1. Heard on the question of admission through Video Conferencing. 2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following relief(s) :- (I) That, the impugned order dated 03-03-2020 (Annexure P/1) and 17-10-2019 (Annexure P/2) be set aside and quashed. (II) That, other relief which is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as Assistant Grade III on 17-10-2015 in 15th Battalion NCC Gwalior. It is mentioned that since, the mother of the petitioner is old therefore, the petitioner went on leave. The cousin brother of the petitioner namely Shri Shatrughan Singh @ Batera was killed on 3-4-2017, therefore, the petitioner was afraid of his life. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that by order dated 17-10-2019, his services have been terminated on the ground of unauthorized absence. It is further submitted that although it is mentioned in the impugned order that the petitioner did not respond as well as also did not join his services, inspite of the service of notice, but it is submitted that since, the petitioner did not read the news papers therefore, he was not aware of the information published in the news paper. The appeal has also been dismissed. Thus, it is prayed that the order of termination has been passed without following the principles of Natural Justice as well as without conducting full fledged enquiry. 5. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 6. The only contention of the petitioner is that the principles of Natural Justice were violated and no full fledged departmental enquiry was conducted. 7. So far as the question of departmental enquiry is concerned, it is clear from order dated 17-10-2019 passed by Secretariat National Cadet Core (State Division), Madhya Pradesh, that a full fledged departmental enquiry was conducted on the allegations that the petitioner had remained on unauthorized absence for a period of one day on 28th April 2017 and from 11th May 2017 onwards. By letters dated 11-4-2017, 8-5-2017,28-7-2017, 31-8-2017, 3-10-2017, 7-11-2017, 30-11-2017, 11-1-2018, 7-3-2018, 27-4-2018, 23-5-2018, 26-6-2018, 2-8-2018, 17-7-2018, 23-7-2018,28-7-2018,13-8-2018 and 30-8-2018 written instructions were issued to submit his joining, but neither the petitioner reported on his duty nor gave the acknowledgment of receipt of the above mentioned letters. By letters dated 11-4-2017, 8-5-2017,28-7-2017, 31-8-2017, 3-10-2017, 7-11-2017, 30-11-2017, 11-1-2018, 7-3-2018, 27-4-2018, 23-5-2018, 26-6-2018, 2-8-2018, 17-7-2018, 23-7-2018,28-7-2018,13-8-2018 and 30-8-2018 written instructions were issued to submit his joining, but neither the petitioner reported on his duty nor gave the acknowledgment of receipt of the above mentioned letters. A letter dated 2-7-2018 was also sent by messenger at his permanent address mentioned in his service book, and acknowledgment of receipt was given by the petitioner on 3-7-2018. Thereafter letter was sent by registered post which was returned back. Thereafter, the enquiry officer sent a letter dated 6-7-2019 which was duly received by the petitioner in the presence of 4 witnesses, but still the petitioner did not join. Further, on 7-6-2019, a notice was got published in the news papers having circulation in Gwalior and Morena but still he did not join. The petitioner did not participate in the departmental enquiry also, and considering the evidence and material available on record, the charge of unauthorized absence from his duty from 11-5-2017 and earlier also on 28-4-2017, was found to be proved . Accordingly, the disciplinary authority, by accepting the enquiry report held that the petitioner has committed misconduct by remaining on unauthorized absence on 28-4-2017 and thereafter from 11-5-2017 onwards and accordingly, the punishment of termination from service was imposed. 8. In this writ petition, the petitioner has merely stated that no notice was served on him and he had not read the news paper. 9. This defence of the petitioner cannot be accepted because the respondents have specifically held that one notice dated 2-7-2018 was served upon the petitioner by a messenger on which was duly received by the petitioner on 3-7-2018 and thereafter another letter dated 6-7-2018 was sent by the enquiry officer which was duly received by the petitioner in the presence of four witnesses. Further, the notice was served upon the petitioner by substituted service by paper publication. The petitioner has not denied the receipt of above mentioned two notices and has also not disputed the publication of public notice in the news papers having circulation in Gwalior and Morena. If the petitioner did not read the public notice, then it cannot be said that the paper publication was bad in law. The petitioner has not denied the receipt of above mentioned two notices and has also not disputed the publication of public notice in the news papers having circulation in Gwalior and Morena. If the petitioner did not read the public notice, then it cannot be said that the paper publication was bad in law. Further,the provisions of Order 5 Rule 20 CPC can be treated as a guiding provision which reads as under : (1-A) Where the Court acting under sub-rule (1) orders service by an advertisement in a newspaper, the newspaper shall be a daily newspaper circulating in the locality in which the defendant is last known to have actually and voluntarily resided, carried on business or personally worked for gain 10. Undisputedly, the petitioner had worked for the last time in Gwalior and from the cause title also, it is clear that the petitioner has claimed himself to be the resident of Gwalior. The notice was published in the news paper having circulation in Gwalior and Morena. 11. Thus, it is clear that the petitioner was duly served by substituted service by paper publication also, but he did not respond to any of the notice issued by the respondents. 12. Further, the petitioner has not given any explanation as to why he did not join his service from 11-5-2017 onwards except by saying that his mother was old and infirm person. 13. Further, it is well established principle of law that an order cannot be quashed merely on the ground of violation of Principles of Natural Justice, unless and until a prejudice is pointed out by the petitioner. The Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala Vs. S.K. Sharma, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 has held as under : 28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a straitjacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India.) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called — that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding — which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer’s report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi) it would be a case falling in the latter category — violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct — in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid. ** * * 33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under — “no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice — or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action — the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no fair hearing”. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice”/“no hearing” and “no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it ‘void’ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.] (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. The Supreme Court in the case of State Vs. N.S. Gnaneswaran reported in (2013) 3 SCC 594 has held as under : 12. The issue also requires to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. Thus, unless in a given situation, the aggrieved makes out a case of prejudice or injustice, some infraction of law would not vitiate the order/enquiry/result. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities. Thus, unless in a given situation, the aggrieved makes out a case of prejudice or injustice, some infraction of law would not vitiate the order/enquiry/result. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities. (Vide: Jankinath W.P. No. 9488 /2020 Girraj Singh Sikarwar vs. State of MP Sarangi v. State of Orissa, State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Debotosh Pal Choudhury v. Punjab National Bank.) Thus, viewed from any angle, it is clear that not only, the petitioner was served, but he also did not participate in the departmental enquiry deliberately. He also did not respond to various letters sent by the department and did not join his service from 11-5-2017 onwards till his services were terminated. Even otherwise, no plausible reason has been given by the petitioner for not joining his services from 11-5-2017 onwards. No other argument is advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner. As the petitioner could not point out any illegality in the order passed by the respondents, therefore, this petition is dismissed in limine.