JUDGMENT : N.B. SURYAWANSHI, J. 1. While hearing group of criminal appeals i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos. 569/2013, 561/2013, 564/2013, 570/2013, 573/2013, 55/2014, 56/2014 and 73/2014, this Court prima-facie was of the view that PW-22 Deepak Trivedi has committed perjury within the meaning of Section 191 read with Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence, the following order was passed:- “We have commenced the hearing of this appeal on 13.04.2015. We have read the evidence of the witnesses that was recorded in the trial court with the assistance of learned counsel for the rival parties. The prosecution had examined PW-22 Deepak Shivmohan Trivedi, as eye witness to the incident of alleged murder that took place at about 11.00 a.m. in the corridor of 6th floor of the District Court when PW-22 Deepak Trivedi, along with Police Constable Deepak Deshbhratar and gunman Karaskar had brought the deceased with other accused persons from Central Jail for production before the Court. PW-22 Deepak Trivedi, whose statements were recorded on the same day of incident i.e. on 19.06.2002, however, resiled from his previous statements and was required to be declared hostile and was accordingly declared hostile. He did not support the prosecution case at all and falsified his statements made by him to the Investigating Officer PW-36 Vinod Mahadeo Yeskhade. Prima facie, we are satisfied that PW-22 Deepak Trivedi has committed perjury within the meaning of Section 191 read with Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. We, therefore, issue show cause notice to PW-22 Deepak Trivedi asking him to show cause as to why prosecution for perjury against him should not be launched. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur to cause service to the notice and his appearance before this Court on 21.04.2015. A photocopy of the depositions of PW-22 Deepak Trivedi be supplied to him along with this show cause notice.” The allegation against PW-22 is that, he being an eye witness and police constable on duty in whose custody and presence the deceased was brutally murdered in the Court premises, turned hostile and resiled from the statement recorded during the investigation. 2. In pursuance of aforesaid order, show cause notice dated 18.04.2015 was issued to PW-22 Deepak Trivedi (for short “PW-22”) calling upon PW-22 to show cause as to why the prosecution for perjury should not be initiated against him. 3. In pursuance of the said notice, PW-22 appeared and filed reply. 2. In pursuance of aforesaid order, show cause notice dated 18.04.2015 was issued to PW-22 Deepak Trivedi (for short “PW-22”) calling upon PW-22 to show cause as to why the prosecution for perjury should not be initiated against him. 3. In pursuance of the said notice, PW-22 appeared and filed reply. In his reply, PW-22 has offered an explanation that the incident had taken place in the year 2002 and the trial of the said crime began in the year 2012 i.e. after 10 years. Therefore, some mistake had taken place on behalf of PW-22 while identifying some accused persons. The mistake on the part of the PW-22 was due to long gap of period between the date of incident and the date of his deposition. The said mistake was not deliberate or intentional. It is further stated that a departmental inquiry was initiated against him for the same reason and he was suspended from 17.04.2012. He further stated that in 27 years of service his entire service record is clean and unblemished. There is no adverse remark against him and he has performed his duty honestly. In his entire service carrier, this was the only departmental enquiry and suspension. He and his family are suffering because of the departmental enquiry and therefore, he requested for dropping the charges against him. 4. Heard learned advocate representing PW-22. On our request, Shri R.M. Daga, Advocate and Shri D.V. Chavhan, Advocate assisted us in this matter as Amicus Curiae. 5. Learned advocate for PW-22 advanced following propositions:- “(1) After conclusion of the trial, action under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be initiated. (2) That action has to be initiated by the same Court before which the evidence is recorded and perjury is committed and the High Court, being the Appellate Court, cannot initiate action for perjury.” 6. Learned advocate for PW-22 vehemently argued that since the trial is already over and even the appeal is decided, action for perjury ought not to be initiated against PW-22. He further states that it is only the trial Court before whom the evidence was recorded and alleged act of perjury was committed, is entitled to initiate action for perjury and notice under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to have been issued by the learned trial Court. He further states that it is only the trial Court before whom the evidence was recorded and alleged act of perjury was committed, is entitled to initiate action for perjury and notice under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to have been issued by the learned trial Court. The High Court, being the Appellate Court, cannot initiate proceedings for perjury by issuing notice under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his argument, he relied upon the following judgments:- “1. Prof. Chintamani Malviya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2018 Cri. L.J. 3391 2. Amarsang Nathaji vs. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel and Others, (2017) 1 SCC 113 3. Sanjay S/o Baburao Gitte vs. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 307/2016 4. Mahila Vinod Kumari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 34 .” He further submits that PW-22 was compulsorily retired from service. He, therefore, prays that the present notice may be dropped as PW-22 has already suffered punishment by way of compulsory retirement and this will be a second punishment on him, if he is prosecuted and ultimately convicted. Taking into consideration all these aspects, he requested for dropping the show cause notice. 7. Shri R.M. Daga, Advocate by referring to Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure submitted that "any Court” is entitled to invoke the said provision in the interests of justice. He would further urge that the High Court, while considering the appeal, is entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by following the procedure mentioned therein. He has pointed out Section 340 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which the word “Court” used in the said provision has the same meaning as in Section 195. By pointing out Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he submits that a summary procedure is prescribed for the trial for giving false evidence. Placing reliance on Section 344 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he states that the Court's power to take action under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is recognized where the Court does not chose to proceed under Section 344. 