JUDGMENT : By the Court: - Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 30.01.2015, passed in Arbitration Misc. Case No. 24 of 2008 by the Sub-Judge –VIII, Ranchi in an application filed under section 34(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, confirming the Award dated 22.12.2007, passed by the sole Arbitrator. 3. The brief facts of the case is that a dispute has arisen between the parties regarding the work order issued to the respondents for extraction/breaking of coal/coal measure strata in slices/layers without resorting to drilling and blasting and then loading/transfer of broken materials into tipping trucks/dumpers, provided by appellant-management. One of the clauses mentioned in the tender was that there will be a pre-bid meeting with all tenderers after the last date of sale of tender document and before receipt of tender document i.e. on 29.06.2002. The work started from 24.11.2002 and agreement of contract between the parties was signed on 12th April, 2003. The respondent-claimant submitted an application to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the appellant raising a gross claim amount of Rs.4,32,87,864.40/- with a request to settle and decide the disputes and claim as detailed in the application, submitted under clause 31.1 of the general terms and conditions of the contract between the parties. The respondent thereafter filed an application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide Arbitration Application No. 38 of 2004 before this Court. During the pendency of the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the learned counsel for the appellant appearing in the said case intimated to the bench of the designated judge of this Court that Mr. S.K. Verma, Ex-CMD has already been appointed as sole Arbitrator. During the pendency of the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the learned counsel for the appellant appearing in the said case intimated to the bench of the designated judge of this Court that Mr. S.K. Verma, Ex-CMD has already been appointed as sole Arbitrator. In the order dated 09.02.2005, passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court -being the Judge designated to entertain the application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it has been observed by the said bench that before filing the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the respondent herein in this appeal served a notice dated 27.01.2004 to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the CCL, Ranchi for deciding the dispute but nothing was done and only after expiry of about 10 months, the respondent of this appeal filed the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. During the course of argument of the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, both the counsel for the parties agreed to appoint Mr. M.A. Ubaid, Ex-CMD, CCL, Ranchi as Arbitrator and accordingly the said Mr. M.A. Ubaid, Ex-CMD, CCL, Ranchi was appointed as the sole Arbitrator vide the said order dated 09.02.2005. 4. Before the Arbitrator, the respondent of this appeal being the claimant put a claim of Rs.4,35,93,844.03/- for the loss sustained because of non-availability of adequate size of coal face and that the loss occasioned to the respondent-claimant was on account of machine owning cost for idle hours, loss of profit, loss of good will, damage of equipment due to working in hostile condition etc. The appellant herein who was the respondent before the Arbitrator denied the claim of the claimant before the arbitrator. The learned Arbitrator worked out the compensation of Rs.2,62,02,434.00/- to the claimant as per the breakups given below:- (a) Working days of Surface Miner/Yr. 330 (b) Working hours of Machine/day 19.5 (c) Total work to be executed in one year 3.5 (d) No of Surface Miner required for this work Mill M3 3 (e) Production per Surface Miner/Yr. The learned Arbitrator worked out the compensation of Rs.2,62,02,434.00/- to the claimant as per the breakups given below:- (a) Working days of Surface Miner/Yr. 330 (b) Working hours of Machine/day 19.5 (c) Total work to be executed in one year 3.5 (d) No of Surface Miner required for this work Mill M3 3 (e) Production per Surface Miner/Yr. 1.1666667 Mill M3 (f) Working days per year/Surface Miner 330 (g) Production per day per surface miner - e/f =3535.536 M3 (h) Days of machines deployed (i) Surface Minor No.1 (01-02-2003 to 1-12-2003) (ii) Surface Miner No.2 (11-07-2003 to 1-01-2004) 302.5 186.0 (i) Total days of deployment of Surface Miner 488.5 (j) Expected Production (g)x(i) 3535.536 x488.5 = 17,27,109.3 (k) Production made (-)8,96,867.46 (l) Production lost 8,30,241.9 (m) Loss of income to contractor (1) x Rs. 31.56 : 830241.9 X 31.56 Rs. 2,62,02,434.00 (Rupees Two crores sixty two lacs two thousand four hundred thirty four only) 5. Before the learned court below, it was agitated by the appellant that as no request was made by the claimant-respondent for appointment of Arbitrator, therefore appointment of Arbitrator on the basis of pre-mature application is ab initio void and the counter claim of the appellant before the learned Arbitrator was rejected without any cogent reason. It was also contended before the learned court below that the learned Arbitrator has acted beyond its limit by interfering with the matter of two bank guarantees which was agreed between the CCL and Bank itself and passed an interim order dated 20.04.2005 in this regard. It was also contended before the learned court below that the act of learned Arbitrator in rejecting the application under section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is against the Public Policy of India; hence the same is liable to be set aside. The grounds like reason for short fall of production as assigned by the claimant, inadequate length provided by the petitioner required for the surface miner, breakdown of surface miner and excessive water percolation was well within the knowledge of the claimant, as the claimant visited the site