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2020 DIGILAW 709 (BOM)

Mansur Daulat Patel v. State of Maharashtra

2020-05-22

R.G.AVACHAT

body2020
ORDER : R.G. Avachat, J. 1. The challenge in both these Writ Petitions is to the order dated 21.11.2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kopargaon (trial Court) on application (Exh. 50) filed by the petitioners for discharge from Sessions Case, being case No. 18 of 2016. By the impugned order, the application for discharge has been rejected. 2. Heard Mr. Thoke, learned Counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ghayal, learned APP for respondent - State and Mr. Shermale, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2/informant. FACTS:- 3. Satish (deceased) committed suicide by jumping into a well on 20.06.2014. He was an Advocate by profession, practicing in the Court at Sangamner. Sitaram (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 176 of 2017) was a Talathi, at Sangamner. Mansur (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1648 of 2016) and one Rashinkar (Rahatekar) were employed by the petitioner-Talathi to assist him in his official work. As such, both Mansur and Rashinkar were not public servants. 4. The deceased had a brief for effecting a mutation entry in respect of agricultural land situated within the jurisdiction of the petitioner-Talathi. An application for effecting necessary mutation entry had, therefore, been moved. The Talathi was supposed to effect the mutation entry. The deceased claimed to have had paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to both the petitioners and Rashinkar, as consideration for favour of action. It, however, appears that the Talathi could not effect the mutation entry. He informed the deceased that no mutation entry could be effected. According to the deceased, the Talathi persistently refused to do him favour, as a result of which trust-deficit developed between the deceased and his client. The deceased felt to have been harassed and therefore, decided to end his life. He, ultimately, committed suicide by jumping into a well. He died of drowning. The deceased before jumping into the well, left behind a suicide note in his pocket diary, squarely blaming the petitioner-Talathi and his two assistants, to be responsible to drive him to commit suicide. 5. Sachin, brother of the deceased, therefore,-lodged the FIR against the trio. A crime for offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code ("I.P.C." for short), vide Crime No. I-131 of 2014 came to be registered with Sangamner City Police Station. Since the deceased was an Advocate by. profession, the lawyers practicing at Sangamner refused to represent the petitioners. A crime for offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code ("I.P.C." for short), vide Crime No. I-131 of 2014 came to be registered with Sangamner City Police Station. Since the deceased was an Advocate by. profession, the lawyers practicing at Sangamner refused to represent the petitioners. The crime, therefore, came to be transferred to Kopargaon Police Station. On completion of the investigation, charge sheet has been filed. Pending the investigation, the petitioners had unsuccessfully moved for quashing of the FIR. The application for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had also been moved on 21.03.2016. Said application was, however, not pressed. The co-accused Rashinkar preferred Criminal Writ Petition (433 of 2016) for discharge and quashment of the charge sheet. The Division Bench of this Court was pleased to allow the Writ Petition on 24.06.2016. Present petitioners had, therefore, preferred two separate Writ Petitions for the similar reliefs. They, however, withdrew the petitions with liberty to prosecute the application for discharge. They, therefore, preferred application (Exh. 50). The trial Court rejected the same. 6. It appears that during hearing of a bail application, the High Court had expressed a view that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act (P.C. Act) do get attracted. Sections 7 and 13 of the P.C. Act, therefore, came to be invoked in the case. 7. It further appears that the trial Court on 15.06.2016 framed Charge (page 306 of compilation of the Writ Petition) only for the offence punishable under Sections 306 read with 34 of I.P.C. It is, however, not known as to why, charge for the offence punishable under Sections 7 read with 13 of P.C. Act has not been framed., Upon scrutiny of the papers in the charge sheet, it does indicate that no sanction appears to have been granted for the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the P.C. Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioners did not press for discharge from the offences under the P.C. Act. Be that as it may. 8. As stated above, the petitioners preferred an application for discharge (Exh. 50). The Trial Court rejected the same with the observation that the charge has already been framed before filing of the application (Exh. 50) and therefore, there is no question of discharge. Be that as it may. 8. As stated above, the petitioners preferred an application for discharge (Exh. 50). The Trial Court rejected the same with the observation that the charge has already been framed before filing of the application (Exh. 50) and therefore, there is no question of discharge. The Trial Court further observed that the petitioners were not entitled for the relief merely because the co-accused - Rashinkar has been discharged by the Division Bench of this Court. The trial Court further observed as under:- ".... There is an oral dying declaration made by the deceased advocate Satish Rahut before advocate Sohel Shaikh on 17.06.2014 and suicidal note was also disclosed that he got under depression due to refusal of accused No. 1 to carry out mutation entry in spite of payment of Rs. 25,000/- made to him and due to which he committed suicide. The statement of Mujafarkhan Sikandarskhan Pathan as well as his legal heirs are also recorded and same disclosed that amount of Rs. 25,000/- was given to deceased advocate Satish Raut and as such, there is a sufficient prima facie material to frame charge against the accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence p.u.s. 306 r.w. 34 of I.P.C. and under sections 7, 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against accused No. 1. " The petitioners are, therefore, before this Court. 