8. Advocate D.V. Chavhan adopted the above argument. Placing reliance on Section 344 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he states that the Court's power to take action under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is recognized where the Court does not chose to proceed under Section 344. 8. Advocate D.V. Chavhan adopted the above argument. By placing reliance on the ratio in Perumal vs. Janaki, (2014) 5 SCC 377 , he submits that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has power of superintendence and suo motu High Court can exercise the power of superintendence. He submits that the superior Courts have authority and the superior Courts are concurrently competent to take cognizance of the offences listed in Section 195 (1) (b) when such offences are committed with respect to its subordinate Courts. He further urged that the superior Court is under duty to exercise powers under Section 195 suo motu to maintain the purity of legal system. He, therefore, states that this Court has jurisdiction and authority to initiate proceedings for perjury against PW-22 and this Court has rightly issued notice under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against him. 9. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar. Perused the material on record and studied the cited precedents. 10. Before embarking on a discussion on the subject issue, a look at the provisions would be best suited at this juncture. The relevant provisions being Sections 340 and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read thus:- “340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195 - (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary:- (a) record a finding to that effect. (b) make a complaint thereof in writing. (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. (b) make a complaint thereof in writing. (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. (d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate. (e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate. (2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. (3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed:- (a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint. (b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in this behalf. (4) In this section “Court” has the same meaning as in section 195.” “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence - (1) No Court shall take cognizance: (a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860). (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence. (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court. (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court. (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court. (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii): Except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2)............ (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that: (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate. (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.” 11. (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.” 11. Plain reading of Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that when any Court forms an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceedings in that Court, such Court may, after conducting preliminary enquiry, record a finding to that effect; make a complaint thereof in writing and send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. The Court used in this section has the same meaning as in Section 195. Sub-section (2) of Section 340 makes it clear that power under sub-section (1) of Section 340 can be exercised in any case where that Court has neither made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. Thus, this provision specifically empowers the Appellate Court to exercise the power under Section 340 even though the trial Court has not exercised the said power. 12. Plain reading of Sub-section (4) of Section 195 makes it clear that for the purposes of Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195, the Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which the appeal ordinarily lie from the appelable decrees or sentences of such former Court. Thus, this provision also enables the Appellate Court to initiate action under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. On conjoint reading of Section 195 (4) and Section 340 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is clear that the Court mentioned in both these provisions would include the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court can initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Said Court has to forward the same to the trial Court for following summary procedure. Said Court has to forward the same to the trial Court for following summary procedure. In our considered view, the power under Section 195 can be exercised by all the Appellate Courts which are competent to entertain the appeals from the sentences passed by the trial Court and they are treated to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similarly, Section 340 provides of any Court which would in the light of the aforesaid observations include the Appellate Court. 14. In Mahila Vinod Kumari (supra) relied upon by learned advocate for PW-22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope and object of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same lays down essential ingredients for invocation of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this case, after considering the Sections 344 and 340 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the object of the legislature underlying enactment of the provision is the evil of perjury and fabrication of evidence has to be eradicated and can be better achieved now as it is open to Courts to take recourse to Section 340 (1), in cases in which they have failed to take action under Section 344. It is also held that for exercise of power under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order must at the instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either unintentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. Thus, this authority is distinguishable and would not apply to the facts of the present case. 15. Thus, this authority is distinguishable and would not apply to the facts of the present case. 15. The second judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for PW-22 was unreported decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 307/2016 wherein also the question which fell for consideration of the learned Single Judge was whether "certificate admissions given in the cross-examination by the witness is sufficient to convict a person for offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code." This Court observed that in terms of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate or a Court of Sessions before whom the judicial proceedings has been conducted at first instance, has to form a prima facie opinion that witness appeared in the proceedings before him knowingly or willingly given false evidence or fabricated false evidence with intention that such evidence should be used in such proceedings. In the facts of that case, the learned Single Judge has observed that the trial Court has to form an opinion about giving false evidence. This case also is of no help to the contentions of PW-22 that it is the only Court before which the evidence is recorded is entitled to initiate action for perjury. 