JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Vishal Kumar Trivedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. Pawan Kumar Pathak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party No. 2. 3. Heard Mr. Birendra Burman, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. 4. This criminal revision application has been filed against the judgment dated 22nd May, 2014 passed by learned Judicial Commissioner-IV, Ranchi in Cr. Appeal No. 71 of 2013 whereby he has been pleased to dismiss the appeal and has been pleased to affirm the judgment dated 18th February, 2013 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Ranchi in Complaint Case No. 1028 of 2010 / T.R. No. 1101 of 2013 whereby the petitioners were convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and they were further directed to pay Rs. 1,40,000/- by way of compensation under Section 357(3) of the Cr. P.C. to the Complainant (Opposite Party No. 2). I.A. (Cr.) No. 8795 of 2019 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that one Interlocutory Application being I.A. (Cr.) No. 8795 of 2019 has been filed in the present case for additional evidence at this stage. 6. Learned counsel has referred to the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Vinod Kumar vs. Smt. Mohrawati reported in 1990 Cri. Law Journal 2068 and another judgment also passed by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Bhagwan Swaroop –vs- State of U.P. and others decided on 21st November, 2014 in an application under Section 482 Cr. P.C bearing No. 4670 of 2003, to submit that it has been held that additional evidence at revisional stage is also permissible and accordingly, the present petition for additional evidence is maintainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel has referred to Section 401 of the Cr. P.C. and submitted that the powers which are conferred upon the court under Section 391 of the Cr. P.C. is available to the revisional court and accordingly, additional evidence which is permissible as per Section 391 Cr. P.C. is also permissible in the revisional jurisdiction of this court. 7. Learned counsel has referred to Section 401 of the Cr. P.C. and submitted that the powers which are conferred upon the court under Section 391 of the Cr. P.C. is available to the revisional court and accordingly, additional evidence which is permissible as per Section 391 Cr. P.C. is also permissible in the revisional jurisdiction of this court. 7. Learned counsel by referring to Interlocutory Application has submitted that reasons for not adducing evidence earlier, which is sought to be adduced at this stage, have been mentioned and the additional evidences are essential for rendering complete justice to the parties and accordingly, the same may be allowed and appropriate order may be passed. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Opposite Party has opposed the prayer made in Interlocutory Application and has submitted that the petition for additional evidence is an afterthought and the same may not be allowed. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the Interlocutory Application, this court finds that as per the case of the petitioners, the material which is sought to be adduced by way of additional evidence was inadvertently left out due to reasons beyond the control of the petitioners, although the same were made available to the conducting lawyer in the court who appeared for the petitioners at the stage of trial, who failed to appreciate the same. It has been stated in the petition that the photocopies of the documents which are sought to be introduced as additional evidence are annexed with the revision application. 10. This court finds that apparently the evidence which is sought to be produced at this stage were available with the petitioners and the reason for not adducing such evidence at appropriate stage appears to be an afterthought and with a view to fill up the gap in the case. The petitioners did not take any steps even at the appellate stage when certainly it must have come to light that the said documents were not exhibited. This court further finds that the documents which are sought to be introduced by way of additional evidence are relating to one agreement executed by one Satyendra Kumar and Tata Motor Finance and its termination. This court further finds that the documents which are sought to be introduced by way of additional evidence are relating to one agreement executed by one Satyendra Kumar and Tata Motor Finance and its termination. It has been recorded in the impugned judgement that during cross-examination, the Complainant had deposed that the vehicle was registered in the name of Satyendra Kumar and there was an agreement between the Complainant and Satyendra Kumar. He has also stated that there was an agreement between the Complainant and the accused Kapildeo Prasad and the Complainant had a right over the vehicle on the basis of the agreement. This court is of the considered view that the petition for additional evidence is not only an afterthought, but also to fill up the lacunae and accordingly, this court is not inclined to allow the Interlocutory Application filed for additional evidence. Consequently, I.A. (Cr.) No. 8795 of 2019 is hereby rejected. Criminal Revision No. 717 of 2014 11. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter has been heard on merits. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned judgments are ex-facie perverse in view of the fact that the learned courts below have failed to consider that condition precedent for filing a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was itself not satisfied and accordingly, the complaint case was pre-mature and hence, not maintainable. Learned counsel has referred to the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Pratap Singh -versus- Savitri Pandey and Another reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 and submitted that it has been held in Paragraph-30 of the said judgment that Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 comprises of main provision which defines the ingredients of the offence and appended to this Section are three clauses (a), (b) and (c) and the offence under Section 138 is made effective only on fulfilment of eventualities contained in clause (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 138 and for completion of an offence under Section 138, not only the satisfaction of the ingredients of offence set out in the main part of the provision is necessary, but it is also imperative that all the three eventualities mentioned in clause (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are satisfied. Mere issuance of cheque and dishonour thereof would not constitute an offence by itself under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the condition precedent as provided in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not satisfied, accordingly, the complaint petition itself was not maintainable. 13. Learned counsel referred to the complaint and submitted that as per the case of the Complainant himself, the legal notice in connection with the cheque was sent on 14.05.2010 by registered post and it was averred by the Complainant that as the registered notice did not return back, hence there is a presumption that the notice has been served upon the petitioners on or before 17.05.2010. It was the specific case of the Complainant that the petitioners did not make payment of the cheque amount to the Complainant within the stipulated period of 15 days after service of notice i.e. by 01.06.2010 and hence the complaint case was filed on 04.06.2010. 14. Learned counsel submits that there is no evidence on record as to when the notice was served upon the petitioners and when the petitioners had replied to the notice. Learned counsel submits that statements of the petitioners were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. and the petitioners had stated that they had received the notice and they had responded to the notice, but the date of receipt of notice has not been disclosed in the statement. Learned counsel also submits that there is no evidence on record to disclose the date of receipt of notice by the petitioners. 15. Learned counsel submits that the learned trial court while convicting the petitioners had taken into account the statement of the petitioners under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. that the petitioners had accepted the fact that they had received the notice and replied thereto and that being so, convicted the petitioners without taking care of the prescribed time lines under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. P.C. that the petitioners had accepted the fact that they had received the notice and replied thereto and that being so, convicted the petitioners without taking care of the prescribed time lines under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Learned counsel has also submitted that merely because the petitioners had received the notice and had replied thereto was not sufficient to comply with ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as the timeline which are prescribed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are required to be complied with and only upon expiry of the timeline as prescribed therein , the cause of action to file a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could arise. 16. Learned counsel submits that in absence of said evidence, the Complainant failed to bring on record the basic ingredients of commission of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 establishing the cause of action to file the complaint case and accordingly, the condition precedent having not been satisfied, the complaint itself was not maintainable and the petitioners could not have been convicted by the learned trial court. 17. Learned counsel further submits that the learned lower appellate court while confirming the sentence and upholding the judgment has taken into consideration one photocopy of the reply dated 01.06.2010 said to have been sent by the petitioners by stating that the same has been produced by the petitioners themselves. Further he submits that the petitioners did not lead any evidence in the defence and the prosecution also did not produce and exhibit the reply dated 01.06.2010, if any, which has been relied upon by the learned lower appellate court to hold that vide reply dated 01.06.2010 the petitioners refused to pay and accordingly, upheld the conviction by saying that cause of action to file case arose immediately after 01.06.2010 and the case was filed on 04.06.2010 and upheld the conviction of the petitioners. It is submitted that under such circumstances the impugned judgements are perverse and fit to be set-aside. Arguments of the opposite parties 18. It is submitted that under such circumstances the impugned judgements are perverse and fit to be set-aside. Arguments of the opposite parties 18. Learned counsels appearing on behalf of State and Opposite Party No. 2 on the other hand submit that the condition precedent for filing the case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was fully satisfied and accordingly, the onus shifted to the petitioners to satisfy the court that there was no legally payable debt. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2 submits that once the condition precedent for filing the case under Section 138 was satisfied, the presumption was available under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Learned counsel submits that it was an admitted fact from the side of the petitioners that they had responded to the notice dated 14.05.2010 vide letter dated 01.06.2010 and accordingly, the service of notice of cheque bouncing dated 14.05.2010 (which was issued by the Complainant) is not in dispute and the case was filed within 15 days from 01.06.2010. It is submitted that the complaint case was maintainable and all the pre-conditions for filing the Complainant case were satisfied. 19. However, learned counsel for the Opposite Party no. 2 does not dispute the fact that date of service of notice upon the petitioners is not available on record except the statement of the Complainant in the complaint petition that since the Complainant did not receive back the notice of cheque bouncing dated 14.05.2010, therefore the same was deemed to be served on 17.05.2010. 20. The learned counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2 has also submitted that reply sent by the petitioners was never served upon the Complainant and therefore the same was not exhibited by the Complainant before the learned trial court. 21. During the course of arguments, learned counsel has also not disputed the fact that in the statement made under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., the petitioners had neither disclosed the date of receipt of the notice dated 14.05.2010, nor they have disclosed the date of sending the reply to the notice and had only stated that a reply was sent which they have filed in court. Admittedly, the reply was not exhibited. Findings of this Court 22. P.C., the petitioners had neither disclosed the date of receipt of the notice dated 14.05.2010, nor they have disclosed the date of sending the reply to the notice and had only stated that a reply was sent which they have filed in court. Admittedly, the reply was not exhibited. Findings of this Court 22. This Court finds that the Complainant filed a complaint case against the petitioners alleging therein that the Complainant runs a business of sale and purchase and finance of vehicles in the name and style of I.I.T.M. Services and the petitioner no. 1 with an intention to purchase a Bolero vehicle contacted the Complainant whereupon a Bolero vehicle was sold through the Complainant to the petitioner no. 1. Important dates are as under:- a. The consideration amount was partly paid in cash and partly through cheque bearing cheque no. 340577 for Rs. 1,39,000/- dated 26.03.10. Cheque was signed by both the petitioners as it was of the joint account. b. Cheque was presented for encashment, but it returned back with cheque return memo dated 21.04.10. c. Legal notice was sent by the Complainant under registered post on 14.05.10 and demanded payment of Rs. 1,39,000/- but the same was not paid. d. It is the specific case in the complaint that it shall be presumed that the notice was received by the petitioners on 17.05.10 and since the petitioners did not pay the amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice i.e. by 01.06.10, cause of action for filing of the complaint arose and thereafter, the complaint was filed on 04.06.10. 23. This Court finds that the Complainant had calculated the cause of action from 01.06.2010 by taking 17.05.2010 as deemed service of cheque bouncing notice date 14.05.2010 upon the petitioners and averred that the petitioners did not pay the amount within 15 days from 17.05.2010. There is no legal or factual basis to assume deemed service of cheque bouncing notice date 14.05.2010 (sent through registered post) as on 17.05.2010. Admittedly, there is no service report or evidence of service of notice upon the petitioners much less service on 17.05.2010. There is no legal or factual basis to assume deemed service of cheque bouncing notice date 14.05.2010 (sent through registered post) as on 17.05.2010. Admittedly, there is no service report or evidence of service of notice upon the petitioners much less service on 17.05.2010. The petitioners in their statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. have mentioned about receipt of cheque bouncing notice and also about sending a reply to it, but the dates of service of notice and date of its reply have not been mentioned in their statements and they have stated that they have filed the reply in court. A photocopy of the reply was found in record which was found to be dated 01.06.2010 by the learned lower appellate court. Admittedly, the reply dated 01.06.2010 was never exhibited by any of the parties. 24. This Court also finds that though in the complaint petition it was mentioned that notice dated 14.05.2010 shall be presumed to have been received by the petitioners on 17.05.2010, but no such statement was made by the Complainant or any of the witnesses before the learned trial court and the evidence of the witnesses is totally silent regarding the date of service of notice dated 14.05.2010 upon the petitioners and is also totally silent as to how the cause of action for filing the case arose on 04.06.2010 as already mentioned above. Admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show service of notice of cheque bouncing dated 14.05.2010 upon the petitioners on 17.05.2010. 25. The learned trial court recorded its findings at para 10, which is quoted as under- “10. Perusal of above evidence of Complainant shows that during his evidence he has proved the cheque in question bearing signature of accused persons which is proved as Ext.1. He has proved the cheque return memo dated 21.04.10 as Ext.