before entering into the agreement were also agitated by the appellant herein, before the court below. Hence, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant before the court below that the claimant cannot claim compensation for these reasons. Hence, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant before the court below that the claimant cannot claim compensation for these reasons. It was also contented by the appellant before the learned court below that the claimant has failed to achieve the daily target of annual production for their own fault. It was further agitated before the learned court below that the Arbitrator has acted beyond the scope and the Arbitrator has erred by not considering section 73 of the Contract Act in its correct perspective. The respondent herein who was the opposite party before the learned court below, submitted before the learned court below that the petition filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was not maintainable. The respondent also submitted before the learned court below regarding limited scope for interference with an award of an arbitrator in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The respondent defended the order passed by the learned sole Arbitrator. It was also contended by the respondents before the learned court below that the CMD of the CCL in response to the notice though was supposed to settle the dispute vide the authority vested upon him under clause 31.1 of the agreement, but he failed to discharge the said duty, prompting the respondent to file the application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and consequently, with the consent of both the parties, the sole Arbitrator was appointed. It was also put forth by the respondents before the learned court below that the appellant herein admitted that they could not provide 35 lakhs cubic metres of coal for extraction which was the scope of work as incorporated in the contract and therefore there was default on the part of the appellant. 6. The learned trial court did not accept the contention of the appellant that the appointment of the learned Arbitrator was pre-mature and the arbitration award is beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, by observing that it is undisputed fact that both the parties to the dispute appeared before this Court and conceded for appointment of the sole Arbitrator. 6. The learned trial court did not accept the contention of the appellant that the appointment of the learned Arbitrator was pre-mature and the arbitration award is beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, by observing that it is undisputed fact that both the parties to the dispute appeared before this Court and conceded for appointment of the sole Arbitrator. The learned trial court also considered that according to the clause 31.1 of the agreement, if any dispute arises during the progress of work or after completion or abandonment thereafter shall be referred to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company or any person authorized by him. So the learned court below observed that the dispute was to be referred to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the CCL and as the said clause is silent, as to whom notice is to be given for appointment of arbitrator, hence there is no fault in addressing the said notice to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the said company. Hence, the learned court below held that the appointment of Arbitrator cannot be termed as pre-mature. The learned court below came to a conclusion that dispute existed between the parties as the claim raised by the respondent-claimant by the said notice dated 27.01.2004 was not honoured and upon the respondent-claimant filing the application before this Court under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with the consent of both the parties, Mr. Ubaid was appointed as the sole Arbitrator. Learned court below also came to a conclusion that the objection of the appellant herein with respect to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator before the learned sole Arbitrator has rightly been rejected by the sole Arbitrator and the rejection of the application under section 17 of the Act being well within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, the same cannot be termed having affected the Public Policy by any stretch of imagination. The learned court below did not accept the contention of the appellant that the award is in conflict with the Public policy of India as the Award does not affect either the public rule or the public in general. The learned court below did not accept the contention of the appellant that the award is in conflict with the Public policy of India as the Award does not affect either the public rule or the public in general. In response to the contention of the appellant that the learned sole Arbitrator did not take into consideration section 73 of the Contract Act is concerned, the learned court below found the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator to be well discussed as the learned Arbitrator has rightly came to a conclusion that the breach in contract has been caused by the appellant and the sole Arbitrator has accordingly not imposed any damage upon the respondent and accordingly the learned court below rejected this application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 7. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned court below has passed the impugned judgment without proper application of judicial mind and committed grave error of law by not entering into the merits of the case and has failed to appreciate Section 16 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.B.P. & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618 having been decided on 26.10.2005 wherein the majority of the judges held as under in paragraph no.47 “47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows: (i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. (ii) The power under Section 11(6) of the Act, in its entirety, could be delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another Judge of that Court and by the Chief Justice of India to another Judge of the Supreme Court. (iii) In case of designation of a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, the power that is exercised by the designated Judge would be that of the Chief Justice as conferred by the statute. (iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. (iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects as indicated in the earlier part of this judgment. These will be his own jurisdiction to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the designated Judge would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the Chief Justice or the designated Judge. (v) Designation of a District Judge as the authority under Section 11(6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (vi) Once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with the orders passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. (vii) Since an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the designated Judge of that Court is a judicial order, an appeal will lie against that order only under Article 136 of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. (viii) There can be no appeal against an order of the Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court designated by him while entertaining an application under Section 11(6) of the Act. (ix) In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Section 16 of the Act. (x) [Ed.: Paras 47(x) & (xii) corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./103/2005 dated 9-11-2005.] Since all were guided by the decision of this Court in Konkan Rly. Corpn. (x) [Ed.: Paras 47(x) & (xii) corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./103/2005 dated 9-11-2005.] Since all were guided by the decision of this Court in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd. [ (2002) 2 SCC 388 ] and orders under Section 11(6) of the Act have been made based on the position adopted in that decision, we clarify that appointments of arbitrators or Arbitral Tribunals thus far made, are to be treated as valid, all objections being left to be decided under Section 16 of the Act. As and from this date, the position as adopted in this judgment will govern even pending applications under Section 11(6) of the Act. (xi) Where District Judges had been designated by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act, the appointment orders thus far made by them will be treated as valid; but applications if any pending before them as on this date will stand transferred, to be dealt with by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned or a Judge of that Court designated by the Chief Justice. (xii) [Ed.: Paras 47(x) & (xii) corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./103/2005 dated 9-11-2005.] The decision in Konkan Rly. Corpn. Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P) Ltd. [ (2002) 2 SCC 388 ] is overruled after the order of the designated judge of this Court in Arbitration Application No.48 of 2004, the ratio laid down in the case of S.B.P. & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (supra) will not be applicable to the said order dated 09.02.2005 passed by the designated judge of this court and the same could not been relied upon by the learned Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator ought to have held that the letter dated 27.01.2004 by the respondent was only the notice of payment and not for adjudication of the dispute by the Arbitrator. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned court below has miserably failed to appreciate that there was illegality and wrong appreciation of the facts on the face of the award, as the Arbitrator has calculated the loss on the basis of total price for one cubic metre amounting to Rs.31.56, which was the price for removal of one cubic metre of coal by using surface minor but the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that for removing one cubic metre of coal, the contractor-claimant had to incur expenses, thus the claimant was entitled to compensation in respect of the said loss for part of the said price less the expenses would have incurred by the claimant had he carried out the said entire work and not for the entire price. But it is fairly submitted by Mr. Mustafa, there is absolutely no evidence in record to suggest as to what expenses would have been incurred by the claimant, had it carried out the said entire work and he has no instruction from the appellant as to what would have been the amount of such expenses though he placed arguments on two separate working days and the question was posed to him on the first day of the argument by this court. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned court below ought to have held that the award of the learned Arbitrator is in conflict with the Public Policy of India and the terms and conditions of the contract has been violated besides violation of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In support of his contention Mr. Ghulam Mustafa relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court of India in the case of Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. vs. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd. (supra) which has been overruled by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its decision in S.B.P. & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (supra). Mr. Mustafa further relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Prasar Bharti vs. Maa Communication (ARB. A, 18/2005 dated 08.02.2010) paragraph no.6 of which reads as under :- “6. The position under the 1996 Act in Section 11 is akin to that under Section 8 and not to that under Section 20 of the 1940 Act. A, 18/2005 dated 08.02.2010) paragraph no.6 of which reads as under :- “6. The position under the 1996 Act in Section 11 is akin to that under Section 8 and not to that under Section 20 of the 1940 Act. In fact, the procedure as prescribed under Section 20 of the 1940 Act has been totally done away with in the 1996 Act. Under the 1996 Act, a party to an arbitration agreement cannot straightaway approach the court for appointment of the arbitrator, as a party to an arbitration agreement was entitled to under Section 20 of the old Act. Under Section 11 of the new Act, even if there is no named arbitrator, the party is not entitled to approach the court straightaway and is required to first issue notice to the other party proposing the names of the arbitrators and is to approach the court only upon the failure of consensus within 30 days of such notice. The procedure prescribed in Section 11 is mandatory. Thus, the question of a party preferring an application under Section 11 (4) or under Section 11 (6) to the Chief Justice or his designate does not arise unless the procedure of giving a notice is followed and without such procedure being followed and failure thereof, there would be no cause of action for the petition under Section 11 (4) or 11(6) of the Act. Thus, the limitation for filing an application under Section 11 (4) or 11(6) of the Act cannot but accrue only upon the failure of the procedure prescribed and can possibly have nothing to do with the limitation for preferring the claim. The Supreme Court in J.C. Budhraja Vs. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 444 , relied by the counsel for the petitioner, has clearly held that the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 8 (2) of the 1940 Act seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be confused with the period of limitation for making the claim.” To buttress his submission that a party is not entitled to approach the court straightway and is required to first issue notice to the other party proposing the names of the arbitrators and is to approach the court only upon the failure of consensus within 30 days of such notice. Mr. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa, learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that the condition precedent for appointment of arbitrator are (i) existence of arbitration agreement between the parties and (ii) existence of dispute between the parties; relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in 1988 AIR SC 1007 wherein in a case relating to the Arbitration Act, 1940 it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as under in paragraph -4 “4. Therefore, in order to be entitled to order of reference under S. 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which this agreement applied. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and silence as well as refusal in respect of the same by respondent. Therefore, a dispute has arisen regarding non payment of the alleged dues of the appellant. The question is for the present case when did such dispute arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and, therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under Art. 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under S. 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or a dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on 28th Feb. 1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, 28th of Feb. 1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under S. 8 or a reference under S. 20 of the Act. See Law of Arbitration by R.S. Bachawat, 1st Edition, page 354. There should be dispute and there can only be a dispute when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other on whatever grounds. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion in denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. When in a particular case a dispute has arisen or not has to be found out from, the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Mustafa also relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Maharastra & Ors. Vs. M/s. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. (CIVIL APPEAL NO.2152 OF 2011, dated 28.02.2011) wherein it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the limitation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would commence from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it aside; to contend that in this case the CMD of the CCL being not a signatory to the agreement between the parties, he is not the proper person to whom the notice dated 27.01.2004 should have been addressed. Mr. Mustafa then relied upon the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Eastern Engineering Company vs. Central Coalfields Limited and Others in L.P.A. No.762 of 2015 dated 11.09.2018 paragraph no.8 of which reads as under:- “8. Thereafter, in the year 2011, this appellant preferred an application under Section 20 of the Act, 2006, before the Facilitation Council. No amount was quantified by this appellant that how much amount they are demanding from respondent no.1. Such application was allowed by the Facilitation Council vide order dated 17.10.2014. Thereafter, in the year 2011, this appellant preferred an application under Section 20 of the Act, 2006, before the Facilitation Council. No amount was quantified by this appellant that how much amount they are demanding from respondent no.1. Such application was allowed by the Facilitation Council vide order dated 17.10.2014. It appears that the Council has not properly appreciated the fact that the demand was not legally tenable at law. Moreover, the Council has also not properly appreciated that the demand was highly time barred. The Council has also not properly appreciated the fact that once the bill of the appellant was raised in the year 2003 and after certain deductions, the rest of the amount was already paid by respondent no.1 to this appellant and it was accepted without any protest. In such eventuality, the application preferred in the year 2011 by this appellant, cannot be allowed by the Facilitation Council, after eight years from the year in which, this appellant accepted the legally payable amount without any protest.” Hence, it is submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned court below be set aside and consequent thereto the award dated 22.12.2007 pronounced on 25.12.2007 also be set aside. 8. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent on the other hand before entering into the merits of the case drew the attention of this Court to the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India regarding the jurisdiction of this Court as well as the trial court in exercise of its power under Section 37 and 34 respectively. In this respect Mr. Rajiv Ranjan first relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of MMTC Ltd. Vs. Vedanta Ltd. reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163 paragraph nos.11 to 14 of which reads as under:- 11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract. 12. It is only if one of these conditions is met that the Court may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of the dispute, and is limited to situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked, or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view based on facts. (See Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 ). Also see ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 ; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 ; and McDermott International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 ). 13. It is relevant to note that after the 2015 amendments to Section 34, the above position stands somewhat modified. Also see ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 ; Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 ; and McDermott International v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 ). 13. It is relevant to note that after the 2015 amendments to Section 34, the above position stands somewhat modified. Pursuant to the insertion of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2), the scope of contravention of Indian public policy has been modified to the extent that it now means fraud or corruption in the making of the award, violation of Section 75 or Section 81 of the Act, contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and conflict with the most basic notions of justice or morality. Additionally, subsection (2A) has been inserted in Section 34, which provides that in case of domestic arbitrations, violation of Indian public policy also includes patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso to the same states that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence. 14. As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.” (Emphasis Supplied) 9. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the court exercising the jurisdiction under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act, 1996 if the award is against the public policy of India. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that a violation of the Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. It is also submitted that additionally the concept of the fundamental policy of Indian law would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice and Wednesbury reasonableness and further more patent illegality itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, as well as contravention of the terms of the contract Act and further only if one of these conditions is met then only the Court may interfere with an Arbitral Award in terms of section 34 (2) (b) (ii) but such interference does not entail a review of the merits of the dispute and is limited to situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary, capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court is shocked or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the root of the matter. It is then submitted that an arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible view based on facts. It is next submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent that the arbitral award shall not be set aside on the ground of erroneous application of law or by the re-appreciation of evidence and that the interference in exercise of power under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under section 34 of the said Act and that in case the arbitral award is confirmed by the Court under section 34, the court exercising the jurisdiction under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has to be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings. It is further submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that it emerges from the documents as well as the evidences of the witnesses that there was not a single case that coal was provided by the appellant herein and was not extracted by the contractor-claimant. It is further submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that it emerges from the documents as well as the evidences of the witnesses that there was not a single case that coal was provided by the appellant herein and was not extracted by the contractor-claimant. It is also submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that the finding of learned sole arbitrator on the issue of maintainability is not arbitrary, capricious nor perverse, nor of such nature which would shock the conscience of the Court, nor do the same violate any legal provision. It is next submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that that the 1996 Act makes the provision for the supervisory role of courts for the review of Arbitral Award only to ensure fairness and intervention of the court is envisaged in a few circumstances only like in case of fraud or bias by Arbitrator or violation of natural justice etc. Relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Orissa and others v, M/s. Lall Brothers reported in AIR 1988 SC 2018 , relating to an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940, where in the Hon’ble Court held as under in paragraph 7 and 8. “7. In our opinion, the High Court was right in refusing to accept the challenge to the award. The fact that there is an unreasoned award is no ground to set aside an award. Lump sum award is not bad per se, as such. An award is conclusive as a judgment between the parties and the court is entitled to set aside an award only if the arbitrator has misconducted himself in the proceedings or when the award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under S. 35 of the Arbitration Act or where an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid under S. 30 of the Act. An award may be set aside by the Court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. 