JUDGMENT : Vinod Chatterji Koul, J. 1. Petitioner is aggrieved of and seeks setting aside of Order dated 16th September 2020, passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar (for short "Appellate Court") on an application titled Maheen Azhar Kakroo v. Sadaf Niyaz Shah and another, filed by her, seeking leave to file an Appeal as an aggrieved party against Orders dated 8th September 2020 and 4th September 2020, passed by Sub Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate) Srinagar (for brevity "Trial Court"), on the grounds made mention of in revision petition on hand. 2. The case set up by petitioner in instant revision petition is that she purchased a residential house along with land underneath and appurtenant measuring 03 Kanals and 06 Marlas situated at Brane, Nishat, Srinagar (hereinafter called as "suit property") by virtue of a Sale Deed, executed on 10th June 2020, and registered by Sub Registrar, East, Srinagar, on 11th June 2020 and, therefore, she in the capacity of owner of suit property has every right to protect the rights that vest in her and if any order, decree, injunction, and fiat passed qua suit property by any authority/court, affecting her rights, she has every right to appeal against the same. According to petitioner, Orders dated 8th September 2020 and 4th September 2020, passed by Trial Court, affect her rights as those orders relate to suit property and having been passed at her back and in her absence. She, therefore, went to the Appellate Court against those orders. However, Appellate Court declined to grant leave in her favour to file Appeal against Trial Court orders. 3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner has, to cement the case set up by petitioner in revision petition on hand, contended that impugned order has been passed by Appellate Court unmindful of provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and against the legislative intent to give right to appeal to any aggrieved person and not merely to a party to the suit only. According to him, impugned order is sheer abuse of process of court and law. He has also averred that Appellate Court has totally ignored factum of the matter thereby giving freehand to respondent no. 1 to throw owner/petitioner out from suit property, which petitioner has purchased from respondent no. 2 by way of a registered document. According to him, impugned order is sheer abuse of process of court and law. He has also averred that Appellate Court has totally ignored factum of the matter thereby giving freehand to respondent no. 1 to throw owner/petitioner out from suit property, which petitioner has purchased from respondent no. 2 by way of a registered document. It is asserted that Appellate Court has also refused to accept the document in the shape of a registered Sale Deed, by virtue whereof possession of suit property has been delivered by respondent No. 2 to petitioner and she is holding the same. He avers that one fails to understand Appellate Court's observation that petitioner is not aggrieved party and has dismissed her application, when the order dated 8th September 2020 passed by Trial Court, during pendency of Appeal, was brought to the notice of Appellate Court by a separate motion, which was enough to seek indulgence of Appellate Court to grant leave to petitioner, who was the only aggrieved person apparent from the face of order dated 8th September 2020, passed as an implementation of order dated 4th September 2020, against which Appeal was preferred. Impugned order is stated to have been passed in breach of audi alteram partem, as it has effect of jeopardizing right of appeal of petitioner. He also states that Executive Magistrate informed Trial Court as to ownership and possession of petitioner qua suit property consequent upon duly registered Sale Deed, but Trial Court ignored those facts, and passed orders that directly affect her rights. 5. Learned counsel for petitioner has also stated that Trial Court gravely and grossly disrespected and disregarded authority of higher courts, before whom the Appeals and other petitions, were pending, by issuing orders dated 4th and 8th September 2020 and also disturbed the whole judicial system by not respecting the authority of higher courts before whom an Appeal was pending. He further states that if an aggrieved party/person files an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble High Court does not proceed ahead in the matter till the case/ appeal pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court is decided. However, such decorum is missing in the present case as Trial Court did not take note of the fact that petitioner had approached higher court against its orders. 6. However, such decorum is missing in the present case as Trial Court did not take note of the fact that petitioner had approached higher court against its orders. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has further submitted that Appellate Court, without considering facts and circumstances of the case as well as pleadings in which it was made clear that plaintiff/respondent No. 1 was never in possession of property, passed impugned order. His further submission is that respondent no. 1 is alien to suit property and she was trying to grab property of petitioner. It is contended that Trial Court has passed such an order, by which property of petitioner has been directed to be handed over to a stranger and if such practice is adopted, purpose of law of land would be buried. 7. Per contra, Mr. Azhar ul Amin, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1, has vehemently stated that petitioner has no right to be aggrieved of orders of the Trail Court and that Appellate Court has rightly rejected application of petitioner for grant of leave to file Appeal as she has approached Appellate Court with unclean hands and has suppressed material facts both before Appellate Court and this Court. According to him, document in the shape of Sale Deed is managed by petitioner and does not confer any right upon her. It is next averred by him that petitioner is precluded from seeking leave to file Appeal against Trial Court orders as she is not prejudiced by orders of Trial Court and on top of it, petitioner has challenged the order in a suit before Sub Judge (Forest Magistrate) Srinagar and, therefore, she has availed legal remedy. It is contended that petitioner has manifest collusion with respondent no. 2 and forcible eviction of respondent no. 1 was planned and executed by respondent no. 2 with the help of land mafia, of which husband of petitioner is an active member. The forcible eviction was executed on 11th March 2020 and on 23rd March 2020 respondent no. 1 and husband of petitioner with support of SHO Nishat and Tehsildar Khanyar in conspiracy and in sheer misuse of provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. The possession is said to have been illegally handed over to respondent no. 2 in his capacity as ostensible owner by Tehsildar, Khanyar, under the canopy of Section 145 Cr.P.C. against direction of law. 1 and husband of petitioner with support of SHO Nishat and Tehsildar Khanyar in conspiracy and in sheer misuse of provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. The possession is said to have been illegally handed over to respondent no. 2 in his capacity as ostensible owner by Tehsildar, Khanyar, under the canopy of Section 145 Cr.P.C. against direction of law. Learned counsel also states that respondent no. 1 held suit property as sub-lessee when possession was taken over from her in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., despite injunction from the court below in civil suit and that sheet anchor of defence of respondent no. 2 before the Trial Court was that respondent no. 1 was a stranger to suit property and never held possession, is belied by record and is redolent of inconsistency and contradiction. Possession of respondent no. 1 is said to be unaffected despite execution of sale deed in favour of petitioner by respondent no. 2, especially when the said sale is fraudulent and the rights, if any, flowing from the said sale deed can be established in a separate legal proceeding, which remedy petitioner has already availed by way of a civil suit. Mr. Azhar also states that leave to Appeal is also to be denied on the doctrine of access jurisprudence inasmuch as conduct of respondent no. 2 is unclean and dishonest and do not deserve any hearing on merits. 