JUDGMENT : Rakesh Srivastava, J. 1. Smt. Sunita Maurya (wife), the petitioner and Anil Kumar Maurya (husband), the respondent No. 2 were married according to Hindu rites and ceremonies, at Pratapgarh, on 12.6.2003. The parties continued to peacefully live together up to 26.2.2011, after which serious differences arose between the couple. This led to the wife initiating proceedings against the husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. (registered as Case No. 3087 of 2013). In the said proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise. As per the said compromise the respondent No. 2 paid a sum of Rs. 2,51,000/- to the petitioner, as full and final settlement towards permanent alimony. 2. In February, 2019 the petitioner filed a Divorce Petition bearing Suit No. 104 of 2019 titled Sunita Maurya v. Anil Kumar Maurya under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1953(sic 1955) (for short 'Act') seeking a decree of dissolution of marriage. On 6.12.2019 the said petition was got dismissed as not pressed. On 7.12.2019, the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 2 filed a joint petition under Section 13-B of the Act (Original Suit No. 1093 of 2019) before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Pratapgarh seeking divorce by mutual consent. 3. On 19.12.2019 the petitioner moved an application for waiver of the statutory six months period on the ground that the petitioner was going to get a job shortly and in case the marriage was not dissolved, she would loose the job and her career would be spoiled. The respondent No. 2 endorsed 'no objection' on the said application, The relevant portion of the application is extracted below: ^^fouez fuosnu gS fd mDr eqdnek mHk;i{kksa dh lgefr ds vk/kkj ij ÁLrqr fd;k tk jgk gSA ÁFke i{k o f}rh; i{k ds e/; o"kZ 2015 esa gh lqyg le>kSrk gks x;k Fkk rFkk lHkh eqdnesa lekIr gks pqds FksA ÁFke i{k ,d lfoZl ÁkIr gks jgh gS ftldh frfFk utnhd gS ftlesa fookg&foPNsn ds fMxzh dh vko';drk gS ;fn fMxzh u feyh rks ÁFke i{k ukSdjh ls foeq[k gks tk;sxh rFkk mldk dSfj;j cckZn gks tk;sxk ÁFke i{k ds firk thou e`R;q ls tw> jgsa gS ÁFke i{k o f}rh; i{k ds 'ks"k eqdnesa xqtkjk] fonkbZ] ngst o"kZ 2015 esa vyx&vyx jgus gsrq fuLrkfjr gks pqds gS rFkk mHk;i{k vyx&vyx thou;kiu dj jgs gSA vr% ÁkFkZuk gS fd mHk; i{kksa }kjk ÁLrqr mijksDr eqdnek fuLrkfjr djus dh d`ik djsaA** 4. Through an order dated 2.1.2020, the said application has been rejected by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Pratapgarh. The relevant portion of the order, to which the attention of the Court was drawn by the counsel for the petitioner, is extracted below: "Heard learned counsel for the party and perused the record. Applicant Sunita mentioned the reasons for waiving six months statutory period that she is going to obtain Government job very soon in which decree for dissolution of marriage is required if she will not get decree as early as possible then she may lost the job and her career will be destroyed. She is living separately from her husband since 2015 and all her disputes and differences have been settled. From the perusal of the papers annexed alongwith the application being paper number 9 (x)1/8 shows that application form for the post of Physical Training Instructor Grade III 2018 was filled up by the applicant on 15th June 2018 and in this application she has declared her marital status as divorcee without getting her marriage dissolved by way of decree of divorce. She has declared herself as divorcee in her application for job and now she has filed petition under Section 13(B) for dissolution of marriage on 11/12/2019. From the above facts it is clear that without getting the decree of divorce from the Court, she has falsely stated in her application her marital status as divorcee. It is clear that to mitigate her previous false statement regarding her marital status she has filed present petition for divorce. The reasons given by applicant for waiving of six months statutory period is that she required decree of divorce for getting Government job cannot be accepted ground for waiving statutory period. From the reasons given by applicant for waiving of six months statutory period it is crystal clear that just to obtain Government job in which she has falsely declared her marital status as divorcee she has filed the present petition under Section 13(B) alongwith the present application. The reasons given by applicant cannot be accepted at all for waiving six months statutory period. The reasons given by applicant cannot be accepted at all for waiving six months statutory period. While admitting petition under Section 13 (B) on the first motion on 11/12/2019, date for second motion was fixed for 22/07/2020 and for compromise and mediation in between party for reunite date was, fixed on 20/01/2020 and matter was referred to mediation center, but it is matter of surprise that on 11/12/2019 and 12/12/2019 before the date fixed by Court hurriedly the matter was placed before the mediation center and learned members of mediation center