JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual quality. I.A.No.2187 of 2020 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 235 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. Heard. In view of the submissions made on behalf of the parties and the averments made in the interlocutory application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, I.A.No.2187 of 2020 is allowed and delay of 235 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No.719 of 2019 The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent of High Court of Judicature at Patna directed against the order/judgment dated 24.01.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.5008 of 2010, whereby and whereunder, the order of punishment has been declined to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are required to be referred herein, which reads as hereunder:- The appellant-writ petitioner while working as Constable under the Central Industrial Security Force at Bokaro, was suspended vide order dated 06.10.2008 in contemplation of departmental proceeding. Subsequently, charge-sheet was issued on 19.11.2008 with a direction to appear before the Enquiry Officer and put-forth his defence, in pursuance thereto, writ petitioner has appeared before the Enquiry Officer and submitted his response in his defence by denying the charges leveled against him but the Enquiry Officer has found the reply unsatisfactory and found the charge proved which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and imposed the punishment by withholding the annual increment of two years with cumulative effect. The said order has been affirmed by the appellant authority as also the revisional authority. The writ petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the orders of punishment which has been declined to be interfered with, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 3. Mrs. The said order has been affirmed by the appellant authority as also the revisional authority. The writ petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the orders of punishment which has been declined to be interfered with, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 3. Mrs. Jasvindar Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner has submitted that the order of punishment suffers from material irregularities since the defence which has been put-forth by the writ petitioner has not properly been considered by the Enquiry Officer as also the nature of offence is not so serious warranting the disciplinary authority to impose punishment which is major in nature which has not been considered by the learned Single Judge, hence, the order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of law. 4. Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned A.C. to A.S.G.I. appearing for the respondents-CISF, has vehemently argued by defending the impugned decision of the respondents authorities as also the order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge by referring to the memorandum of charge, which according to him is serious in nature. He further submits that defence has been considered by the Enquiry Officer as would be evident from the enquiry report, wherein, the charges have been found to be proved. The disciplinary authority taking into consideration the nature of allegation, has accepted the enquiry report and after following the position of law by issuing the 2nd show cause and on consideration of reply, has passed the order of punishment which is in proportion to the offence committed by the writ petitioner. His further submission is that the order passed by the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the appellate authority as also the revisional authority and since there are three concurrent findings which have been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge and rightly not been interfered with. In view of the aforesaid argument, it has been submitted that the order impugned requires no interference. 5. In view of the aforesaid argument, it has been submitted that the order impugned requires no interference. 5. This Court after having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of rival submissions advanced on their behalf as also the material available on record and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, deem it fit and proper to refer the imputation of charge as contained in the memorandum of charge, wherefrom, it is evident that altogether three charges have been leveled against the writ petitioner. The first charge is that in course of coming to duty on 05.10.2008 in 2nd half, the writ petitioner has not come from the government vehicle rather he has reported on duty from the private vehicle (motorcycle). The second charge is that a motorcycle being Registration No.JH-07-A-1590 was purchased by the writ petitioner in the year 2002 but no information to that effect has been furnished to the Office which is contrary to the Rule 18(3) of the CCS Conduct Rules, 1964. The third charge is that on 05.10.2008, when he was going to his residence on private motorcycle along with one Constable, namely, Dilbag Singh by keeping one suspicious article in between him and Dilbag Singh and when on suspicion, he was intercepted by the QRT Constables, instead of stopping the motorcycle, they had flee away by accelerating the motorcycle, which has been found to be suspicious and with the connivance of Constable Dilbag Singh only for the purpose of stealing the articles of the Company. The writ petitioner was asked to appear before the Enquiry Officer, wherein, depositions have been laid down by the different prosecution witnesses who have been cross-examined by the writ petitioner and after due deliberation of the material put-forth before the Enquiry Officer, the charges have been found to be proved. 6. We have perused the enquiry report, wherefrom it is evident that the Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved. The disciplinary authority has accepted the said enquiry report and issued second show cause notice which has duly been responded but the reply having not been found to be satisfactory, therefore, the disciplinary authority has came to the conclusive finding of accepting the enquiry report and in pursuance thereto, the order of punishment has been passed, withholding the annual increment of two years with cumulative effect. The said order passed by the disciplinary authority, has been affirmed by the appellate as also the revisional authority. It is, therefore, the admitted fact herein that the writ petitioner has been provided with all opportunities to defend his case and all procedures as required to be followed, was followed. In such circumstances, can this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India be interfered with the conclusive decision of the administrative authority in exercise of power of judicial review as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? It is settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got limited scope in showing interference in the decision taken by the authorities. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 , wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India Vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr., reported in (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali, reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down the guidelines at paragraph-8 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali, reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down the guidelines at paragraph-8 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; 13.