16. Reliance is placed by the learned advocate for PW-22 in Prof. Chintamani Malviya vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh wherein it is held that prosecution for perjury should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish delinquent. There can be no dispute about the said proposition. Further reliance is placed in Amarsang Nathaji vs. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the pre-conditions for initiation of prosecution for perjury. It is held that preconditions for initiation of proceedings under Section 340 are - (i) materials produced before Court must make out case for enquiry about alleged offence and (ii) it should be expedient in interests of justice to hold such enquiry about alleged offence. It was held that mere making of contradictory statement by itself is not sufficient to proceed under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it must be shown that such statement was intentionally made. Thereafter, Court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry. It was held that mere making of contradictory statement by itself is not sufficient to proceed under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it must be shown that such statement was intentionally made. Thereafter, Court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry. In order to form an opinion, Court must prima-facie be satisfied that the offence appears to have been committed. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal vs. Vinesh Anand and Others, 2001 AIR SCW 1590 has held that to prosecute the offender is a social need and concept of locus standi is foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In para no. 5, it is observed thus:- “5. Before adverting to the matter in issue and the rival contentions advanced one redeeming feature ought to be noticed here pertain to Criminal jurisprudence: To pursue an offender in the event of commission of an offence, is to sub-serve a social need Society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability, since that would bring about a state of social pollution, which is neither desired nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus the doctrine of locus-standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence.” 18. In Perumal (supra), charge-sheet was filed by the Investigating Officer against the accused for offence of cheating on the ground that the accused enticed the complainant into marrying her, had sexual interaction, made her pregnant and later refused to marry her though there was clinching evidence that the complainant was not found pregnant. The accused was acquitted and the complaint was lodged by the accused against the IO for offence under Section 193 of the IPC. The same was dismissed by the learned Magistrate in view of the bar under Section 195 as the private complaint was not maintainable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in these facts held that offence under Section 193 of the IPC was not made out as the Police Officer filing charge-sheet does not make any statement on oath. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the IO was liable to the prosecuted under Section 211 of the IPC for which the matter was remitted to the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “17. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the IO was liable to the prosecuted under Section 211 of the IPC for which the matter was remitted to the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:- “17. But the High Court, in our view, is not justified in confining itself to the examination of the correctness of the order of the magistrate dismissing the said private complaint. Both Section 195 (1) and Section 340 (2) Cr.P.C. authorise the exercise of the power conferred under Section 195 (1) by any other court to which the court in respect of which the offence is committed is subordinate to. (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as ‘the original court’) 18. It can be seen from the language of Section 195(4) Cr.P.C. that it creates a legal fiction whereby it is declared that the original court is subordinate to that court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the judgments or orders of the original court (hereinafter referred to as ‘the appellate court’). In our view, such a fiction must be understood in the context of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 10 (1) and 15(1) of Cr.P.C. Article 227 confers the power of superintendence on a High Court over all courts and tribunals functioning within the territories in relation to which a High Court exercises jurisdiction. Section 10(1) and 15(1) of Cr.P.C. declare that the Assistant Sessions Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates are subordinate to the Session Judge and other Judicial Magistrates to be subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate subject to the control of the Session Judge. It may be remembered that Section 195(4) deals with the authority of the superior courts in the context of taking cognizance of various offences mentioned in Section 195(1). Such offences are relatable to civil, criminal and revenue courts etc. Each one of the streams of these courts may have their administrative hierarchy depending upon under the law by which such courts are brought into existence. It is also well known that certain courts have appellate jurisdiction while certain courts only have original jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is the creature of statute and depending upon the scheme of a particular statute, the forum of appeal varies. Generally, the appellate fora are created on the basis of either subject matter of dispute or economic implications or nature of crime etc. 19. Appellate jurisdiction is the creature of statute and depending upon the scheme of a particular statute, the forum of appeal varies. Generally, the appellate fora are created on the basis of either subject matter of dispute or economic implications or nature of crime etc. 19. Therefore, all that sub-section (4) of Section 195 says is that irrespective of the fact whether a particular court is subordinate to another court in the hierarchy of judicial administration, for the purpose of exercise of powers under Section 195(1), every appellate court competent to entertain the appeals either from decrees or sentence passed by the original court is treated to be a court concurrently competent to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 195(1). High Courts being constitutional courts invested with the powers of superintendence over all courts within the territory over which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction, in our view, is certainly a Court which can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 195(1). In the absence of any specific constitutional limitation of prescription on the exercise of such powers, the High Courts may exercise such power either on an application made to it or suo moto whenever the interests of justice demand. 