without order from the Court and without looking the order dated 11/12/2019 passed by the Court while admitting the main petition under Section 13(B) wherein date was fixed on 20/01/2020 for mediation entertained the mediation and decided hurriedly and one compromise agreement was executed on 12/12/2019 as per the paper 10(Ga)2/2 and 10(Ga)2/3 and all these facts shows that without order from the Court and in contravention of the order dated 11/12/2019 this mediation was conducted: The purpose of referring the petition under Section 13(B) Hindu Marriage Act to mediation center was to made efforts to reunite the parties and not to separate the party but it is matter of surprise that learned members of mediation center have executed the compromise agreement for separation of parties and that to in contravention of the order dated 11/12/2019 of Court. From the above facts it is prima facie found that no real efforts were made by the mediation center to reunite the parties. Which is the main purpose of referring the case to mediation center. Honorable Supreme Court in Amardeep Sing v. Harveen Kaur has also held that where the Court dealing with matter is satisfied that the case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13(B)2 it can do so after considering the fact that all efforts for mediation, conciliation etc. to reunite parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts, but from the above facts and circumstances it is clear that the reasons for waiving of six months statutory period given by applicant is not satisfactory and it cannot be accepted at all and the case is not made out for waiving six months statutory period and also mediation and conciliation process in this case is not properly done to reunite the parties. In the instant case it appears that purpose of waiving six months statutory period is only to get decree of divorce as early as possible to get Government job, whereas Honorable Supreme Court in the above judgment has held that the purpose must be to avoid further agony of parties. So the purpose given by applicant in her application for waiving six months statutory period is not satisfying the requirements of Honorable Supreme Court's judgment. Under the above facts and circumstances, 1 reached to the conclusion that the application 6(x)2 of applicant is being devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected. Hence the application 6(x)2 is rejected." (emphasis supplied) It is this order which is under challenge in this petition. 5. Pleadings have been exchanged between the contesting parties and with the consent of their counsels the matter has been heard finally. Sri Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the marriage between the parties had irretrievably broken down and the parties had genuinely settled their differences. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746 , the counsel submits that in the absence of any chance of reconciliation, the Family Court ought to have exercised its discretion to waive off the cooling period of six months in favour of the petitioner in order to enable her to secure a job and rehabilitate herself. Sri Bajrang Bahadur Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has supported the petitioner. 6. Heard the counsel for the contesting parties and carefully perused the order impugned in the present petition. 7. Section 13-B of the Act reads as under; "13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. (2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree." (emphasis supplied) 8. The three ingredients for initiating proceedings under Section 13-B of the Act for divorce by mutual consent are: firstly, that the parties to the marriage have been living separately for a minimum period of one year. Secondly, they have not been able to live together, and thirdly, they have mutually agreed that marriage should be dissolved. 9. Sub-section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act is an enabling section. It enables the parties to file a petition for divorce by mutual consent. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B lays down the procedure for the parties to adhere to after expiry of six months from the date of filing of the petition for divorce by mutual consent. The second motion, which as per Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is to be made not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition, enables the Court to proceed with the case. If the Court is satisfied that the consent of the parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence and they mutually agree that the marriage should be dissolved, the Court is left with no other option but to pass a decree of divorce. 10. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act, in unequivocal terms, provides that the second motion has to be made not earlier than six months from the date of presentation of the petition before the Court, Prior to the judgment in Amardeep Singh (supra), sub-section (2) was treated to be mandatory in nature. 10. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Act, in unequivocal terms, provides that the second motion has to be made not earlier than six months from the date of presentation of the petition before the Court, Prior to the judgment in Amardeep Singh (supra), sub-section (2) was treated to be mandatory in nature. In Need Malviya v. Rakesh Malviya, (2010) 6 SCC 413 , a Bench of two Judges of the Apex Court, while dealing with the question as to whether the period prescribed in Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 could be waived off or reduced by the Apex Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, observed as under: "7. As already stated, the language of the said provision is clear and prima facie admits of no departure from the time-frame laid down therein i.e. the second motion under the said sub-section cannot be made earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of Section 13-B of the Act." 11. However, in Amardeep Singh (supra), the Apex Court for the first time opined that the statutory period of six months specified under subsection (2) of Section 13-B of the Act is not mandatory and the Court, in exceptional circumstances, can waive the same, subject to certain conditions specified therein. Paragraph 19 of the said report is extracted below: "19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13-B(2), it can do so after considering the following: (i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13-B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13-B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself; (ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order 32-A Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts; (iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties; (iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the Court concerned." (emphasis supplied) 12. Keeping the aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court in mind, it is now to be seen as to whether the Family Court has erred in rejecting the application for waiver of the six months period filed by the petitioner. 13. A perusal of the order rejecting the application for waiver of the cooling period shows that the application has been rejected by the Principal Judge on two counts. Firstly, that no good ground for waiver of the statutory period was made out, and secondly, that no mediation took place between the parties. 14. In the instant case, a bare reading of the application made by the petitioner shows that the same is absolutely vague and bereft of substance. It has been vaguely stated that the petitioner was going to get a job in the near future for which the decree of divorce was needed and in case the waiting period was not waived, she would be deprived of the job and her career would be ruined. The application is conspicuously silent regarding the nature of job, the co-relation between the petitioner getting the job and the decree of divorce, the date, month and year when she was to get the alleged job. 15. From the documents annexed as Annexure SA-2 to the supplementary-affidavit filed by the petitioner, it appears that on 15.6.2018, the petitioner submitted her form for appearing in the Direct Recruitment for Physical Training Instructor Grade III Examination being conducted by Rajasthan Employees Selection Board, Jaipur. In her application form, she falsely mentioned her marital status as' Divorcee'. She was selected for appointment to' the post of Physical Training Instructor and was asked to provide district-priorities for provisional district allotment latest by 15.11.2019. At this juncture, the petitioner, it appears, realized that the false entry made in her application form regarding her marital status could result in the cancellation of her candidature. No sooner had the said fact dawned upon the petitioner, than she moved an application for divorce by mutual consent, followed by an application for waiver of the statutory period of six months. No sooner had the said fact dawned upon the petitioner, than she moved an application for divorce by mutual consent, followed by an application for waiver of the statutory period of six months. The entry made by the petitioner in her application form regarding her marital status is admittedly false and to cover up the false statement made by her she has urged urgency in the matter and seeks waiver of the cooling period for the second motion. The petitioner cannot be heard to allege her own fraudulent purpose as the reason for waiving the statutory waiting period. In any case, the Courts would not aid the petitioner in her pursuit of a job based upon her false statements. The Court below has committed no wrong in rejecting the application of the petitioner on this ground. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had committed no fraud by making a wrong entry. He submits that it was essentially an inadvertent error on her part. 16. Be that as it may. The second ground on which the application made by the petitioner for waiver of the statutory period has been rejected is good enough to sustain the order under challenge. 