JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. None of the parties has raised any complaint regarding audio and visual quality. 2. The instant appeal, filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of judicature of High Court at Patna, is directed against the order/judgment dated 11.01.2019 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 4741 of 2008. The appellants being aggrieved with the part of the order pertaining to direction to disburse the salary for the period from 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 directing it to be paid in favour of the writ petitioner has preferred the instant appeal. 3. The brief facts of the case, which are required to be referred herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are hereunder as: The writ petitioner was working under the Bharat Refractories Limited (in short ‘BRL’), a Government of India undertaking incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Indira Gandhi Marg, Sector – IV, Bokaro Steel City, Jharkhand (herein after referred to as the “transferor company”), which was referred to Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction ( in short “BIFR”) in the year 1992 on the erosion of its net worth mainly due to technological obsolescence, ageing of plant and equipments, low capacity utilization, lower price realization of finished products and lack of necessary capital investments. The BIFR has recommended for three revival packages in the year 1996, 1999 and 2002 but the transferor company could not be revived and continued to incur losses and had a negative net worth. The Government of India through the Ministry of Steel vide letter Ref. No. 4 (52)/2005-HSM dated 02.05.2008, after obtaining approval of the BIFR, has approved the amalgamation of the M/s Bharat Refractories Limited, the transferor company with M/s Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), a Government of India undertaking (herein after referred to as the “transferee company”) and permitted them to proceed with the process of amalgamation under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Board of Directors of the transferor company has approved the scheme of amalgamation in the Board meeting held on 10.07.2008 and its shareholders have approved the scheme of amalgamation in their Annual General Meeting held on 12.09.2008. The Board of Directors of the transferor company has approved the scheme of amalgamation in the Board meeting held on 10.07.2008 and its shareholders have approved the scheme of amalgamation in their Annual General Meeting held on 12.09.2008. Similarly, the Board of Directors of transferee company has approved the scheme of amalgamation in the Board Meeting held on 27.06.2008 and its shareholders have approved the scheme of amalgamation in their Annual General Meeting hold on 10.09.2008. The objectators (the employees, ex-employees, representatives of the various employees’ union of transferor company) had desired that before the Central Government takes a decision in respect of the merger of the two companies, that their grievances may be sorted out, which reads hereunder as: (i)MOU signed on 22.03.2007 by the transferor company with its employees union in respect of wage revision from 1997, should be made effective; (ii) the advance of Rs. ten thousand paid to the employees of the transferor company in pursuance of the above wage agreement should not be recovered from them; (iii) the effective date for amalgamation should be “Appointed date”, i.e. 1.4.07 as per the Cabinet decision; (iv) the age of retirement of the employees should be 60 years as is allowed for the employees of the transferee company; (v) medical benefit to employees/ex-employees should be as per the service rules of the transferee company; (vi) those employees of transferor company who had opted for Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) and their gratuity amount was paid after almost 17 months. In such cases interest should be paid for the delayed period; (vii) the transferee company should agree to abide by orders of the courts as several issues are under consideration of various courts in respect of service conditions and payments to employees and ex-employees. The Central Government, thereafter, in exercise of power conferred under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956 has taken decision for amalgamation of the said two companies and order in this regard was referred to as the “Bharat Refractories Limited and the Steel Authority of India Limited Amalgamation Order, 2009”. The gazette notification in this regard was issued vide order dated 28.07.2009, wherein in the definition clause, in particular clause 2(b), speaks about the “appointed date”, which reads hereunder as: 2(b)“appointed date” means April 1, 2007. The gazette notification in this regard was issued vide order dated 28.07.2009, wherein in the definition clause, in particular clause 2(b), speaks about the “appointed date”, which reads hereunder as: 2(b)“appointed date” means April 1, 2007. The merger would be deemed to have taken place with effect from 1st April, 2007 and from that day onwards transferor company would become a part of transferee company, for all legal and accounting purposes including those of employees' benefits; Clause 9 of the notification dated 28th July, 2009 contains provisions regarding existing officers and other employees of the transferor company, which reads hereunder as: “9. PROVISIONS REGARDING EXISTING OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE TRANSFEROR COMPANY (i) their service shall have been continuous and shall not have been interrupted by reason of the amalgamation of the transferor company; (ii) every whole time officer, including whole time Director (employee) or other employees of the transferor company immediately before the appointed date shall become an officer, employee, as the case may be, of the