be ultimately imposed, the possibility of interference with the investigation or the witnesses and public interest. 17. In Balveer Singh Bundela Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,MANU/MP/0830/2020 [MCRC No. 5621/2020 Decided on 12.05.2020 - Gwalior Bench] the accused was declared as absconder and award of Rs. 5,000/- was declared by the Superintendent of Police as per Police Regulation 789. It was argue by the State that the applicant is required for investigation. Rs.5,000/- as award has been declared by the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior over his arrest vide proclamation dated 30-01-2020 as per M.P. Police Regulations, para 80 and the fact that several Farari Panchnamas are being prepared against him for ensuring his appearance but he did not submit, therefore, he is absconding and therefore his bail application be dismissed accordingly. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Lavesh (supra) and Pradeep Sharma(supra). The Court heard the arguments upon the following two questions :- "(i) Whether after being declared as an absconder under Section 82/83 of Cr.P.C. or by police through Farari Panchnama or through declaration of cash award for apprehension of accused, his application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. seeking anticipatory bail before High Court or Sessions Court is maintainable or not ? (ii) Whether application for anticipatory bail is barred even after filing of charge-sheet ?" The single bench referred the various judgments and held that anticipatory bail application is maintainable even after filing of charge sheet, till the person is arrested as per the mandate of Apex Court in the cases of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. Vs. The State of Punjab, (1980) AIR SC 1632 , Sushila Aggarwal and others Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another in SLP (Criminal) Nos.7281-7282 / 2017 passed on 29-01-2020, Bharat Chaudhary and another Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2003) 8 SCC 77 and Ravindra Saxena Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684 . Vs. The State of Punjab, (1980) AIR SC 1632 , Sushila Aggarwal and others Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another in SLP (Criminal) Nos.7281-7282 / 2017 passed on 29-01-2020, Bharat Chaudhary and another Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2003) 8 SCC 77 and Ravindra Saxena Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684 . The Court said that so far as maintainability of anticipatory bail is concerned, it is maintainable even the person is declared absconder under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. but on merits case would be governed by the judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case of Lavesh Vs. State (NCT Of Delhi), 2012 8 SCC 73 . Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. is transient provision subject to finality of proceedings as provided under Sections, 84, 85 and 86 of Cr.P.C. In para 24 and 25, the Court said :- "24. From the discussion of judgments of Constitution Bench in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. and Sushila Aggarwal (supra) as well as judgment of Apex Court in the case of Bharat Chaudhary and Ravindra Saxena (supra), it is apparently clear that no bar can exist against a person seeking anticipatory bail. In other words application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is maintainable even after filing of charge-sheet or till the person is not arrested. 25. It is to be kept in mind that Personal Liberty of an individual as ensured by Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is embodiment of Article 21 of Constitution of India in Cr.P.C. Therefore, scope and legislative intent of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is to be seen from that vantage point." The single bench quoted the para 12 of Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 73 0 , and said in para 28,29 & 31 as under :- "28. The word 'Entitled' used in the above referred para of Lavesh (supra) itself suggests that it talks mainly about entitlement on merits and not about maintainability. Perusal of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. makes it very clear that four factors as enumerated into Section 438(1) of Cr.P.C. contemplates four different exigencies in which factor (iii) refers the "possibility of the applicant to flee from justice" and consequence to this factor is 'Abconsion of person' or 'his Concealment' from Investigating Agency. 29. Perusal of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. makes it very clear that four factors as enumerated into Section 438(1) of Cr.P.C. contemplates four different exigencies in which factor (iii) refers the "possibility of the applicant to flee from justice" and consequence to this factor is 'Abconsion of person' or 'his Concealment' from Investigating Agency. 29. In other words if chance of fleeing from justice exists then application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. can be rejected and when a person is declared as proclaimed offender as per Section 82 of Cr.P.C. it means that factor (iii) of Section 438 (1) of Cr.P.C. manifested in reality or in other words possibility of applicant to flee from justice converted into reality. To put it differently, Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is manifestation of "Apprehension" as contained in Section 438 (1) factor (iii) of Cr.P.C. The judgments pronounced by the Apex Court in the case of Lavesh and Pradeep Sharma (supra) nowhere bar the maintainability of the application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. in wake of person being declared as absconder under Sections 82 and 83 of Cr.P.C. and understandably so because this would not have been in consonance with letter and spirit of Constitution Bench judgment of Apex Court pronounced in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. (supra) and Sushila Aggarwal and others (supra) as well as two Judge Bench of Apex Court in the case of Bharat Chaudhary and another (supra) as well as Ravindra Saxena (supra) because these judgments categorically held that anticipatory bail is maintainable even after filing of charge-sheet and till the person is not arrested. 31. Therefore, Apex Court in the case of Lavesh and Pradeep Sharma (supra) impliedly referred the factor (iii) of Section 438 (1) of Cr.P.C. and its different fallouts because according to Apex Court, a person who is proclaimed offender under Sections 82 and 83 of Cr.P.C. loses the sheen on merits to seek anticipatory bail. His application deserves dismissal on merits if he is declared as absconder under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. but application is certainly maintainable. His application deserves dismissal on merits if he is declared as absconder under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. but application is certainly maintainable. Even otherwise, because the proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 of Cr.P.C. are transient/interim/provisional in nature and subject to proceedings under Section 84 (at the instance of any person other then proclaimed offender having interest in the attach property), Section 85 (at the instance of proclaimed offender himself) and Section 86 [Appeal against the order (under Section 85 rejecting application for restoration of attach property]. Even Section 84 (4) of Cr.P.C. gives power to the objector to institute a suit