17. Hindu marriage is a religious sacrament in which a man and a woman are bound in a permanent relationship. It is precisely for the said reason that when the provision for mutual divorce was introduced in the Statute it was specifically provided that before proceeding with the matter, the Courts would make an earnest effort to reunite the contesting parties. 18. Order 32-A Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act and Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, are relevant and are extracted below: ORDER 32-A RULE 3 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3. Duty of Court to make efforts for settlement.- (1) In every suit or proceedings to which this Order applies, an endeavour shall be made by the Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit. (2) If, in any such suit of proceeding, at any stage it appears to the Court that there is a reasonable possibility of a settlement between the parties, the Court may adjourn the proceeding for such period as it thinks fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a settlement. (3) The power conferred by sub-rule (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings. (emphasis supplied) * * * SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 23 OF THE ACT 23. Decree in proceedings.- (2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the Court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of Section 13. * * * SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 9 OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT, 1984 9. Duty of Family Court to make efforts for settlement.- (I) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it Is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit. -(1) In every suit or proceeding, endeavour shall be made by the Family Court in the first instance, where it is possible to do so consistent with the nature and circumstances of the case, to assist and persuade the parties in arriving at a settlement in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding and for this purpose a Family Court may, subject to any rules made by the High Court, follow such procedure as it may deem fit." (emphasis supplied) 19. On a conjoint reading of the provisions extracted above, it is apparent that a duty is cast upon the Family Court, in every suit or proceeding before it, to first make a sincere effort at reconciliation before proceeding to deal with the case in the usual course. Even where the estrangement between the parties to the marriage might seems to be acute, Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act enjoins upon the Court to make every endeavour to bring the parties to reconciliation. Of course, the Court cannot help, if in spite of its endeavour no reconciliation can be brought about. 20. In V.K. Gupta v. Nirmala Gupta, (1979) 4 SCC 258 , Justice Krishna Iyer, in his inimitable style, has opined that- "It is fundamental that reconciliation of a ruptured marriage is the first essay of the Judge, aided by counsel in this noble adventure. The sanctity of marriage is, in essence, the foundation of civilisation and, therefore, Court and counsel owe a duty to society to strain to the utmost to repair the snapped relations between the parties." (emphasis supplied) 21. In K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 , the Apex Court has emphasised the importance of mediation in family disputes. The Apex Court has observed thus: "46.1. In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the counselors submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a reasonable time-limit for mediation centers to complete the process of mediation because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its discretion, can always extend the time-limit." (emphasis supplied) 22. In Santhini v. Vijaya Venketesh, (2018) 1 SCC 62 , the Apex Court reiterated that in every matrimonial dispute an Endeavour has to be made for the parties to restore their relationships in the following words- "The principal thrust of the law in family matters is to make an attempt for reconciliation before processing the disputes in the legal framework. Reconciliation is not mediation. Neither is it conciliation. No doubt, there is conciliation in reconciliation. Reconciliation is not mediation. Neither is it conciliation. No doubt, there is conciliation in reconciliation. But the concepts are totally different. Similarly, there is mediation in conciliation but there is no conciliation in mediation. In mediation, the role of the mediator is only to evolve solutions whereas in reconciliation, the duty-holders have to take a proactive role to assist the parties to reach an amicable solution. In conciliation, the conciliator persuades the parties to arrive at a solution as suggested by him in the course of the discussions. In reconciliation, as already noted above the duty-holders remind the parties of the essential family values, the need to maintain a cordial relationship, both in the interest of the husband and wife or