ORDER : 1. Present Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 14(A) of the Scheduled Castes and the Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the Atrocity Act’) against the order dated 24.12.2019 passed by learned 7th Additionally Sessions Judge, Surat in Criminal Misc. Application No.7315 of 2019, whereby the request for seeking anticipatory bail came to be rejected in connection with the FIR, being C.R. No.II-34 of 2017 registered before Mangrol (Surat Rural) Police Station, Surat for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(m)(r)(s) and 3(2)(5a) of the Atrocity Act. 2. The facts, in brief, which have given rise to the present appeal are that the complainant, i.e. Daxaben, wife of Navinbhai Govanbhai Vasava, is the Sarpanch of the village and when she was doing inspection work of a public road of the village, the appellant Nos.1 and 2 used atrocious words in presence of the public to the respondent-complainant and conveyed that she belonging to ‘Dubla’ community, what development can be made by her and thereby threat was administered by the present appellants and when the people gathered in the village, the appellants went away on their vehicles. Since this utterances were made in public while discharging public duty and threat was administered and insulted in the public by using atrocious words, a complaint came to be lodged, being C.R. No.II-34 of 2017 before Mangrol (Surat Rural) Police Station, Surat for the offences punishable under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3(1) (m)(r)(s) and 3(2)(5a) of the Atrocity Act. 3. The appellants upon such filing of the complaint, raised an issue that the ingredients of the offences are prima facie not established and thereby initially, preferred a petition for quashing before the High Court, being Criminal Misc. Application No.6223 of 2017 and by raising multiple contentions about non-applicability of the provisions of the Act, a request was made to quash the complaint. But, after hearing both the sides at length, the said petition for quashing came to be withdrawn vide order dated 11.12.2019 and the interim order which was granted earlier on 6.3.2017 was vacated. Of-course for a period of one week, the said protection was extended. 4. But, after hearing both the sides at length, the said petition for quashing came to be withdrawn vide order dated 11.12.2019 and the interim order which was granted earlier on 6.3.2017 was vacated. Of-course for a period of one week, the said protection was extended. 4. It appears from the record that after disposal of the petition for quashing, the present appellants appeared to have rushed down for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘the Code’ for short) before learned District and Sessions Judge, (Special Atrocity Court) at Surat, which application came up for consideration before learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, who by order dated 24.12.2019 was pleased to dismiss the same, which has given rise to present Criminal Appeal before this Court. 5. It further appears that after the present alleged commission of the offence, some other appellants of same village have rushed down to the house of the Sarpanch in the night hours and administered threat and repeated the said offence, which has given rise to filing of a complaint by husband Navinbhai, which was registered C.R. No.I-10 of 2017 and in the said complaint also, a petition for quashing was filed by raising several contentions but, the same was also dismissed by the Court and in the similar way, after disposal of the quashing petition, in the said complaint also, relevant accused have filed an appeal for anticipatory bail, being Criminal Appeal No.2534 of 2019. Both these criminal appeals came up for consideration before this Court and conjointly with consent of learned advocates, both the appeals were taken up for hearing. 6. Learned advocate Mr. N.K. Majmudar appearing on behalf of the appellants in the present appeal has also practically made a joint submissions and at the outset, has contended that prima facie offence is not made out. It has further been vehemently contended that there is no embargo for considering the anticipatory bail application irrespective of disposal of the petition for quashing and further, it has been submitted that usage of word ‘Dubla’ is not an atrocious or derogatory word but it is merely referring to a weak person and therefore, ex-facie, utterance which has been made by the appellants can never attract the provisions of the Atrocity Act. Hence, to reject the anticipatory bail keeping in view Section 18 is legally not sustainable. 6.1. Mr. Hence, to reject the anticipatory bail keeping in view Section 18 is legally not sustainable. 6.1. Mr. Maumudar, after submitting the aforesaid contentions in brief, has also tendered written submissions along with series of decisions and thereby has requested to grant anticipatory bail to the appellants by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Court below. 