JUDGMENT Protik Prakash Banerjee, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the co-owners of lands parts of which were acquired by the respondent no. 1. The writ petition was taken out for the principal reliefs for which Rule Nisi had been prayed for, including a writ in the nature of certiorari and the following writs in the nature of Mandamus: a. A writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents particularly the respondents no.2, 3 and 4 to take immediate appropriate steps for removal/demolition of the unauthorized/ illegal construction of shop room measuring 2.75 decimals to the western-southern side of the land in R.S. Plot No.625 corresponding to L.R. Plot No.667 of Mouza Bindabanpur, J.L. No.39, within Arambagh Police Station in the District of Hooghly forthwith. b. A writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents particularly the respondents no.2, 3 and 4 to take immediate appropriate steps for demolition/removal of the shop room illegally constructed over encroached portion of land made by the private respondent on the basis of representation made by the petitioners praying for removal of such encroachment dated 24.01.2017 being Annexure P/12. 2. The respondent no. 8 is not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Neither is it a "person or authority" under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the principal reliefs, as demonstrated aforesaid, are directed against its removal by the agency of the State Respondentsfrom the property claimed by the writ petitioners to have been encroached. On this ground alone, the writ petition could have been dismissed, had there not been two reasons requiring a deeper scrutiny. The first are the series of writ petitions which the present writ petitioners have engaged in, first to get part of their lands free from acquisition by way of lapse, and then to remove the encroachment, and second since they claim that the encroachment was done by the respondent no. 8 at a time when the land in question was formally under acquisition of the respondent no. 1, and therefore after the declaration of its lapse, the petitioners were entitled to get back the entire land free from encumbrances, for which the State respondents are strictly liable. 3. The State respondents and the private respondent have both used affidavits-in-opposition. 8 at a time when the land in question was formally under acquisition of the respondent no. 1, and therefore after the declaration of its lapse, the petitioners were entitled to get back the entire land free from encumbrances, for which the State respondents are strictly liable. 3. The State respondents and the private respondent have both used affidavits-in-opposition. I infer this because affidavits-in-reply was used by the writ petitioners which means their copies must have been served on the writ petitioners. The affidavits-in-reply are on record, as are also, the written notes of argument filed by the Writ Petitioners, the State Respondents and the Private Respondent no. 8. In addition, there is a report of the special officer appointed in the case to which none of the parties have taken any exception. 4. It is the case of the writ petitioners that it was finally declared by a coordinate bench of this Court in WP No.17952 (W) of 2013 on November 30, 2016 that acquisition proceedings in respect of 17 decimals of land out of total 22 decimals, stood lapsed because possession of the said 17 decimals was not taken by the State. That the petitioners were in possession of this 17 decimals of land is clearly averred in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, and in fact the acquisition was held to have lapsed in respect of 17 decimals out of 22 decimals because possession was not taken, a sine qua non for vesting of the lands in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the writ petition is replete with repetition of this fact. Despite the aforesaid, the petitioners claim that it is the duty of the respondents to remove the encroachment, since the encroachment happened during pendency of the dispute between the respondent no. 1 and the petitioners, even though the petitioners were in physical possession of the said lands. The petitioners have tried to avoid the issue of WP No.9032 (W) of 2014 having been instituted for the selfsame reliefs of removal of encroachment by the present respondent no. 8 as pleaded in paragraph 13, by submitting that the order dated March 25, 2014 which was passed therein, asking the respondent no. The petitioners have tried to avoid the issue of WP No.9032 (W) of 2014 having been instituted for the selfsame reliefs of removal of encroachment by the present respondent no. 8 as pleaded in paragraph 13, by submitting that the order dated March 25, 2014 which was passed therein, asking the respondent no. 4 to consider and dispose of the petitioners' representation was made prior to November 30, 2016, and conclusion by the reasoned decision dated March 4, 2015 left the entire issue open for decision after finalization as to the authority of the land that may be decided by this Court in WP No.17952 (W) of 2013. So they say, there is no question of res judicata or even constructive res judicata, barring the present writ petition. 5. All the respondents have made a prayer for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that the real dispute here is removal of encroachment by a private party from the lands of another private party, for which, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be granted, nor such a petition entertained, in view of the statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioners under the general law of the land in a normal course of proceeding; further that the issue involves a disputed question of fact and of title, as to who has the right to the said property for which a civil suit is indicated. It was also submitted that the uncontroverted special officer's report clearly showed that the encroachment by the respondent no. 8 was not within the 5 decimals of land which was utilized for the purpose of extension of Arambagh to Bandar Road, which was acquired and thus it is clear that the case was of private encroachment of private land. The petitioners have opposed this submission by drawing my attention to the order sheet which shows that before issuance of the Rule in this matter, these questions were raised and answered, and the Rule was issued on a prima facie satisfaction that the respondents had a case to answer. Furthermore, until November 30, 2016 it was unclear whether the acquisition of 22 decimals of land would stand or any part of it would lapse. Furthermore, until November 30, 2016 it was unclear whether the acquisition of 22 decimals of land would stand or any part of it would lapse. If it was held to be valid, then the petitioners would lose title to it, and only on the basis of prior possession when they had lost title to the land, they would have to contest the encroachment by the respondent no. 8; on the other hand, if any part of the acquisition was held to have lapsed as contended by the petitioners, then they would have title to that part of the land, and only thereafter would have the right to proceed against the encroachment once it was found that the encroachment was done in respect of the portion to which the petitioners continued to have title. Hence, the petitioners contend that prior to November 30, 2016 they could not have the locus to institute any proceeding to dispossess the private respondent, and once 17 decimals were held to be free of acquisition due to lapse, it became the duty of the State Respondents to hand over possession of the same to the petitioners without encumbrances. 