-2 showing reason of bouncing of cheque due to insufficient fund in the account of accused. Complainant (C.W. 3) has proved the copies of legal notices dated 14.05.10 as Ext. 3 & 3/1 respectively, and he has proved the postal registry receipts dated 14.05.10 as Ext. 4 & Ext. 4/1 respectively. Perusal of record shows that Complainant has filed this case on 04.06.10. Perusal of all above documentary evidences shows that Complainant has complied with all the necessary time limits which are required for the prosecution under Section 138 of N.I. Act. 4 & Ext. 4/1 respectively. Perusal of record shows that Complainant has filed this case on 04.06.10. Perusal of all above documentary evidences shows that Complainant has complied with all the necessary time limits which are required for the prosecution under Section 138 of N.I. Act. All the steps viz-presentation of cheques for encashment, issuing notice to accused, filing of this case in the court have been taken by the Complainant within time as prescribed under the N.I. Act. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Both the accused persons have also accepted the fact that they had received the notice and issued reply thereof.” 26. This Court finds that the learned trial court has not recorded any finding with regards to the date of service of cheque bouncing notice dated 14.05.10 which was sent to the petitioners under registered cover. Inspite of this, the learned trial court recorded a finding that all the steps viz-presentation of cheques for encashment, issuing notice to accused, filing of this case in the court have been taken by the Complainant within time as prescribed under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Although it has been recorded in the impugned judgement of the trial court that in the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C, both the accused persons have also accepted the fact that they had received the notice and issued reply thereof, but there is no finding about the date on which the petitioners had received the cheque bouncing notice and the date on which they had replied to the notice. 27. This Court is of the considered view that date of service of notice of cheque bouncing is a material date for the purposes of calculation of time line giving a cause of action for filing a complaint case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was for the Complainant to prove that the cause of action arose as per the provisions of Section 138 proviso (c) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which clearly provides that the cause of action arises upon expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of cheque bouncing notice. It was for the Complainant to prove that the cause of action arose as per the provisions of Section 138 proviso (c) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which clearly provides that the cause of action arises upon expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of cheque bouncing notice. In absence of the relevant date regarding service of cheque bouncing notice, the finding of the learned trial court that all the steps viz-presentation of cheques for encashment, issuing notice to accused, filing of this case in the court have been taken by the Complainant within time as prescribed under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is perverse and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 28. The learned lower appellate court recorded the findings as under: - “Heard both the sides and perused the entire record. On perusal of the record it transpires that photocopy of the reply notice sent on behalf of the appellants through Sri Ajit Kumar, Advocate is there on the record which was sent on 01.06.10. In course of argument it was submitted that the accused persons never received any notice but in the statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. it is apparent that both the appellants have stated that they had received notice for which they had given reply. Also on this point learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants contends that the appellants are ignorant and they could not understand the nature of the question put to them. The entire argument appears to be false in view of the fact that photocopy of the legal notice sent on behalf of the appellant is there on record which reply notice is dated 01.06.10. This apparently means that the demand notice sent through the Complainant/respondent no. 2 was definitely received by the appellant prior to 01.06.10 and on 01.06.10 the respondents have categorically denied the liability of making any payment, hence cause of action arose immediately. In that view of the matter the institution of case on 04.06.10 thus does not appear to be premature or nor any question of limitation adversely effects it.” 29. 2 was definitely received by the appellant prior to 01.06.10 and on 01.06.10 the respondents have categorically denied the liability of making any payment, hence cause of action arose immediately. In that view of the matter the institution of case on 04.06.10 thus does not appear to be premature or nor any question of limitation adversely effects it.” 29. This Court finds that the learned lower appellate court has relied upon a photocopy of the reply dated 01.06.2010 which was available on record, though not exhibited by any of the parties, and also recorded that in that reply dated 01.06.2010, the petitioners categorically denied their liability and accordingly, held that the cause of action to file the case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 immediately arose after they refused to pay vide reply dated 01.06.2010 and also held that the notice dated 14.05.2010 must have been served on or before 01.06.2010. 