JUDGMENT : 1. Heard, learned Senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Anil Kumar assisted by learned counsel, Ms. Chandana Kumari. 2. The tenant is the appellant before this Court. The appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 14.08.2018 (decree signed on 28.08.2018) passed by learned District Judge-I, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Civil Appeal No.01 of 2010, affirming the judgment dated 26.11.2009 (decree signed on 05.12.2009) in Eviction Suit No.17 of 2007 passed by learned Munsif, Singhbhum West at Chaibasa. 3. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant, Mr. Anil Kumar has assailed the impugned judgment, on the ground that both the courts below have wrongly considered the appellant-tenant to be defaulter for non-payment of monthly rent of December, 2006 to April, 2007 rather the same has been remitted through Money-Order on 25.05.2007, as such, finding recorded by both the courts below is perverse and non-sustainable. The evidence of the defendant, regarding payment of rent for September, 1997 to December, 1997 paid on 24.01.1998 has not been considered properly by the lower courts below, as the tenancy was not monthly rather lumpsum payment was practice between the parties. 4. The plaintiff-Sheo Shankar Prasad Sao filed a suit for eviction of the tenant, Gopal Agarwal on 14.09.2007 under Sections 11(i)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the then 'Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982' now 'Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011' on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff, sub-letting, damage as well as default in making payment of the rent from December, 2006 to August, 2007 @ Rs. 896/-per month total Rs.8,064/-. The defendant appeared and have taken several pleas. The learned trial court has decided the ground of default under Sections 11(i)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, “where the amount of two months rent lawfully, payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 16”. The learned trial court has framed nine issues out of which two issues are as follows:- “(iv) Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent from the month of December, 2006 and onwards? The learned trial court has framed nine issues out of which two issues are as follows:- “(iv) Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent from the month of December, 2006 and onwards? (v) Whether defendant is in arrears of rent?” 5. After considering the entire material brought on record, the learned trial court has discussed the issue at para 27 of the judgment holding therein that “defendant is a defaulter having not paid or validly remitted the rent for the month of December, 2006 to March, 2007 and decided both the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant”. The learned appellate Court has also considered the issue No.(iv) “Whether the defendant has defaulted in payment of rent from the month of December, 2006 and onwards? 6. Learned appellate court has considered the same at internal page 25 of the appellate court's judgment holding that “there is no specific contract for payment of rent, the rent of a rented premises has to be paid or validly remitted necessarily by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable and the appellate court has held that rent for the month of December, 2006 was to be necessarily paid or remitted by the defendant/appellant by the end of January, 2007 and similarly the rent for the month of January, 2007 was to be paid or remitted by the defendant/appellant necessarily by the end of February, 2007 and so on, but in the instant case, the rent since the Month of December, 2006 to April, 2007 has been admittedly remitted by the defendant/appellant on 25.05.2007 and thus, the appellate court has held that defendant /appellant has defaulted in payment of rent for the Month of December, 2006 to March, 2007 by non-paying or remitting the rent by the last day of succeeding month as per provision of Section 11 (1)(d) of the 'Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act and decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent and against the appellant/defendant”. This Court has perused the material brought on record including the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant-tenant. 7. This Court has perused the material brought on record including the submissions made by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant-tenant. 7. Section 11 (1)(d) of the 'Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act is profitably quoted hereunder:- “(d) Where the amount of two months' rent lawfully payable by tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or, in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 16.” 8. The defendant has not been able to satisfy this Court, why the rent of December, 2006 to August, 2007 was not paid in time? So far the plea taken by the defendant that there was precedence of remitting such rent in lumpsum, since they have remitted the same also on 24.01.1998 for the Month of September 1997 to December, 1997, but both the courts below have considered this aspect of the matter and have rightly considered that the pleading of the defendant is not, in consonance with the material brought on record. 9. In the written statement, the defendant has taken a plea that since the Month of January, 2007 plaintiff or his agent could not make available, in the matter of receiving rent on account of illness of plaintiff, so rent in lumpsum for the Month from December, 2006 to April, 2007 was sent by money-order on 25.05.2007. On this point, that Court is of the opinion that the appellant/tenant was required to pay the rent of the Month of December, 2006 to the landlord on any date in the month of January, 2007 and in case, the landlord was not available, the tenant was duty bound to remit the rent through the money-order. 10. As such, the things which have not been pleaded in the written statement cannot be allowed to adduce as an evidence on record. The same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Om Prabha Jain vs. Abnash Chan & Another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1083 that it is well settled law that pleading of both the parties is the foundation of suit and no party can allow to travel beyond the pleading. The same has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Om Prabha Jain vs. Abnash Chan & Another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1083 that it is well settled law that pleading of both the parties is the foundation of suit and no party can allow to travel beyond the pleading. Similar view has been reiterated in the case of Kashi Nath (Dead) through LRs vs. Jaganath, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 740 that evidence must be consistent with the pleadings and there must not be variance. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sadanand Dass vs. Md. Hussain and Anr., reported in 1986 supp. SCC 261, has refrained in interfering with the finding recorded by both the courts below held that “a tenant is not excused from paying rent regularly every month even if there was no express contract regarding time of payment of rent and the principle is applicable in the fact of present suit”. 12. This Court has relied upon the judgment in the case of Kashi Nath (Dead) Through LRS. vs. Jaganath, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 740 wherein findings of fact recorded on the basis of evidence were not open to challenge in the second appeal. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in the case of Dinesh Kumar vs. Arsad Ali, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 740 that the second appeal under Section 100 CPC is maintainable basically on a substantial question of law and not appreciation of fact. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held in the case of Gurnam Singh (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Ors. vs. Lehna Singh (Dead) by Legal Representatives, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 641 . The distinction between the appeal under Section 96 CPC and 100 CPC. 13. The High Court cannot appreciate the entire evidence on record, in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC as the High Court is not first appeal under Section 96 of the Act. vs. Lehna Singh (Dead) by Legal Representatives, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 641 . The distinction between the appeal under Section 96 CPC and 100 CPC. 13. The High Court cannot appreciate the entire evidence on record, in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC as the High Court is not first appeal under Section 96 of the Act. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, reported in 1999 (3) SCC 722 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute in its own opinion from that of the first appellate Court unless its finds that the conclusion drawn by the Lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court; (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. In the case of Madamanchi Ramappa vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa, reported in (1964) 2 SCR 673 : AIR 1963 SC 1633 at para 12 which reads as follows :- “12. ..... whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid”. 14. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid”. 14. Having considered the submissions of the learned Senior counsel, the finding of the both the courts below on the point of default and relying upon the judgments as discussed above, this court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the courts below. The tenant has rightly been declared defaulter, which does not require any interference by this Court, as no substantial question is made out to admit this appeal. Accordingly, the second appeal being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed. 15. Thus, I.A. No.2448 of 2020 also stands dismissed.