JUDGMENT : 1. In Sessions Trial No. 125 of 2006, the appellants, namely, John Kerketta and Silbrius Kerketta have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/- each under section 302/34 IPC and section 201/34 of Indian Penal Code by way of consolidated punishment. 2. At this stage itself it needs to be indicated that under the Code there is no concept of “consolidated punishment”. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Simdega has committed an error – but not fatal – in not awarding separate sentence under section 302/34 IPC and section 201/34 IPC. This was necessary also for the reason that the maximum punishment prescribed under section 201/34 IPC is RI for seven years. 3. The case of the prosecution is that daughter of the informant, namely, Anima Lakra had love affair with Silbrius Kerketta for about one year but later on Silbrius Kerketta refused to marry her and for that reason for quite some time his daughter was not seeing Silbrius Kerketta, the appellant No.2. On 15.09.2006 Anima Lakra went to the house of the appellant No.2 with him and on 20.09.2006 her dead body was found hanging with a Mahua tree. The informant has alleged that the appellant No.2 with the help of his friend has committed murder of his daughter. On the basis of his fardbeyan which was recorded on 21.09.2006 at about 13:00 hrs., Kurdeg P.S. Case No. 50 of 2006 was registered against the appellant No.2 under section 302 and 201 read with section 34 IPC. As during course of investigation complicity of the appellant No.1 has surfaced a charge-sheet was filed against both the appellants. They have faced the trial under section 302/34 IPC for committing murder of Anima Lakra and section 201/34 IPC for causing disappearance of her dead body. 4. During the trial, the prosecution has examined seventeen witnesses; the informant is PW-15. 5. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Simdega has held that the prosecution has proved the charges against the appellants who have committed murder of Anima Lakra in furtherance of their common intention and to give it colour of suicide they hanged her dead body with a Mahua tree. 6. Mr. 5. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Simdega has held that the prosecution has proved the charges against the appellants who have committed murder of Anima Lakra in furtherance of their common intention and to give it colour of suicide they hanged her dead body with a Mahua tree. 6. Mr. H.K. Shikarwar, the learned counsel, who appears for the appellant No.1, submits that during the trial the prosecution did not lead any evidence on complicity of the appellant No.1 in the crime except a bald statement of PW-11 that in the evening of 19.09.2006 he has seen both the appellants going towards the house of the appellant No.2. 7. Appearing for the appellant No.2, Mr. J.J. Sanga, the learned counsel contends that may be there is strong suspicion against the appellant No.2 due to his intimate relationship with Anima Lakra and since he has refused to marry her but the chain of circumstances proved by the prosecution against him is not complete, inasmuch as, there is no evidence on the appellant No.2 and Anima Lakra going towards the place of occurrence and the prosecution has failed to disclose where and how death of Anima Lakra has been caused. 8. To prove the charges against the appellants the prosecution has laid evidence on: (i) love affair between Anima Lakra and the appellant No.2, (ii) reluctance and refusal of the appellant No.2 to marry her, (iii) medical evidence on homicidal death of Anima Lakra, and (iv) motive. 9. The law on circumstantial evidence is by now well-settled. It is not necessary that the principal fact (factum probandum) is proved by direct evidence rather it may be proved through interferences drawn from factum probandum. However, an interference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating circumstances are found to be incompatible with innocence of the accused and the circumstances from which an interference of guilt of an accused are drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and these must be closely connected with the principal fact, that is, murder in this case. In “Bhagat Ram versus State of Punjab” reported in AIR 1954 SC 621 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when a case depends upon the conclusions drawn from the circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt. 10. In “Gambhir Vs. State of Maharashtra” reported in (1982) 2 SCC 351 , the Supreme Court has explained the law on circumstantial evidence, thus; “9. ..................When a case rests upon the circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 11. To fortify his submissions, Mr. J.J. Sanga, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant No.2 has relied on the decision in “Chandru alias Chandrasekaran versus State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police CB CID and others” reported in (2019) 15 SCC 666 , but we find that this judgment is of no avail to the appellant. In this case also the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the age old law on circumstantial evidence as enunciated in the aforesaid judgments. 12. PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-11, PW-13 and PW-15 have spoken about love affair of the appellant No.2 with Anima Lakra. PW-13 is the mother of Anima Lakra and PW-15 is her father. Other witnesses are the co-villagers. They all have deposed in the Court in unison that the appellant No.2 had intimate relationship with the deceased. Some of them have also stated that the appellant No.2 had promised to marry her but later on he refused. There was a Panchayati held in which the parents of Anima Lakra and family members of the appellant No.2 — his mother and brother – had participated and it was decided that during X-mas period marriage of the appellant No.2 with Anima Lakra would be performed and till the time she goes with the appellant No.2 to his house, his parents would maintain her while she would remain at her parents place. PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-13 have stated in the Court that the appellant No.2 had refused to marry Anima Lakra and that was the reason Panchayati was held in the village. 13. On such evidence, the prosecution has proved motive on the part of the appellant No.2. 14. Generally, motive does not play an important role in a case based on direct evidence except where the prosecution evidence is not such that the trial Judge can form a definite opinion and, therefore, he turns to the motive part of the case, but in a case based on circumstantial evidence motive played an important role. In “Surinder Pal Jain Vs. Delhi Administration” reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 681, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “11. …… In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes pertinent significance as existence of the motive is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in such a case. The absence of motive, however, puts the court on its guard to scrutinise the circumstances more carefully to ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not take place of legal proof.” 15. On 21.09.2006, Dr. Sarwar Alam- PW-14 has conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Anma Lakra and observed the following: “On External Examination: Face and neck of deceased was swollen, venous engorgement was present on upper part of chest, eyes were closed, blood oozing from nostrils and ears, tongue was protruded from mouth. Maggots were present on neck and scalp. Two ligature marks were present amongst them on which lower. It was in circle all around the neck and another which was above was ascending in occipital region. On Internal Examination: On opening chest cavity the lungs pale, heart chambers empty, all the abdominal viscera pale, no food particles present in stomach, uterus was non gravid.” 16. With the help of the Inquest Report, Post-mortem Report and testimony of PW-14, the prosecution has proved that Anima Lakra has died homicidal death. 17. The father of the deceased has disowned his fardbeyan and therefore he was declared hostile, but, in his examination-in-chief he has stated that his daughter was in love with the appellant No.2 and a Panchayati was convened in the village. 17. The father of the deceased has disowned his fardbeyan and therefore he was declared hostile, but, in his examination-in-chief he has stated that his daughter was in love with the appellant No.2 and a Panchayati was convened in the village. The Investigating Officer has deposed in the Court that on 21.09.2006 he has recorded the fardbeyan of Albinus Lakra who after reading it and having understood the contents therein put his thumb impression on that. He has identified fardbeyan of the informant which was marked as Ext.4. 18. If a witness denies his previous statement then during cross-examination of the Investigating Officer his attention is drawn to the previous statement of the witness and if the Investigating Officer affirms that the witness had stated before him such facts which he has denied in the Court, the previous statement of the witness is proved. The law on the subject has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand” reported in (2015) 9 SCC 588 , in the following words: “19. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act when it is intended to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination. The attention of witness is drawn to that part and this must reflect in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no need to further proof of contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement and must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter when investigating officer is examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked for the purpose of contradiction, it will then be proved in the deposition of the investigating officer who again by referring to the police statement will depose about the witness having made that statement. The process again involves referring to the police statement and culling out that part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court cannot suo-motu make use of statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction”. 