30. This Court finds that even the learned lower appellate court did not record any finding regarding the date of service of notice dated 14.05.2010 upon the petitioners, but simply recorded that the notice must have been served on or before 01.06.2010 which is the date of reply by the petitioners whereby the petitioners had allegedly refused to pay the amount. The learned lower appellate court took the date of alleged refusal to pay as the starting point for the cause of action to file the case which was filed on 04.06.2010, although the reply letter dated 01.06.2010 was never exhibited, it was only a photocopy in the file and the Complainant never received the same. 31. This Court finds that petitioners, before the learned lower appellate court, had taken a specific plea that there is no evidence on record to show that the notices were received by the petitioners and in that view of the matter, the presumption regarding the service of notice dated 14.05.2010 sent through registered cover could be 30 days from the date of issuance of notice and from there 15 days waiting period is prescribed for the petitioners to make payment of the cheque amount and only thereafter the cause of action for filing the case could have arisen in the instant case. 32. 32. This argument was rejected by the learned lower appellate court by referring to the photocopy of the reply which was said to have been sent on 01.06.2010 by the petitioners and accordingly holding that the petitioners had refused to pay vide reply dated 01.06.2010 and accordingly, immediately thereafter the cause of action had arisen for filing the case and the case having been filed on 04.06.2010 cannot be said to be premature. 33. This Court finds that admittedly there is no material on record for service of notice upon the petitioners on 17.05.2010 and presumption regarding service of notice sent through registered cover can be drawn only upon expiry of 30 days from the date of issuance of notice as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 (Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayprakash M. Sah and Another). In the said judgment the notice was sent through speed post and although the actual date of service of notice was not known, the Complainant proceeded on the basis that the same was served within the reasonable period. It was held that if the presumption of notice within the reasonable period is raised, the deemed service at best can be taken to be 30 days from the date of its issuance and the accused was required to make payment in terms of the said notice within 15 days thereafter and the complaint petition therefore could have been filed after expiry of 15 days given to the accused for payment of money after receipt of notice. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 (Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey and Another) it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court at Paragraphs- 30 to 38 which reads as under: 30. Section 138 of the NI Act comprises of the main provision which defines the ingredients of the offence and the punishment that would follow in the event of such an offence having been committed. Appended to this section is also a proviso which has three clauses viz. (a), (b) and (c). The offence under Section 138 is made effective only on fulfilment of the eventualities contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso. Appended to this section is also a proviso which has three clauses viz. (a), (b) and (c). The offence under Section 138 is made effective only on fulfilment of the eventualities contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso. For completion of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act not only the satisfaction of the ingredients of offence set out in the main part of the provision is necessary but it is also imperative that all the three eventualities mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are satisfied. Mere issuance of a cheque and dishonour thereof would not constitute an offence by itself under Section 138. 31. Section 138 of the NI Act has been analysed by this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. wherein this Court said that the following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act: (SCC p. 753, para 10) “(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.” 32. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 33. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 33. In K.R. Indira, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act could be completed if all the above components are satisfied. 34. Insofar as the present reference is concerned, the debate broadly centres around clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. The requirement of clause (c) of the proviso is that the drawer of the cheque must have failed to make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Clause (c) of the proviso offers a total period of 15 days to the drawer from the date of receipt of the notice to make payment of the cheque amount on its dishonour. 35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the Code defines “complaint”. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of the law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of the law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque. 36. A complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. Therefore, a court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. 37. We, therefore, do not approve the view taken by this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia and so also the judgments of various High Courts following Narsingh Das Tapadia that if the complaint under Section 138 is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the same is premature and if on the date of taking cognizance, a period of 15 days from the date of service of notice on the drawer/accused has expired, such complaint was legally maintainable and, hence, the same is overruled. 38. Rather, the view taken by this Court in Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy wherein this Court held that service of notice in terms of Section 138 proviso (b) of the NI Act was a part of the cause of action for lodging the complaint and communication to the accused about the fact of dishonouring of the cheque and calling upon to pay the amount within 15 days was imperative in character, commends itself to us. As noticed by us earlier, no complaint can be maintained against the drawer of the cheque before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice because the drawer/accused cannot be said to have committed any offence until then. As noticed by us earlier, no complaint can be maintained against the drawer of the cheque before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice because the drawer/accused cannot be said to have committed any offence until then. We approve the decision of this Court in Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy and also the judgments of the High Courts which have taken the view following this judgment that the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act filed before the expiry of 15 days of service of notice could not be treated as a complaint in the eye of law and criminal proceedings initiated on such complaint are liable to be quashed. 34. This Court finds that the law has been well settled by the aforesaid judgement that the cause of action for filing a complaint case under Section 138 of the said Act could not arise prior to expiry of 15 days from the date of service of notice on the accused. This Court is of the considered view that even in case of refusal to pay, the cause of action to file the case cannot arise unless the statutory period of 15 days from service of cheque bouncing notice has elapsed. There is no provision under the said provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act to calculate the cause of action to file the case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act from the date of refusal to pay and there is no provision enabling curtailment of statutory period of 15 days given for making payment even in cases of refusal to pay before expiry of 15 days from service of notice of cheque bouncing. 35. This Court finds that in the instant case, the reply dated 01.06.2010 could not have been considered as only a photocopy of the reply dated 01.06.2010 was said to be kept in file which was never exhibited before the learned trial court; it never formed a part of the evidence on behalf of the Complainant and the petitioners in their statements under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. never disclosed the date of receipt of cheque bouncing notice dated 14.05.2010 or date of issuance of reply dated 01.06.2010. 36. P.C. never disclosed the date of receipt of cheque bouncing notice dated 14.05.2010 or date of issuance of reply dated 01.06.2010. 36. Even assuming that the learned lower appellate court could have considered the photocopy of the reply and its date i.e. 01.06.2010 then also, date of service of notice dated 14.05.2010 could not have been presumed to be on any date prior to 01.06.2010 as the 30 days for presuming service of notice from the date of its issuance on 14.05.2010 under registered cover was yet to expire. In that view of the matter, the finding of the learned lower appellate court that the cause of action for filing the case arose was available on 04.06.2010 is ex- facie perverse and is accordingly set aside. 37. This Court also finds that even if the best case of the Complainant is taken into consideration, then the date of reply by the petitioners is dated 01.06.2010 and 15 days from the date of reply would expire only on 15.06.2010 and present complaint case has been filed on 04.06.2010. This Court finds that in the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 (Yogendra Pratap Singh –versus- Savitri Pandey and another), the complaint is pre-mature as the cause of action for filing the complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 had not crystalised and accordingly, the complaint itself was pre-mature and hence not maintainable. 38. Consequently, the condition precedent for filing the case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, having not been satisfied, the complaint itself was not maintainable on the day it was filed and accordingly, the petitioners could not have been convicted under the said Section. The question of any presumption regarding existing debt under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 did not arise as the complaint itself was not maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition is hereby allowed. The impugned judgements and sentence passed by the learned courts below are hereby set aside. 39. This court also finds that in the aforesaid judgement reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 , the Hon’ble supreme court while holding that the complaint as pre-mature also observed in Para-41 of the said judgement itself that the remedy for the Complainant was to file a fresh complaint and satisfy the court regarding sufficient cause for delay. 40. 39. This court also finds that in the aforesaid judgement reported in (2014) 10 SCC 713 , the Hon’ble supreme court while holding that the complaint as pre-mature also observed in Para-41 of the said judgement itself that the remedy for the Complainant was to file a fresh complaint and satisfy the court regarding sufficient cause for delay. 40. The present revision petition is allowed and the parties may proceed as per law. 41. Let the lower court records be sent back to the court concerned. 42. Let this order be communicated to the learned court below through FAX / e-mail.