8. An award may be set aside by the Court on the ground of error on the face of the award, but an award is not invalid merely because by a process of inference and argument it may be demonstrated that the arbitrator has committed some mistake in arriving at his conclusion. 8. It is not open to the court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the arbitrator, as to what impelled him to arrive at his conclusions. See in this connection the observations of the Judicial Committee in Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 50 Ind App 324 : ( AIR 1923 PC 66 ) and of this court in Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Seth v. Chintamanrao Balaji, (1964)5 SCR480: ( AIR 1965 SC 214 ). it is submitted that the court cannot review the award or correct any mistake in the adjudication unless the objection of the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it. It is also submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Joginderpal Mohinderpal and another and Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Veshno Rice Millers reported in AIR 1989 SC 1263 relating to an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940, wherein it has been observed that the courts will not sit as courts of appeal to consider the correctness of the Award on the merit in respect of matters of fact or even of law. Further relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India M/s Markfed Vanaspati and Allied Industries vs. Union of India reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5910, it is submitted that Arbitration is a mechanism or a method of resolution of disputes that unlike court take place pursuance to agreement between the parties. The parties agree to be bounded by the decision rendered by the chosen arbitrator after giving hearing. The Endeavour of the court should be to honour and support the award as far as possible. The parties agree to be bounded by the decision rendered by the chosen arbitrator after giving hearing. The Endeavour of the court should be to honour and support the award as far as possible. It is next submitted by learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent relying upon the judgment of Rabindra & Associates vs. Union of India reported in (2010) 1 SCC 80 relating to an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940 that therein as the Arbitrator considered the relevant issue and made award based on facts, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India did not intervene with the same. Next relying upon the case of M.P. Housing Board v. Progressive Writers & Publishers reported in (2009) 5 SCC 678 , relating to an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that once it is found that the view of the Arbitrator is plausible one, the court will refrain itself from intervening. Further relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.V. Mohd. Zakir vs. Regional Sport Center reported in 2009 AIR SCW 217, relating to an appeal under the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that court should not substitute its view for the view taken by the Arbitrator while dealing with the proceedings for setting aside the award and whether the Arbitrator acts within the jurisdiction, the reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator is not open to scrutiny by the courts. Hence, it is submitted that as the learned Arbitrator has rightly rejected the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Hence, this appeal being without any merit be dismissed. 10. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials in the record, the following points for determination emerged for consideration in this appeal:- (i) Whether for the appointment of the Arbitrator being premature and in the absence of any dispute between the parties, the award of the sole arbitrator is liable to be set aside? (ii) Whether the Arbitral Award is against the public policy of India and the terms and conditions of the contract has been violated? (iii) Whether the learned trial court has committed any illegality warranting interference by this Court? 11. (ii) Whether the Arbitral Award is against the public policy of India and the terms and conditions of the contract has been violated? (iii) Whether the learned trial court has committed any illegality warranting interference by this Court? 11. Before considering the first point for determination it will be appropriate to reiterate the settled principles regarding the jurisdiction of this court in exercise of its power under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. As has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of MMTC Vs. Vedanta Ltd. (supra) a court can interfere with an arbitral award on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333 has held in paragraph- 61 that it naturally follows that Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is analogous to Section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940. Now coming to the first point for determination as to whether the appointment of the Arbitrator is premature and for the said reason the award of the sole arbitrator is liable to set aside is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here the undisputed background of this case. Undisputedly in this case before the designated judge of this court appointing the arbitrator, the appellant appointed one arbitrator and intimated the court of such appointment. But the designated judge with the consent of both the parties appointed the present arbitrator whose award is under challenge and as submitted by the learned counsel for the parties during the course of argument the said sole arbitrator whose award is under challenge has expired in the meanwhile. The act of the appellant in appointing an arbitrator voluntarily before the designated judge of this court having done so, takes the wind out of the sail of the appellant’s contention that the appointment of the present arbitrator is premature and the appellant does not have any answer as to if there was no occasion for appointment an arbitrator then why it does so voluntarily. 