transferee company and upon implementation of the Scheme from the appointed date the Scheme, all the conditions of service and employment of the transferee company would be applicable to the employees of the transferor company. In order to bring uniformity, the employees of the transferor company shall be absorbed on equivalent scales of pay, taking scales prior to salary/wage revision effective from January 1, 1997 in the transferee company with protection of pay (Basic + Dearness Allowance). While doing so, care would be taken not to disturb both the transferee company’s and the transferor company’s internal seniority and to ensure that employees are not lowered by more than one grade and under no circumstance, E-0 scale would become non-executive scale; (iii) section 396 of Companies Act, 1956 casts an obligation on the Central Government to satisfy itself that the scheme for amalgamation or merger is not contrary to public interest. The basic principle of such satisfaction is to observe that the interests of the employees of the transferor company are protected by the scheme of amalgamation which should not be unfair to them; (iv) powers under section 396 can be exercised only if amalgamation is in public interest. The word “public interest” assumes the interest of the employees also. The basic principle of such satisfaction is to observe that the interests of the employees of the transferor company are protected by the scheme of amalgamation which should not be unfair to them; (iv) powers under section 396 can be exercised only if amalgamation is in public interest. The word “public interest” assumes the interest of the employees also. To take into account only the interest of the shareholders and not to consider the interest of employees is to completely go against the mandate of section 396 of the Companies Act; (v) the amalgamation arrangement should take care of the interest of the employees of the Transferor Company and the service conditions of the employees of the transferor company should not be worse than the existing service conditions by implementing the scheme of amalgamation. From the various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts, it can be concluded that in scheme of amalgamation the interest of employees of transferor company has to be protected. All benefits which are available to the employees of the transferee company shall be available to the employees of the transferor company from the appointed date including those of medical benefits. In the larger interest of the employees, ten thousand rupees which has been given as an advance to the employees of the transferor company in anticipation of revised pay scales, shall not be recovered from them by the transferee company as a good will gesture. The grievances in respect of Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) and medical benefits of the ex-employees of the transferor company may be suitably addressed by the Ministry of Steel. It further appears from clause 11 of the notification, which speaks about membership of provident fund, which reads hereunder as: “11.MEMBERSHIP OF PROVIDENT FUND As far as provident fund, gratuity fund, superannuation fund or any other special fund created or existing for the benefit of the staff, workmen and other employees of the transferor company are concerned, the transferee company shall stand substituted for the transferor company for all purposes whatsoever related to the administration or operation of such funds or in relation to the obligation to make contributions to the said funds in accordance with the provisions of such funds as per the terms provided in the respective trust deeds. All the rights, duties and benefits of the employees employed in the transferor company under such funds and trusts stand protected.” It further appears from clause 12, which deals with the issue of dissolution of the transferor company, which reads hereunder as: “12.DISOLUTION OF THE TRANSFEROR COMPANY On issue of this order and its notification the transferor company shall stand dissolved without being wound up as on the appointed date and no person shall make, assert or take, any claims, demands or proceedings against the transferor company, except in so far as may be necessary for enforcing the provisions of this order. Lastly, the notification speaks about memorandum and articles of association of the transferee company, which reads hereunder as: “The Memorandum and Articles of Association of the transferor company, ie., Bharat Refractories Limited as they stood immediately before the appointed day shall be the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the transferee company, viz. Steel Authority of India Limited.” 4. It is evident from the materials available on record that that under the BRL, the transferor company the age of superannuation was 58 years while under the SAIL, the transferor company the age of superannuation was 60 years, therefore, the writ petitioner since was working with the transferee company wherein the age of superannuation was 58 years retired on 30.06.2008 but after coming into effect of notification dated 28.07.2009, by which the BRL, the transferor company has merged with the SAIL, the transferee company where the age of superannuation was 60 years, the writ petitioner had claimed that the employees who was working under the transferor company will be deemed in service till one or the other employee of the transferor company attains the age of 60 years. Herein, the writ petitioner was under the roll of the transferor company as on 01.04.2007, i.e. on the appointed date, but retired on 30.06.2008 on attaining the age of 58 years, which was the age of superannuation by virtue of working in the BRL, the transferor company, but after the notification came into effect by virtue of order dated 28.07.2009, by that time the writ petitioner retired from service on attaining the age of 58 years w.e.f. 30.06.2008, hence, he claims to be treated to be in service and to be allowed to discharge duty till he attains the age of 60 years on the basis of the fact that under the transferee company i.e. SAIL the age of superannuation is 60 years. 