to establish the right which he claims in respect of property in dispute. Therefore, all these provisions render the proceedings under Section 82/83 of Cr.P.C. transient or intermediary and on the basis of transient provision, valuable right of personal liberty of an individual at least to seek anticipatory bail cannot be curtailed. Therefore, on this count also, application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. is maintainable even if a person has been declared as proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of Cr.P.C. ". The Court again said that submission of learned counsel for the complainant lacks merits so far as maintainability of application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. qua Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is concerned. Even otherwise proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. are not given effect to yet and only cash award of Rs.5,000/- by Superintendent of Police has been declared. Said factor can certainly be an important consideration while deciding anticipatory bail application but not having overriding effect to create a bar for filing anticipatory bail application. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, even if the police authority has declared award or prepared Farari Panchnama even then anticipatory bail application is maintainable, however, it is to be seen on merits that whether that application deserves to be considered and allowed as per the factors enumerated in Section 438 of Cr.P.C. itself and if any of those factors are not satisfied then the Court certainly has discretion to reject it. The said discretion has been given by Constitutional Bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. (supra) 18. The word 'Entitled' used in the case of Lavesh and Pradeep Sharma (supra). The said discretion has been given by Constitutional Bench decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc. (supra) 18. The word 'Entitled' used in the case of Lavesh and Pradeep Sharma (supra). Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid discussion of laws that "Tenability of application" and "Entitlement to get the bail" are different. If an application is "not-tenable' then the Court cannot considered the facts of the case and bound to reject the application outright upon the ground of tenability. If the application is tenable, then the Court will consider the merits ,facts and other circumstances of the case. In the aforesaid situation, the Court may grant or refused the anticipatory bail. 19. S o far as maintainability of anticipatory bail is concerned, it is maintainable even the person is declared absconder under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. but on merits case would be governed by the judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case of Lavesh Vs. State (NCT Of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 73 . There is no any restrictions in the law about the tenability of the application by the accused, who is absconded or against whom the challan has been filed by showing him as an 'absconded accused'. In the aforesaid situation, it may be presumed that the investigation is going on against the aforesaid absconded accused. When he will arrest, then supplementary charge-sheet in the shape of additional evidence will be filed. 20. In this case the trial Court dismissed the application only upon the ground of tenability, while as per aforesaid law, application was tenable. Trial Court was required to see the merits of the case. If the accused is absconded than definitely it may be a ground for dismissal of application, but it cannot be treated as a bar for the purpose of tenability of application in the light of settled law of Hon'ble Apex Court. 21. So far as present set of facts are concerned from the case Diary and the submissions it appears that the applicants are the father-in-law and the mother-in-law of the deceased. His son was married with the deceased on 29.06.2012. The deceased committed suicide after seven and half years on 05.12.2019. Allegations against all the accused persons are the same. The husband has been enlarged on bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. by this Court. 22. His son was married with the deceased on 29.06.2012. The deceased committed suicide after seven and half years on 05.12.2019. Allegations against all the accused persons are the same. The husband has been enlarged on bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. by this Court. 22. In reference to the present applicants, by order dated 02.06.2020, information was called from the trial Court. In compliance of the aforesaid direction, the trial Court seeks the information from the JMFC, Rewa (Sweta Parte) who give the information by letter No. 58/2020 dated 06.06.2020. As per the aforesaid information, no any proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 of Cr.P.C. has been initiated against the present applicants. Only permanent arrest warrant No. 01/20 has been issued on 28.02.2020. Thereafter, the case committed to the Court of the Sessions. 23. Therefore, it appears that when the challan was filed at that time the applicants were not arrested. Therefore, the challan was filed against the accused Jitendra who was under custody. The Magistrate took the cognizance and issued the permanent arrest warrant against present applicants because their names were shown in the challan as an "absconded accused". Neither the police nor the Court initiated any proceedings under Section 82 and 83 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, if the police was unable to arrest the accused persons then only upon the aforesaid facts, it cannot be said that the applicants were absconded. 24. Because the husband has been enlarged on bail and the allegations are same against all persons, then applicants are also entitled to get the bail upon the ground of parity. It is also appears that the husband was arrested and granted bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. while the applicants are preying for anticipatory bail U/s 438 of Cr.P.C.. In this case it appears that no custodial interrogation is required. The Substantive evidence has been collected in the shape of statements of parents of the deceased and other witnesses. The applicants having no any criminal background. 25. Therefore, in the overall circumstances of the case in view of this Court applicants are entitled to get the anticipatory bail. Therefore, application is allowed. It is ordered that :- (i) Both applicants will surrender before the Trial Court within 20 days from the order of this Court. The applicants having no any criminal background. 25. Therefore, in the overall circumstances of the case in view of this Court applicants are entitled to get the anticipatory bail. Therefore, application is allowed. It is ordered that :- (i) Both applicants will surrender before the Trial Court within 20 days from the order of this Court. (ii) Thereafter, the court shall release them upon their furnishing a bail bond Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand Only) each and a personal bond of the same amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. (iii) The Trial Court will also inform the Investigation Officer and will give the proper opportunity to submit the additional evidence (if any) against present applicants as per section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.. 26. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of.