9. Mr. Thoke, learned Counsel for the petitioners, would submit that the co-accused has been discharged. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to the same relief in view 'of the principle of parity. According to learned Counsel, the deceased was an Advocate by profession. The deceased was, therefore, supposed to know the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (M.L.R.C.) and the rules thereunder. If the petitioner-Talathi was unable to effect the mutation entry, the deceased had a remedy of appeal or approaching the higher revenue Officers. According to learned Counsel, inability of the petitioner-Talathi to effect the mutation entry in favour of the client of the deceased could, in no way, be inferred that the petitioner-Talathi and his assistants had intended to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The deceased was under depression. He was not doing well in the profession. He had requested his colleague to find a job for him. The deceased committed suicide out of frustration. The deceased was under depression. He was not doing well in the profession. He had requested his colleague to find a job for him. The deceased committed suicide out of frustration. The petitioners could not be prosecuted for being responsible for his death. Learned Counsel, ultimately, urged for allowing the petitions. 10. Learned APP representing respondent No. 1 - State and Mr. Shermale, learned Counsel representing respondent No. 2/informant, would submit that on investigation, charge sheet has been filed. The deceased left behind a suicide note, holding the petitioners responsible to drive him to commit suicide. At the stage of framing of charge, it could have been seen, as to whether there was sufficient material to proceed against. Both learned Counsel took me through the statements of Advocate Sohel Sheikh and the widow of the deceased recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to submit that the trial Court has been justified in framing of the charge. Both learned Counsel have relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak, 2019 DGLS (SC) 477 : 2020 Cri LJ 638 : AIR 2019 SC 5604 . 11. As a proposition, it is correct to say that there cannot be discharge after framing of the charge. The facts of the present case are, however, quite different. The trial Court framed charge against the petitioners and the co-accused - Rashinkar for the offence punishable under Section 306 r/w Section 34 of I.P.C. on 15.06.2016. Thereafter, the co-accused Rashinkar has been granted the relief of discharge. The proceedings of Sessions Case No. 18 of 2016 have been quashed so far as the co-accused Rashinkar is concerned, by virtue of judgment and order dated 24.06.2016 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 433 of 2016. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred two separate Writ Petitions for the same relief. Both the Writ Petitions came to be withdrawn with liberty to prosecute the application for discharge. In the given circumstances, the trial Court ought not to have observed that since the charge has been framed, there is no question to discharge the petitioners. 12. The Division Bench vide order dated 24.06.2016, in paragraph 6 and 7, was pleased to observe as under:- "6. ........the accused should be shown to have instigated the victim to commit suicide. In the given circumstances, the trial Court ought not to have observed that since the charge has been framed, there is no question to discharge the petitioners. 12. The Division Bench vide order dated 24.06.2016, in paragraph 6 and 7, was pleased to observe as under:- "6. ........the accused should be shown to have instigated the victim to commit suicide. Such instigation should be a positive act. It would also be a physical act. Such act of instigation is generally committed in presence of the victim. In this case, assuming the petitioner and other accused intentionally avoided to pass favourable order in favour of the victim, it is not the prosecution case that such act on their part would amount to instigation for suicide. 7. ....Let us assume that petitioner and other accused intentionally did not help the victim. Can it be said that their conduct aided the act of suicide. The answer is in negative. Their conduct saddened the victim so-much-so that he in the fit of depression committed suicide". So far as regards offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of P.C. Act, the Division Bench observed thus: "....The petitioner is not a Government employee or a public servant and therefore, he cannot be accused of any offence under the Act. In view of this, we are inclined to quash the proceeding against the petitioner". 13. This Court may not be at one with the reasons given by the Division bench. The fact, however, remains that the co-accused has been discharged of the case. Neither the State nor respondent No. 2/informant took exception to the said order. The order has attained finality. 