the children, as the case may be, and also make a persuasive effort to make the parties reconcile to the reality and restore the relationship, if possible. The Family Courts Act expects the duty-holders like the Court, counselors, welfare experts and any other collaborators to make efforts for reconciliation. However, reconciliation is not always the restoration of status quo ante; it can as well be a solution as acceptable to both parties. In all these matters, the approaches are different. (emphasis supplied) 23. A learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court, in Mrs. Pramila Bhagat V. Ajit Raj Singh Bhagat, while setting aside the judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage passed by the trial Court on the ground of non-compliance of Sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Special Marriage Act, which is in pari materia with Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act, held that the provisions of Subsection (2) of Section 34 were mandatory and even where dissolution of marriage was sought on mutual consent, its non-compliance would be fatal. Paragraph 3 of the report is extracted below: "3. When this appeal was taken up for hearing, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the judgment and decree of the Court below were passed without complying with the mandatory provision of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Special Marriage Act and as such the case has to be remanded for fresh trial in accordance with law. When this appeal was taken up for hearing, it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the judgment and decree of the Court below were passed without complying with the mandatory provision of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Special Marriage Act and as such the case has to be remanded for fresh trial in accordance with law. No doubt the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed jointly on the ground mentioned in Section 28 of the Act and is covered by Clause C of sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act, but nevertheless endeavour by the Court to bring about reconciliation between the parties has to be made before the trial is taken up and the decree for dissolution of the marriage is passed. It was contended that it will make no difference as regards compliance of Section 34(2) whether the trial is a contested one or whether the judgment and decree are to be passed on a joint petition of the parties. I think this submission is correct. Even if the dissolution of marriage is sought by a joint petition of the parties, still it is incumbent on the Court to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 34(2) of the Act and the Court has to make endeavour to bring reconciliation between the parties. If such an endeavour is made, there is still chance that the parties even though they may have initially mutually agreed for dissolution of their marriage through a joint petition, may retrace their step and an afterthought may abstain from taking the extreme step of separation from each other." (emphasis supplied) 24. In the case at hand, the petition for mutual divorce was presented on 7.12.2019 and the same was placed before the Court for admission on 11.12.2019 on which date the case was ordered to be registered. While 22.7.2020 was fixed as the next date in the matter, the parties were directed to appear before the mediation centre on 20.1.2020. The order dated 11.12.2019 is extracted below: ^^okni= vUrxZr /kkjk 13 ch fgŒ fookg vf/kfu;e dk ÁLrqr gqvkA eaqlfje fjiksZV dk voyksdu fd;k ntZ jftLVj gSA i=koyh okLrs vfxze vkns'k fnukad 22-07-2020 dks is'k gksA mHk;i{k lqyg le>kSrk gsrq e/;LFkrk dsUæ esa fnukad 20-01-2020 dks is'k gksA gLrk{kj viBuh;A** 25. The order dated 11.12.2019 is extracted below: ^^okni= vUrxZr /kkjk 13 ch fgŒ fookg vf/kfu;e dk ÁLrqr gqvkA eaqlfje fjiksZV dk voyksdu fd;k ntZ jftLVj gSA i=koyh okLrs vfxze vkns'k fnukad 22-07-2020 dks is'k gksA mHk;i{k lqyg le>kSrk gsrq e/;LFkrk dsUæ esa fnukad 20-01-2020 dks is'k gksA gLrk{kj viBuh;A** 25. As per the mediation report dated 12.12.2019, the mediation was held on 11.12.2019 and 12.12.2019 and the parties had resolved to terminate their marriage amicably. As per the order dated 11.12.2019, the parties were to appear before the mediation centre on 20.1.2020. It is not the case of the petitioner that any application for proponing the date fixed for appearance before the mediation centre was moved by her or that the order dated 11.12.2019 was modified by the Court suo moto. The divorce petition was ordered to be registered on 11.12.2019". It is beyond comprehension as to how the matter was taken up by the mediation centre on the same day and without there being any order from the Court. 