(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." It also requires to refer herein the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue of quantum of punishment dealing with the case of the employees working in the financial institutions like the bank, holding therein that the bankers are supposed to perform their duty with utmost sincerity and integrity and they are to be treated differently to the other civil servants on the ground that they are dealing with the public money. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. Vs. P.C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 , which reads hereunder as: “14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [ (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” It is equally settled that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the power of judicial review with respect to the quantum of punishment if the punishment is found to be disproportionate to the gravity of charge shocking the conscience of the Court. Simultaneously, it is also settled that on sympathy there should not be any interference in the quantum of punishment if the charge is grave one and the same has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer. Otherwise, if any, interference would be shown leaving apart the gravity of charge, same will be an example of misplaced sympathy towards the delinquent employee, as has been decided by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Bank Ltd Vs. A.L. Mohan Rao reported in (2006) 1 SCC 63 , wherein it has been observed that it is not for the Courts to interfere in cases of gross misconduct of this nature with decision of disciplinary authority, on any mistaken notion of sympathy, so long as inquiry has been fair and proper, and misconduct proved. In such matter it is for disciplinary authority to decide what is the fit punishment? Further in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors Vs. J. Hussain, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 106 , it has been held at paragraph 16, which reads hereunder as: "16. In the present case, it cannot be imputed that the departmental authorities while imposing the punishment acted in a manner which manifests lack of reasonableness or fairness. In Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. A.L. Mohan Rao [ (2006) 1 SCC 63 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 59] , charge against the delinquent employee was that he had colluded with one of the Branch Managers and enabled grant of fictitious loan. The High Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement on sympathetic ground even when it found that the misconduct was proved. This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that the courts should not be guided by misplaced sympathy or continuity ground, as a factor in judicial review while examining the quantum of punishment." It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the guidelines has been framed by the Hon’ble Apex Court by laying down the ratio warranting interference in the matter of punishment on conclusion of the departmental proceeding. It is evident that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not expected to exercise the power of judicial review, if there is no perversity, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. It is evident that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not expected to exercise the power of judicial review, if there is no perversity, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali (supra), save and except, in a condition where the quantum of punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of offence committed. 7. This Court on the basis of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and on appreciation of the factual aspects involved in this case, is of the view that the charge having been found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer which has duly been accepted by the disciplinary authority as also the writ petitioner has been provided with all due opportunities to put-forth his defence, therefore, the decision of the administrative authority is not coming under the fold of guidelines, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments as referred above and therefore, not inclined to interfere with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, which has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the cases of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. Vs., P.C. Kakkar (supra), Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vrs. A.L. Mohan Rao, (supra) and Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan and Ors. Vs. J. Hussain, (supra) that if interference can be made on the quantum of punishment, the same will lead to misplaced sympathy and therefore, we have proceeded to examine the nature of allegation to come to the conclusion as to whether any interference can be made in the quantum of punishment or not? Admittedly, herein the writ petitioner is a member of disciplined force and as such, being the member of disciplined force, it is expected from him to perform his duty with utmost sincerity and in accordance with rules and norms, but as would be evident from the charges which has been found to be proved that he has came to Office not from the government vehicle rather from his private motorcycle which is contrary to the order of competent authority. Further, he has purchased the motorcycle being Registration No. JH-07-A-1590 but no information to that effect has been furnished to the Office, which is required to be furnished under the provision of Rule 18(3) of the CCS Rules, 1964. Further, as would be evident from the charges no.3 that while he was going to his residence from duty on his private motorcycle along with one Constable Dilbag Singh keeping some articles in between him and the said Constable Dilbag Singh but when they were intercepted, instead of staying, they had flee away by accelerating the speed of the motorcycle, where it also shows the action which is not expected from the member of the disciplined force. These three charges have been proved by the Enquiry Officer and as such, according to our considered view, the nature of charges are serious in nature keeping the fact into consideration that the writ petitioner is the member of disciplined force, in that view of the matter, the order of punishment of withholding the annual increment of two years with cumulative effect cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of charge. 8. According to our considered view, if in these circumstances any interference would be shown, so far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the same will lead nothing but to misplaced sympathy which will not be proper as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors. Vrs. J. Hussain (supra) and Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vrs. A.L. Mohan Rao (supra). 9. This Court on the basis of the aforesaid reasons, is of the view that the learned Single Judge showing no interference with the order of punishment as also the order passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority, has committed no error. 10. Accordingly, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. 11. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.