JUDGMENT : Manikumar, J. Instant writ petition is filed for the following reliefs: “(i) Declare that order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No. 1641/2014 (Exhibit-P1) passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, 1st respondent, is illegal, unconstitutional and void; (ii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 passed by the 1st respondent; (iii) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing notice dated 31.01.2017 (Exhibit-P4) issued by the 1st respondent; (iv) Declare that respondent Nos.6 & 7 viz., Secretary, Home Department, Kerala Government Secretariat, Thrivunanthapuram; and the Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Kerala Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, are not empowered to implement Exhibit-P1 order without hearing the petitioner and other affected parties;” 2. Facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are that, petitioner was an officer in the Kerala Police, who retired in the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector. He was the first respondent in HRMP No.1641/2014 before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The 2nd respondent herein was the complainant in the said case. The parties are addressed hereafter in accordance with the sequence assigned to them in the Writ Petition. 3. The 2nd respondent has alleged, in the complaint lodged before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, that on 05.02.2014 at 1 p.m., his son Ajsal and his college friends saw the petitioner, who then was an ASI of Kareelakulangara Police Station, in an inebriated state. Petitioner is alleged to have abused Ajsal as well as his friends using filthy words, caught hold of Ajsal's shirt, wrongfully restrained him and slapped him on both the cheeks. When the onlookers questioned his action, the petitioner made a phone call and then, two police officers came in a jeep. Ajsal was caught by the police and thrown into the jeep. Thereafter, he was taken to the police station. Policemen, including the petitioner, assaulted Ajsal. Subsequently, the policemen went on to foist a case, based on a wrong allegation against Ajsal, obstructing the police from discharging their official duty. 4. Petitioner has further stated that pursuant to the above, Crime No.127/2014 on the file of the Kareelakulangara Police Station was registered under Sections 294(b), 341, 323 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the son of the complainant. He was arrested, later produced before the learned Magistrate, and remanded. 4. Petitioner has further stated that pursuant to the above, Crime No.127/2014 on the file of the Kareelakulangara Police Station was registered under Sections 294(b), 341, 323 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against the son of the complainant. He was arrested, later produced before the learned Magistrate, and remanded. On the next day, he was released on bail. 5. Petitioner has further contended that, Ajsal in his complaint, has stated that he was admitted to Government hospital till 18.02.2014. After his discharge, Ajsal filed a complaint before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. It was also mentioned in the complaint that while the 2nd respondent tried to procure a wound certificate, he was told by the Hospital Superintendent that hospital records have been unauthorisedly tampered with. 6. Petitioner has further stated that the 1st respondent Commission, on receipt of the complaint, directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Alappuzha (respondent No.3), to submit a report. In compliance of the said direction, respondent No.4-Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam (respondent No.4), conducted an inquiry and submitted a report to the Commission. The 4th respondent, after due enquiry, found the allegations made by the 2nd respondent as untrue. In his report, the following findings on facts were recorded: “On 05.02.2014 at 12.30 p.m., petitioner had gone to take a photocopy at a shop near Nangiarkulangara Junction and while returning, he saw many college students belonging to SH college, including Ajsal, the son of the 2nd respondent, coming by road in groups. Petitioner questioned the students, as to whether this is the way students must walk on a National Highway. On hearing this, Ajsal used abusive language on the petitioner and slapped him. Thereafter, he pushed the petitioner and made him fall down on the road. The petitioner was thus injured in the incident and thereafter, he made a call to the Police Station, and he was taken to the Hospital and admitted there. The 4th respondent found that allegations made by the 2nd respondent are totally false and that it was the 2nd respondent's son, who had attacked the petitioner.” 7. On the side of the complainant/respondent No.2 herein, Kerala State Human Rights Commission examined PWs.1 and 2 and Exts.P1 and P2 documents were marked. Whereas, on the side of the petitioner herein, RWs.1 and 2 were examined and Ext.R1 document was marked. 8. On the side of the complainant/respondent No.2 herein, Kerala State Human Rights Commission examined PWs.1 and 2 and Exts.P1 and P2 documents were marked. Whereas, on the side of the petitioner herein, RWs.1 and 2 were examined and Ext.R1 document was marked. 8. PW1-Ajsal, the son of the 2nd respondent and PW2-Ajsal's friend, both deposed, affirming the averments made in the complaint. PW3, the doctor in Government Hospital, Haripad, explained the wounds, as noted in the Ext.P1 wound certificate. RW1 and RW2 -police officers, who were on patrol duty on that fateful day, deposed that they went to the location, since they were informed that a fellow police officer had met with some danger. They had taken the 2nd respondent's son to the Police station. Ext.R1 is the medical certificate issued by the District Hospital, Mavelikkara, when the 2nd respondent's son was taken to the hospital on 05.02.2014, as per the orders passed by the learned Magistrate. 9. After considering the evidence, Kerala State Human Rights Commission found that Ext.R1 was not proved and thus, held that the said document cannot be relied upon. The Commission also rejected the 4th respondent's report, as being untrustworthy. The Commission, relying on the depositions of PW1 and PW2, held the petitioner and his fellow officer guilty, and resultantly, directed the 5th respondent -District Police Chief, Alappuzha, to take departmental action against the petitioner and the fellow officer. Further direction was issued that the 6th respondent, Secretary, Home Department, Kerala Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram, shall pay compensation of Rs.20,000/-to the 2nd respondent's son, for the injuries caused, and the same be recovered from petitioner and the fellow officer. The Commission also recommended that the 7th respondent -Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, to conduct an enquiry into loss of wound certificate from Haripad Taluk Hospital and to take appropriate actions in that regard. 10. Petitioner has further stated that on 03.12.2015, the 2nd respondent again approached the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, seeking speedy implementation of Exhibit-P1 order. Upon Exhibit-P3 complaint/petition, the 1st respondent Commission issued Exhibit-P4 notice dated 31.01.2017 to the petitioner. 11. Petitioner has further stated that the allegations made in the complaint, which culminated in Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014, were raised by the 2nd respondent's son in a private complaint, and the complaint was taken on file by the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Haripad, as CC No. 627/2017. 11. Petitioner has further stated that the allegations made in the complaint, which culminated in Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014, were raised by the 2nd respondent's son in a private complaint, and the complaint was taken on file by the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Haripad, as CC No. 627/2017. The said private complaint was presented on 19.02.2014. The charges framed were under Sections 341, 323 and 324 IPC r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. After trial, the learned Magistrate, by Exhibit-P5 judgment dated 20.09.2019, acquitted the accused of all the charges. In Exhibit-P5 judgment, the learned Magistrate specifically found that the complainant / 2nd respondent herein failed to prove his case. It was found that the medical evidence did not substantiate the case of the complainant, and that, despite the alleged incident happened before the public, the prosecution was unable to corroborate the evidence by producing or examining anyone from the public, who could have witnessed the incident. In such circumstances, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 13. On the reliefs sought for, as extracted above, petitioner has raised the following grounds. A. Ext.P1 is an illegal order, passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, without attending to various relevant aspects of the case. It was passed beyond jurisdiction and by negating an enquiry report filed by the 4th respondent. The Commission also failed to appreciate Ext.R1 certificate in the correct aspect. Moreover, Ext.P1 order is now questionable due to the operation of Ext.P5 judgment passed by a criminal court after due trial. Thus, the petitioner is seriously prejudiced by Ext.P1 order passed by the 1st respondent Commission. B. Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014 was passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission is without jurisdiction and by overlooking the specific bar imposed by Section 12(b) of the Protection of the Human Rights Act, 1993, which specifically states that the Commission shall intervene in any proceedings pending before a Court of law only with the approval of that court. The case already having been under the consideration of Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Haripad, since 19.02.2014, the 1st respondent Commission ought to have desisted from entertaining the complaint alleging human rights violation. Thus, Exhibit-P1 order suffers from competence and jurisdictional vires and, hence requires interference. C. The 1st respondent Commission has illegally rejected the 4th respondent's report submitted before it. The case already having been under the consideration of Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Haripad, since 19.02.2014, the 1st respondent Commission ought to have desisted from entertaining the complaint alleging human rights violation. Thus, Exhibit-P1 order suffers from competence and jurisdictional vires and, hence requires interference. C. The 1st respondent Commission has illegally rejected the 4th respondent's report submitted before it. The investigation conducted by the 4th respondent being the only investigation done in this case could have been rejected only for strong and cogent reasons which are lacking in Exhibit-P1 order. The Commission ought to have accepted the report submitted by the 4th respondent. D. It is further contended that since the Kerala State Human Rights Commission has rejected the report submitted by the 4th respondent, the Commission ought to have constituted another investigation before rendering findings on facts. The said investigation could have been conducted through any other officer or agency of the State. Without investigation being conducted and without an inquiry that succeeds it to verify the authenticity of the investigation and its report, the Commission is powerless to proceed with the recording of findings of facts as per the dictate of Section 14(5) of the Protection of the Human Rights Act, 1993. E. As per Section 12 r/w Section 18 of the Protection of the Human Rights Act, 1993, the investigation stage of a complaint must succeed with a report being called from the concerned State Government, before the Commission can conduct an inquiry on the allegations. This exercise was not conducted and, therefore, is fatal. Such an omission vitiates Ext.P1 order and is liable to be struck down. F. Petitioner has further contended that Kerala State Human Rights Commission can only make recommendations to the concerned Government and per se cannot issue directions or order. This cardinal rule embodied in Section 18(a) of the Protection of the Human Rights Act, 1993 was ignored by the Commission, when it passed Ext.P1 order. Thus, none of the directions passed by 1st respondent Commission in Ext.P1 order is workable or enforceable for the reason that it overstepped its authority and passed directions beyond jurisdiction. G. It is further contended that even though Section 18 of the Act, 1993, talks about entitlement of compensation, Section 19(a) explicitly mentions that the Commission has no authority to grant compensation and can only recommend the same. G. It is further contended that even though Section 18 of the Act, 1993, talks about entitlement of compensation, Section 19(a) explicitly mentions that the Commission has no authority to grant compensation and can only recommend the same. It was also observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC 143 , that the power to award compensation is with the District Magistrate, which furthermore elucidated on the jurisdiction of HRC. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in Indian Handcrafts Emporium v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 589 ; N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 579 and T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, 2001 (6) SCC 181 , that Human Rights Commission is a recommendatory body and it has no jurisdiction to pass an order directing payment of compensation. H. Similarly, the State Government cannot and is not duty bound to enforce Ext.P1 order. This is mainly because the Commission failed to call for the State's report before delving into inquiry on the complaint. Even if, the State wants to enforce Ext.P1 order, it will have to hear the petitioner and other affected parties, and reach a considered decision in that regard, and pass a speaking order on the issue, before taking coercive action against the petitioner, as natural justice would require it to do. I. Petitioner has further contended that the Kerala State Human Rights Commission is not an execution court nor does it have the mandate under the law for implementing its own orders. All that the Commission can do is to pass recommendations to the concerned Government. Thus, Ext.P3 complaint ought not to have been entertained by the Commission and it ought not have issued Ext.P4 notice. Therefore, Exts.P3 and P4 are devoid of any merit in law and warrant interference of this Court. J. The Commission failed to appreciate Ext.P2 Certificate, which evidences that the 2nd respondent's son was not injured. Thus, by not considering a relevant factor into the decision making, the Commission has rendered a wrong finding and conclusions in Ext.P1 order. K. Ext.P5 judgment of a criminal court is an authoritative finding of facts and is binding. J. The Commission failed to appreciate Ext.P2 Certificate, which evidences that the 2nd respondent's son was not injured. Thus, by not considering a relevant factor into the decision making, the Commission has rendered a wrong finding and conclusions in Ext.P1 order. K. Ext.P5 judgment of a criminal court is an authoritative finding of facts and is binding. It was specifically found by the learned Magistrate, after due trial, that the wound certificate produced in duplicate is not reliable, medical evidence regarding the 2nd respondent's son, is not trustworthy, and that despite the alleged incident having happened on broad day light and in front of many people including teachers and other students, none of them came forward to corroborate the story given by 2nd respondent's son. If a proper investigation or inquiry had been done, these aspects would have come to the knowledge of the Commission as well. L. In the light of Ext.P5 judgment, Ext.P1 order is no longer workable or enforceable. The Commission is a fact finding body and since the criminal court has recorded an authoritative finding of facts, after due trial, the findings rendered by the Commission, which stand contrary to the findings of fact made by the criminal court, are unreliable and unworkable. The Madras High Court, in its judgment dated 15.02.2013 in K. Rangasamy v. The Registrar W.P. No. 23005 of 2007, held that the Human Rights Commission loses its relevance once a criminal court has decided upon the same set of facts in issue.” 14. Apart from the above, Mr. Manu Srinath, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the recommendations of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission amount to double jeopardy. 15. Before proceeding to appreciate the contentions raised, it is relevant to consider the statutory provisions. 16. Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is an Act to provide for the constitution of National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commissions in States, and Human Rights Courts, for better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. As per Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, “human rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India. 17. Chapter III of the Act, 1993 deals with functions and powers of the Commission. As per Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, “human rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India. 17. Chapter III of the Act, 1993 deals with functions and powers of the Commission. Section 12 in Chapter III of the Act deals with the functions of the Commission and the same reads thus: “The Commission shall perform all or any of the following functions, namely:- (a) inquire, suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim or any person on his behalf or on a direction or order of any court, into complaint of - (i) violation of human rights or abetment thereof; or (ii) negligence in the prevention of such violation, by a public servant; (b) intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of human rights pending before a court with the approval of such court; (c) visit, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any jail or other institution under the control of the State Government, where persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, reformation or protection, for the study of the living conditions of the inmates thereof and make recommendations thereon to the Government; (d) review the safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or any law for the time being in force for the protection of human rights and recommend measures for their effective implementation; (e) review the factors, including acts of terrorism that inhibit the enjoyment of human rights and recommend appropriate remedial measures; (f) study treaties and other international instruments on human rights and make recommendations for their effective implementation; (g) undertake and promote research in the field of human rights; (h) spread human rights literacy among various sections of society and promote awareness of the safeguards available for the protection of these rights through publications, the media, seminars and other available means; (i) encourage the efforts of non-governmental organisations and institutions working in the field of human rights; (j) such other functions as it may consider necessary for the protection of human rights.” 