20. The High Courts not only have the authority to exercise such jurisdiction but also an obligation to exercise such power in appropriate cases. Such obligation, in our opinion, flows from two factors - (1) the embargo created by Section 195 restricting the liberty of aggrieved persons to initiate criminal proceedings with respect to offences prescribed under Section 195 and (2) such offences pertain to either the contempt of lawful authorities of public servants or offences against public justice. 21. A constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah while interpreting Section 195 Cr.P.C. although in a different context, held that any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded. The power of superintendence like any other power impliedly carries an obligation to exercise powers in an appropriate case to maintain the majesty of the judicial process and the purity of the legal system. Such an obligation becomes more profound when these allegations of commission of offences pertain to public justice.” 19. In the light of the above quoted observations, the legal position is clear that the Appellate Court is competent to exercise the power under Section 195 (1). Such an obligation becomes more profound when these allegations of commission of offences pertain to public justice.” 19. In the light of the above quoted observations, the legal position is clear that the Appellate Court is competent to exercise the power under Section 195 (1). The High Court in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India since is vested with the power of superintendence over all subordinate Courts and Tribunals, is entitled to exercise the said jurisdiction. Thus, the High Court certainly can exercise the power under Section 195 (1) and the High Court in absence of any specific Constitutional limitation prescribed on the exercise of such powers may exercise such power either on an application made to it or suo motu whenever interests of justice demand. 20. Considering the facts of the present case, in the light of exposition of law in the above referred judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, prima-facie it is clear from the record that PW-22, being a public officer was duty bound in law to protect the deceased who was in his custody. In his presence, in the Court premises, the deceased was brutally attacked with weapons and murdered. PW-22 while deposing before the Court has resiled from his previous statement and tried to support the defence. Thus, a prima-facie case is made out against PW-22 for perjury and it is expedient in the interests of justice to launch prosecution for perjury against PW-22. 21. In the present case, since this Court being an appellate Court has exercised the power suo motu and issued show cause notice for perjury to PW-22, the same was justified in terms of Sections 195 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court not only has the authority to exercise such jurisdiction but also has an obligation to exercise such power in appropriate cases. Looking to the facts of the present case, in our considered opinion, this is a fit case to exercise such jurisdiction, so as to maintain the majesty of judicial process and the purity of legal system. This obligation has become more profound as the allegations of commission of perjury are made against a public servant. He has deliberately given false evidence before the Court so as to help the accused persons. This obligation has become more profound as the allegations of commission of perjury are made against a public servant. He has deliberately given false evidence before the Court so as to help the accused persons. Since this offence is committed against public justice, this Court was justified in exercising the jurisdiction by issuing show cause notice for perjury against PW-22. 22. In the fact situation of the case, this Court cannot be a silent spectator where stinking facts warrants interference in order to serve the interests of justice. If this Court remains oblivious to the patent facts on record, it would tantamount to failure in performing its obligation under the law. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contentions of PW-22 that it is only trial Court before which the evidence is recorded can issue notice under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 23. The explanation given by PW-22 is unacceptable and we are not convinced with the explanation so offered by PW-22 that because of lapse of 10 years period, some mistake has taken place while identifying some accused persons and that the said mistake was not deliberate or intentional. PW-22 being a responsible Police Officer on duty, while the accused persons were in his custody in the Court premises, the deceased was brutally murdered and PW-22 being the eye witness, was duty bound to tell the truth before the Court, however, he has resorted to falsehood and hence, we are unable to accept the explanation offered by him. The said according to us is after-thought and not plausible and it does not justify the serious act of perjury committed by him. 24. To initiate prosecution for perjury, two pre conditions must be made (1) material produced before the Court must make out a prima facie case for launching prosecution. (2) It is expedient in the interests of justice to permit the prosecution. In the light of the observations made herein-above, we are of the considered opinion that a prima-facie case is made out for initiation of prosecution of perjury under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and it is expedient in the interests of justice to launch such prosecution. 25. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the contentions advanced on behalf of PW-22. 25. In the light of the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the contentions advanced on behalf of PW-22. Hence, the following order:- ORDER (a) Initiate prosecution of PW-22 Deepak Trivedi under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code before the Competent Court and he be tried in accordance with law. (b) The matter be forwarded to appropriate Court for trial. (c) We appreciate the assistance rendered by Learned Advocates Shri D.V. Chavhan and Shri R.M. Daga appointed as amicus curiae in the matter.