JUDGMENT : B. Vijaysen Reddy, J. 1. The detention order vide SB(I) No. 170/PD-2/HYD/2019 dated 30.10.2019 passed against Varakala Narsimha @ Cherpata Narsimha S/o. V. Krishna, by the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, respondent No. 2, in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Amendment Act No. 13 of 2018) (for short 'the Act') and as approved by the State vide G.O. Rt. No. 100, General Administration (SPL) Law & Order Department dated 10.1.2020 are challenged in this writ of habeas corpus as being illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Mrs. Ravula Sowmya Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. T. Srikanth Reddy, learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detenu was falsely implicated in the crimes referred in the detention order. The detaining authority passed the impugned detention order on flimsy grounds without any basis in a mechanical manner and without application of mind. There is no material to substantiate and justify for treating the detenu as 'Goonda' within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. The crimes wherein the detenu is allegedly involved can be dealt with under ordinary law. Further, the alleged activities of the detenu come within the purview of maintenance of law and order and not public order. Hence, the impugned detention order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the detenu has been habitually committing offences including attempt to commit murder, hurt by using dangerous weapons, house trespass, sexual harassment and criminal intimidation in public places in the limits of Hyderabad Police Commissionerate, thus creating large scale fear, terror and panic among the people, thereby adversely affecting the public order. 5. The detaining authority has considered (5) offences committed by the detenu as antecedents, and (03) offences committed by him in the recent past have been considered as grounds for his detention. 5. The detaining authority has considered (5) offences committed by the detenu as antecedents, and (03) offences committed by him in the recent past have been considered as grounds for his detention. The three ground cases with relevant details as reflected in the detention order are shown as below: Crime No. and Date Police Station Offence Date of arrest Particulars of Bail Cr. No. 42 of 2019 Kulsumpura u/s. 324 IPC --- On 25.2.2019 the detenu surrendered before Kulsumpura Police and admitted his guilt Police served a notice u/s. 41(a) & (d) Cr.P.C. to the detenue and released him with directions to appear before the Court or Police whenever required Cr. No. 48 of 2019 Kulsumpura u/s. 354-A & B, 448, 504, 506 IPC 11.3.2019 (Through PT warrant) Detenu moved bail petition before the XVI ACMM, Hyderabad, on 31.5.2019 and the Magistrate granted bail to him and he was released from jail on bail vide release order Dis. No. 934/2019, dated 10.6.2019 Cr. No. 49 of 2019 Kulsumpura u/s. 323, 307 and 504 IPC 11.3.2019 Detenu moved second bail petition before the XVI ACMM, Hyderabad on 23.5.2019 and the Magistrate granted bail to him and he was released from jail on bail vide release order Dis. No. 883/2019, dated 31.5.2019 6. The detaining authority pointed out that the detenu has been granted bail in Cr. Nos. 48 of 2019 and 49 of 2019 of Kulsumpura P.S., and he was released on bail in both the cases. Hence, there is every possibility of his moving bail petition in Cr. No. 157 of 2016 of Kulsumpura P.S., and grant of bail by the Magistrate and on his consequent release from jail, there is an imminent possibility of his committing similar offences, which would be detrimental to public order. 7. Interestingly Cr. No. 157 of 2016 of Kulsumpura P.S., is not referred to as one of ground cases for the purpose of detention. As referred to above, the three ground cases are Cr. Nos. 42, 48 and 49 of 2019 of Kulsumpura P.S. It is mentioned that during the course of investigation in Cr. No. 49 of 2019 of Kulsumpura P.S., on 11.3.2019 Kulsumpura Police found him at Puranapul Dhobi Ghat, Musi River Bed, Hyderabad, and on interrogation detenu voluntarily confessed to have committed offence in Cr. No. 49 of 2019 and six more offences. No. 49 of 2019 of Kulsumpura P.S., on 11.3.2019 Kulsumpura Police found him at Puranapul Dhobi Ghat, Musi River Bed, Hyderabad, and on interrogation detenu voluntarily confessed to have committed offence in Cr. No. 49 of 2019 and six more offences. Further, the Kulsumpura Police executed the pending NBW in Cr. No. 157 of 2016 offence registered under Section 302 IPC of Kulsumpura P.S. on 17.7.2019 and remanded him to judicial custody. 8. The detaining authority having not chosen to rely upon Cr. No. 157 of 2016 as one of the ground cases for detention, yet referred to that crime stating that there is possibility of moving bail petition in the said crime, which shows there is non-application of mind. The previous crimes committed by the detenu are referred to show antecedent history or past conduct. The antecedent history, though can be taken into account for passing the detention order, it only serves the purpose of indicating the tendency of the detenu in indulging in prejudicial activities and nexus with the prejudicial activities referred to in the ground cases. Thus, antecedent history or past conduct serves a limited purpose. When the detaining authority has consciously chosen not to consider the Cr. No. 157 of 2016 as one of the ground cases and only referred it to point out antecedent history, the question of relying upon Cr. No. 157 of 2016 and further saying about the possibility of moving bail petition in the said crime does not arise at all. The reasoning given above is buttressed by the following judgments. Antecedent History/Ground Cases: The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hemalata Kantilala Shah v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1981) 4 SCC 647 , held at Para 12 as follows: "12. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. The reasoning given above is buttressed by the following judgments. Antecedent History/Ground Cases: The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hemalata Kantilala Shah v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1981) 4 SCC 647 , held at Para 12 as follows: "12. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a person that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or his act of violation of foreign exchange regulations and his smuggling activities are likely to have deleterious effect on the national economy." In Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others, (1975) 2 SCC 81 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Venkatarama, Ayyar, I, also pointed out in Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, 1956 SCR 644 , that construing the words 'grounds on which the order has been made' in their natural and ordinary sense, "they would include any information or material on which the order was based. The Oxford concise Dictionary gives the following meanings to the word 'ground' : 'Base, foundation, motive, valid reason'. On this definition, the materials on which the District Magistrate considered that an order of detention should be made could properly be described as grounds therefore". In Khaja Bilal Ahmed v. State of Telangana, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "24. In the present case, the order of detention states that the fourteen cases were referred to demonstrate the "antecedent criminal history and conduct of the appellant". The order of detention records that a "rowdy sheet" is being maintained at P.S. Rain Bazar of Hyderabad City and the appellant "could not mend his criminal way of life" and continued to indulge in similar offences after being released on bail. In the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court, the detaining authority recorded that these cases were "referred by way of his criminal background ... (and) are not relied upon". The detaining authority stated that the cases which were registered against the appellant between 2009 and 2016 "are not at all considered for passing the detention order" and were "referred by way of his criminal background only". This averment is plainly contradictory. (and) are not relied upon". The detaining authority stated that the cases which were registered against the appellant between 2009 and 2016 "are not at all considered for passing the detention order" and were "referred by way of his criminal background only". This averment is plainly contradictory. The order of detention does, as a matter of fact, refer to the criminal cases which were instituted between 2007 and 2016. In order to overcome the objection that these cases are stale and do not provide a live link with the order of detention, it was contended that they were not relied on but were referred to only to indicate the antecedent background of the detenu. If the pending cases were not considered for passing the order of detention, it defies logic as to why they were referred to in the first place in the order of detention." 9. It has been settled in a catena of decisions that preventive detention law cannot be invoked as a substitute to ordinary law. The order of preventive detention has to be passed as a last resort when the activities of the detenu cannot be controlled under ordinary law. It is imperative for the authorities to specify clearly that prosecution of the detenu under ordinary law is not having deterrent effect on him and thus, the preventive detention laws are invoked. In Sudhir Kumar Saha v. The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, (1970) 1 SCC 149 , it was held in Para 7 as under: "7. The freedom of the individual is of utmost importance in any civilized society. It is a human right. Under our Constitution, it is a guaranteed right. It can be deprived of only by due process of law. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under exceptional circumstances. It is wrong to consider the same, as the executive appears to have done in the present case, that it is a convenient substitute for the ordinary process of law. It can be deprived of only by due process of law. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under exceptional circumstances. It is wrong to consider the same, as the executive appears to have done in the present case, that it is a convenient substitute for the ordinary process of law. The detention of the petitioner under the circumstances of this case appears to be a gross misuse of the power conferred under the Preventive Detention Act." The High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in C. Neela v. State of Telangana, 2017 (2) ALD (Crl.) 760, held as under: "...Preventive detention of a person is an extreme measure resorted to by the State when ordinary criminal law is found not adequate to control his activities which cause disturbance to public order. Article 21 of the Constitution of India ordains that no citizen shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Under ordinary criminal laws, several safeguards are available to him such as, his arrest only in connection with cognizable/non-bailable offences and permitting him to apply for bail etc. The preventive detention laws have been conceived in order to control the activities of a person which tend to disturb public order as opposed to law and order and the procedural safeguards prescribed by the ordinary criminal laws are not available to the detenu under preventive detention laws. In Shashi Agarwal v. State of U.P., (1998) 1 SCC 436, it was held as under: "Every citizen in this country has the right to have recourse to law. He has the right to move the Court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the State thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose the grant of bail. He cannot, however, be interdicted from moving the Court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the Court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order." 10. The possibility of the Court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible information or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order." 10. The impugned order is vitiated also for the reason that all the above three crimes relate to specific individuals and come within the ambit of maintenance of law and order and not public order. The difference between law and order and public order has been pointed out by various authoritative. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Supreme Court observed: "Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large." In Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 , the Supreme Court held as under: "...It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order." 11. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order." 11. In the light of the above discussion, the impugned detention order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order dated 3.10.2019, passed by respondent No. 2, and the confirmation order dated 10.1.2020, passed by respondent No. 1 are set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Mr. Varakala Narsimha @ Cherpata Narsimha, S/o. V. Krishna, at liberty forthwith, in case he is no longer detained in judicial custody in the criminal cases, which have been so far registered against him. 12. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.