12. Section 37(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides appeal from an order of the arbitral tribunal accepting the plea that it has no jurisdiction. 12. Section 37(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides appeal from an order of the arbitral tribunal accepting the plea that it has no jurisdiction. But if such plea is refused, the remedy for the aggrieved party is to challenge the same after the award is made within the limited scope of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is needless to mention that Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been enacted to consolidate the law of arbitration in India and to cut short the procedural aspects for providing speedy and efficacious remedy and not providing independent appeal against ruling of the arbitrator upholding his competence to deal with the matter as has been provided for in section 37 (2) of the said Act in case of refusal of such jurisdiction, is one of such step in aid of faster disposal of such arbitral proceedings. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 enunciates that the main object of the legislature was to minimize the supervisory role of the courts in the arbitral process. Arbitration is a mechanism or a method of resolution of disputes that unlike the court, pursuance to agreement between the parties. The parties agree to be bounded by the decision rendered by chosen arbitrator. The Endeavour of the court should be to honour and support the award as far as possible, if no misconduct is alleged against the arbitrator or any prejudices is caused to the parties by such appointment. Keeping in view the principles of law as discussed above as admittedly, during the pendency of the application under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the appellant itself voluntarily appointed an Arbitrator namely S.K. Verma and the present sole Arbitrator is appointed with the consent of both the parties. Further as without intervention of the court also the parties can appoint an arbitrator with mutual consent. It is a mere technicality at this stage to say that such appointment is premature and certainly the principle of estoppel and waiver will come into play. The appellant accepted the essential ingredients of appointment of an Arbitrator being the existence of a dispute and notice for such appointment. It is a mere technicality at this stage to say that such appointment is premature and certainly the principle of estoppel and waiver will come into play. The appellant accepted the essential ingredients of appointment of an Arbitrator being the existence of a dispute and notice for such appointment. So at this stage it is not open for the respondent to raise the plea that no dispute existed between the parties and appointment of Arbitrator was premature. More so when there is no allegation of any misconduct of the arbitrator or any miscarriage of justice has occurred. So far as the contention of the appellant that no dispute existed between the parties is concerned there is no quarrel that notice dated 27.01.2004 relating to the claim raised by the respondent-claimant has been received by the appellant. The appellant failed to pay the demanded amount within thirty days of receipt of the said notice. There is no response on the part of the appellant within the period of 30 days stipulated in the said notice. Straightway the appellant during the pendency of the said application under section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before this court, unilaterally and voluntarily appointed an arbitrator obviously relating to the dispute between the parties. So far as the contention of the appellant regarding the CMD of the CCL being not a signatory to the agreement between the parties, he is not the proper person to whom the notice dated 27.01.2004 should have been addressed is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that undisputedly CCL is a body corporate and the CMD of the CCL acted upon the said notice by treating the said notice having created a dispute between the parties and also the same is a notice for appointment of arbitrator and voluntarily and unilaterally appointed an arbitrator. In view of these facts, at this stage it will be too puerile a ground to interfere with the award of the arbitrator, particularly in the absence of any allegation of any misconduct on his part or any miscarriage of justice having been caused to the appellant. In view of these facts, at this stage it will be too puerile a ground to interfere with the award of the arbitrator, particularly in the absence of any allegation of any misconduct on his part or any miscarriage of justice having been caused to the appellant. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in this contentions of the appellant that there does not exist any dispute between the parties and that the appointment of Arbitrator is premature, so as to set aside the award of the sole arbitrator, in exercise of the limited scope of appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In view of the discussions made above, the award of the sole arbitrator is not liable to be set aside on the ground that the appointment of the Arbitrator is premature or there is absence of any dispute between the parties. The first point for determination is answered in negative and against the appellant. 