19. In view of the evidence of the Investigating Officer that he has recorded fardbeyan of the informant which was duly proved by him during the trial, we find that the prosecution has proved that the informant has given his fardbeyan to the Investigating Officer. Even otherwise also, the informant’s disowning his fardbeyan is not of much significance, for the First Information Report is not a substantive piece of evidence. 20. The prosecution has laid documentary evidence such as seizure list and post-mortem report. The Investigating Officer who has been examined as PW-16 has deposed about the objective findings and we find that there is almost no cross-examination of the Investigating Officer by the defence on the material aspects of the case. 21. The prosecution has laid evidence on last-seen-together through the parents of Anima Lakra and the co-villager Jorge Tiga- PW-11. Anima Lakra had left her home with the appellant No.2 on 15.09.2006 and between 16.09.2006 till the evening of 19.09.2006 she was seen by PW-11 in the house of the appellant No.2. The mother of the deceased who has stated that her daughter had love affair with the appellant No.2 and she was killed by throttling, in her cross-examination stated that on Tuesday she had gone to the house of the appellant No.2 to deliver Saree to her daughter. The mother of the deceased who has stated that her daughter had love affair with the appellant No.2 and she was killed by throttling, in her cross-examination stated that on Tuesday she had gone to the house of the appellant No.2 to deliver Saree to her daughter. This goes to show that till 19.09.2006 her daughter was in the house of the appellant No.2. The testimony of PW-11 would also disclose that between 16.09.2006 to 19.09.2006 Anima Lakra was seen residing in the house of the appellant No.2. On such evidence we find that the prosecution has successfully proved that Anima Lakra was lastly seen in the company of the appellant No.2 and soon thereafter her dead body was found hanging on a Mahua tree. 22. In “Navaneethakrishnan v. State”, (2018) 16 SCC 161 , the supreme court has held as under: 22. “………………. It is a settled legal position that the law presumes that it is the person, who was last seen with the deceased, would have killed the deceased and the burden to rebut the same lies on the accused to prove that they had departed. Undoubtedly, the last seen theory is an important event in the chain of circumstances that would completely establish and/or could point to the guilt of the accused with some certainty. However, this evidence alone cannot discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and requires corroboration.” 23. In the opinion of the doctor, Anima Lakra was killed by strangulation and thereafter her dead body was hanged. The death was caused within thirty-six hours from the time of post-mortem examination. Medical evidence thus establishes close proximity between the last-seen-together and the death of Anima Lakra. Since Anima Lakra was lastly seen in the company of the appellant No.2 till the evening of 19.09.2006 and immediately thereafter her dead body was found hanging on Mahua tree, possibility of any other person being author of the crime is very remote. The medical evidence rendered by PW-14 has also aided to satisfying the “proximity test” as indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Bodhraj alias Bodha and others” reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 . 24. As seen from the above discussions, the prosecution has produced sufficient corroborative evidence to support the last-seen story. 25. The medical evidence rendered by PW-14 has also aided to satisfying the “proximity test” as indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Bodhraj alias Bodha and others” reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 . 24. As seen from the above discussions, the prosecution has produced sufficient corroborative evidence to support the last-seen story. 25. We therefore hold that the chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution against the appellant No.2 is so complete that it leads to one and the only one conclusion that it was the appellant No.2 who has caused death of Anima Lakra. 26. On complicity of the appellant No.1, we find that there is absolutely no evidence laid by the prosecution during the trial. In “State of U.P. versus Ashok Kumar Srivastava” reported in (1992) 2 SCC 86 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidences relied on are reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. 27. The statement of PW-11 that in the evening of 19.09.2006 he has seen both the appellants going towards the house of the appellant No.2, in our opinion, is not even an incriminating circumstance and, therefore, we hold that conviction of the appellant No.1 under section 302/34 IPC and section 201/34 IPC is not sustainable and, accordingly, the appellant No.1, namely, John Kerketta is acquitted of the charges framed against him. 28. The appellant No.1 is on bail and, therefore, he is discharged of liability of the bail-bonds furnished by him. 29. As regards the appellant No.2, namely, Silbrius Kerketta this criminal appeal is dismissed. 30. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1174 of 2008 is partly allowed, in the above terms. 31. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith. 32. Let a copy of the judgment be communicated to the trial court through FAX.