14. The petitioner - Mansur was an assistant to the petitioner-Talathi. He was not a public servant. He had no authority to effect any mutation entry and issue a copy of 7/12 extract. His case is at par with the co-accused - Rashinkar, against whom the prosecution has been quashed even after the charge has been framed against him and the petitioners. 15. In the case of Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746 : (2010 Cri LJ 1899 (SC)) : (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 582) : (2010 AIR SCW 1494), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "23. 15. In the case of Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746 : (2010 Cri LJ 1899 (SC)) : (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 582) : (2010 AIR SCW 1494), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "23. The principle of parity in criminal case is that, where the case of the accused is similar in all respects as that of the co-accused men the benefit extended to one accused should be extended to the co-accused. With regard to this principle, it is important to mention the observation of this court in the case of Harbans Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (1982) 2 SCC 101 : ( AIR 1982 SC 849 ) : (1982 Cri LJ 795 (SC))). In that case it was held, that, in view of commutation of death sentence of one of the accused, who was similarly placed as that of appellant, award of death sentence to appellant was unjustified and, hence, the death sentence of the appellant was stayed till the decision of the President on commutation of sentence. 24. An important observation of this Court on the point need to be noticed at this stage: "18. ....It will be a sheer travesty of justice and the course of justice will be perverted, if for the very same offence, the petitioner has to swing and pay the extreme penalty of death whereas the death sentence imposed on his co-accused for the very same offence is commuted to one of life imprisonment and the life of the co-accused is shared (sic spared)." 25. In Akhil Ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v. State of Maharashtra,: (2003) 2 SCC 708 ), this Court maintained that as the second accused was placed on the same situation as the appellant, Article 21 of the Constitution would not permit this court to deny the same benefit to the second accused." 16. The petitioner-Talathi may not be entitled for the relief on the ground of parity because he is the person, with whom the deceased claimed to have a dealing. His case, therefore, will have to be considered on merits. 17. In the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and anr. The petitioner-Talathi may not be entitled for the relief on the ground of parity because he is the person, with whom the deceased claimed to have a dealing. His case, therefore, will have to be considered on merits. 17. In the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2020)I SCC (Cri) 686: AIR 2018 SC 2039 : AIR 2018 SC (Criminal) 663, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 33 referred to various judgments of the Apex Court, wherein it was observed as under: "33. ..............The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab: (2014)3 SCC 92 : ( AIR 2014 SC 1400 ) : (2014 Cri LJ 1118 (SC)) : (2014 AIR SCW, 667), wherein it has been observed thus:- "100. However, there is a series of cases wherein this Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 227, 228, 239, 240, 241, 242 and 245, Cr.P.C., has consistently held that the court at the stage of framing of the charge has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of an offence by the accused. The court has to see as to whether the material brought on record reasonably connect the accused with the offence. Nothing more is required to be enquired into. While dealing with the aforesaid provisions, the test of prima facie case is to be applied. The court has to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence are sufficient for the court to proceed against the accused further. (Vide State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1976 Cri LJ 763 (SC)); All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Union of India : (1989) 4 SCC 90 : ( AIR 1989 SC 2045 )); Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia (1989) 1 SCC 715 ), State of M.P. v. Krishna Chandra Saksena : (1996) 11 SCC 439 : AIR Online 1996 SC 177) and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2583 ) : (2000 Cri LJ 3504 (SC)) : (2000 AIR SCW 2674)) 101. In Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : AIR 2002 SC 564 : 2002 Cri LJ 980 (SC) : 2002 AIR SCW 146) this Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., placed a very heavy reliance on the earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4 : AIR 1979 SC 366 : 1979 Cri LJ 154 (SC)) and held that while considering the question of framing the charges, the court may weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out and whether the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained. In such an eventuality, the court is justified in framing the charges and proceeding with the trial. The court has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but the court should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh evidence as if it is conducting a trial. 