8. Having regard to rival submissions made by learned counsel for parties, a question that emerges for consideration is as to whether a person, who is not a party to a suit, can file an appeal. 9. The Supreme Court in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay, A.I.R. 1971 SC 385, has observed that a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. It has been held in a number of cases that a person, who is not a party to suit, may prefer an appeal with leave of appellate court and such leave would not be refused where judgment or order would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Code of Procedure. It has been held in a number of cases that a person, who is not a party to suit, may prefer an appeal with leave of appellate court and such leave would not be refused where judgment or order would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Code of Procedure. It is no more res integra that right to file an appeal is not restricted to parties to the suit/action or to legal representative of parties; a person, who is aggrieved by an order or judgment sought to be appealed against, may be allowed to appeal against an order or judgment if he is adversely affected by such an order or judgment. 10. Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an Appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceeding unless he satisfies the Court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affect a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court. Reference in this regard is made to the observation given by the Supreme Court in Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties Private Ltd. (1970) 3 SCC 573 : "It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the Judgment." 11. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Amar Singh & Anr. (1974) 2 SCC 70 , while dealing with the maintainability of appeal by a person who is not party to a suit, has observed thus:- "Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following the dictum of Lindley, L.J., in re Securities Insurance Co., [(1894) 2 Ch 410] have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the Court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it." 12. In Baldev Singh Vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma and Ors (2003) 1 SCC 34 ., the Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. While dealing with the concept of person aggrieved, it was observed in paragraph 15 as under: "A person aggrieved to file an appeal must be one whose right is affected by reason of the judgment and decree sought to be impugned." 13. The Supreme Court again in A. Subash Babu Vs. State of A.P. and Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 616 , held: "The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined that the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the complainant's interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injuries suffered by him." 14. The expression 'person aggrieved' does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized. [Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York (1974) 2 SCC 387 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 592 ]. 15. [Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Canji Vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York (1974) 2 SCC 387 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 592 ]. 15. It is a well settled law that any transaction that takes place during pendency of a suit in respect of a property, is affected by doctrine of Lis Pendens, which principle is enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Whether a person is a bona fide purchaser or otherwise, would not strip off doctrine of Lis Pendens or its impact on such transaction. A party, gaining interest in an immoveable property, which is subject matter of the suit, is always bound by the judgment or order of the Court, notwithstanding the fact that he is not party to the Suit. This principle of law is based on the principle of equity. The immoveable property, which is subject matter of Suit, is nucleus, around which are woven interests of beneficiaries of suit property. It is the interest, which flows from the property, which is germane to the issues, which are to be settled by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The rights and interests flow from the property, which is subject matter of the Suit and it is those rights and interests, which are to be adjudicated upon by the Court of competent jurisdiction. When the Court of competent jurisdiction returns its findings in respect of suit property, then all those persons, who have secured interest in such property, are bound by the judgment and decree of the Court notwithstanding the fact that such a person may not be party to the Suit. If case on hand is analysed on the touchstone of above settled legal position, petitioner is bound by order(s) and judgment(s), which have been passed by Trial Court and/or which may/would come up during pendency/trial before the Trial Court qua suit property, notwithstanding the fact that she is not party to the suit before the Trial Court. However, Appellate Court, unmindful of the fact that any order or judgment emanating from the proceedings pending before Trial Court relating to suit property is to be ultimately implemented by petitioner, given the right she has accrued in suit property, has passed impugned order, which, therefore, is liable to be set-aside. 16. However, Appellate Court, unmindful of the fact that any order or judgment emanating from the proceedings pending before Trial Court relating to suit property is to be ultimately implemented by petitioner, given the right she has accrued in suit property, has passed impugned order, which, therefore, is liable to be set-aside. 16. For the reasons discussed herein above, revision petition on hand is allowed and impugned order dated 16th September 2020 is set-aside. As a corollary thereof, petitioner is declared as an aggrieved person and leave to file appeal is granted in her favour. The court of 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, shall hear the Appeal of petitioner and decide the same, as early as possible, preferably within six weeks, which, however, shall run after ensuing winter vacation. Parties shall appear before the Appellate Court on 30th December 2020. 17. Before parting, it may be pertinent to add here that it has been stated by parties that there are a number of civil suits/proceedings as to present controversy between the parties, pending before different Courts. The parties are at liberty to approach Principal District Judge, Srinagar, for transferring/consolidating the cases, who shall, after considering such a plea, pass appropriate orders so as to avoid multiple and conflicting orders. 18. Civil Revision is disposed of in terms of above. 19. Copy of this judgment be sent down to the court of Principal District Judge, Srinagar; court of 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar; and Sub Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate), Srinagar.