18. Section 13 of the Act, 1993 deals with the powers relating to inquiries and the same reads thus: “(1) The Commission shall, while inquiring into complaints under this Act, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in particular in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath; (b) discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed. (2) The Commission shall have power to require any person, subject to any privilege which may be claimed by that person under any law for the time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters as, in the opinion of the Commission, may be useful for, or relevant to, the subject matter of the inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed to be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of section 176 and section 177 of the Indian Penal Code. (3) The Commission or any other officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission may enter any building or place where the Commission has reason to believe that any document relating to the subject matter of the inquiry may be found, and may seize any such document or take extracts or copies there from subject to the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in so far as it may be applicable. (4) The Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court and when any offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, Act 45 of 1860, is committed in the view or presence of the Commission, the Commission may, after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the Magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused as if the case has been forwarded to him under section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (5) Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, and the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (6) Where the Commission considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it may, by order, transfer any complaint filed or pending before it to the State Commission of the State from which the complaint arises, for disposal in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided that no such complaint shall be transferred unless the same is one respecting which the State Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the same. (7) Every complaint transferred under sub-section(6) shall be dealt with and disposed of by the State Commission as if it were a complaint initially filed before it.” 19. Section 14 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 deals with investigation and the same is reproduced: (1) The Commission may, for the purpose of conducting any investigation pertaining to the inquiry, utilise the services of any officer or investigation agency of the Central Government or any State Government with the concurrence of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. (2) For the purpose of investigating into any matter pertaining to the inquiry, any officer or agency whose services are utilised under subsection (1) may, subject to the direction and control of the Commission:- (a) summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examine him; (b) require the discovery and production of any document; and (c) requisition any public record or copy thereof from any office. (3) The Provisions of section 15 shall apply in relation to any statement made by a person before any officer or agency whose services are utilised under sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to any statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission. (4) The officer or agency whose services are utilised under subsection (1) shall investigate into any matter pertaining to the inquiry and submit a report thereon to the Commission within such period as may be specified by the Commission in this behalf. (5) The Commission shall satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the report submitted to it under sub-section (4) and for this purpose the Commission may make such inquiry (including the examination of the person or persons who conducted or assisted in the investigation) as it thinks fit.” 20. Chapter IV of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 deals with procedure. Section 17 in Chapter IV of the Act deals with inquiry into the complaints and the same reads thus: “17. Inquiry into complaints.-The Commission while inquiring into the complaints of violations of human rights may– (i) call for information or report from the Central Government or any State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate thereto within such time as may be specified by it:- Provided that– (a) if the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own; (b) if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly; (ii) without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it considers necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry.” 21. Section 18 of the Act, 1993 deals with steps during and after inquiry and the same reads thus: “The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely:- (a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abetment thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority – (i) to make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons; (iii) to take such further action as it may think fit; (b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary; (c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (d) subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative; (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission; (f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission.” 22. Section 20 of the Act, 1993 speaks about annual and special reports of the Commission and the same is reproduced: “(1) The Commission shall submit an annual report to the Central Government and to the State Government concerned and may at any time submit special reports on any matter which, in its opinion, is of such urgency or importance that it should not be deferred till submission of the annual report. (2) The Central Government and the State Government, as the case may be, shall cause the annual and special reports of the Commission to be laid before each House of Parliament or the State Legislature respectively, as the case may be, along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken on the recommendations of the Commission and the reasons for non-acceptance of the recommendations, if any.” 23. Chapter V of the Act, 1993 deals with the State Human Rights Commission. Section 28 in Chapter V speaks about annual and special reports of State Commission and the same reads thus: “(1) The State Commission shall submit an annual report to the State Government and may at any time submit special reports on any matter which, in its opinion, is of such urgency or importance that it should not be deferred till submission of the annual report. (2) The State Government shall cause the annual and special reports of the State Commission to be laid before each House of State Legislature where it consists of two Houses, or where such Legislature consists of one House, before that House along with a memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken on the recommendations of the State Commission and the reasons for non-acceptance of the recommendations, if any.” 24. The incident took place on 5.2.2014 at 1 p.m. Son of the complainant was stated to have been abused, beaten, taken to police station by fellow policemen, and beaten there till 6 p.m. A case in Crime No.127/2014 was registered under Sections 294(b), 341, 323 and 332 of the IPC against the son of the complainant. He was produced before the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate at 8 p.m. and remanded. On 6.2.2014, he was released on bail. 25. The 2nd respondent's son has been examined by the Doctor. When the wound certificate was requested, the Superintendent of the Hospital had informed the 2ndrespondent complainant that the wound certificate had been illegally removed from the register. Thus, in the above circumstances, father has lodged the complaint before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. 26. Though Sri. 25. The 2nd respondent's son has been examined by the Doctor. When the wound certificate was requested, the Superintendent of the Hospital had informed the 2ndrespondent complainant that the wound certificate had been illegally removed from the register. Thus, in the above circumstances, father has lodged the complaint before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. 26. Though Sri. Manu Srinath, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that Kerala State Human Rights Commission ought not to have rejected the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam Police Station, respondent No.4, let us consider as to how, the 4th respondent has conducted the investigation and submitted report. After considering the report, Kerala State Human Rights Commission, at paragraph 15 of the order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014, has recorded thus: “As mentioned before the Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam has submitted the report as per the Commission's direction. The aforesaid person has submitted this report without any investigation having done and only by taking statements from the 1st and 2nd respondents. PW1, the complainant was not questioned. The documents at the hospital were also not examined. The said report which is prepared for helping his colleague police officers without conducting an honest investigation does not deserve to be assigned any value by the Commission.” 27. Therefore, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, ought not to have rejected the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam Police Station, respondent No.4, cannot be accepted. 28. Complainant has stated that the original wound certificate has been illegally removed from the Hospital register. Let us consider how the Kerala State Human Rights Commission has addressed the said issue. At paragraphs 18 and 19 of the order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No. 1641/2014, the Commission recorded thus: “18. No evidence is brought before the Commission to show that the 1st respondent was injured from the scene of occurrence. PW1 had informed the Magistrate that the police officers had assaulted him. He had also told the same thing to the doctor who treated him. This strengthens the allegation made by PW1. This case has another suspicious circumstance. In the statement given by PW3 and the hospital Superintendent, the original page of wound certificate and its carbon copy was lost from the Harippad Government Hospital wherein PW1 was admitted. He had also told the same thing to the doctor who treated him. This strengthens the allegation made by PW1. This case has another suspicious circumstance. In the statement given by PW3 and the hospital Superintendent, the original page of wound certificate and its carbon copy was lost from the Harippad Government Hospital wherein PW1 was admitted. It was PW3 who had treated PW1 on 06.02.2014 and drew the certificate. The said person left for Sabarimala duty on the next day and while on duty, the hospital Superintendent had called him and informed him that the wound certificate was lost from the hospital and it is required to be prepared again and then later he had created another wound certificate by referring to the case sheet and P1 is the copy of that certificate which is produced before the Commission. In the report made by the Superintendent of Haripad hospital, it is not mentioned as to how the wound certificate is lost. Superintendent is the custodian of the said certificate. 19. The loss of certificate from the Haripad Government Hospital happened in dubious circumstances. It has to be understood that the said pages were removed so as to save the police officers and a proper investigation is required in this regard as per the opinion of the Commission.” 29. After analysing the evidence adduced by the parties therein, at paragraph 20 of Exhibit-P1 order, Kerala State Human Rights Commission came to the conclusion as hereunder: “This case witnesses naked human right violations by the police. Police officers have committed a wild assault on a student on a public road. There is no reason to disbelieve statements given by PW1 and PW2. PW1 was assaulted on the allegation that he talked rudely to the police officers. It is also clear that he was assaulted in the police station as well. The 2nd respondent has disputed his presence, but this is also without evidence. The statements given by RW1 and RW2 cannot be disbelieved. The police officers who have assaulted PW1 need to be proceeded against. Even despite an intimation was given from the hospital, no action was taken from the police. The Commission recommends the following:- 1. The District Police Chief, Alappuzha shall take disciplinary proceedings against 1st and 2nd respondents for assaulting PW1 in the incident occurred on 05.02.2014. 2. The police officers who have assaulted PW1 need to be proceeded against. Even despite an intimation was given from the hospital, no action was taken from the police. The Commission recommends the following:- 1. The District Police Chief, Alappuzha shall take disciplinary proceedings against 1st and 2nd respondents for assaulting PW1 in the incident occurred on 05.02.2014. 2. The Secretary, Home Department shall pay Rs.20,000/- as compensation to the injured PW1 (Ajsal). The said amount must be recovered from the 1st and 2nd respondents. 3. The Vigilance Division of the Health Department must investigate the circumstance that led to the loss of wound certificate which was prepared pursuant to the treatment received by PW1 on 06.02.2014 at Haripad Taluk Hospital and the guilty must be proceeded against and action be taken against them.” 30. First of all, on the violation of human rights, reported to the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, after analysing the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam Police Station, the Commission has categorically found, the investigation is not an honest investigation. Going through the entire order in HRMP No.1641/2014 dated 21.05.2015, the findings therein cannot be said to be perverse or illegal. Let us consider a few decisions as to, what 'perversity' means: (i) In Arulvelu v. State [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 27, 29 and 30, explained what "perverse" means as hereunder: "27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English -1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. ...... 29. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. ...... 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of “perverse” has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others reported in [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312], and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness -as distinguished from the legal permissibility -of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." (ii) In The General Manager (P) Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 233 , at paragraph 24, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: "24. Absence of reasons in a disciplinary order would amount to denial of natural justice to the charge-sheeted employee. But the present case was certainly not one of that category. Once the charges were found to have been established, the High Court had no reason to interfere in the decision. Even though there was sufficient documentary evidence on record, the High Court has chosen to hold that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse. A perverse finding is one which is based on no evidence or one that no reasonable person would arrive at. This has been held by this Court long back in Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, AIR 1994 SC 1341 . Unless it is found that some relevant evidence has not been considered or that certain inadmissible material has been taken into consideration the finding cannot be said to be perverse. The legal position in this behalf has been recently reiterated in Arilvelu v. State, [ (2009) 10 SCC 206 ]. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained.” (iii) In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 , at paragraph 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held as follows: "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant /inadmissible material. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant /inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is against the weight of evidence, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 31. Though, on the one hand, the petitioner has heavily relied on the report of the Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam Police Station, respondent No.4, meaning thereby, the procedure followed by the Commission is correct, but then, the Commission ought not to have rejected the same, quite contrary to the above and relying on Section 17 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the petitioner has contended that the Commission ought to have called for a report from the State before proceeding with the complaint to enquire. Admittedly, the Commission had not proposed to investigate, as per Section 14 of the Protection of Human Rights Act. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that a further investigation could have been conducted through any other officer or agency of the State is rejected. Finding, prima facie case the Commission has entertained the complaint dated 19.02.2014 and proceeded to inquire. 32. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that a further investigation could have been conducted through any other officer or agency of the State is rejected. Finding, prima facie case the Commission has entertained the complaint dated 19.02.2014 and proceeded to inquire. 32. As per Section 17(1) of the Act, the Commission, while inquiring into the complaints of violations of human rights, may- (i) call for information or report from the Central Government or any State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate thereto within such time as may be specified by it: Provided that— (a) if the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own; (b) if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly; (ii) without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it considers necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry.” 33. Before considering the contentions that the Commission should have first called for a report from the State Government and cannot inquire into the complaint on its own, let us consider a few decisions on Interpretation of statutes. (i) In the words of Tindal, C.J., in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & F 85], wherein, he said thus, “If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves so alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. (ii) In Nairin v. University of St. Andrews reported in 1909 AC 147, the Hon'ble Court held that, “Unless there is any ambiguity it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that the intention of the Legislature should be primarily gathered from the words which are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and construed in the light of surrounding circumstances and constitutional principle and practice. (iii) In Ram Rattan v. Parma Nand reported in AIR 1946 PC 51 , the Hon'ble Mr.S.R.Das, held as follows: “The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning, the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case, the literal construction leads to no apparent absurdity and therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction.” (iv) In Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1953 SC 274 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “It is settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase and sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.” (v) In Rao Shive Bahadur Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1953 SC 394 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “While, no doubt, it is not permissible to supply a clear and obvious lacuna in a statute, and imply a right of appeal, it is incumbent on the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application.” (vi) What is the spirit of law, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R. Das in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749 , said that, “The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act.” (vii) In Hari Prasad Shivashanker Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar reported in AIR 1957 SC 121 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:- “It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended, Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined.” (viii) In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan reported in AIR 1957 SC 907 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “It must always be borne in mind that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to consider the mischief and defect which the, Act purports to remedy and correct.” (ix) In Attorney-General v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover reported in (1957) 1 All.ER 49 , Lord Somervell of Harrow has explained the unambiguous, as “unambiguous in context”. (x) In State of W.B., v. Union of India reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in considering the expression used by the Legislature, the Court should have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. (xi) In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj ( AIR 1963 SC 946 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: “But it is said, relying upon certain passages in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, at p, 68, and in Crawford on "Statutory Construction' at p. 492, that it is the duty of the Judge "to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy," and for that purpose the more extended meaning could be attributed to the words so as to bring all matters fairly within the scope of such a statute even though outside the letter, if within its spirit or reason. But both Maxwell and Crawford administered a caution in resorting to such a construction. Maxwell says at p.68 of his book: "The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words." Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statute's scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature. The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. It is a well recognized rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature.” (xii) In Namamal v. Radhey Shyam reported in AIR 1970 Rajasthan 26, the Court held as follows: “It was observed by Pollock C. B. in Waugh v. Middleton, 1853-8 Ex 352 (356):--"It must, however, be conceded that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest and without doubt, that construction ought to prevail, unless there be some strong and obvious reason to the contrary. But the rule adverted to is subject to this condition, that however plain the apparent grammatical construction of a sentence may be, if it be properly clear from the contents of the same document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it." And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry. v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):--"The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated." Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:--"I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further." 11. Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 226 observes thus:-- "The rule of strict construction, however, whenever invoked, comes attended with qualifications and other rules no less important, and it is by the light which each contributes that the meaning must be determined. Among them is the rule that that sense of the words is to be adopted which best harmonises with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and object of the legislature. The paramount object, in construing penal as well us other statutes, is to ascertain the legislative intent and the rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words to have their full meaning, or the more extensive of two meanings, when best effectuating the intention. They are indeed frequently taken in the widest sense, sometimes even in a sense more wide than etymologically belongs or is popularly attached to them, in order to carry out effectually the legislative intent, or, to use Sir Edward Cole's words, to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.” (xiii) In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. Joiner reported in (1975) 3 All. ER 1050, it has been held that normally a statutory provision consists of a general description of some factual situation and the legal consequences ensuing from it. Whether the general description is wide or narrow, it will have some limits. The question before a court of law in dealing with a statute is whether the factual situation proved before it falls within the general description given in the statute. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an “ambiguity” in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, “ambiguity” and “ambiguous” are widely used in judgments. A real difficulty in determining the right answer can be said to arise from an “ambiguity” in the statute. It is in this sense that the words, “ambiguity” and “ambiguous” are widely used in judgments. (xiv) In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s.Mangal Sen Shyamlal reported in 1975 (4) SCC 35 : AIR 1975 SC 1106 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it "according to the intent of them that made it". From that function the court is. not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim, “ut res magis valiat quam pereat”, lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin air." (xv) In C.I.T., Madras v. T. Sundram Iyengar (P) Ltd., reported in (1976) 1 SCC 77 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and if two interpretations are not reasonably possible, it would be wrong to discard the plain meaning of the words used, in order to meet a possible injustice. (xvi) If the words are precise and unambiguous, then it should be accepted, as declaring the express intention of the legislature. In Ku. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., and others reported in (1981) 2 SCC 585 : AIR 1981 SC 1274 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that a legislature does not waste words, without any intention and every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due import and significance. (xvii) In LT.-Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India reported in (1983) 3 SCC 140, at Paragraph 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “8. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. ..........If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. ..........If the literal construction leads to an absurdity, external aids to construction can be resorted to. To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it is enacted and the object which it is required to subserve and the authority by which the rule is framed. This necessitates examination of the broad features of the Act.” (xviii) In Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court reported in 1985 (3) SCC 103 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraph 15, held as follows: “(15) No cannon of statutory construction is more firmly, established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as 'elementary rule' (See Attorney General v. Bastow [ (1957) 1 All.ER 49 7]) and as a 'settled rule' (See Poppatlal Shall v. State of Madras [1953 SCR 667 : AIR 1953 SC 274 ]). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: 'it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers' (Quoted with approval in Punjab Breverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [ (1978) 3 SCR 370 : (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165]).” (xix) In Narendra H. Khzurana v. Commissioner of Police reported in 2004 (2) Mh.L.R. 72, it was held that, it must be noted the proper course in interpreting a statute in the first instance is to examine its language and then ask what is the natural meaning uninfluenced by the considerations derived from previous state of law and then assume that it was property intended to leave unaltered. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. It is settled legal position, therefore, that the Courts must try to discover the real intent by keeping the direction of the statute intact. (xx) In Nyadar Singh v. Union of India ( AIR 1988 SC 1979 ), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. (xxi) It is a well settled law of interpretation that “when the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. Reference can be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nelson Motis v. Union of India reported in AIR 1992 SC 1981 .” (xxii) In M/s.Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise and others reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716 : AIR 1993 SC 2288 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- “Where the words of the statute are plain and clear, there is no room for applying any of the principles of interpretation, which are merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute. The Court would interpret them as they stand.” (xxiii) In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “35. In a case where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom.... 37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. ......But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act.” (xxiv) In Indian Dental Association, Kerala v. Union of India reported in 2004 (1) Kant. LJ 282, the Court held thus:- “The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, "but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used", for it is well-accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. The decision in a case calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected.” (xxv) In Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta reported in AIR 2005 SC 648 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:-- “The interpretation function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent, it is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.” In Nathi Devi's case, it was further held that, “It is equally well-settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors.” (xxvi) In Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn., 2008), the learned author while referring to judgments of different Courts states (at page 134) that procedural laws regulating proceedings in court are to be construed as to render justice wherever reasonably possible and to avoid injustice from a mistake of court. He further states (at pages 135 and 136) that: "Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding a particular construction is a rule which must be applied with great care. "The argument ab inconvenienti", said LORD MOULTON, "is one which requires to be used with great caution". (xxvii) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. (xxvii) In State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. 13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. 14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language..... 15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so. (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.) 16. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so. (See Frankfurter: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, p. 51.) 16. It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and, therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [(1980 (1) All.ER 529] (All ER at p. 542c-d): “It endangers continued public confidence in the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments to statutes which experience of their operation has shown to have had consequences that members of the court before whom the matter comes consider to be injurious to the public interest.” (xxviii) In Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., [ (2006) 2 SCC 670 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:- “12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. It is well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.” (xxix) In A.N. Roy Commissioner of Police v. Suresh Sham Singh [ AIR 2006 SC 2677 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:- “It is now well settled principle of law that, the Court cannot change the scope of legislation or intention, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction, which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.” (xxx) In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the great consequences of the alternative constructions.” (xxx) In Adamji Lookmanji & Co. v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2007 Bom. 56 , the Bombay High Court held that, when the words of status are clear, plain or unambiguous, and reasonably susceptible to only meaning, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used. Attention should be paid to what has been said in the statute, as also to what has not been said. (xxxi) In State of Haryana v. Suresh reported in 2007 (3) KLT 213 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “One of the basic principles of Interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary, to or inconsistent with any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.” (xxxii) In Visitor Amu v. K.S. Misra reported in (2007) 8 SCC 594, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “It is well settled principle of interpretation of the statute that it is incumbent upon the Court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which will render a part of the statute devoid of any meaning or application. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intent is that every of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being in apposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.” (xxxiii) In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., reported in (2008) 4 SCC 755 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 52, 54, 55 and 56, held as follows: “52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd.” (xxxiv) In Phool Patti v. Ram Singh reported in (2009) 13 SCC 22 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “9. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that the court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear.” (xxxv) In Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “179. Even otherwise, it is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is a determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana[ (2009) 3 SCC 553 ]. 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Reference in this regard may be made to a recent decision of this Court in Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana[ (2009) 3 SCC 553 ]. 180. Further, it is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision is enacted by the legislature, which prescribes a condition at one place but not at some other place in the same provision, the only reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. In such cases, it will be wrong to presume that such omission was inadvertent or that by incorporating the condition at one place in the provision the legislature also intended the condition to be applied at some other place in that provision.” (xxxvi) In Satheedevi v. Prasanna reported in (2010) 5 SCC 622 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “12. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well recognised rules of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise--Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [ AIR 1957 SC 907 ] 13. The other important rule of interpretation is that the court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to do so. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not there in it. Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the court cannot correct the defect or supply the omission Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323] and Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn. [ AIR 1966 SC 1678 ]” (xxxvii) In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors. v. A.G. Syed Mohideen & Ors. [ 2010 CIJ 273 SC (1)], it was held as under:- "6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be." (xxxviii) In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., [ (2011) 9 SCC 354 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with a provision under Section 17(3A) of the Act, held as follows: “Therefore, the provision of Section 17(3-A) cannot be viewed in isolation as it is an intrinsic and mandatory step in exercising special powers in cases of emergency. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3-A) must be read together. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation. 55. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) and 17(3-A) must be read together. Sections 17(1) and 17(2) cannot be worked out in isolation. 55. It is well settled as a canon of construction that a statute has to be read as a whole and in its context. In Attorney General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [ 1957 AC 436 ], Lord Viscount Simonds very elegantly stated the principle that it is the duty of court to examine every word of a statute in its context. The learned Law Lord further said that in understanding the meaning of the provision, the Court must take into consideration “not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy.”(All ER p. 53 I) 57. These principles have been followed by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth [ 1977 (4) SCC 193 ]. At SCC p. 240, Bhagwati, J. as His Lordship then was, in a concurring opinion held that words in a statute cannot be read in isolation, their colour and content are derived from their context and every word in a statute is to be examined in its context. His Lordship explained that the word context has to be taken in its widest sense and expressly quoted the formulations of Lord Viscount Simonds, set out above.” 34. Now, let us consider a few decisions, as to whether the courts can add or delete or substitute any words, in a statute or section. (i) In CIT v. Badhraja and Company [1994 Supp (1) SCC 280], the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an object oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to the extent of doing violence to the plain meaning of the Section used by rewriting the Section or substituting the words in the place of actual words used by the legislature. (ii) In Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu reported in (2001) 7 SCC 71 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. The court cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, or add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are there.” (iii) In Institute of C.A. of India v. Ajit Kumar Iddya reported in AIR 2003 Kant. 187, the Karnataka High Court held thus: “So far as the cardinal law of interpretation is concerned, it is settled that if the language is simple and unambiguous, it is to be read with the clear intention of the legislation. Otherwise also, any addition/subtraction of a word is not permissible. In other words, it is not proper to use a sense, which is different from what the word used ordinarily conveys. The duty of the Court is not to fill up the gap by stretching a word used. It is also settled that a provision is to be read as a whole and while interpreting, the intention and object of the legislation have to be looked upon. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own.” (iv) In Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission reported in (2007) 3 SCC 720 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “It is well settled that courts will not add words to a statute or read into the statute words not in it. Even if the courts come to the conclusion that there is any omission in the words used, it cannot make up the deficiency, where the wording as it exists is clear and unambiguous. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules.” 35. While the courts can adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislative or the rule-making authority, it cannot set at naught the legislative intent clearly expressed in a statute or the rules.” 35. The word "may'' used in Section 17(1) of the Act is not mandatory and it is only discretionary. Our conclusion is fortified by clause (ii) of Section 17, which states that without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it is considered necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry. The Legislature has empowered the Commission to inquire into a complaint, without resorting to the procedure in Section 17(1) of the Act. The expression “without prejudice to anything contained”, has been considered as early as in 1945 by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji and Others reported in AIR 1945 PC 156 : (1945) 2 Mad LJ 325 (PC) : 1945 MWN 546 and held as under: “Their Lordships are unable to agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court on his statement of the relative positions of sub-ss. 1 and 2 of s. 2 of the Defence of India Act, and counsel for the respondents in the present appeal was unable to support that statement, or to maintain that r. 26 was invalid. In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub-s. 2 is merely an illustrative one; "the rule-making power is conferred by sub-s. 1, and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub-s. 2 are the rules which are authorised by, and made under, sub. s. 1: the provisions of sub-s. 2 are not restrictive of sub-s. 1, as, indeed, is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. 1." There can be no doubt-as the learned judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-s. 1 amply justifies the terms of r. 26, and avoids any of the criticisms which the learned judge expressed in relation to sub-s. 2.” 36. When this expression “without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i)”, is used, it is an exception carved out to the preceding provision and it is not mandatory that only after exercising the power under the first provision, the latter should be invoked. When this expression “without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i)”, is used, it is an exception carved out to the preceding provision and it is not mandatory that only after exercising the power under the first provision, the latter should be invoked. The object of Section 17(ii) of the Act is also to empower the Human Rights Commission to inquire into complaints relating to violation of human rights or prevention of violation of human rights, without calling for any information or report from the State or Central Government, or any other authority etc. 37. The expression “without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i) of Section 17 of the Act” is followed by further expressions that, (i) “if it is considered necessary”; and (ii) “having regard to the nature of the complaint”. Reading of Section 17(ii) of the Act makes it clear that the Commission is not denuded of its powers to inquire without any information or report from the state or central Government or authority, as the case may be. To exercise the power under Section 17(ii), all that is required is, whether the Commission, having regard to the nature of the complainant, has considered it necessary to inquire. In the case on hand, the Commission has considered it necessary to inquire. 38. Keeping in mind the purposes of the Act, we are of the view that in Section 17(ii) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, there is a clear legislative intent to confer power on the Commission, to take an independent decision, notwithstanding any information or report from the State or Central, Governments etc. Recourse to Section 17(ii) of the Act is not prohibited. If the contentions of the petitioner are to be accepted, then Section 17(ii) of the Protection of Human Rights Act would be simply erased from the Statute. In the light of the above discussion, contention of the petitioner to the contrary, is rejected. 39. In State of Kerala v. The Human Rights Commission reported in 2015 (1) KLT 239 , on receipt of a complaint, the Kerala State Human Rights Commission directed the Geologist, Mining and Geology Department to submit a report. The said report was rejected. Then, the Commission proceeded further. When the correctness of the same was questioned, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held as under: “13. The said report was rejected. Then, the Commission proceeded further. When the correctness of the same was questioned, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held as under: “13. The scheme of Act, 1993 indicate that the Commission has power to direct for conducting any investigation pertaining to the enquiry by any Officer or through the investigating agency of the Central or State Government with the concurrence of the Central or State Government which is clearly delineated in Sec.14. Section 17 deals with the procedure regarding enquiry into complaints. From the order of the Commission it is clear that the Commission has not directed for investigation rather proceeded to enquire about the complaint as per Sec.17. It is relevant to note that complaint has been defined in Regulation 2(e) which contains a very wide definition and includes all petitions or communications or any information by any other means whatsoever alleging violation of human rights. Regulation 2(e) is as follows: “2(e) “Complaint” means all petitions or communications received by the Commission from a victim or any other person on his behalf in person or by post or by telegram or by fax or by any other means whatsoever alleging violation of human rights or abetment thereof or negligence in the prevention of such violation by a public servant of all or any of the human rights defined in clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 2 read with sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Act.” 14. The Commission in the present case proceeded to enquire into the violation of human rights on the basis of the newspaper report dated 16.06.2007 as noted above which is clearly covered by the definition of complaint under Regulation 2(e). From the order of the Commission it also does appear that the Commission has called for report from the Geologist, Mining and Geology Department as well as owner of the quarry. Section 17(i) empowers the Commission to call for report from “the Central Government or any State Government or any other authority or organization subordinate thereto”. Geologist, Mining and Geology Department is subordinate to the State Government, hence report could have been called from him. Thus in the present case the Commission proceeded to conduct an enquiry suo motu and also called for report as mentioned in the order. Geologist, Mining and Geology Department is subordinate to the State Government, hence report could have been called from him. Thus in the present case the Commission proceeded to conduct an enquiry suo motu and also called for report as mentioned in the order. Submission of the learned Government Pleader for the appellant that the Commission did not enquire into the matter according to the provisions of Act, 1993 thus cannot be accepted. In so far as investigation as contained in Sec.14 is concerned, it is not necessary in all cases that any investigation be directed. Commission can proceed to enquire into the matter and take decision even without directing for an investigation. We thus do not find any fault or infirmity in the order of the Commission on the basis of the above submission.” 40. Though, by placing reliance on the decisions in K. Rangasamy v. The Registrar (W.P. No.23005 of 2007) of the Madras High Court, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd. [ (2017) 5 SCC 143 ], India Handicrafts Emporium v. Union of India [ (2003) 7 SCC 589 ], N. C. Dhoundial v. Union of India [ (2004) 2 SCC 579 ], and T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [ (2001) 6 SCC 181 ], though petitioner has contended that the Kerala State Human Rights Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction, in ordering the respondents therein, to pay compensation, we are not inclined to accept the said contention, for the reason that, vide order in HRMP No.1641/2014 dated 21.05.2015, the Commission has only made recommendations. For brevity, operative portion of the order dated 21.05.2015 (Exhibit-P1) is extracted hereunder: “The Commission recommends the following:- 1. The District Police Chief, Alappuzha shall take disciplinary proceedings against 1st and 2nd respondents for assaulting PW1 in the incident occurred on 05.02.2014. 2. The Secretary, Home Department shall pay Rs.20,000/-as compensation to the injured PW1 (Ajsal). The said amount must be recovered from the 1st and 2nd respondents. 3. The Vigilance Division of the Health Department must investigate the circumstance that led to the loss of wound certificate which was prepared pursuant to the treatment received by PW1 on 06.02.2014 at Harippad Taluk Hospital and the guilty must be proceeded against and action be taken against them.” 41. 3. The Vigilance Division of the Health Department must investigate the circumstance that led to the loss of wound certificate which was prepared pursuant to the treatment received by PW1 on 06.02.2014 at Harippad Taluk Hospital and the guilty must be proceeded against and action be taken against them.” 41. Yet another issue raised by the petitioner is that the Commission has committed jurisdictional error, by intervening the proceeding, involving allegations of human rights violation, pending before a criminal court. Let us consider as to whether there was any case pending on the file of the criminal court, when the complainant under HRMP No.1641/2014 was lodged and inquiry ordered. Incident is stated to have occurred on 05.12.2014 at 1 p.m. After considering the report submitted by the Circle Inspector of Police, Kayamkulam, respondent No.4, inquiry was conducted, evidence taken and after analysing the same, Kerala State Human Rights Commission vide order in HRMP No.1641/2014 dated 21.05.2015, found the petitioner and another, guilty of human rights and made recommendations to the Government, as stated above. The complaint before the Commission has ended in passing an order on 21.05.2015. Though a private complaint was stated to have been filed on 19.02.2014, the same seemed to have been taken cognizance only in the year 2017, in C.C. No.627/2017, which ended in acquittal. No case was pending and, therefore, there is no question of getting approval from the criminal court. Yet another aspect to be taken note of is that, throughout the inquiry conducted by the Commission, nothing was brought before the Commission by the petitioner. 42. On the aspect as to whether, Kerala State Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to take any steps towards implementation of Exhibit-P1 order in HRMP No.1641/2014 dated 21.05.2015 and, therefore, Exhibit-P4 notice is without jurisdiction, at the risk of repetition, let us consider what Section 18(e) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 states as hereunder: “18. 42. On the aspect as to whether, Kerala State Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to take any steps towards implementation of Exhibit-P1 order in HRMP No.1641/2014 dated 21.05.2015 and, therefore, Exhibit-P4 notice is without jurisdiction, at the risk of repetition, let us consider what Section 18(e) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 states as hereunder: “18. Steps during and after inquiry.—The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely:— (a) xx xxx xxxxx xx xxx xxxxx (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission;” 43. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner, by referring to Section 20 of the Act, 1993 relating to publication of annual and special reports of the Commission, submitted that the Government have decided not to implement Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014,there is nothing on record to substantiate the same. 44. Notice dated 31.01.2017 (Exhibit-P4) issued by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, respondent No.1, is reproduced: “KERALA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION Turbo Plus Towers, PMG Jn., Vikas Bhavan P.O., Thiruvananthapuram - 695 033. Phone No. 0471-2307263 Fax : 0471-2307490 e-mail: hrckleralatvm@gmail.com HRMP No.12134/15/ALP Dated : 31/1/17 To Sri Krishnankutty ASI, Kareelakulangara Police Station, Alappuzha Dist. Whereas a petition has been received from Shri Abdul Razak …………………………….. ........................................................ ..................................................................................................................... and the same was placed before the Commission on 24/1/17 and whereas upon perusing the petition, the Commission has passed an order requiring you to forward a detailed action taken report on the petition with copy on or before 21/2/17 at KSHRC, TVPM. You are requested to forward the requisite action taken report (two copies) within the aforesaid time stipulated by the Commission. A photocopy of the petition and the Order dated 21/5/2015 are attached herewith. Sd/- Registrar Encl: As above” 45. Exhibit-P4 notice is addressed not to the State Government and does not give a cause of action to the petitioner, to challenge. 46. A photocopy of the petition and the Order dated 21/5/2015 are attached herewith. Sd/- Registrar Encl: As above” 45. Exhibit-P4 notice is addressed not to the State Government and does not give a cause of action to the petitioner, to challenge. 46. On the aspect of lack of, jurisdictional error/jurisdiction on the part of Kerala State Human Rights Commission, respondent No.1, to entertain a complaint regarding violation of human rights, let us consider a few decisions, which are extracted hereunder: (i) In Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1962 SC 1621 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “…....Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable "at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry'. (Rex v. Bolten [1841] I Q.B. 66. Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determine any of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e.) had jurisdiction to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e.) had jurisdiction to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But there are other cases where Parliament when it empowers an inferior tribunal to enquire into certain facts intend to demarcate two areas of enquiry, the tribunal's findings within one area being conclusive and with in the other area impeachable. "The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists or not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to try. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constitution them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess." (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 11 page 59). The characteristic attribute of judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal…………………………” (ii) In Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commissioner, (1969) 1 All ER 208, Lord Reid at pages 213 and 214 of the Report stated as under: "It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision is a nullity. But in such cases the words "jurisdiction has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in had faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to if for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly." (iii) In Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Brothers, [ (1971) 1 SCC 486 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 22, held thus:- "22. But if it decides a question remitted to if for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly." (iii) In Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Brothers, [ (1971) 1 SCC 486 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 22, held thus:- "22. ....The word "jurisdiction" has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former, it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several aspects, one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in noncompliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act, and therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction." (iv) In Shri. M.L. Sethi v. Shri R.P. Kapur, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 427 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 12, held thus:- "12. ...The "jurisdiction" is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, namely, the entitlement "to enter upon the enquiry in question". If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Denean in R. v. Bolton. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd. case (supra), Lord Reid said: "But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive." In the same case, Lord Pearce said: "Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or, in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the inquiry which the Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity." The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above case would show the extent to which 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of "jurisdiction". The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference 'between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction it the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction it the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal", "imposing an unwarranted condition" or "addressing themselves to a wrong question". The majority opinion in the, case leaves a Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will, give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow. In the end it can only be a value judgment (see H.W.R. Wade, "Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anismanic case", Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 85, 1969, p. 198). Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata 'was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision ? It is a it difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the Court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court." (v) In Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur [ (1973) 1 SCC 633 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "No authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assesses was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assesses was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. It is incomprehensible to think that a quasi-judicial authority like the Income-tax Officer can erroneously decide a jurisdictional fact and thereafter proceed to impose a levy on a citizen. In our opinion the Appellate Bench is wholly wrong in opining that the Income-tax Officer can "decide either way". (vi) In Shrisht Dhawan (SMT.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, [ (1992) 1 SCC 534 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 19, held thus:- "19....What, then, is an error in respect of jurisdictional fact? A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or nonexistence of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a Court, tribunal or an authority. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad. In Raza Textiles it was held that a court or tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly." (vii) After considering Anisminic’s case (cited supra) and several decisions, a learned single Judge of this Court has explained “Jurisdiction” in Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner (KGST) [ 2006 (3) KLT 581 ], and held that the concept of jurisdiction has been drastically expanded after the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic v. The Foreign Compensation Commission (1967 (2) AER 986). Now, every error of law is a jurisdictional error. If a decisive fact is wrongly understood, even then, the decision will be outside jurisdiction. This concept is best explained by K.S. Paripoornan, J., in his Lordship's separate Judgment in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ]. Now, every error of law is a jurisdictional error. If a decisive fact is wrongly understood, even then, the decision will be outside jurisdiction. This concept is best explained by K.S. Paripoornan, J., in his Lordship's separate Judgment in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ]. The relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as follows: “Opinions may differ as to when it can be said that in the 'public law' domain, the entire proceeding before the appropriate authority is illegal and without jurisdiction or the defect or infirmity in the order goes to the root of the matter and makes it in law invalid or void (referred to in Illuri Subbayya Chetty case and approved in Dhulabhai case). The matter may have to be considered in the light of the provisions of the particular statute in question and the fact-situation obtaining in each case. It is difficult to visualise all situations hypothetically and provide an answer. Be that as it may, the question that frequently arises for consideration, is, in what situation/cases the noncompliance or error or mistake, committed by the statutory authority or tribunal, makes the decision rendered ultra vires or a nullity or one without jurisdiction? If the decision is without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions for obtaining reliefs contained in the Act and the 'ouster clauses', the jurisdiction of the ordinary court is not excluded. So, the matter assumes significance. Since the landmark decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, the legal world seems to have accepted that any 'jurisdictional error' as understood in the liberal or modern approach, laid down therein, makes a decision ultra vires or a nullity or without jurisdiction and the 'ouster clauses' are construed restrictively and such provisions whatever their stringent language be, have been held, not to prevent challenge on the ground that the decision is ultra vies and being a complete nullity, it is not a decision within the meaning of the Act. The concept of jurisdiction has acquired 'new dimensions'. The original or pure theory of jurisdiction means 'the authority to decide' and it is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. The concept of jurisdiction has acquired 'new dimensions'. The original or pure theory of jurisdiction means 'the authority to decide' and it is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. The said approach has been given a go-by in Anisminic case as we shall see from the discussion hereinafter (See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995 Edn.) p.238, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) p. 114, para 67, footnote (9). As Sir William Wade observes in his book, Administrative Law (7th Edn.), 1994, at p.229: “The tribunal must not only have jurisdiction at the outset, but must retain it unimpaired until it has discharged its task.” The decision in Animinic case has been cited with approval in a number of cases by this Court: citation of a few such cases - Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros ( AIR 1971 SC 1558 at p.1565, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ( 1988 (2) SCC 602 at p.650), 'R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) ( 1989 (1) SCC 628 at p.634), N. Parthasararhy v. Controller of Capital Issues ( 1991 (3) SCC 153 at p.195), Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A.P. ( 1991 (4) SCC 93 ), Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi ( 1993 (3) SCC 161 at p.173). Delivering the Judgment of a two member Bench in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur ( AIR 1972 SC 2379 ), Mathew, J., in paras 10 and 11 of the Judgment explained the legal position after Anisminic case to the following effect: “10. The word 'jurisdiction is a verbal cost of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign. Compensation Commission, namely, the entitlement 'to enter upon the enquiry in question. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then, any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Dennan in 'R. v. Boltan. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Dennan in 'R. v. Boltan. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd., Lord Reid said: 'But there are many cases, where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done for failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith, have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.” In the same case, Lord Pearce said: 'Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may, at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage, while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may, depart from the rules of natural justice, or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby, it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the enquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decisions to be a nullity.' 11. Thereby, it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the enquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decisions to be a nullity.' 11. The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords, in the above case, would show the extent to which 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of 'jurisdiction'. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as 'basing their decision n a matter with which they have no right to deal', 'imposing an unwarranted condition' or 'addressing themselves to a wrong question'. The majority opinion in the case leaves a court or tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the court is prepared to allow............” (viii) In Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju ( AIR 1973 SC 2602 ), a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed as under: (SCC pp 423-24, para 28). “Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has arisen because the word 'jurisdiction' is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context (see per Diplock, J. at p.394 in the Anisminic case). The difficulty has arisen because the word 'jurisdiction' is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context (see per Diplock, J. at p.394 in the Anisminic case). Whereas the 'pure' theory of jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control to a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower meaning might result in a more useful legal concept even though the formal structure of law may lost something of its logical symmetry. 'At bottom, the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for purpose of judicial review has been one of public policy rather than one of logic'. (S.A. Smith 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., p.98. (1968) Edn.) The observation of the learned author (S.A.De Smith) was continued in its 3rd Edn. (1973) at p.98 and in its 4th Edn. (1980) at p.112 of the book. The observation aforesaid was based on the then prevailing academic opinion only as is seen from the footnotes. It should be stated that the said observation is omitted form the latest edition of the book De Smith, Woolf and Jowell -Judicial Review of Administrative Action -5th Edn. (1995) as is evident from p.229; probably due to later developments in the law and the academic opinion that has emerged due to the change in the perspective. 335. After 1980, the decision in Anisminic case came up for further consideration before the House of lords, Privy Council and other courts. The three leading decisions of the House of Lords wherein Animinic principle was followed and explained, are the following: Racal Communications Ltd., In re (1981 AC 374), O' Reilly v. Mackman [ 1983 (2) AC 237 ], Re. v. Hull University Visitor (1993 AC 682). It should be noted that Racal, In re case, the Anisminic principle was held to be inapplicable in the case of (superior) court where the decision of the court is made final and conclusive by the statute. (The superior court referred to in this decision is the High Court) (1981 AC 374 (383, 384, 386, 391)). In the meanwhile, the House of Lords, in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service ( 1985 AC 374 ), enunciated three broad grounds for judicial review, as 'legality', 'procedural propriety' and 'rationality' and this decision had its impact on the development of the law in post-Anisminic period. In the meanwhile, the House of Lords, in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service ( 1985 AC 374 ), enunciated three broad grounds for judicial review, as 'legality', 'procedural propriety' and 'rationality' and this decision had its impact on the development of the law in post-Anisminic period. In the light of the above four important decisions of the House of Lords, other decisions of the court of appeal, Privy Council etc., and the later academic opinion in the matter, the entire case-law on the subject has been reviewed in leading text books. In the latest edition of De Smith on Judicial Review of Administrative Action -edited by Lord Woolf and Jowell, Q.C. (Professor of Public Law, 5 Edn. -1995) in Chapter 5, titled as 'Jurisdiction, Vires, Law and Fact' (pp-223-204), there is exhaustive analysis about the concept 'Jurisdiction' and its ramifications. The authors have discussed the pure theory of jurisdiction, the innovative decision in Anisminic case, the development of the law in the post-Anisminic period, the scope of the 'finality' clauses (exclusion of jurisdiction of courts) in the statutes and have laid down a few propositions at pp-250-256 which could be advanced on the subject. The authors have concluded the discussion thus at p.256: “After Anisminic virtually every error of law is a jurisdictional error, and the only place left for non-jurisdictional error is where the components of the decision made by the inferior body included matters of fact and policy as well as law or where the error was evidential (concerning for example, the burden of proof or admission of evidence). Perhaps the most precise indication of jurisdictional error is that advanced by Lord Diplock in Raccal Communications, when he suggested that a tribunal is entitled to make an error when the matter 'involves, as many do interrelated questions of law, fact and degree'. Thus, it was for the county court judge in Pearlman, to decide whether the installation of central heating in a dwelling amounted to a 'structural alternation, extension or addition'. Thus, it was for the county court judge in Pearlman, to decide whether the installation of central heating in a dwelling amounted to a 'structural alternation, extension or addition'. This was a typical question of mixed law, fact and degree which only a scholiast would think it appropriate to dissect into two separate questions, one for decision by the superior court, viz., the meaning of these words, a question which must entail considerations of degree and the other for decision by a country court viz., the application of words to the particular installation, a question which also entails considerations of degree. It is however, doubtful whether any test of jurisdictional error will prove satisfactory. The distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error is ultimately based upon foundations of sand. Much of the superstructure has already crumbled. What remains is likely quickly to fall away as the courts rightly insist that all administrative action should be, simply, lawful, whether or not jurisdictionally lawful.” 336. The jurisdictional control exercised by superior courts over subordinate courts, tribunals or other statutory bodies and the scope and content of such power has been pithily stated in Halsbury's Laws of England - 4th Edn. (Reissue), 1989 Vol. 1(1), p.113 to the following effect: “The inferior court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction if it has no power to enter upon an enquiry into a matter at all and it exceeds jurisdiction if it nevertheless enters upon such an enquiry or, having jurisdiction in the first place, it proceeds to arrogate an authority withheld from it by perpetrating a major error of substance, form or procedure or by making an order or taking action outside its limited area of competence. Not every error committed by an inferior court or tribunal or other body, however, goes to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to decide a matter imports a limited power to decide that matter incorrectly.” A tribunal lacks jurisdiction if (1) it is improperly constituted or (2) the proceedings have been improperly instituted or (3) authority to decide has been delegated to it unlawfully, or (4) it is without competence to deal with a matter by reason of the parties, the area in which the issue arose, the nature of the subject-matter, the value of that subject-matter, or the non-existence of any other prerequisite of a valid adjudication. Excess of jurisdiction is not materially distinguishable from lack of jurisdiction and the expression may be used interchangeably. Where the jurisdiction of tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of, the issue, or as jurisdictional. There is a presumption in construing statutes which confer jurisdiction or discretionary powers on a body, that if that body makes an error of law while purporting to act within that jurisdiction or in exercising those powers, its decision or action will exceed the jurisdiction conferred and will be quashed. The error must be one on which the decision or action depends. An error of law going to jurisdiction may be committed by a body which fails to follow the proper procedure required by law, which takes legally irrelevant considerations into account, or which fails to take relevant considerations into account, or which asks itself and answers the wrong question. The presumption that error of law goes to jurisdiction may be rebutted on the construction of a particular statute, so that the relevant body will not exceed its jurisdiction by going wrong in law. Previously the courts were more likely to find that errors of law were within jurisdiction; but with the modern approach errors of law will be held to fall within a body's jurisdiction only in exceptional cases. The courts will generally assume that their expertise in determining the principles of law applicable in any case has not been excluded by Parliament.(p.120) Errors of law include misinterpretation of statute or any other legal document or a rule of common law; asking oneself and answering the wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations into account or failing to take relevant considerations into account when purporting to apply the law to the facts; admitting inadmissible evidence or rejecting admissible and relevant evidence; exercising a discretion on the basis of incorrect legal principles; giving reasons which disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are inadequate to fulfil an express duly to give reasons and misdirecting oneself as to the burden of proof.(pp.121-122). 337. H.W.R.Wade and C.F.Forsyth in their book-Administrative Law 7th Edn.(1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior courts over subordinate courts and tribunals under the head 'jurisdiction over Fact and Law' in Chapter 9, pp.284 to 320. 337. H.W.R.Wade and C.F.Forsyth in their book-Administrative Law 7th Edn.(1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior courts over subordinate courts and tribunals under the head 'jurisdiction over Fact and Law' in Chapter 9, pp.284 to 320. The decisions before Anisminic and those in the post-Anisminic period have been discussed in detail. At pp.319-320, the authors give the Summary of Rules thus: 'Jurisdiction over fact and law: Summary At the end of a chapter which is top-heavy with obsolescent material it may be useful to summarise the position as shortly as possible. The overall picture is of an expanding system struggling to free itself from the trammels of classical doctrines laid down in the past. It is not safe to say that the classical doctrines are wholly absolute and that the broad and simple principles of review, which clearly now commend themselves to the judiciary, will entirely supplant them. A summary can therefore only state the long-established rules together with the simpler and broader rules which have now superseded them, much for the benefit of the law. Together they are as follows: Errors of fact Old rule: The court would quash only if the erroneous fact was jurisdictional. New rule: The court will quash if an erroneous and decisive fact was - (a) jurisdictional (b) found on the basis of no evidence; or (c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored. Errors of law Old rule: The court would quash only if the error was - (a) jurisdictional (b) on the face of the record. New rule: The court will quash for any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictional. (ix) In Arun Kumar v. Union of India [ (2007) 1 SCC 732 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 74, 80 to 84, held as follows: "74. A "jurisdictional fact" is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency's power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency's power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. ....... 80. The Court relied upon a decision in White & Collins v. Minister of Health (1939) 2 KB 838 : 108 LJ KB 768, wherein a question debated was whether the court had jurisdiction to review the finding of administrative authority on a question of fact. The relevant Act enabled the local authority to acquire land compulsorily for housing of working classes. But it was expressly provided that no land could be acquired which at the date of compulsory purchase formed part of park, garden or pleasure-ground. An order of compulsory purchase was made which was challenged by the owner contending that the land was a part of park. The Minister directed public inquiry and on the basis of the report submitted, confirmed the order. 81. Interfering with the finding of the Minister and setting aside the order, the Court of Appeal stated: "The first and the most important matter to bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to make the order is dependent on a finding of fact; for, unless the land can be held not to be part of a park or not to be required for amenity or convenience, there is no jurisdiction in the borough council to make, or in the Minister to confirm, the order. In such a case it seems almost self-evident that the Court which has to consider whether there is jurisdiction to make or confirm the order must be entitled to review the vital finding on which the existence of the jurisdiction relied upon depends. If this were not so, the right to apply to the Court would be illusory." [See also Rex v. Shoredich Assessment Committee; (1910) 2 KB 859 : 80 LJ KB 185]. 82. A question under the Income Tax Act, 1922 arose in Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur, (1973) 1 SCC 633 : AIR 1973 SC 1362 . If this were not so, the right to apply to the Court would be illusory." [See also Rex v. Shoredich Assessment Committee; (1910) 2 KB 859 : 80 LJ KB 185]. 82. A question under the Income Tax Act, 1922 arose in Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur, (1973) 1 SCC 633 : AIR 1973 SC 1362 . In that case, the ITO directed X to pay certain amount of tax rejecting the contention of X that he was not a non-resident firm. The Tribunal confirmed the order. A single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad held X as non-resident firm and not liable to deduct tax at source. The Division Bench, however, set aside the order observing thus: "ITO had jurisdiction to decide the question either way. It cannot be said that the Officer assumed jurisdiction by a wrong decision on this question of residence". X approached this Court. 83. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Division Bench, this Court stated: "The Appellate Bench appears to have been under the impression that the Income-tax Officer was the sole judge of the fact whether the firm in question was resident or nonresident. This conclusion, in our opinion, is wholly wrong. No authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assesses was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. It is incomprehensible to think that a quasi- judicial authority like the Income-tax Officer can erroneously decide a jurisdictional fact and thereafter proceed to impose a levy on a citizen." (emphasis supplied) 84. From the above decisions, it is clear that existence of 'jurisdictional fact' is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. From the above decisions, it is clear that existence of 'jurisdictional fact' is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of 'jurisdictional fact', it can decide the 'fact in issue' or 'adjudicatory fact'. A wrong decision on 'fact in issue' or on 'adjudicatory fact' would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present." (x) In Carona Ltd v. M/s. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 559, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph Nos. 21 to 24 and 31, held thus:- 21. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority depends can be said to be a 'jurisdictional fact'. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. 22. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol. 1, para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol. 1(1), para 68, pp. 114-15, it has been stated: "Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not conclusive". 23. The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal. JURISDICTIONAL FACT AND ADJUDICATORY FACT 24. But there is distinction between 'jurisdictional fact' and 'adjudicatory fact' which cannot be ignored. 23. The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal. JURISDICTIONAL FACT AND ADJUDICATORY FACT 24. But there is distinction between 'jurisdictional fact' and 'adjudicatory fact' which cannot be ignored. An 'adjudicatory fact' is a 'fact in issue' and can be determined by a Court, Tribunal or Authority on 'merits', on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. It is no doubt true that it is very difficult to distinguish 'jurisdictional fact' and 'fact in issue' or 'adjudicatory fact'. Nonetheless the difference between the two cannot be overlooked. ............. 31. It is thus clear that for assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or a Tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the Court or Tribunal has power to decide adjudicatory facts or facts in issue.” (xi) In Harpal Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2007) 13 SCC 387 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under; “9. At this stage it will be useful to refer to the dictionary meaning of the word 'Jurisdiction': Black's Law Dictionary: "Court's power to decide a case or issue a decree". Words and Phrases -Legally defined -Third Edition (p.497) : "By 'jurisdiction' is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by the statute, charter, or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which the particular court has cognizance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction extends." Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar - 2nd Edn. Reprint 2000 : "An authority or power, which a man has to do justice in causes of complaint brought before him (Tomlin's Law Dic). The power to hear and determine the particular case involved; the power of a Court or a judge to entertain an action, petition, or other proceeding; the legal power of hearing and determining controversies. Reprint 2000 : "An authority or power, which a man has to do justice in causes of complaint brought before him (Tomlin's Law Dic). The power to hear and determine the particular case involved; the power of a Court or a judge to entertain an action, petition, or other proceeding; the legal power of hearing and determining controversies. As applied to a particular claim or controversy, jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the controversy. Jurisdiction, therefore, means the authority or power to entertain, hear and decide a case and to do justice in the case and determine the controversy. In absence of jurisdiction the court has no power to hear and decide the matter and the order passed by it would be a nullity.” (xii) In Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 68 to 70, held as under:- "68. A 'jurisdictional fact' is one on existence of which depends jurisdiction of a Court, Tribunal or an Authority. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court or Tribunal cannot act. If an inferior Court or Tribunal wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, a writ of certiorari lies. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess. 69. The counsel referred to a recent decision of this Court in Arun Kumar v. Union of India. Speaking for the Court, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) observed as under: (SCC p.758, para 74) "74. A 'jurisdictional fact' is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency's power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses". It was further observed: (SCC p.759, para 76) 76. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses". It was further observed: (SCC p.759, para 76) 76. "The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or condition precedent for the exercise of power by a court of limited jurisdiction". 70. Drawing the distinction between 'jurisdictional fact' and 'adjudicatory fact', the Court stated: (Arun Kumar case, SCC p.761, para 84) "84.... it is clear that existence of 'jurisdictional fact' is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of 'jurisdictional fact', it can decide the 'fact in issue' or 'adjudicatory fact'. A wrong decision on 'fact in issue' or on 'adjudicatory fact' would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present". The principle was reiterated in Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Others, (2007) 1 SCC 559." 47. Giving due consideration to the pleadings, submissions, provisions of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and the decisions, extracted above, we find that there are no materials to substantiate the fact that Kerala State Human Rights Commission has committed any jurisdictional error in entertaining the complaint HRMP No.1641/2014 and erroneously adjudicated the issues raised therein. Contention of the petitioner that there is lack of jurisdiction is rejected. 48. Though Mr. Manu Srinath, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed strong reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, first of all we state that the decision of the learned Single Judge is not binding on us. 49. Though persuasive, on facts, the same is inapposite to the case on hand, for the reason that the complaint inquired into by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission has already ended in Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 in HRMP No.1641/2014, whereas, the private complaint before the learned Magistrate appears to have been taken cognizance of, long after the disposal of the complaint. A subsequent decision by a learned Magistrate, in a trial into the commission of the offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, would not upset the action taken by the Human Rights Commission, in accordance with law. 50. As per section 18 (e) of the Protection Of Human Rights Act 1993, the State Government is obligated to send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission. Though in the case on hand, the Commission has not fixed any time limit to the State Government to forward its comments on the inquiry report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken to the Commission, it cannot be said that the Commission is powerless to proceed further. If the Government does not respond to forward the comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken, the Commission may take such other action as it may deem fit. 51. Though the Commission's report is only recommendatory in nature, considering the violation of human rights, finally found against the petitioner and another, the Government cannot be said to be mute spectator to the verdict of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. The State Government has an obligation to consider the recommendation of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission and to act upon the same by forwarding their comments. If the Government decides to accept the recommendation of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, then a copy of the report should be served on the public servant, calling upon his explanation. If the Government does not accept the recommendation, then also the Government should forward its comments to the Commission. In the case on hand, it appeared that the Government had not chosen to do either. 52. Purpose of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is to conduct inquiry or investigation by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, either suo motu or on complaint into the violation of human rights or prevention of violation of human rights. 53. In the case on hand, it appeared that the Government had not chosen to do either. 52. Purpose of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is to conduct inquiry or investigation by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, either suo motu or on complaint into the violation of human rights or prevention of violation of human rights. 53. On the aspect as to why National Human Rights Commission (in the case on hand State Human Rights Commission), has been constituted and on the meaning of the words “human rights”, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Deo Chauhan v. Bani Kanta Das, [ (2010) 14 SCC 209 ] held thus: “41. The NHRC has been constituted to inquire into cases of violation of and for protection and promotion of human rights. This power is an extensive one, which should not be narrowly viewed. It must be jurisprudentially accepted that human right is a broad concept and cannot be straitjacketed within narrow confines. Any attempt to do so would truncate its all-embracing scope and reach, and denude it of its vigour and vitality. That is why, in seeking to define human rights, the Legislature has used such a wide expression in section 2(d) of the Act. It is also significant to note that while defining the powers and functions of NHRC under section 12 of the Act, the said broad vision has been envisioned in the residuary clause in Section 12(j). 42. Therefore, it is imperative that while interpreting the powers and jurisdiction of NHRC, the Court construes section 2(d) of the 1993 Act along with its long title and also the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act. The relevant portion of the statement of objects and reasons are excerpted below: "2. However, there has been growing concern in the country and abroad about issues relating to human rights. Having regard to this, changing social realities and the emerging trends in the nature of crime and violence, Government has been reviewing the existing laws, procedures, and system of administration of justice; with a view to bringing about greater accountability and transparency in them, and devising efficient and effective methods of dealing with the situation." 43. Having regard to this, changing social realities and the emerging trends in the nature of crime and violence, Government has been reviewing the existing laws, procedures, and system of administration of justice; with a view to bringing about greater accountability and transparency in them, and devising efficient and effective methods of dealing with the situation." 43. In his Tagore Law Lecture (The Dialectics and Dynamics of Human Rights in India), Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer describes the width and sweep of human rights in his matchless words and which are worth quoting: "Human rights are writ on a large canvas, as large as the sky. The law makers, lawyers and particularly, the judges, must make the printed text vibrant with human values, not be scared of consequences on the status quo order. The militant challenges of today need a mobilization of revolutionary consciousness sans which civilized systems cease to exist. Remember, we are all active navigators, not idle passengers, on spaceship earth as it ascends to celestial levels of the glorious human future." 44. We share the same view. 45. What was said by Alexander Hamilton, the great constitutional expert and political philosopher, way back in 1775, is poignant still today for having a clear perception of what human rights are. The words of Hamilton still resonate with a strange relevance and immediacy, and are quoted below: "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself; and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." 46. Keeping those broad principles in our mind if we look at Section 12(j) of the 1993 Act, we find that it confers on NHRC "such other functions as it may consider necessary for the promotion of human rights." It is not necessary that each and every case relating to the violation of human rights will fit squarely within the four corners of section 12 of the 1993 Act, for invoking the jurisdiction of the NHRC. One must accept that human rights are not like edicts inscribed on a rock. They are made and unmade on the crucible of experience and through irreversible process of human struggle for freedom. They admit of a certain degree of fluidity. One must accept that human rights are not like edicts inscribed on a rock. They are made and unmade on the crucible of experience and through irreversible process of human struggle for freedom. They admit of a certain degree of fluidity. Categories of human rights, being of infinite variety, are never really closed. That is why the residuary clause in subsection (j) has been so widely worded to take care of situations not covered by sub-sections (a) to (i) of Section 12 of the 1993 Act. 47. The jurisdiction of NHRC thus stands enlarged by section 12(j) of the 1993 Act, to take necessary action for the protection of human rights. Such action would include inquiring into cases where a party has been denied the protection of any law to which he is entitled, whether by a private party, a public institution, the government or even the Courts of law. We are of the opinion that if a person is entitled to benefit under a particular law, and benefits under that law have been denied to him, it will amount to a violation of his human rights. 48. Human rights are the basic, inherent, immutable and inalienable rights to which a person is entitled simply by virtue of his being born a human. They are such rights which are to be made available as a matter of right. Constitution and Legislation of civilized country recognize them since they are so quintessentially part of every human being. That is why every democratic country committed to rule of Law put into force mechanisms for their enforcement and protection. 49. Human rights are universal in nature. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as UDHR) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948 recognizes and requires the observance of certain universal rights, articulated therein, to be human rights, and these are acknowledged and accepted as equal and inalienable and necessary for the inherent dignity and development of an individual. Consequently, though the term 'human rights' itself has not been defined in UDHR, the nature and content of human rights can be understood from the rights enunciated therein. 50. Consequently, though the term 'human rights' itself has not been defined in UDHR, the nature and content of human rights can be understood from the rights enunciated therein. 50. Possibly considering the wide sweep of such basic rights, the definition of 'human rights' in the 1993 Act has been designedly kept very broad to encompass within it all the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India. Thus, if a person has been guaranteed certain rights either under the Constitution or under an International Covenant or under a law, and he is denied access to such a right, then it amounts to a clear violation of his human right and NHRC has the jurisdiction to intervene for protecting it.” 54. In the light of the above, the report of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission cannot be simply ignored by respondents 5 to 7. As per Section 18(e) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, they are bound to act. 55. One of the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the recommendation of Kerala State Human Rights Commission amounts to double jeopardy. Let us consider as to what “double jeopardy” means as hereunder: “(i) Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, 1949 reads thus: “20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.- (1) xxxx (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once (3) xxxx” (ii) Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 reads as under: “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.-(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub- section (2) thereof. (2) xxxx (3) xxxx (4) xxxx (5) xxxx (6) xxxx (iii) Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads thus: “26. (2) xxxx (3) xxxx (4) xxxx (5) xxxx (6) xxxx (iii) Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads thus: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.—Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” (iv) As per Black's Laws Dictionary, Ninth Edition, p.564, double jeopardy means the fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense. Double jeopardy is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. In 2005, the United Kingdom abolished the rule for certain serious offenses, such as murder and hijacking. A court may quash an acquittal and order a retrial if new and compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt is discovered, and the evidence was not available before the acquittal. Only one retrial is allowed. Double jeopardy clause means that the Fifth Amendment provision stating, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”. The clause, which was ratified in 1791, does not prevent postacquittal appeals by the government if those appeals could not result in the defendant's being subjected to a second trial for substantially the same offense before a second fact-trier. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.C.T. 1013 (1975). (v) As per Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fifteenth Edition, Jeopardy means the risk of conviction and punishment that a criminal defendant facts at trial. Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled, and in a Bench trial when the first witness is sworn. Also termed legal jeopardy, Back;'s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p.839. Double is the subjection of an accused person to repeated trial for the same alleged offence, Dictionary of Political Science, Joseph Dunner 1965, p.154. In India, no person can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Durga Das Basu, Vol. D, 6th Edition, p. 14. [Constitution of India, Art.20(2)] (vi) According to Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., P.810, 'prosecution' means a proceeding either by way of indictment or information., in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender upon his trial. In all criminal prosecutions the King is nominally the prosecutor. D, 6th Edition, p. 14. [Constitution of India, Art.20(2)] (vi) According to Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., P.810, 'prosecution' means a proceeding either by way of indictment or information., in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender upon his trial. In all criminal prosecutions the King is nominally the prosecutor. This very question was discussed in the case of Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ( AIR 1953 SC 325 ), with of reference to the context in which the word 'prosecution' occurred in Art. 20. In the course of discussion in the judgment, the following observations, which apply with full force to the present case, were made: '.......and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure.' (vii) As per the Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, Double jeopardy means, the Constitutional protection given in Article 20(2) is that “no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” Although words like “before a Court of law or judicial tribunal” do not appear in the Article, as they are invoked in the British practice and USA Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the proceedings contemplated in Article 20 are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a Court of law or a judicial tribunal, which do not include customs authorities. A second prosecution after a first trial for the same offence. The fifth amendment of the American Constitution provides inter alia “Nor shall any person be subjected for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb.” Applicability of the principle of 'Double jeopardy' to administrative matters considered. Mohindar Pratap Singh v. Director Health Services, AIR 1956 Pun 81, 82 [Constitution of India, Art. 20(2)] (viii) In S.A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors. [ AIR 1954 SC 375 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: 5. Mohindar Pratap Singh v. Director Health Services, AIR 1956 Pun 81, 82 [Constitution of India, Art. 20(2)] (viii) In S.A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India (UOI) and Ors. [ AIR 1954 SC 375 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: 5. Although these were the materials which former the background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of the guarantee, as this court pointed out in the case referred to above, are much narrower than those of the common law rule in England or the doctrine of "double jeopardy" in the American Constitution. Article 20(2) of our Constitution, it is to be noted, does not contain the principle of "autrefois acquit" at all. It seems that our Constitution makers did not think it necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the level of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from legislative interference. This has been left to be regulated by the general law of the land. In order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of article 20 of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words "prosecuted and punished" are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted. The position is also different under the American Constitution. There the prohibition is not against a second punishment but against the peril in which a person may be placed by reason of a valid indictment being presented against him, before a competent court, followed by proper arraignment and plea and a lawful paneling of the jury. It is not necessary to have a verdict at all (Vide Wills on Constitutional Law, p. 528.). (ix) In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in (2012) 7 SCC 621 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: “9. The sole issue raised in this appeal is regarding the scope and application of the doctrine of double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. The manifestation of this rule is to be found contained in Section 300 CrPC; Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 71 IPC. 13. The rule against double jeopardy provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. The manifestation of this rule is to be found contained in Section 300 CrPC; Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 71 IPC. 13. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1953 SC 325 ], the Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the issue wherein the central issue arose in the context of the fact that a person who had arrived at an Indian airport from abroad on being searched was found in possession of gold in contravention of the relevant notification, prohibiting the import of gold. Action was taken against him by the Customs Authorities and the gold seized from his possession was confiscated. Later on, a prosecution was launched against him in the criminal court at Bombay charging him with having committed the offence under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (hereinafter called “the FERA”) read with the relevant notification. In the background of these facts, the plea of autrefois acquit was raised seeking protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter called “the Constitution”). 14. This Court in Maqbool Hussain held that the fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of “autrefois convict” or “double jeopardy” i.e. a person must not be put in per il twice for the same offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient maxim nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto, that is to say, that no one ought to be punished twice for one offence. The plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter. 15. A plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter. 15. The Constitution Bench of this Court in S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India [ AIR 1954 SC 375 ] explained the scope of doctrine of double jeopardy, observing that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words “prosecuted” and “punished” are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must coexist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted.” 16. In Om Parkash Gupta v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1957 SC 458 ] and State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri [ AIR 1957 SC 592 ] this Court has held that the prosecution and conviction or acquittal under Section 409 IPC do not debar trial of the accused on a charge under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 because the two offences are not identical in sense, import and content. 17. In Leo Roy Frey v. Supt., District Jail, proceedings were taken against certain persons in the first instance before the Customs Authorities under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act and heavy personal penalties were imposed on them. Thereafter, they were charged for an offence under Section 120-B IPC. This Court held that an offence under Section 120-B IPC is not the same offence as that under the Sea Customs Act: (AIR p. 121, para 4) “4. … The offence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of the crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. They are, therefore, quite separate offences.” (emphasis added) 18. In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte [ AIR 1961 SC 578 ], the Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, held: (AIR pp. 581 & 583, paras 13 & 16) “13. They are, therefore, quite separate offences.” (emphasis added) 18. In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte [ AIR 1961 SC 578 ], the Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, held: (AIR pp. 581 & 583, paras 13 & 16) “13. To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for “the same offence”. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the article is that the offences are the same i.e. they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out. * * * 16. The next point to be considered is as regards the scope of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to “the act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments”, the emphasis is not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion of the section which refers to “shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence”. If the offences are not the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked.” (emphasis added) 19. In Roshan Lal v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1965 SC 1413 ], the accused had caused disappearance of the evidence of two offences under Sections 330 and 348 IPC and, therefore, he was alleged to have committed two separate offences under Section 201 IPC. It was held that neither Section 71 IPC nor Section 26 of the General Clauses Act came to the rescue of the accused and the accused was liable to be convicted for two sets of offences under Section 201 IPC, though it would be appropriate not to pass two separate sentences. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Kharkan v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1965 SC 83 ] 20. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Kharkan v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1965 SC 83 ] 20. In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1965 SC 682 ], while dealing with the issue, this Court held: (AIR pp. 688-89, paras 11-12) “11. … The previous case in which this accused was convicted was in regard to a conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds of the Jupiter and that case was finally disposed of by this Court in Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1957 SC 747 ]. Therein it was found that Caveeshar was a party to the conspiracy and also a party to the fraudulent transactions entered into by the Jupiter in his favour. The present case relates to a different conspiracy altogether. The conspiracy in question was to lift the funds of the Empire, though its object was to cover up the fraud committed in respect of the Jupiter. Therefore, it may be that the defalcations made in Jupiter may afford a motive for the new conspiracy, but the two offences are distinct ones. Some accused may be common to both of them, some of the facts proved to establish the Jupiter conspiracy may also have to be proved to support the motive for the second conspiracy. The question is whether that in itself would be sufficient to make the two conspiracies the one and the same offence. 12. … The two conspiracies are distinct offences. It cannot even be said that some of the ingredients of both the conspiracies ar e the same. The facts constituting the Jupiter conspiracy are not the ingredients of the offence of the Empire conspiracy, but only afford a motive for the latter offence. Motive is not an ingredient of an offence. The proof of motive helps a court in coming to a correct conclusion when there is no direct evidence. Where there is direct evidence for implicating an accused in an offence, the absence of proof of motive is not material. The ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they do not form the same offence within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that article has no relevance to the present case.” (emphasis added) 21. The ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they do not form the same offence within the meaning of Article 20(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, that article has no relevance to the present case.” (emphasis added) 21. In State of A.P. v. Kokkiliagada Meerayya [ (1969) 1 SCC 161 ] this Court while having regard to Section 403 CrPC, 1898, held: (SCC pp. 163- 64, para 6) “6. The following important rules emerge from the terms of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: (1) An order of conviction or acquittal in respect of any offence constituted by any act against or in favour of a person does not prohibit a trial for any other offence constituted by the same act which he may have committed, if the court trying the first offence was incompetent to try that other offence. (2) If in the course of a transaction several offences are committed for which separate charges could have been made, but if a person is tried in respect of some of those charges, and not all, and is acquitted or convicted, he may be tried for any distinct offence for which at the former trial a separate charge may have been, but was not, made. (3) If a person is convicted of any offence constituted by any act, and that act together with the consequences which resulted therefrom constituted a different offence, he may again be tried for that different offence arising out of the consequences, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and has been either convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence or for any other offence arising out of the same facts, for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made or for which he might have been convicted under the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) 23. This Court has time and again explained the principle of issue estoppel in a criminal trial observing that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence. This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial. Thus, the rule relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court in a previous trial on a factual issue. (Vide Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 415 , Manipur Admn. v. Thokchom Bira Singh AIR 1965 SC 87 , Workmen v. Gujarat Electricity Board (1969) 1 SCC 266 and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787 .) 24. In V.K. Agarwal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia [ (1988) 3 SCC 467 ] wherein the accused were prosecuted under the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as “the Customs Act”) and subsequently under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, [hereinafter called as “the Gold (Control) Act”] it was held that: (SCC p. 474, para 7) “7. … the ingredients of the two offences are different in scope and content. The facts constituting the offence under the Customs Act are different and are not sufficient to justify the conviction under the Gold (Control) Act.” (emphasis in original) It was held that what was necessary is to analyse the ingredients of the two offences and not the allegations made in the two complaints. 25. In P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons v. Director of Enforcement 1993 Supp (2) SCC 724 it was held: (SCC p. 732, para 11) “11. 25. In P.V. Mohammad Barmay Sons v. Director of Enforcement 1993 Supp (2) SCC 724 it was held: (SCC p. 732, para 11) “11. The further contention that under the Customs Act, 1962 for the selfsame contravention, the penalty proceedings terminated in favour of the appellant, is of little avail to the appellant for the reasons that the two Acts operate in different fields, one for contravention of FERA and the second for evasion of [excise] duty. The mere fact that the penalty proceedings for evasion of the [excise] duty had ended in favour of the appellant, does not take away the jurisdiction of the enforcement authorities under the Act to impose the penalty in question. The doctrine of double jeopardy has no application.” (See also State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655, Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman (1991) 4 SCC 109 , State of T.N. v. Thiru K.S. Murugesan (1995) 3 SCC 273 and State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh (2001) 9 SCC 212 . 26. In A.A. Mulla v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 11 SCC 606 the appellants were charged under Section 409 IPC and Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for making false panchnama disclosing recovery of 90 gold biscuits on 21-9-1969 although according to the prosecution case the appellants had recovered 99 gold biscuits. The appellants were tried for the same and acquitted. The appellants were also tried for the offence under Section 120-B IPC, Sections 135 and 136 of the Customs Act, Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act and Section 23(1-A) of FERA and Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The appellants filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate contending that on the selfsame facts they could not be tried for the second time in view of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 300 CrPC). 27. This Court held: (A.A. Mulla case (1996) 11 SCC 606 , SCC pp. 613-14, para 22) “22. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the ingredients of the offences for which the appellants were charged in the first trial are entirely different. 613-14, para 22) “22. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the ingredients of the offences for which the appellants were charged in the first trial are entirely different. The second trial with which we are concerned in this appeal, envisages a different fact situation and the enquiry for finding out facts constituting offences under the Customs Act and the Gold (Control) Act in the second trial is of a different nature. … Not only the ingredients of offences in the previous and the second trial are different, the factual foundation of the first trial and such foundation for the second trial is also not indented (sic). Accordingly, the second trial was not barred under Section 403 CrPC of 1898 as alleged by the appellants.” (emphasis added) 28. In Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Sarkar (2001) 3 SCC 414 , this Court considered the argument that if the punishment had already been imposed for court-martial proceedings, the proceedings under the Central Rules dealing with disciplinary aspect and misconduct cannot be held as it would amount to double jeopardy violating the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The Court explained that the court-martial proceedings deal with the penal aspect of the misconduct while the proceedings under the Central Rules deal with the disciplinary aspect of the misconduct. The two proceedings do not overlap at all and, therefore, there was no question of attracting the doctrine of double jeopardy. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in R. Viswan v. Union of India reported in (1983) 2 SCC 401. 29. In Union of India v. P.D. Yadav (2002) 1 SCC 405, this Court dealt with the issue of double jeopardy in a case where the pension of the official, who stood convicted by a Court Martial, had been forfeited. The Court held: (SCC p. 425, para 25) “25. … This principle is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari, (si constat curiae quod sit) pro una et eadem causa meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double jeopardy is a protection against prosecution twice for the same offence. … This principle is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari, (si constat curiae quod sit) pro una et eadem causa meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double jeopardy is a protection against prosecution twice for the same offence. Under Articles 20-22 of the Indian Constitution, provisions are made relating to personal liberty of citizens and others. … Offences such as criminal breach of trust, misappropriation, cheating, defamation, etc., may give rise to prosecution on criminal side and also for action in civil court/other forum for recovery of money by way of damages, etc., unless there is a bar created by law. In the proceedings before General Court Martial, a person is tried for an offence of misconduct and whereas in passing order under Regulation 16(a) for forfeiting pension, a person is not tried for the same offence of misconduct after the punishment is imposed for a proven misconduct by the General Court Martial resulting in cashiering, dismissing or removing from service. Only further action is taken under Regulation 16(a) in relation to forfeiture of pension. Thus, punishing a person under Section 71 of the Army Act and making order under Regulation 16(a) are entirely different. Hence, there is no question of applying principle of double jeopardy to the present cases.” 30. In State of Rajasthan v. Hat Singh (2003) 2 SCC 152, this Court held that as the offence of glorification of Sati under Section 5 of the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, is different from the offence of violation of prohibitory order issued under Section 6 thereof, the doctrine of double jeopardy was not attracted for the reason that even if the prohibitory order is promulgated, a subsequent criminal act even if it falls under Section 5 could not be covered under Section 6(3) of the said Act. Doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 300 CrPC and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Both the provisions employ the expression “same offence”. 31. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh (2003) 3 SCC 362 , observing that there may be cases of misappropriation, cheating, defamation, etc. Doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in Section 300 CrPC and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Both the provisions employ the expression “same offence”. 31. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh (2003) 3 SCC 362 , observing that there may be cases of misappropriation, cheating, defamation, etc. which may give rise to prosecution on criminal side and also for action in civil court/other forum for recovery of money by way of damages, etc. Therefore, it is not always necessary that in every such case the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution may be attracted. 