5. The writ petitioner has raised a grievance about his date of birth claiming his date of birth to be 10.01.1956 as per the Matriculation Certificate, although, the date of birth mentioned in his service record was 01.07.1950. 6. It is pertinent to note here that the writ petitioner has initially approached the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for correction of his date of birth, before coming into force of notification dated 28.07.2009. However, during pendency of the writ petition, since notification dated 28.07.2009 came into being, as such one amendment petition was filed by the writ petitioner for amendment in the prayer portion of the writ petition for disbursement of payment of salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 on the pretext that the writ petitioner would be treated to be in service till he attains the age of 60 years, as per the service condition applicable so far it relates to the age of superannuation in the transferee company. It further appears from the fact that the writ petitioner was re-appointed vide letter dated 03.02.2010 and he joined on 06.02.2010. After joining, the writ petitioner was paid entire salary till the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years. It further appears that the entire retiral benefits paid to the writ petitioner by the transferor company was returned by the writ petitioner to the transferee company as a condition of reemployment. After joining, the writ petitioner was paid entire salary till the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years. It further appears that the entire retiral benefits paid to the writ petitioner by the transferor company was returned by the writ petitioner to the transferee company as a condition of reemployment. The writ Court taking into consideration the principle laid down so far as it relates to interference with the correction of date of birth is concerned has declined to interfere with the same on the ground that the claim is now belated one but the part of the prayer pertaining to payment of salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010, the writ Court has held the writ petitioner entitled for the salary for the said period. Being aggrieved with the part of order, by which, the writ petitioner was held entitled to get salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010, the instant appeal has been preferred by the respondents-appellants. 7. The writ petitioner has put his appearance through the counsel, namely, Mr. Sanjeev Thakur. 8. Though, the appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation, but the delay in preferring the appeal was condoned being satisfied with the grounds taken in the Interlocutory Application, being I.A. No. 4936 of 2019, filed by the appellants, vide order dated 15.06.2020 and the matter was listed under the heading for “Admission”. 9. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the instant appeal is being heard and is being disposed of at this stage itself. 10. Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants has advanced two fold arguments in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Firstly, it has been submitted that although in the notification dated 28.07.2009 the merger of the transferor company with the transferee company is from 01.04.2007 i.e. from the appointed day but since the notification to that effect was issued by the competent authority on 28.07.2009, therefore, the deemed appointed day would not be treated to be effective from 01.04.2007 rather it will be effective from 28.07.2009 and further when the writ petitioner has already retired from service on 30.06.2008 i.e. prior to coming into the notification dated 28.07.2009, he will not be entitled to continue his service till the age of 60 years as per the age of superannuation, as provided by way of service condition under the transferee company. But, according to him, the learned Singh Judge has not appreciated this aspect of the matter and hence, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the order passed by another learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 dated 22.03.2018, which has been brought on record by way of Annexure 2 to the memo of appeal, whereby and whereuner the admissibility of the salary of another person, namely, Manoj Kumar, has been treated to be from the date of notification i.e. from 28.07.2009. 11. Mr. Sanjeev Thakur, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent has submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned order whereby and whereunder the writ petitioner-respondent has been held entitled for salary from the appointed date i.e. from 01.04.2007 for the reason that when transferor company has been decided to be merged with the transferee company making the effective date for amalgamation as 01.04.2007, as per the Cabinet decision, therefore, the employees working under the transferor company i.e. BRL/IFICO will be deemed to have been in service in the transferee company i.e. SAIL and by virtue of age of superannuation prevailing by way of service condition i.e. age of 60 years, as per the service condition stipulated in condition no. 9 to the notification dated 28.07.2009 whereby and whereunder it has explicitly been stated that all the staffs, workmen or employees, in the service of the transferor company, on the date immediately preceding the appointed date shall become the employees of the transferee company and, therefore, the employee i.e. the writ petitioner herein would be treated to be in service of the SAIL on or after 01.04.2007 and in that view of the matter, the writ petitioner will be entitled to continue his service till he attains the age of 60 years since being in the service condition of the transferee company. Considering this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned, which cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent further contended that the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the order passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 but which according to him is not a correct law and as such the same may not to be considered. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent further contended that the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the order passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 but which according to him is not a correct law and as such the same may not to be considered. 12. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating the materials available on record as also the finding recorded in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, deem fit and proper to first deal with the effect of merger notification dated 28.07.2009 as the same is of paramount consideration to look into the propriety and legality of the impugned order as also the applicability of the order passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009. Learned counsel for the appellants has mainly contended that the date of appointed day i.e. 01.04.2007 cannot have legal sanctity in view of the fact that the notification to that effect has come on 28.-07.2009 and if there is any delay by the competent authority, for which, the appellants cannot be put to suffer. 13. This Court, after going across the notification dated 28.07.2009, wherefrom it is evident that the Government of India, Ministry of Steel vide letter dated 02.05.2008 has approved the amalgamation of the transferor company with the transferee company. Thereafter, the Board of Directors of transferee company has approved the scheme of amalgamation in the Board Meeting held on 27.06.2008 and its shareholders have approved the scheme of amalgamation in their Annual General Meeting hold on 10.09.2008. The order dated 28.07.2009 contains the effective date for amalgamation as 01.04.2007 as per the Cabinet decision with the further condition that age of the retirement of the employee will be 60 years, as is of the transferee company. The Central Government being satisfied for merger of BRL, the Government of India Undertaking with the SAIL, the Government of India Undertaking into a single company by virtue has come out with a notification as contained in order dated 28.07.2009. Clause 9 of the notification dated 28.07.2009 specifically provides provision regarding existing officers and other employees of the transferor company. The Central Government being satisfied for merger of BRL, the Government of India Undertaking with the SAIL, the Government of India Undertaking into a single company by virtue has come out with a notification as contained in order dated 28.07.2009. Clause 9 of the notification dated 28.07.2009 specifically provides provision regarding existing officers and other employees of the transferor company. It further appears from Clause 9(ii) that in order to bring uniformity, the employees of the transferor company shall be absorbed on equivalent scales of pay, taking scales prior to salary/wage revision effective from January 1, 1997 in the transferee company with protection of pay (Basic + Dearness Allowance). Admittedly, the writ petitioner was retired from service on 30.06.2008 on attaining the age of 58 years, which was the age of superannuation of the officers/employees in the transferor company. The approval of the amalgamation which was taken on 02.05.2008 has got its legal sanctity by virtue of order dated 28.07.2009 and as such the writ petitioner, although has retired form service on 30.06.2008 since was on the roll of the service on 01.04.2007 has ventilated his grievance for treating him in service of the transferee company with a request to return all the retiral benefit, which he has received by virtue of superannuation from the transferor company. The aforesaid proposal of the writ petitioner was accepted by the transferee company by accepting the refund of the retiral benefit as a condition of re-employment and in consequence thereof, the writ petitioner was re-appointed vide letter dated 03.02.2010 and consequently he joined on 06.02.2010. 14. The writ petitioner, while in service of the transferor company has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pertaining to correction in the date of birth. While the writ petition was pending and since order dated 28.07.2009 has come for merger of the BRL, the transferor company with the SAIL, the transferee company, hence by virtue of amendment petition a prayer was made by the writ petitioner for addition of prayer for direction of disbursement of salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010. 15. While the writ petition was pending and since order dated 28.07.2009 has come for merger of the BRL, the transferor company with the SAIL, the transferee company, hence by virtue of amendment petition a prayer was made by the writ petitioner for addition of prayer for direction of disbursement of salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010. 