6. While simple, this is deceptively simple. If on the one hand the writ petitioners contend that they were in physical possession of 17 decimals of land, for which reason they could obtain an order that the acquisition proceeding had lapsed since there was no vesting in the State of the land under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, they could not, in the same breath, contend that the State took possession of the land and allowed it to become encumbered, and on the acquisition having been held to have lapsed subsequently, the State was bound to restore the land, id est, its possession, after removal of all encumbrances/ unauthorized construction made thereon. This is blowing hot and cold with vengeance. Yet equity demands that the petitioners are not allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. This has been the position of law which has been administered by this Court from its inception. If any authority is needed, I will rely upon the cases of Bhaja Choudhury-v- Chuni Lal,1906 11 CalWN 284 , and also Dwijendra Narain Roy-v-Joges Chandra De and Others, (1924) AIR Calcutta 600 equivalent to 79 Indian Cases 520 to cite only two of the authorities of classical antiquity. If any authority is needed, I will rely upon the cases of Bhaja Choudhury-v- Chuni Lal,1906 11 CalWN 284 , and also Dwijendra Narain Roy-v-Joges Chandra De and Others, (1924) AIR Calcutta 600 equivalent to 79 Indian Cases 520 to cite only two of the authorities of classical antiquity. More recently The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold in R.N. Gosain-v-Yashpal Dhir, (1993) AIR SC 352 , as under:- "Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage." Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that this contention of the petitioners is not well-founded. They cannot now say that it was the obligation of the respondent no. 1 to free the said 17 decimals completely from encumbrance after having pleaded and consistently taken the stand that the said lands were never out of their possession. 7. Coming now to the question a disability on the part of the petitioners to initiate new proceeding for removal of encroachment under the general law before the question of lapse of acquisition was finally decided, in respect of any part of the said 17 decimals and only thereafter, if it was found that the encroachment was in respect of any part of the lands relating to which there was a finding that the acquisition hand lapsed, to have the right to move any competent court, assuming without holding conclusively that the stand of the writ petitioners is correct, even then, that disability ceased to exist from November 30, 2016 and the petitioners had twelve years to obtain a relief under general law based on their title, under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, from that date. Instead of filing a civil suit for recovery of khas possession, on March 28, 2017 they affirmed and filed the present WP No.9327 (W) of 2017 under the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964 from which the present Rule arises. Instead of filing a civil suit for recovery of khas possession, on March 28, 2017 they affirmed and filed the present WP No.9327 (W) of 2017 under the West Bengal Highways Act, 1964 from which the present Rule arises. There is no attempt to explain why, within 6 months of dispossession, in respect of 2.75 decimals of the said lands out of 17 decimals, the writ petitioners did not proceed under the effective statutory remedy which is also speedy, under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. So far as the question of the said questions having been answered in an earlier stage, before issuance of the Rule is concerned, the Rule issued in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is in the nature of a Rule Nisi therefore, unless cause is shown, the same is to be made absolute. Therefore, of necessity, all findings reached before cause is shown and before final adjudication, are tentative. At the time of hearing, it the Court finds that there was an effective and adequate alternative remedy, which the writ petitioners not only failed to avail of, but either did not explain the reason for their failure or, gave an explanation which on the face of the facts pleaded, is insufficient, the Court has sufficient powers to discharge the Rule and dismiss the writ petition. 8. In the instant case, for the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above, and the analysis contained therein, I am firmly of the opinion this private dispute ought to have been brought before the general courts under the civil law, rather than before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and there is no sufficient explanation as to why the same was brought before the Court. None of the exceptions to our self-imposed rule against entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of alternative remedy has been substantiated in the petition. 9. As a result, I decline to entertain and exercise my writ jurisdiction in respect of the cause of action agitated herein by the petitioners, and I discharge the Rule and dismiss the writ petition on the ground of effective and adequate alternative remedy. 9. As a result, I decline to entertain and exercise my writ jurisdiction in respect of the cause of action agitated herein by the petitioners, and I discharge the Rule and dismiss the writ petition on the ground of effective and adequate alternative remedy. This dismissal is not on merits of the case made out by the writ petitioners, and this order shall not prevent the writ petitioners from availing of any alternative remedy as they may be advised, in accordance with law, on the self-same cause of action. There shall be no order as to costs.