102. In Suresh v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 3 SCC 703 : ( AIR 2001 SC 1375 ) : (2001 Cri LJ 1697 (SC)): (2001 AIR SCW 1156), this Court after taking note of the earlier judgments in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya (1990) 4 SCC 76 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1962 ): (1990 Cri LJ 1869 (SC))) and State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj (1997) 4 SCC 393 : AIR 1997 SC 2041 : 1997 AIR SCW 1833), held as under:(Suresh case, SCC p. 707, para 9):- "9. ....at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as the gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. The court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as the gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Therefore, at the stage of framing of the charge the court has to consider the material with a view to find out if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against him and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (Priya Sharan case, SCC p. 397, para 8) : AIR 1997 SC 2041 :1997 Cri LJ 2248" (Emphasis in original) 103. Similarly in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977)4 SCC 39 : AIR 1977 SC 2018 ), while dealing with the issue, this Court held: (SCC p. 42, para. 4). "4. ... If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then. there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial." The Court in paragraph 37 has further observed as under:- "37. ....Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482, Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution...... 18. There cannot be two views about the observations of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Deepak (supra), relied upon by learned APP. One has, however, to go by the facts of each case. The facts of Dipak's case (supra), undoubtedly, indicate that the victim therein committed suicide by consuming poison at her residence. Her dying declaration was recorded by the Naib Tahsildar. It was her grievance that Dipak, accused in the said case, had molested her. She had, therefore, instituted a case against him. Since then, he was harassing her. She has, therefore, lodged not less than three complaints against him. He was alleged to have caused the deceased to be terminated from the employment and also allegedly caused her landlord to oust her from the possession. She had, therefore, instituted a case against him. Since then, he was harassing her. She has, therefore, lodged not less than three complaints against him. He was alleged to have caused the deceased to be terminated from the employment and also allegedly caused her landlord to oust her from the possession. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has found it to be a case to frame charge and proceed against Dipak (accused therein). 19. Let us now consider the material and the documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value, disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence.'' 20. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under: "Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." Section 107 of the IPC reads as under: "107. Abetment of a thing.- A person abets the doing of a thing, who First. Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly. Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.- A person who, by willful misrepresentation, or by willful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing." 21. In the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3837 ) : (2001 Cri LJ 4724 (SC)) : (2001 AIR SCW 4282) different shades of the meaning of word "instigation" have been examined. 22. In the case of M. Mohan v. State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police 2011(3) Mh LJ (Cri) 127: AIR 2011 SC 1238 ) : (2011 Cri LJ 1900 (SC)): (2011 AIR SCW 1601)), the Supreme Court of India has observed as under: "44. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. 22. In the case of M. Mohan v. State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police 2011(3) Mh LJ (Cri) 127: AIR 2011 SC 1238 ) : (2011 Cri LJ 1900 (SC)): (2011 AIR SCW 1601)), the Supreme Court of India has observed as under: "44. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),: 2011(1) Mh LJ (Cri) (SC) 290 : (2009) 16 SCC 605 , had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and "goading". The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person's suicidability pattern is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straightjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. 45. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. 46. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under section 306, Indian Penal Code there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeking no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide. 47. In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Limited and others: (2010) 10 SCC 361 , this Court has held that when prima facie no case is made out against the accused, then the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and quashed the complaint." 23. Death by commission of suicide must have been the desired object of the abettors; and with that in view they must have instigated, goaded, urged or encouraged the victim in commission of suicide. Death by commission of suicide must have been the desired object of the abettors; and with that in view they must have instigated, goaded, urged or encouraged the victim in commission of suicide. The instigation may be by provoking or inciting the person committing suicide and this instigation may be gathered by positive acts done by the abettors or by omission in the doing of a thing. Thus, the acts or omission committed by the abettors immediately before the commission of suicide are vital. The mere fact that certain persons have been named in the suicidal note to be responsible for his death is not by itself a ground to fasten one with the charge of abetment. In terms of Section 107, it must prima facie appear to hold that the person named in the suicide note to be responsible for commission of suicide has abetted in the act. The act for conduct of the accused, even if there may be any, however, insulting and abusive those may be, will not by themselves suffice to constitute abetment of commission of suicide, unless those are reasonably capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such acts consequence of suicide. 