15. The writ Court though refused the prayer so far it relates to direction for correction in the date of birth of the writ petitioner is concerned, but so far as prayer for direction for disbursement of salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 is concerned, the same was directed to disbursed in favour of writ petitioner, which is subject matter of present intra-court appeal. We, on the basis of factual aspect as referred herein above, are of the view that since in the order dated 28.07.2009 the effective date of merger is w.e.f 01.04.2007 making effective date of merger w.e.f. 01.04.2007 as such the merger of the transferor company with the transferee company will be treated to be w.e.f. 01.04.2007 and not from the date of order dated 28.07.2009, as has been contended by learned counsel for the appellants, it is for the reason as would be evident from order dated 28.07.2009 wherein it has specifically been referred that “the effective date for amalgamation should be “Appointed date”, i.e. 1.4.2007 as per the Cabinet decision”. The above assertion clarifies the decision that the date of amalgamation should be ‘appointed date’ i.e. 01.04.2007 as per the decision of the Cabinet and it is settled that once the Cabinet takes a decision the same can only be altered by the Cabinet if any such eventualities arise. Further, nobody has got any authority to make any addition or alteration in the decision taken by the Cabinet under the democratic set up of the Government which is prevailing in our country. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 , in particular paragraphs 27 and 28, which reads hereunder as: “27. Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of Government of the British model both for the Union and the States. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 , in particular paragraphs 27 and 28, which reads hereunder as: “27. Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary or Cabinet system of Government of the British model both for the Union and the States. Under this system the President is the constitutional or formal head of the Union and he exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Article 103 is an exception to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers because it specifically provides that the President acts only according to the opinion of the Election Commission. This is when any question arises as to whether a Member of either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Article 102. 28. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion.” In view of such provision, as contained in our Constitution, we are of the considered view that once the Cabinet has taken a decision fixing the appointed date as 01.04.2007, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the anyone to deviate or to raise a question about said appointed date, in that view of the matter, even though notification to that effect has been issued vide order dated 28.07.2009 it cannot be said that the appointed date will automatically shift to 28.07.2009 and if such would be conclusion ultimately the “appointed date” which has been fixed as per the Cabinet decision will have to be given go by, which will not be permissible taking into consideration our Constitutional set up of the Government, as referred herein above. Since we have come to the conclusive finding on the appointed date of merger i.e. on 01.04.2007 as such we have to see other conditions as contained in order dated 28.07.2009 in order to assess what would be the status of the employees of the transferor company as on 01.04.2007, the same would be evident from the condition as contained in clause 9 whereby and whereunder it has specifically been agreed and concluded also by the Cabinet while taking such decision of merger making it clear that on the appointed date immediately preceding the appointed date all the staff, workmen and other employees of the transferor company i.e. BRL are become the employee of the transferee company. This specific condition i.e., the staffs who were on roll as on 01.04.2007 of the BRL company the transferor company will be treated to be the employees of the transferee company i.e. SAIL, the appellant herein. It is further evident from the notification dated 28.07.2009 that the age of retirement of the employees is 60 years as per the service condition of transferee company. Admittedly, herein the writ petitioner has retired from service on 30.06.2008 and his status was not of an employee of the transferee company since the Government had not notified for implementation order of amalgamation dated 28.07.2009 till that date and the order of approval of amalgamation dated 02.05.2008 has got its legal sanctity vide notification dated 28.07.2009, the date when the order to that effect was passed. In that view of the matter, the writ petitioner who has received all the retirement benefits from the transferor company has ventilated his grievance for treating him in service till he attains the age of 60 years since while working with the transferor company he was made to retire on attaining the age of 58 years on 30.06.2008, for which he has also offered for refund of all the retiral benefits, which was accepted by the transferee company and the decision for re-appointment was taken vide order dated 03.02.2010 and in terms thereof, the writ petitioner joined on 06.02.2010 and retired on attaining the age of 60 years but salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 was not paid to him, which the writ petitioner challenged before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge allowed his prayer directing the respondents-appellants to make payment for the salary period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 taking into consideration the condition of the order dated 28.07.2009 which contains the “appointed date” as 01.04.2007. 