26. It is not in dispute that mediation could be taken up only in pursuance of the order passed by the Family Court. Despite repeated queries, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to explain as to how the matter was taken up by the mediator on 11.12.2019 and 12.12.2019. A perusal of the report submitted by the mediator also shows that the space meant for 'date of filing the petition', the name of the Presiding Officer and the date of order passed by him' has been left blank. The possibility of the mediator having submitted his report on extraneous consideration cannot be ruled out. A perusal of the report submitted by the mediator also shows that the space meant for 'date of filing the petition', the name of the Presiding Officer and the date of order passed by him' has been left blank. The possibility of the mediator having submitted his report on extraneous consideration cannot be ruled out. The report submitted by the mediator is extracted below: vuqlwph&5 U;k;ky; e/;LFkrk vkSj lqyg dsUæ ¼fuiVku dk djkj½ ;g fuiVku djkj vkt fnukad 12-12-2019 dks Jherh lquhrk ekS;Z ftudh igpku Jh jkts'k dqekj oekZ ,MoksdsV vf/koDrk }kjk dh x;h vkSj Jh vfuy dqekj ekS;Z ftudh igpku Jh lqHkk"k dqekj iky ,MoksdsV vf/koDrk }kjk dh x;h ds e/; fd;k x;kA pawfd] 1- buds i{kdkjksa ds e/; fookn vkSj erHksn gks x;s Fks vkSj fnukad----------¼lafLFkr dju dk fnukad½ ifjokj U;k;ky; Árkix<+ ¼lEcfU/kr U;k;ky; dk fooj.k nhft,½ ds le{k vUrxZr /kkjk 13ch fgUnw fookg vf/kfu;e ¼okn la[;k½ nk;j dh x;h FkhA 2- Jh-----------o ¼lEcfU/kr ihBlhu vf/kdkjh dk uke vkSj inuke½ }kjk fnukad dks ikfjr vkns'k }kjk ekeyk fufnZ"V fd;k x;k FkkA 3- i{kdkjx.k lger gS fd Jh uohu dqekj JhokLro ¼e/;LFk dk uke½ muds e/;LFk ds :i esa dk;Z djsaxsA 4- e/;LFkrk dh ÁfØ;k ds nkSjku fnukad 11-12-2019 ls fnukad 12-12-2019 rd cSBds gqbZ vkSj i{kdkjx.k us mifjmfYyf[kr fooknksa vkSj erHksnksa dks lqy>kus ds fy, e/;LFk dh lgk;rk ls lkSgknZ lek/kku dj fy;k gSA i{kdkjx.k ;gka iqf"V djrs gS vkSj ?kksf"kr djrs gS fd mUgksaus e/;LFk dh mifLFkfr esa LosPN;k vkSj viuh Lora= bPNk ls fuiVku dk djkj fd;k gSA 5- fuEufyf[kr djkj blds i{kdkjksa ds e/; fd;k x;k gS%& ¼d½ djkj layXu gS ¼[k½-------------- ¼x½-------------- bl djkj ij gLrk{kj djds i{kdkjx.k ;g c;ku gS fd---------¼okn la[;k½ ds lEcU/k esa ,d&nwljs ds fo:} mudk vc dksbZ nkok ;k ekax ugh jg xbZ gS vkSj e/;LFkrk dh ÁfØ;k ds ek/;e ls bl lEcU/k esa blds i{kdkjksa us fooknksa vkSj erHksnksa dks lkSgknZiw.kZ i{kdkjx.k ds fnukad lfgr iwjs gLrk{kj gLrk{kj lquhrk ekS;Z jkts'k dqekj 'kekZ ,MoksdsV jftLVMZ uEcj 13229@10 vf/koDrk ds fnukad lfgr iwjs gLrk{kj gLrk{kj vfuy dqekj ekS;kZ lqHkk"k dqekj iky ,MoksdsV jftLVMZ uEcj 07@30@17 27. It is well-settled that if a statute provides something to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner only, or not at all. Anything done otherwise would be illegal. It is well-settled that if a statute provides something to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner only, or not at all. Anything done otherwise would be illegal. The said principle recognized in Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 , has been endorsed by the Apex Court in a number of subsequent cases. 28. In Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, 2001 (4) SCC 9 , the Apex Court opined that- "It is a settled principle of law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain manner, the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 29. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, 2002 (1) SCC 633 , has held as under: "It is a normal rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself." 30. Thus, the alleged mediation having been undertaken without there being any order from the Court is no mediation in the eyes of law. 31. Even otherwise, the undue haste with which the mediation is alleged to have been conducted makes it apparent that no effort for reconciliation was made and straightaway the mediator has submitted his report to facilitate the parties to move an application for waiver of the statutory period of six months. 32. The normal rule is that the second motion under Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B can be made not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition under sub-section (1) of the said Section. Waiver of the said period is an exception and in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Amardeep Singh (supra), the waiting period can be condoned only when the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. 33. As per the judgment in Amardeep Singh (supra), one of the factors to be taken into account by the Court before exercising its discretion to waive off the statutory period of six months is as to whether all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts. 34. Neither in the application for waiver, nor in her petition before this Court has the petitioner mentioned about any mediation having taken place between the parties prior to the alleged mediation on 11.12.2019 and 12.11.2019. In the absence of any effort to reconcile the contesting parties, the statutory waiting period could not have been condoned. 35. The Family Court has committed no wrong in rejecting the application for waiver of six months statutory period." There is no infirmity or illegality in the order impugned. The petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. 36. No order as to cost.