6.2. Since, in common, the matters were argued by learned advocate Mr. Majmudar, the Court deems it proper to reproduce the said written submissions hereinafter:- 1. The appellants have preferred present appeal seeking Anticipatory Bail in connection with the FIR being C.R. No. I-1-34/2017 dated 7/2/2017 for the offences punishable under section 504, 506 (2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 3(1)(m)(r)(s) and 3(2)(5a) of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of atrocity) Act, 1989. The said FIR is annexed at page 1-3 Annexure-A. 2. The complainant Dakshanben w/o Navinbhai Gomanbhai Vasava who is a complainant in respect of another Criminal Appeal No. 2534 of 2019 bare reading of the allegations that would make it clear that there is no need for "custodial interrogation" of the appellants as no any untoward incident is reported though petitioners have be granted ad-interim order for more than last 3 years and 4 moths. 3. The ingredients of the offences under section 504 and 506(2) are not being attracted as such there is no material evidence in support of the alleged therefore, ingredient of Atrocities Act are not all made out as there are no usage of any alleged atrocious words, use of word "DUBLI” would having meaning of week person or feeble and there are no allegations to the effect that accused persons have committed offences because complainant belong to SC/ST community. There are no averments of usage of alleged words with an intention to intimidate and humiliate respondent no 2. 4. The quashing petition was permitted to be withdrawn by Hon'ble High Court. (Annexed at Annexure-B at page No. 4). 5. The Anticipatory Bail came to be rejected by order. (Annexure-C, Order of L.d. Sessions Court page No. 12-16). 6. Appellant do not have Criminal record, antecedent and considering nature of accusation "custodial interrogation" is not at all required and therefore, appellant may kindly be granted Anticipatory Bail. 7. (Annexed at Annexure-B at page No. 4). 5. The Anticipatory Bail came to be rejected by order. (Annexure-C, Order of L.d. Sessions Court page No. 12-16). 6. Appellant do not have Criminal record, antecedent and considering nature of accusation "custodial interrogation" is not at all required and therefore, appellant may kindly be granted Anticipatory Bail. 7. Advocate of the appellant relies upon the following judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamlesh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2019 CRLR (SC) 874. Even if quashing petition is rejected on merits the Anticipatory Bail may be considered and heard on its own merits.” 6.3. To substantiate his contentions, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has also relied upon the following decisions:- (1) Dinesh @ Buddha v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2006 (0) AIJEL-SC-36965. (2) Parbat Dahyabhai Rabari v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2010 (0) AIJEL-HC-224346. (3) Sandip @ Sanjay @ Chhaganbhai Uhreja v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2016 (0) AIJEL-HC-233882. (4) Union of India v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2019 (0) AIJEL-SC-64961. (5) Pravinbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2019 (0) AIJEL-HC-240972. (6) Kamlesh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2019 (0) AIJELSC-65807. (7) Prithvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, reported in 2020 (0) AIJEL-SC-65745. (8) A decision rendered by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.596 of 2020, decided on 6.7.2020. 7. As against the aforesaid submissions, learned APP Mr. J.K. Shah appearing on behalf of the State-authority has submitted that from the bare reading of the complaint itself, it would be quite clear that prima facie offence is made out. On the contrary, attempt was made to discourage a public servant by using this utterance in the public at large and to prevent the public servant from functioning. This itself is sufficient enough to indicate that the offence is made out. Apart from this, this is not a case where these appellants were unaware about the fact that the complainant was belonging to SC/ST caste, to which the Act is applied and as such, there is a deliberate insult in the public by these appellants and by usage of words, the provisions are clearly attracted and as such, this is not a case that ex-facie, the Act is not applicable at all. It has further been contended vehemently that these very contentions which have been raised before this Court, have been raised before a Bench which took up the hearing of the quashing petition and after hearing both the sides, since these contentions have not been found in favour of the appellants, the quashing petition came to be withdrawn without inviting order and as such, now, it is not open for these appellants to raise this kind of very contentions in an application or appeal for seeking anticipatory bail since prima facie, it appears that the Act is applicable and the petition for quashing came to be disposed of. Learned APP has, in addition to the aforesaid submissions, submitted a report made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, SC/ST Cell, Surat (Rural) in which also, it has been conveyed that these appellants have participated in the commission of the crime and since the petition for quashing is already disposed of, the draft charge-sheet also came to be prepared. So, when prima facie Act is applicable, it cannot be said that the complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Since this aspect was considered by the Bench taking up of quashing petition as well, the rigour of Section 18 of the Atrocity Act will apply to the full extent and therefore, there is no room for exercising the jurisdiction under Section 438 of the Code, which has rightly been not exercised by the Court below and as such, this is not a fit case in which anticipatory bail can be granted. Additionally, learned APP has submitted that simply because the appellants are under protection for quite some time, the same is not a ground to extend the anticipatory bail in a routine manner particularly when Section 18 of the Atrocity Act has got itself full effect and as such, has requested to dismiss the appeal. 