16. Learned Single Judge has taken a view that principle of ‘no work no pay’ will not be applicable for the aforesaid period treating his date of retirement i.e. 30.06.2008 as indicated in amalgamation notification dated 28.07.2009, which according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity for the reason that it was incumbent upon the authority of the transferee company i.e. SAIL to treat his service under roll of the transferee company as on 01.04.2007, hence, the writ petitioner has ventilated his grievance for treating him in service for which he has offered to refund the entire retiral benefit which although has been accepted by the transferee company and the order for re-appointment was passed on 03.02.2010 in pursuance thereto the writ petitioner has joined the transferee company on 06.02.2010. Hence, if any delay has been caused that is attributable to the transferee company, for which, the writ petitioner cannot be made to suffer on the principle of ‘no work no pay’. The aforesaid principle will only be available to the employees who are not willing to discharge his duty. It cannot be disputed that if the employee has not discharged his duties, the principle of ‘no work no pay’ will be applicable but the said principle is not universally applicable, if it is found that the fault not lies on the part of the employee. It cannot be disputed that if the employee has not discharged his duties, the principle of ‘no work no pay’ will be applicable but the said principle is not universally applicable, if it is found that the fault not lies on the part of the employee. The same issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors reported in (1989) 2 SCC 541 . Likewise, in Union of India & Ors Vs. K.V. Janki Raman & Ors reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 , the issue came for consideration as to whether government can deny the wages of the past period if he has been granted promotion subsequently but from back date. The Union of India had contended that a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. This contention was negated as not applicable where an employee who is willing to work, is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. The Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 24 and 25 of the said judgment held as under: “24. It was further contended on their behalf that the normal rule is “no work no pay”. Hence a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. To allow him to do so is against the elementary rule that a person is to be paid only for the work he has done and not for the work he has not done. As against this, it was pointed out on behalf of the concerned employees, that on many occasions even frivolous proceedings are instituted at the instance of interested persons, sometimes with a specific object of denying the promotion due, and the employee concerned is made to suffer both mental agony and privations which are multiplied when he is also placed under suspension, When, therefore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away unjustly. 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 17. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, we are of the view that the writ petitioner will be held entitled for the salary for the period 01.07.2008 to 03.01.2010 for the laches committed on the part of the appellants-authorities and further taking into consideration the date of appointed date as 01.04.2007 as also date of superannuation which was 60 years under the transferee company. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants has also tried to impress upon the Court by placing order dated 22.03.2018 passed in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009, in which, the learned Single Judge has taken a view that the entitlement in pursuance to issuance of order of notification dated 28.07.2009 will be from the date of order i.e. w.e.f. 28.07.2009 and has submitted that the said view will be said to be in consonance with the law. 19. 19. It requires to refer herein that the order passed by another learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 is not challenged, however, since the issue about applicability of judgment rendered in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 has been challenged therefore, we have gone across the finding recorded by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009, wherefrom we find that the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 has not laid down a correct law as because if the said proposition of law is said to be effective, the same would nullify the decision of the Cabinet and in that situation the democratic set up as per the Constitution by way of collective responsibility will ultimately be put to question since once Cabinet takes a decision the same cannot be allowed to be altered by anybody, save and except, the Cabinet itself through the same process, if the occasion arises, or by the Court of law in exercise of power of judicial review, but as has been admitted, the order dated 28.07.2009 has not been questioned by anybody including the appellants herein rather they have accepted the date as per the terms of the order dated 28.07.2009 only condition that it was notified on 28.07.2009 the appointed date will be deemed to be shifted from 01.04.2007 to 28.07.2009 which according to us, as has been referred herein above, is wrong proposition put forth by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 6069 of 2009. Learned Single Judge while delivering judgment in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 has further not appreciated that if the Cabinet takes a decision in coming with order after 01.04.2007 why the employee will suffer and if allowed to suffer the same will be contrary to the condition as contained in condition no. 9 to the order dated 28.07.2009 which speaks about status of the employee of the transferor company who shall become the employee of transferee company on the date immediately preceded the appointed day. Therefore, according to our considered view finding as has been recorded by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 shall not govern the field. 20. Therefore, according to our considered view finding as has been recorded by learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6069 of 2009 shall not govern the field. 20. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the order passed by learned Single Judge which is the subject matter of the present appeal suffers from no infirmity for the reasons aforesaid. 21. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed.