JUDGMENT Michael Zothankhuma, J. - Heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor as well as Mr. Lalpianfela Chawngthu, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This is an appeal filed by the State against the Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the Court of the Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Criminal Revision Petition No. 6/2019, arising out of Criminal Trial No. Ex(M) 95/2018, by which the Sessions Court set aside the Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2018, passed by the learned Trial Court, wherein it had convicted the respondent under Section 43(2) MLPC Act, 2014 on his own plea of guilt and sentenced him to undergo S.I. for one month. 3. This appeal had been admitted by this Court vide Order dated 05.08.2020. Subsequent to the admission of the appeal by this Court, the State has preferred this application for withdrawal of the appeal vide I.A.(Crl.) No. 18/2020 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that as per the letter No. C.11016/1/2019-EXC dated 22.09.2020 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Excise & Narcotics Department, which is addressed to the Additional Public Prosecutor, the Government has taken a decision to withdraw the appeal due to humanitarian grounds. The Additional Public Prosecutor thus prays that the State should be allowed to withdraw the appeal. 4. The brief facts of the case is that the respondent accused, Sh. K. Zorammuana, who was serving as Driver Grade-III in the Excise & Narcotics Station, Mamit, was arrested on 05.06.2018 at around 7:30 PM for consumption of liquor. Accordingly, Excise Case No. MENS 79/2018 under Section 43(2) MLPC Act, 2014 was registered against the respondent accused. A charge sheet/Final report was prepared and thereafter sent to the learned Trial Court. 5. During consideration/framing of charge on 20.06.2018, the charge under Section 43(2) MLPC Act was read over and explained to the respondent, to which he pleaded guilty. The learned Trial Court thereafter convicted the respondent accused on his own plea of guilt under Section 43(2) MLPC Act and sentenced him to undergo S.I. for a period of one month. 6. 5. During consideration/framing of charge on 20.06.2018, the charge under Section 43(2) MLPC Act was read over and explained to the respondent, to which he pleaded guilty. The learned Trial Court thereafter convicted the respondent accused on his own plea of guilt under Section 43(2) MLPC Act and sentenced him to undergo S.I. for a period of one month. 6. Being aggrieved by the conviction order dated 20.06.2018, the appellant preferred Criminal Revision Petition No. 6/2019 before the Court of the Sessions Judge, Aizawl, on the ground that (i) the learned Trial Court did not record the statement of the respondent under Section 313 Cr.P.C., (ii) that the Trial Court did not ensure that the plea of the respondent was voluntary, clear, unambiguous and unqualified. Further, the respondent accused had pleaded his guilt under influence and that he pleaded guilty without understanding the charge, (iii) the exercise of discretion on the part of the Trial Court to convict the respondent of his own plea of guilt, could not have been exercised summarily under Section 229 Cr.P.C. and (iv) that the respondent was not given a chance to engage a Lawyer of his choice before pleading guilty. 7. The Court of the Sessions Judge, Aizawl after hearing the counsels for the parties passed the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 6/2019, holding that though the learned Trial Court had the power to try the case summarily under Chapter XXI Cr.P.C, the learned Trial Court should have tried the respondent, by converting the summons case into a warrant case under Section 259 Cr.P.C., as the conviction of a Government employee would entail serious consequences. Accordingly, to ensure that minimal procedural guarantees had been followed, the learned Trial Court should have applied the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases against the respondent accused as permissible under Section 259 Cr.P.C. The above procedure would accordingly have required a formal charge to be framed in writing and the examination of the accused would require the signature of the accused on the record of the examination done while framing charge. Though the requirement of taking a signature of the accused on the record of his examination is waived only for summary trials as per Section 281(6) Cr.P.C., the signature of the accused on the record of his examination would be required while framing a charge for a warrant case. Though the requirement of taking a signature of the accused on the record of his examination is waived only for summary trials as per Section 281(6) Cr.P.C., the signature of the accused on the record of his examination would be required while framing a charge for a warrant case. Accordingly, as there could be serious consequences from the conviction of a Government employee in a case tried summarily, the learned Trial Court should have adopted the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases. 8. The learned Sessions Court also held that there was nothing in the record to show that the respondent had ever acknowledged his guilt. Thus, the conviction of the respondent due to the reasons stated above visited the respondent accused with serious consequences including loss of employment and livelihood. The learned Sessions Court also observed that the Trial Court ought to have approached the case with greater circumspection. 9. The conviction of the respondent accused by the learned Trial Court vide Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2018 passed in Criminal Trial No. Ex(M) 95/2018 was thereafter set aside by the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 passed in Criminal Revision No. 6/2019. 10. Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Court in Criminal Revision No. 6/2019, the State has come in appeal under Section 378(i)(b) Cr.P.C. Before this Court can go into the merits of the appeal, the first issue that has to be decided is whether the application for withdrawal of the appeal should be allowed by this Court. As is noted from the letter dated 22.09.2020 issued by the State Government, the Additional Public Prosecutor has been requested to withdraw the appeal on humanitarian grounds. This Court is hard pressed to understand as to how an appeal can be withdrawn on humanitarian grounds, when the same has already been admitted by this Court. Further, the State Government having already given permission to the Public Prosecutor to file an appeal against the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court, after having apparently considered the merits of the impugned judgment and order, the State Government cannot be allowed to change its decision on a ground that is unconnected with the interest/ administration of justice. 11. In the case of Sheonandan Paswan Vs. 11. In the case of Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (1983) 1 SCC 438 , the Apex Court has held that the settled law laid down by the Apex Court is that the withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor and the ultimate decision to withdraw from the prosecution is his. Besides the above, the Apex Court has also held that the exercise of power to accord or withdraw consent by the Court is discretionary which it has to exercise judicially. The Apex Court further held that when an application to withdraw from the prosecution is made, it has to see whether the grounds of withdrawal are valid and whether the application is bona fide or is collusive. It further held that the Public Prosecutor must apply it's own mind while moving an application for withdrawal from prosecution and the Court according its permission for withdrawal, is to see whether the interest of public justice is advanced and the application for withdrawal is not moved with oblique motive, unconnected with the vindication of cause of public justice. In the case of P.N. Bhagwati Vs. R. Krishna Iyer S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, AIR 1977 902, the Apex Court has held that in an application praying for withdrawal from prosecution, the paramount consideration must be the interest of administration of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down nor can any categories of cases be defined, in which consent should be granted or refused. It must ultimately depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in the light of what is necessary in order to promote the ends of justice, because the objective of every judicial process must be the attainment of justice. A perusal of the above two cases shows that the Apex Court had to consider applications for withdrawal of prosecutions under Section 321 Cr.P.C., prior to the judgment being pronounced by the Trial Court. In the case in hand, the respondent has been convicted by the learned Trial Court on his own plea of guilt and his conviction has been set aside in revision by the Sessions Court. The application for withdrawal of the appeal has not been made for the advancement/ cause of public justice, but only to help an individual on humanitarian grounds. The application for withdrawal of the appeal has not been made for the advancement/ cause of public justice, but only to help an individual on humanitarian grounds. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the present case is not a fit case for invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. In view of the above facts, the application for withdrawal of the appeal filed by the State cannot be allowed, especially when the appeal has already been admitted by this Court, prior to the application for withdrawal of the appeal being filed. 12. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court should be set aside, as the Session Court has failed to acknowledge the fact that the respondent had himself pleaded guilty to the charge under Section 43(2) MLPC Act, 2014. That the Sessions Court having admitted to the fact that the learned Trial Court had the power to try the case summarily, the learned Sessions Court did not have any justification to hold that the case should have been tried by the learned Trial Court as per the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases, by invoking Section 259 Cr.P.C. 13. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the Sessions Court could not have come to a finding on humanitarian consideration, as the same can be done only on the basis of the facts and evidence recorded in the Trial Court. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor accordingly prays for setting aside the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the Court of the Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Criminal Revision Petition No. 6/2019 and to uphold the Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2018 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mamit in Criminal Trial No. Ex(M) 95/2018, as the conviction had been made on the respondent's own plea of guilt. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that there is no infirmity with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court and the same should accordingly be upheld. 15. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 16. Section 378 (1) (a) & (b) states as follows:- "378. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that there is no infirmity with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court and the same should accordingly be upheld. 15. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 16. Section 378 (1) (a) & (b) states as follows:- "378. Appeal in case of acquittal.---[(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (30 and (5),-- (a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and nonbailable offence; (b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court, from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.]" A reading of the above provision of the Cr.P.C. clearly shows that an appeal can be preferred against an order of acquittal passed by a Court of Session in its revisional jurisdiction. 17. Section 42(2) & 43(2) of the MLPC Act, 2014 states as follows:- "42. Prohibition of manufacture, transport, import, export, and consumption of liquor, except under licence, permit or pass: (2) No person shall consume liquor except on a permit granted under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, as the case may be. 43. Punishment for contravention of Section 42: (2) Whoever in contravention of the provisions of subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5) of Section 42 of this Act shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month which may extend to two years or with fine of not less than one thousand rupees which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both. Provided that the trying magistrate may, after convicting the accused and in lieu of imprisonment and fine, pass order by which the convict is released and is compelled to do social work for not more than five working days under the supervision of the Excise & Narcotics officer or Police officer as per the terms and conditions as may be passed by the trial court in the order or prescribed in the rules. Provided further that if the convict absconds or violates the terms and conditions passed by the trial court in the order or the rules except on sufficient ground, he shall be liable to the sentence prescribed in this sub-section." A perusal of Section 43(2) of the MLPC Act, 2014 shows that the present case is a summons case and that a trial of a summons case by a Magistrate can be held under Chapter XX & XXI of the Cr.P.C. 18. Section 2 (w) and (x) Cr.P.C states as follows:- (w) "summons-case" means a case relating to an offence, and not being a warrant-case; (x) "warrant-case" means a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years," Sections 251, 252, 259 & 260 of the Cr.P.C. states as follows:- "251. Substance of accusation to be stated.-When in a summonscase the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. 252. Conviction on plea of guilty.-If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. 259. Power of Court to convert summons-cases into warrantcases.-When in the course of the trial of a summons-case relating to an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, it appears to the Magistrate that in the interests of justice, the offence should be tried in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases, such Magistrate may proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by this Code for the trial of warrant-cases and may recall any witness who may have been examined. 260. 260. Power to try summarily.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code- (a) any Chief Judicial Magistrate; (b) any Metropolitan Magistrate; (c) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, may, if he thinks fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences:- (i) offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; (ii) theft, under section 379, section 380 or section 381 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where the value of the property stolen does not exceed 1 [two thousand rupees]; (iii) receiving or retaining stolen property, under section 411 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where the value of the property does not exceed 1 [two thousand rupees]; (iv) assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, under section 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where the value of such property does not exceed 1 [two thousand rupees]; (v) offences under sections 454 and 456 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (vi) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 504, and 2 [criminal intimidation punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both], under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (vii) abetment of any of the foregoing offences; (viii) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence; (ix) any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle-trespass Act, 1871 (1 of 1871). (2) When, in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, the Magistrate shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by this Code." 19. (2) When, in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, the Magistrate shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by this Code." 19. In the present case, a perusal of the records of the learned Trial Court shows that the charge under Section 43(2) MLPC Act was framed, read over and explained to the respondent accused in his language of understanding on 20.06.2018, to which the respondent accused replied as follows:- "I was drunk while on duty in the Excise & Narcotics Station and that I do not have any permit to consume alcohol." 20. The provisions of Sections 251, 252, 259 & 260 Cr.P.C. clearly show that the case of the respondent accused can be tried summarily and that he could be convicted on his own plea of guilt. Section 259 Cr.P.C. also provides that a summons case can be converted to a warrant case if during the trial of the summons case, it appears to the Magistrate that in the interest of justice, the offence should be tried in accordance with the procedure for trial of warrant cases. This aspect has also been observed and accepted by the learned Sessions Court in the impugned judgment and order. Having stated above, it is quite clear that no trial was conducted against the respondent accused by the learned Trial Court as he was convicted on his own plea of guilt. In view of there being no trial proceedings in respect of the summons case, there is no question of application of Section 259 Cr.P.C. Consequently, the observation of the learned Sessions Court that the learned Trial Court should have converted the summons case of the respondent accused into a warrant case does not have any basis and is accordingly not justified. 21. As can be seen from the foregoing paragraphs, the respondent accused admitted his guilt in the Mizo language and the same has been recorded by the learned Trial Court, as nearly as possible in the words used by the respondent accused. The learned Trial Court having convicted the respondent accused after applying its discretion, there is nothing to show that there was anything arbitrary or illegal in the discretion applied by the learned Trial Court. 22. The learned Trial Court having convicted the respondent accused after applying its discretion, there is nothing to show that there was anything arbitrary or illegal in the discretion applied by the learned Trial Court. 22. A perusal of the revision petition filed by the respondent accused before the Sessions Court shows that the respondent accused in his revision petition has not taken the stand that he did not plead guilty to the charge framed against him. His only plea was that he did not understand the charge and that the plea of the respondent accused was not clear and ambiguous. On perusal of the respondent's plea recorded by the learned Trial Court, which is to the effect that the respondent accused admitted that he was drunk while on duty in the Excise & Narcotics Station and that he did not have a permit to drink alcohol, indicates that he was very much aware of the charge framed against him. It also shows that he understood the charge and his answer/plea to the charge was clear and unambiguous. Further, the respondent accused being a Driver (Grade-III) in the Excise & Narcotics Department, the respondent accused cannot take the plea that he was ignorant of the law, especially when the Excise & Narcotics Department is the main enforcement agency along with the Police, in the State of Mizoram, for enforcing prohibition in the State, as per the MLPC Act, 2014. 23. In the case of State of Mizoram Vs. Ramengmawia,2006 1 GLT 762, the Division Bench of this Court while holding that conviction on a plea of guilt can be accepted by a Sessions Court under Section 229 of the Cr.P.C., held it would be imperative on the part of the Sessions Judge to make all endeavor to satisfy himself that the accused admits the facts or ingredients constituting the offence. The plea of the accused must, therefore, be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal and the Court must be satisfied that the accused has understood the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them accordingly. The Division Bench of this Court in the above case also took note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdeo Singh, (1992) AIR SC 2100 and held as follows in paragraph No. 23:- "23. The Division Bench of this Court in the above case also took note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Sukhdeo Singh, (1992) AIR SC 2100 and held as follows in paragraph No. 23:- "23. From a careful reading of what has been observed and held in Sukhdeo Singh (supra), it is abundantly clear that in law, there is no absolute bar, on the part of the Court of Sessions, to convict an accused on his plea of guilty; but before the conviction of the accused is based entirely on his plea of guilt, the Court must take care to ensure that the plea of the accused is voluntary, clear, unambiguous and unqualified, that the accused understands the nature of the allegations made against him and admits them and that the accused admits all such facts, which are necessary and essential to constitute the offence." 24. In the above case of State of Mizoram Vs. Ramengmawia (Supra), the accused therein had confessed to having killed his father and accordingly, the Sessions Court convicted and passed sentence on the basis of the said plea of guilt. The Division Bench in the above case held that a killing, in only specified circumstances, can amount to murder. Thus, to plead guilty to the charge of murder does not necessarily mean that the person knew that killing of a person necessarily amounted to murder. It was in the above context that the Division Bench of this Court had held that the Sessions Court should not, ordinarily, act upon the plea of guilt of an accused in serious offences and that the Court must ensure that the accused understood the nature of the allegation made against him and admitted the said facts. 25. In the present case, the charge against the respondent is as to whether he had consumed liquor without having a permit to consume liquor, which would in violation of Section 43(2) read with Section 42(2) of the MLPC Act, 2014. The offence in the present case is not a serious offence. The question of whether a person drank liquor or not, without a permit issued by the Government, is a question of fact which does not have different nuances. It is a simple question which can be understood and answered simply by a "yes" or "no". The offence in the present case is not a serious offence. The question of whether a person drank liquor or not, without a permit issued by the Government, is a question of fact which does not have different nuances. It is a simple question which can be understood and answered simply by a "yes" or "no". The respondent being a driver (Grade-III) in the Excise & Narcotics Department, is in the opinion of this Court, competent to understand the question. Further, as per Section 252 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate 1st Class/Chief Judicial Magistrate can convict, in his discretion, an accused who pleads guilty to the charge. Accordingly, in view of the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any infirmity with the conviction of the respondent by the Trial Court vide the Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2018, passed in Criminal Trial No. Ex (M) 95/2018. 26. The reasoning of the learned Sessions Court that the summons case should have been converted into a warrant case under Section 259 Cr.P.C., only because the conviction of a Government employee would entail serious consequences is unjustified and cannot be a germane reason for setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court. The stage of consideration of charge/framing of charge is to elicit a response from the accused as to whether the charge leveled against the accused is correct. At the stage of consideration of charge/framing of charge, the Court is not to see the consequences of the answer to be given by the accused. In fact, the consequences having already been laid down by the Indian Penal Code and other statutory laws, the consequences would naturally flow depending upon the answer of the accused. It only has to see whether the accused understood the charge and has admitted or not admitted the charge. It is expected of an accused to give a truthful answer/reply at the time of framing of charge and the answer/reply of the accused should in all fairness, not depend upon the consequences that could flow from the answer/reply. 27. It only has to see whether the accused understood the charge and has admitted or not admitted the charge. It is expected of an accused to give a truthful answer/reply at the time of framing of charge and the answer/reply of the accused should in all fairness, not depend upon the consequences that could flow from the answer/reply. 27. Thus, in the view of this Court, as the respondent understood the charge and admitted the same, there is no infirmity in the Trial Court having convicted and sentenced the respondent on his own plea of guilt as per Section 252 Cr.P.C. This Court is thus of the view that the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the Sessions Court, Aizawl in Criminal Revision Petition No. 6/2019 is not sustainable in law. The impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.04.2019 is set aside and the Judgment & Order dated 20.06.2018 passed by the learned Trial Court in Criminal Trial No. Ex.(M) 95/2018 is upheld. 28. For the reasons stated earlier, the application for withdrawal of the appeal filed by the State is rejected. The appeal is accordingly allowed.