8. In addition to the submissions made by learned APP, learned advocate Mr. H.B. Shethna representing the complainant has also vehemently opposed the present appeal and has submitted that the law is amply made it clear by the Apex Court on the issue of exercise of the powers under Section 438 of the Code and has relied upon the latest pronouncement in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan Vs. H.B. Shethna representing the complainant has also vehemently opposed the present appeal and has submitted that the law is amply made it clear by the Apex Court on the issue of exercise of the powers under Section 438 of the Code and has relied upon the latest pronouncement in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan Vs. Union of India decided on 10.2.2020 reported in AIR 2020 SC 1036 and additionally, has also relied upon the other decisions and has also tendered bullet points in writing in common for both these appeals. The Court would like to incorporate the said bullet points in the present order, as under:- “((FIR in Crim. Appeal 2537/19 filed by the wife, is the cause of action why FIR required to be filed in Crim. Appeal 2434/19 later on my husband. Therefore second matter requires to be heard first)) Bar of Sec. 18 and Sec. 18A(2) of Atrocity Act against granting "Anticipatory Bail" in Atrocity Cases. Case of Subhash Kashinath Mohajan v. State of Mah. (20-3-2018) 2018 (6) SCC 454 reviewed and recalled in Union of India State of Mah. (1-10-2019) AIR 2019 SC 4917 (relevant paras 6 to 9). Challenge to Sec. 18A of Atrocity Act rejected by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prithvi Raj Chauhan y. Union of India (10-02-2020) AIR 2020 SC 1036 (relevant paras 4(47 to 51), 4(57), 5, 6, 32, 33 "what legislature cannot do legitimately cannot be done by interpretative process by the courts". "32. I would only add a caveat with the observation and emphasize that while considering any application seeking pre-arrest bail, the High Court has to balance the two interests: i.e. that the power is not so used as to convert the jurisdiction into that under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but that it is used sparingly and such orders made in very exceptional cases where no prima facie offence is made out as shown in the FIR, and further also that if such orders are not made in those classes of cases, the result would inevitably be a miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of law. I consider such stringent terms, otherwise contrary to the philosophy of bail, absolutely essential, because a liberal use of the power to grant pre-arrest bail would defeat the intention of Parliament." Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Mah. I consider such stringent terms, otherwise contrary to the philosophy of bail, absolutely essential, because a liberal use of the power to grant pre-arrest bail would defeat the intention of Parliament." Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Mah. 2012 (8) SCC 795 , para 9; "The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no Court shall entertain the application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, the scope for an appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence. Swaran Singh State 2008 (8) SCC 435 "PUBLIC VIEW" (relevant paras. 22 to 31) 27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3()(S) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression public place', but instead the expression used is in a place within public view'. In our opinion, there is a clear distinction between the two expressions. 28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a Chamar) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression place within public view' with the expression public place'. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies. Prima Facie case because; 1. Quashing petitions earlier withdrawn, order at Annex. D in Crim. Appeal 2534/2019, and, order at Annex. B in Crim. Appeal 2537/2019. 2. Casteist abuse "dubda" is done in public view. Therefore sec. 3(1)(s) of Atrocity Act is attracted. 3. Complainants are insulted, intimidated to humiliate them in public view. Therefore sec. 3(1)(r) of Atrocity Act is attracted. 4. In the FIR in Crim. Appeal 2534/19 clothes of complainant are torn, he is physically abused, his money is stolen. Therefore sec. 3(2)(va) of Atrocity Act is attracted. 5. In the FIR in Crim. Appeal 2537/19 the complainant is woman Sarpanch of Ranakpor Gram Panchayat. She is intimidated and prevented from doing her work, road construction for village. Therefore sec. 3(1)(m) of Atrocity Act is attracted. Additional Submissions; 1. Irrelevant and misleading submissions made by Accused. (i) In the application at Annex. A in Crim. Appeal 2534/19, none of the complainants/first informants are named. (ii) In the FIR at Annex. B in Crim. Appeal 2534/19, none of the complainants/first informants are named. (iii) How above two are connected with the FIR's in question? Kamleshpuri Ashokpuri Goswami v. State of Guj. (i) In the application at Annex. A in Crim. Appeal 2534/19, none of the complainants/first informants are named. (ii) In the FIR at Annex. B in Crim. Appeal 2534/19, none of the complainants/first informants are named. (iii) How above two are connected with the FIR's in question? Kamleshpuri Ashokpuri Goswami v. State of Guj. – Judgment delivered by Hon'ble Justice A.P. Thakar on 28-3-19 in Criminal Appeal No. 558 of 2019. Identical case as current ones where since casteist abuse was given, a prima facie case was made out. (relevant paras 3, 9, 10) Azimkhan Hamidkhan Pathan v. State of Guj. - Judgment delivered by Hon'ble Justice B.N. Karja on 29-10-2018 in Criminal Appeal 1498/2018. Guidelines for granting Anticipatory Bail in Atrocity Matters. (relevant paras 15 to 18). 8.1. After submitting the aforesaid contentions, a request is made to dismiss the appeal. 9. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the overall material on record, including the remarks submitted by learned APP, following few circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed by this Court:- (1) Bare reading of the complaint, reflecting on page 1 onwards of the appeal compilation, is indicating that on a fateful day, when the complainant went for inspection of the metal road, which contract was given to one Vikramsinh Natvarsinh Solanki, and they were present, at that time, nearby persons namely Dahyabhai Prabhubhai, Rameshbhai Prabhubhai and others, specifically named in the complaint, came on the spot in a tractor and they in the open public conveyed why the road is being constructed by the complainant and whether the land is belonging to their father and also conveyed that ‘Dublas’ like you, how can make development of the village and used abusive language in presence of public. At that point of time, the complainant, being a lady, immediately called from the mobile the elder person from the village Mr. Ambubhai Bhagwanbhai Patel and conveyed that these appellants are behaving with her like this. At that time, the people gathered. Hence, the appellants left the place. But, while going away, also some threat has been administered, as a result of which, the complainant belonging to Scheduled Caste community rushed down to lodge the complaint since the appellants have committed a specific crime punishable under the Atrocity Act. As a result of this, the complaint was registered being C.R. No.II-34 of 2017. But, while going away, also some threat has been administered, as a result of which, the complainant belonging to Scheduled Caste community rushed down to lodge the complaint since the appellants have committed a specific crime punishable under the Atrocity Act. As a result of this, the complaint was registered being C.R. No.II-34 of 2017. (2) Additionally, it appears from the record that whether the Atrocity Act is applicable or not, whether prima facie offence is made out or not, by raising these contentions, a petition for quashing the complaint was filed by these appellants, which was registered as Criminal Misc. Application No.6223 of 2017. But, it appears that after extensive arguments from both the sides, the said petition for quashing came to be disposed of, vide order dated 11.12.2019, which order reads as under:- “Mr. Maulik Soni, learned advocate for Mr. N.K. Majmudar, learned advocate for the applicants, on written instructions as disclosed, seeks permission to withdraw this application. This application is disposed of as withdrawn. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier vide order dated 06.03.2017, though objected by the learned advocate for the original first informant, is extended for a period of one week from today.” So, it appears that whether the Atrocity Act is applicable or not, whether this complaint is abuse of process of law or whether prima facie offence is established or not, all these issues are no longer available since the petition for quashing came to be disposed of. (3) Another factor, which is coming to the light during the course of hearing of both the appeals, is that since this complaint is filed by the complainant, the other sets of accused of the village went in the night hours, at the place of this complainant where the husband and the present complainant are residing and in presence of guests and in presence of some 20 persons, a threat is administered, same words were used in public, people gathered and even administered threat unto death. At that point of time, also, these very objectionable words were used, which prima facie is found to be covered under the provisions of the Atrocity Act since in both these complaints, petitions for quashing came to be dismissed. At that point of time, also, these very objectionable words were used, which prima facie is found to be covered under the provisions of the Atrocity Act since in both these complaints, petitions for quashing came to be dismissed. So, in this situation, it appears that with a view to discourage the present complainant to precipitate further the complaint, a further threat was also administered upon the complainant and her husband. 