32. In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, (2003) 5 SCC 257 this Court while considering the case for quashing the criminal prosecution for evading the customs duty, where the matter stood settled under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, observed that once the tax matter was settled under the said Scheme, the offence stood compounded, and prosecution for evasion of duty, in such a circumstance, would amount to double jeopardy. 33. In view of the above, the law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section 300 CrPC or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, the ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing the offence cannot be termed as the ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge. 34. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 while dealing with the proceedings under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, this Court quashed the proceedings (by a majority of 2:1) under Section 56 of the said Act because adjudication under Section 51 stood finalised. This Court held: (SCC p. 598, para 38) “38. 34. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 while dealing with the proceedings under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, this Court quashed the proceedings (by a majority of 2:1) under Section 56 of the said Act because adjudication under Section 51 stood finalised. This Court held: (SCC p. 598, para 38) “38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows: (i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously; (ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution; (iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other; (iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution; (v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and (vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.” The ratio of the aforesaid judgment is not applicable in this case for the reason that the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are still sub judice as the appeal is pending and the matter has not attained finality 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance on the judgment in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 wherein during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, prosecution under Sections 406/420 IPC had been launched. This Court quashed the criminal proceedings under Sections 406/420 IPC, observing that it would amount to the abuse of process of law. In fact, the issue as to whether the ingredients of both the offences were same, had neither been raised nor decided. This Court quashed the criminal proceedings under Sections 406/420 IPC, observing that it would amount to the abuse of process of law. In fact, the issue as to whether the ingredients of both the offences were same, had neither been raised nor decided. Therefore, the ratio of that judgment does not have application on the facts of this case. 36. Same remained the position so far as the judgment in Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao, (2011) 2 SCC 703 is concerned. It has been held therein that once the conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act has been recorded, the question of trying the same person under Section 420 IPC or any other provisions of IPC or any other statute is not permissible being hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300(1) Cr.PC.” (x) In State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI v. Lalu Prasad and Ors. (2017) 8 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: 40.8 In Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2011) 1 SCC 284 this Court considered the meaning of the expression "same offence" employed in Article 20(2) and observed that second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the Rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. This Court has observed thus: 26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 20(2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited Under Article 20(2) is, that the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the Rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. .... x x x x x 29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence. 40.11 In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjay etc. (2014) 9 SCC 772 this Court considered the maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" i.e. no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. 40.11 In State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjay etc. (2014) 9 SCC 772 this Court considered the maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" i.e. no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. In case ingredients are different there can be separate trial for the same offence also. This Court has laid down thus: 52. It is well known principle that the Rule against double jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct. 44. It is apparent from the aforesaid decision that this Court did not consider various provisions and question of double jeopardy did not arise for consideration. It was held in the facts that there was no prejudice to the Accused persons. There was no misjoinder of the charges. On facts the case has no application and cannot be said to be an authority on Article 20 of the Constitution and Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure. 59. With respect to issue of estoppel in R. v. Humphrys (1976) 2 AER 497, Humphrys had previously been acquitted on a charge of driving a motorcycle whilst being disqualified to do so. During his trial he testified that he hadn't at all driven a motorcycle during that year and he was acquitted. Later, it was found that he had lied leading to a charge of perjury. Their Lordships were then faced with two broad issues: first, whether issue estoppel operated in criminal proceedings; second, even if issue estoppel was not recognised by the criminal law, was the bringing of a charge of perjury prevented by the generality of the double jeopardy doctrine? On the first issue, the one that was being addressed there, the House was unequivocal in its view that issue estoppel had no place in criminal proceedings. 60. On the first issue, the one that was being addressed there, the House was unequivocal in its view that issue estoppel had no place in criminal proceedings. 60. In Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh (2013) 9 SCC 245 , the Appellant had come up in appeal against the High Court order dismissing his application for quashing of criminal proceedings initiated by R-1 under SC, ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The dispute was over some agricultural land in Delhi over which multiple FIRs. and writs were filed. Counsel for the Appellant pleaded on the grounds of issue estoppel stating that the issue had already been settled by the High Court. While allowing the appeal, this Court then drew a distinction between 'issue-estoppel' and 'double jeopardy' holding the former not to be a bar on a second proceeding but merely acting as estoppel qua prior findings. (xi) In Union of India (UOI) v. Purushottam [ (2015) 3 SCC 779 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “8. We shall forthwith analyse the concept of double jeopardy, especially in the backdrop of Constitutions of countries spanning our globe. 8.1 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution promises that - "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." This protection has been construed as admitting of three facets: i) Autrefois Acquit ii) Autrefois Convict iii) Protection against multiple punishments. We shall be referring briefly to John Hudson v. United States 522 US 93 (1997) where the U.S. Supreme Court has delineated on what the parameters of double jeopardy. 8.2 Second, Article 35(3)(m) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) provides that a person is "not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted". 8.2 Second, Article 35(3)(m) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) provides that a person is "not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted". 8.3 Third, Section 11(h) of the Charter of Rights of the Canadian Constitution provides that any person charged with an offence has the right "if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again". 8.4 Fourth, Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) states: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country". 8.5 Fifth, Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, reads thus- “Protection against double punishment and self incrimination-No person-(a) shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once; or (b) shall, when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 10. The Constitution of India charters a contrasting course in the context of incorporation of the doctrine of double jeopardy in that Article 20(2) postulates that- "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." This variance from constitutional protections given in other countries has prompted us to sift through the 'Debates of the Constituent Assembly' so as to ascertain whether autrefois convict in preference to the more preponderant autrefois acquit, was the position intended to be ordained by the drafters of our Constitution. These Debates bear witness to the fact that it was indeed meditated and intended. The original proposal was-"No person shall be punished for the same offence more than once". A proposed amendment whereby the words "otherwise than as proposed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898," was sought to be added, but was roundly rejected. The suggestion made by Shri Naziruddin Ahmad was that "the principle should be that a man cannot be tried again, tried twice, if he is acquitted or convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, while the conviction or acquittal stands effective... A man acquitted shall also not be liable to be tried again." (2nd December, 1948). The suggestion made by Shri Naziruddin Ahmad was that "the principle should be that a man cannot be tried again, tried twice, if he is acquitted or convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, while the conviction or acquittal stands effective... A man acquitted shall also not be liable to be tried again." (2nd December, 1948). On the next day, the extracted intervention of Shri T.T. Krishnamachari was accepted, sounding the death knell for 'autrefois acquit' and leading to Article 20(2) as it stands today. Shri T.T. Krishnamachari (Madras: General) “Mr. Vice-President, Sir, the point I have to place before the House happens to be a comparatively narrow one. In this Article 14, Clause (2) reads thus: 'No person shall be punished for the same offence more than once'. It has been pointed out to me by more Members of this House that this might probably affect cases where, as in the case of an official of Government who has been dealt with departmentally and punishment has been inflicted, he cannot again be prosecuted and punished if he had committed a criminal offence; or, per contra, if a Government official had been prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment or fine by a court, it might preclude the Government from taking disciplinary action against him. Though the point is a narrow one and one which is capable of interpretation whether this provision in this particular clause in the Fundamental Rights will affect the discretion of Government acting under the rules of conduct and discipline in regard to its own officers, I think, when we are putting a ban on a particular type of action, it is better to make the point more clear. I recognise that I am rather late now to move an amendment. What I would like to do is to word the clause thus: 'No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once." If my Honourable Friend Dr. Ambedkar will accept the addition of the words 'prosecuted and' before the word 'punished' and if you, Sir, and the House will give him permission to do so, it will not merely be a wise thing to do but it will save a lot of trouble for the Governments of the future. That is the suggestion I venture to place before the House. That is the suggestion I venture to place before the House. It is for the House to deal with it in whatever manner it deems fit.” 11. It would be relevant to mention that modern jurisprudence is presently partial to the perusal of Parliamentary Debates in the context of interpreting statutory provisions, although earlier this exercise was looked upon askance. Suffice it to mention the analysis of the Constitution Bench in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) 2 SCC 183 and in Haldiram Bhujiawala v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar (2000) 3 SCC 250 ; and particularly Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 8 SCC 191 , where Parliamentary Debates were studied by this Court. It appears to be beyond debate that the framers of our Constitution were fully alive to the differing and disparate concepts of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and consciously chose to circumscribe the doctrine of double jeopardy only to prosecution culminating in a conviction. This facet of the law has already been carefully considered by the Constitution Bench in Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay 1953 SCR 730 , and we cannot do better than extract the relevant portions therefrom: “7. The fundamental right which is guaranteed in Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of "autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy". The roots of that principle are to be found in the well established rule of the common law of England "that where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence". (Per Charles, J. in Reg v. Miles). To the same effect is the ancient maxim "Nimo Bis Debet Puniri pro Uno Delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence or as it is sometimes written "Pro Eadem Causa", that is, for the same cause. 11. These were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of fundamental right given in Article 20(2). 11. These were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of fundamental right given in Article 20(2). It incorporated within its scope the plea of "autrefois convict" as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as known to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. 12. The words "before a court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Article 20(2). But if regard be had to the whole background indicated above it is clear that in order that the protection of Article 20(2) be invoked by a citizen there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute but not required to proceed on legal evidence given on oath. The very wording of Article 20 and the words used therein: "convicted", "commission of the act charged as an offence", "be subjected to a penalty", "commission of the offence", "prosecuted, and punished, accused of any offence, would indicate that the proceedings therein contemplated are of the nature of criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or starting of proceedings of a criminal nature before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure.” 12. Keeping in perspective this exposition of double jeopardy as postulated in our Constitution, the obiter dicta in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655, expressed en passant by the two Judge Bench does not correctly clarify the law, as this view is contrary to the dictum of the Constitution Bench, which was not brought to the notice of the Bench. 13. 13. The US Supreme Court has extensively excogitated over the conundrum as to what constitutes a successive "punishment" for the purposes of attracting Constitutional protection against Double Jeopardy, under the 5th Amendment. The Court, in John Hudson v. United States 522 US 93 (1997), affirmed the distinction between civil punishment and proceedings and criminal punishment and prosecution, and held that the Fifth Amendment proscribes two (or more) successive punishments or prosecutions of a criminal nature only, and permits civil punishment or proceedings either preceding or succeeding a criminal prosecution or punishment. In the case before the U.S. Supreme Court, John Hudson was the Chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon, and used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and Regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in the Federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th Amendment. Overruling United States v. Halper 490 U.S. 436 (1989), wherein the Court had ruled as unconstitutional successive proceedings taking place in similar circumstances to Hudson's case, the Court in Hudson reaffirmed the distinction established between the "civil" and "criminal" nature of the particular successive punishment, in United States v. Ward 448 U.S. 242 (1980). The U.S. Supreme Court thus held in Hudson's case that the Double Jeopardy clause did not preclude his subsequent criminal prosecution, because the OCC administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal. Inter alia, the civil nature of the punishment was ascertained with reference to the money penalties statutes' express designation of their sanctions as "civil". This reference indubitably eases the resolution of the Double Jeopardy question in the present Appeal. As has been detailed earlier, Article 20(2) does not within it imbibe the principle of autrefois acquit. The Fifth Amendment safeguards, inasmuch as it postulates both autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, could have been interpreted to prohibit civil punishment even in the wake of an acquittal in prosecution, but was not found by the U.S. Supreme Court to do so. As has been detailed earlier, Article 20(2) does not within it imbibe the principle of autrefois acquit. The Fifth Amendment safeguards, inasmuch as it postulates both autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, could have been interpreted to prohibit civil punishment even in the wake of an acquittal in prosecution, but was not found by the U.S. Supreme Court to do so. A fortiori Article 20(2), which contemplates "prosecuted and punished" thus evincing the conscious exclusion of autrefois acquit, palpably postulates that the prescribed successive punishment must be of a criminal character. It irresistibly follows that departmental or disciplinary proceedings, even if punitive in amplitude, would not be outlawed by Article 20(2). 17. Although this question also does not arise before us, Section 300 of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may arguably not be in harmony with the Constitution since it contemplates both autrefois acquit and autrefois convict even though a conscious decision had been taken by the Drafters of our Constitution that protection only as regards the latter shall be available. of course, the Code of Criminal Procedure grants much wider protection to the individual and for this reason has understandably not been assailed on the touchstone of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. We must again advert to the speech of Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad, who had reminded the Constituent Assembly of this very position, namely, of the wider parameters of Double Jeopardy enshrined even in the then extant Code of Criminal Procedure, and his pitch for the Constitution to do likewise.” 56. In the case on hand, the petitioner has not been prosecuted twice under the criminal justice system, but on the other hand, the Commission adjudicated on the civil liability of the petitioner and the finding of guilt therein has nothing to do with guilt under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, there is no basis for the contention that petitioner was found guilty twice and punished for the same offence. 57. In the light of the decisions considered and findings rendered above, contentions of the petitioner are rejected. 58. Testing the correctness of Exhibit-P1 order dated 21.05.2015 passed in HRMP No.1641/2014, on the basis of the abovesaid decisions, we find no illegality, irregularity, and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, respondent No.1, to have entertained the complaint and resultantly, the order. In the result, the writ petition fails and accordingly, dismissed.