24. Let us now examine the material on record. The allegations in the FIR are reiteration of the contents of the suicide note. The suicide note reads as under:- 25. The suicide note suggests that the petitioners and co-accused - Rashinkar had received the amount and agreed to effect a necessary mutation entry. They, however, refused to effect the mutation entry as a result of refusal, trust-deficit developed between the deceased and his client. He (deceased) suffered mental torture. He decided to end his life due to the trouble/harassment by the petitioners. The deceased had requested the Police Officer, Sangamner Police Station, to register crime against them and ensure that they are punished. 26. Advocate Sohail Shaikh has stated in his statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that on 09.06.2014, the deceased alone went to the office of the petitioner-Talathi. On 13.06.2014, the deceased told him that the petitioner-Talathi was going to issue him 7/12 extract and for the same, he paid him (Talathi) Rs. 25,000/-. On 17.06.2014, the deceased met him in the Court. The deceased was seen weary/pensive. He told him 27. Then, there is a statement of the widow of the deceased. On 13.06.2014, the deceased told him that the petitioner-Talathi was going to issue him 7/12 extract and for the same, he paid him (Talathi) Rs. 25,000/-. On 17.06.2014, the deceased met him in the Court. The deceased was seen weary/pensive. He told him 27. Then, there is a statement of the widow of the deceased. She has stated that on 17.06.2014, the deceased was seen frustrated. She, therefore, inquired with him. He related her that the petitioner-Talathi has been troubling him. He had paid the petitioner-Talathi Rs. 25,000/- for effecting mutation entry, still the Talathi was not doing favour to him. The petitioner-Talathi made him visit his office many a time. It is further in her statement that the deceased was seen pensive.. She, therefore, again inquired with him to learn that the petitioner- Mansur and co-accused Rashinkar informed him that mutation entry could not be effected and also told him to do whatever he want to. They returned him the papers. 28. Taking the suicide note and the aforesaid two statements as they are, one can reach to a conclusion that the deceased on behalf of his client, had filed an application for effecting mutation entry in the revenue record in respect of a particular agricultural land. The petitioner-Talathi was supposed to affect the mutation entry for which, he had been paid a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. The petitioner - Mansur and co-accused Rashinkar did not have any authority to effect any mutation entry. They were simply assisting the petitioner-Talathi in his official work. The petitioner-Talathi then expressed his inability to do the work. Let us' accept the case of the prosecution as it is that the petitioner-Talathi had refused to effect the mutation entry, as was expected by the deceased. Such refusal, on the part of the petitioner-Talathi, by no stretch of imagination, could be termed him to have had intended to drive the deceased to commit suicide. As has been rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioners, the deceased had ways and means to tackle the situation. The deceased being an Advocate by profession, could have approached higher Officers of the petitioner-Talathi. The M.L.R.C. provides for the remedy of an appeal. Even if the petitioner-Talathi had refused to effect the mutation entry, the deceased could have approached the Court of law. The deceased being an Advocate by profession, could have approached higher Officers of the petitioner-Talathi. The M.L.R.C. provides for the remedy of an appeal. Even if the petitioner-Talathi had refused to effect the mutation entry, the deceased could have approached the Court of law. Committing suicide was not an answer to the problem created by the petitioner-Talathi and his assistants. 29. If we assumed that the prosecution material goes unchallenged, the petitioners could not be held guilty of offence of abetment of suicide. Mens rea an ingredient of offence of abetment is lacking. The deceased had approached the petitioner-Talathi first on 09.06.2014. On 17.06.2014, the petitioner-Talathi allegedly refused (expressed inability) to effect the mutation entry. He allegedly made the deceased to visit his office many a time. The statement of the widow of the deceased, however, indicates that the petitioner-Talathi had returned the deceased all the necessary papers. The same indicate that the petitioner-Talathi was not going to effect the mutation as expected by the deceased. The deceased, thereafter, could have approached the superiors of the petitioner-Talathi. Instead of resorting to a judicial remedy, as is available under M.L.R.C. and rules thereunder, the deceased committed suicide. It is reiterated that mere fact of refusal or expressing inability to effect a mutation entry as was expected by the deceased, by no stretch of imagination, could be a cause for committing suicide. The deceased appears to have been frustrated or felt let down since he had, allegedly, obtained money from his client for being paid to the petitioner-Talathi. As such, it is a case for discharge. 30. In view of the above, both the petitions deserve to be allowed. Hence, the following order:- (i) Both the petitions are partly allowed. (ii) The petitioners are discharged of the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. (iii) Charge framed against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, is quashed. 31. After pronouncement of the order, Mr. Shermale, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, prays for stay of this order for a period of eight weeks. The prayer is granted.