10. Now, in light of the aforesaid background of facts, the latest pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra) is not possible to be unnoticed by this Court and the most relevant paragraph contained in the said decision which is reproduced in the written submission of learned advocate Mr. Shethna, the Court deems it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter:- "32. I would only add a caveat with the observation and emphasize that while considering any application seeking pre-arrest bail, the High Court has to balance the two interests: i.e. that the power is not so used as to convert the jurisdiction into that under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but that it is used sparingly and such orders made in very exceptional cases where no prima facie offence is made out as shown in the FIR, and further also that if such orders are not made in those classes of cases, the result would inevitably be a miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of law. I consider such stringent terms, otherwise contrary to the philosophy of bail, absolutely essential, because a liberal use of the power to grant pre-arrest bail would defeat the intention of Parliament." From the aforesaid observations made by the Apex Court, it has been propounded that while considering application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C., the Court has to balance two interests and also observed that liberal use of power to grant pre-arrest bail would defeat the intention of the Parliament, and therefore, such powers are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where no prima facie offence is made out. So, considering the fact that the petition for quashing was disposed of after extensive hearing, the aspects of abuse of process of law, non-applicability of the Act and non-availability of the prima facie case could not be gone into by the Court below while dealing with the application under Section 438 of the Code. Therefore, the Court below has rightly dismissed the application. This Court finds no irregularity or illegality in the said conclusion. 11. Further, it appears from the record that while considering the application of the present appellants, learned Court below has applied its mind and it is not the case that the contentions have not been considered at all and on the contrary, the fact that the petition for quashing is already disposed of, also appears to have been considered and therefore, para 6 of the said judgment, the Court deems it proper to reproduce hereinafter:- “[6] In view of the above submissions and taken into account police papers as well as affidavit executed by the investigating officer it is evident that incident pertains to the year 2017. However, since, the applicants approached the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court under Section-482 o Cr. P.C. and were granted interim protection by the Hon’ble High Court, the applicants were not arrested by the investigating agency and thereafter the quashing petition filed by the applicant was withdrawn on 11.12.2019 and the interim protection granted was further extended or a period of week. It is also evident from the police papers that the complainant and the applicants were known to each other prior to incident. There is a mention of applicants having referred to complainant as 'Dubra'. Therefore, it cannot be said that no evidence under the Atrocity Act, is made out. The argument that the use of word 'Dubra' referred to the complainant as a physically infirm person, cannot be appreciated at this stage. Hence, taken into account the nature of accusations as well as the bar created Section-18 of the Prevention of Atrocity Act, this court is not inclined to exercise the discretion of granting Anticipatory Bail to the present applicants. Hence, the following final order is passed.” So, from the aforesaid material on record and prima facie reading of the latest pronouncement delivered by the Apex Court, the Court is satisfied that no error is committed by the Court below. Hence, the following final order is passed.” So, from the aforesaid material on record and prima facie reading of the latest pronouncement delivered by the Apex Court, the Court is satisfied that no error is committed by the Court below. So, the judgments which have been produced on record by learned advocate Mr. Majmudar, which are large in number, as if the Court is dealing with a petition for quashing, same are of no assistance to the appellants. The Court rather would go by the latest pronouncement which is delivered by the Apex Court and after considering practically all the earlier decisions, the Court finds that this is not a fit case in which the Court may exercise discretion under Section 438 of the Code where the scope is very circumscribed. 