13. So far as the second point for determination as to whether the Arbitral Award is against the public policy of India and the terms and conditions of the contract has been violated are concerned, as has been rightly submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that the public policy of India includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award and the concept of the fundamental policy of Indian law would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice and Wednesbury reasonableness and patent illegality itself mean contravention of the substantive law of India and contravention of the 1996 Act, as well as contravention of the terms of the contract Act. After careful perusal of the record, I do not find any material in the impugned award to term the same to be against the public policy of India, as nothing therein is in conflict with justice or morality and the award cannot be termed to be suffering from any patent illegality as there is no contravention of any substantive law of India or contravention of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Though a bald submission was made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the terms and conditions of the contract has been violated by the learned Arbitrator but during the course of his argument neither could he put forth any specific instance of such violation nor after carefully scanning the record could this court find any such instance of the violation of the terms and conditions of the contract. Accordingly the second point for determination is also answered in the negative and against the appellant. 14. Now coming to the third point for determination as to whether the learned trial court has committed any illegality warranting interference by this Court with the impugned judgment is concerned, it is a settled principle of law that an arbitral award may not be interfered with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible view based on facts and that the arbitral award shall not be set aside on the ground of erroneous application of law or by the re-appreciation of evidence. It is also a settled principle of law that in case the arbitral award is confirmed by the Court under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court exercising the jurisdiction under section 37 of said Act, has to be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings. It is pertinent to mention here that the interim Award was not under challenge before the learned court below nor the same is under challenge in this appeal and the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed only against the final award and this appeal is also confined to the final Award passed by the sole Arbitrator. The contention of the appellant that the learned Arbitrator has acted beyond its limit by interfering with the matter of two bank guarantees which was agreed between the CCL and Bank itself and passed an interim order dated 20.04.2005 in this regard is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that the same was not open to be agitated before the learned court below as well as before this court as the same relates to the interim award and no adjudication regarding the same has been made in the final award which is under challenge in this appeal. So far as the contention of the appellant that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate that for removing one cubic metre of coal, the contractor-claimant had to incur expenses, thus the claimant was entitled to compensation in respect of the said loss for part of the said price less the expenses which would have incurred by the claimant, had he carried out the said entire work and not for the entire price and thereby urging upon this court to reduce the compensation by that amount is concerned, such contention of the appellant is not feasible basically for two reasons. Firstly the said amount is a fact. It was incumbent upon the appellant before the learned arbitrator to put forth evidence in this respect. But as submitted by Mr. Mustafa, the learned counsel for the appellant that there is absolutely no evidence in record to suggest as to what expenses would have been incurred by the claimant, had it carried out the said entire work and he has no instruction from the appellant as to what would have been such expenses. Secondly the learned Arbitrator against a claim of the claimant of Rs.4,35,93,844.03/- has awarded only Rs.2,62,02,434.00/- and after carefully going through the record this court finds that the view taken by the arbitrator is a plausible view based on facts. Hence in the absence of any evidence as to what expenses would have been incurred by the claimant, had it carried out the said entire work and for the failure of the appellant to come forward with any amount of the same though the learned counsel for the appellant continued placing his submission in two different working days, there is no way the said part of the award can be reduced in exercise of the limited jurisdiction of this court under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned trial court has considered each of the contention raised by the appellant who was the applicant before it and has considered the same in proper perspective, within the limited scope of interference as has been mentioned above in detail. In view of the facts of this case, this Court is of the considered view that in exercise of the limited jurisdiction of this Court under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the impugned order does not warrant interference by this Court. In view of the facts of this case, this Court is of the considered view that in exercise of the limited jurisdiction of this Court under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the impugned order does not warrant interference by this Court. The third point for determination is answered in negative and against the appellant. 15. Accordingly, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs. 16. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned court below forthwith.