12. At this stage, even if the Court may consider that after disposal of the petition for quashing, application under Section 438 of the Code can be considered, but, in view of the fact that after exhausting meritorious contentions, the petition for quashing came to be disposed of and hence very little scope is left for the Court to consider Section 438 request of the appellants, since prima facie, it cannot be said that no offence is made out and further, it is not open for the bail Court to jump to a conclusion of this elementary stage that this complaint is nothing but abuse of process of law, particularly when the quashing petition is already disposed of. Therefore, with full effect, embargo created by the Statute by way of Section 18 and 18A of the Atrocity Act, the request for anticipatory bail cannot be considered. The intention of the legislature is not to be brushed aside as has been held by the Apex Court. Large number of decisions which are pressed into service, in the considered opinion of this Court, are of no avail to the appellants, particularly when in recent pronouncement of the judgment in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan (supra), the Court has expressly made it clear that liberal use of power to grant pre-arrest bail would defeat the intention of the Parliament. So, the Court would not like to exercise the discretion in view of this peculiar set of circumstance and having gone through the overall material on record, the appeal is found to be merit-less since facts are altogether different. 13. So, the Court would not like to exercise the discretion in view of this peculiar set of circumstance and having gone through the overall material on record, the appeal is found to be merit-less since facts are altogether different. 13. Apart from the above, learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has also relied upon one decision of the Coordinate Bench delivered on 6.7.2020 in Criminal Appeal No.596 of 2020. But, having gone through the same at length, the Court finds that the facts are altogether different. In that case, there was a categorical consideration of the fact that the appellant of that case was not having any knowledge that the deceased was belonging to SC/ST category and the role of the appellant is only that he is alleged to have deleted CCTV footage. So, looking to the said facts which are contained in para 9 of the said decision, no reliance is permissible for the present appellants since facts are altogether different. 14. The law of precedent is clear on the issue that if there is a slight change in the fact or one additional fact would make a world of difference in applying the precedent. Resultantly, even after considering the said decision also, this Court is not satisfied with the submissions made by learned advocate for the appellants. Accordingly, the appeal being merit-less, deserves to be dismissed. 15. Additionally, at this stage, learned advocate Mr. Shethna has relied upon one quoting from website of ‘Divya Bhasker’ dated 2.7.2010, in which this word ‘Dubla’ is stated to be a word of ‘insult’ and therefore, the department of Government has in a circular directed to use the word ‘Halpati’ or ‘Talavia’ in place of ‘Dubla’. This is indicative of the fact that when the Government has also thought it fit to disallow such word to be used, there is hardly any reason for this Court to jump to a conclusion that usage of this word cannot attract the provisions of the Atrocity Act. At the best, this can be a point of trial, which can be agitated and examined at an appropriate stage. 16. From the overall material on record, even after examining all the decisions which have been placed on record, the Court is unable to be persuaded to exercise the discretion in this peculiar background of facts. At the best, this can be a point of trial, which can be agitated and examined at an appropriate stage. 16. From the overall material on record, even after examining all the decisions which have been placed on record, the Court is unable to be persuaded to exercise the discretion in this peculiar background of facts. Resultantly, the submission made by learned advocate for the appellants are not convincing and this Court is not inclined to exercise the discretion under Section 438 of the Code in favour of the appellants. Hence, the present appeal stands DISMISSED. Notice is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. 17. Upon pronouncement of the judgment, Mr. N.K. Majmudar, learned advocate for the appellants, has requested that since right from the beginning, the interim relief is operative, the appellants would like to approach the higher forum. So, for some reasonable period, the operation of the present order may not be effected by continuing interim protection. To this request, after initial objection against this extension of time, the request is left it open to the Court’s discretion. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that from the beginning, the interim relief is operating in present proceedings, and while disposing of quashing petition also, time was granted, the Court is inclined to consider the request in part and accordingly, two weeks’ time is granted to the appellants so as to enable them to approach the higher forum.