JUDGMENT : 1. This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer that the show cause notice dated 15.01.2020 issued under Section 68H of the NDPS Act, 1995 and the letter dated 20.01.2020 be quashed and set aside. 2. The facts in brief are as under: 2.1 The dispute involved in the present petition is pertaining to property situated at Plot No. 58, Sector - III in Satyagraha Chhavni, Satellite, Ahmedabad. It is the case of the petitioner that original owners – Dilip Jasubhai Soni and Sangam Jasubhai Soni entered into an agreement to sell the property to Ms. Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Ms. Bhartiben Bipin Panchal on 04.02.1992. On 23.04.1993, the original owners again entered into an agreement to sell with M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals which was belonging to the petitioner family. The entire consideration was paid and Paras Pharmaceuticals was handed over possession of property. 2.2 On 16.03.2000, registered sale deeds were entered into between the original owners and the family concern of the petitioner for transfer of such property in their name. Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal and M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals were also signatories to the deeds in question. In the year 2003, the name of the family concern was entered in the register of the society. 2.3 It is the case of the petitioner that in May 2019, when the petitioner group was approached for the purchase of the property in question, request was made by the petitioner on 22.05.2019 to the society for recording the internal transfers that had taken place inter se in the family in the years 2009 and 2012. It was at that point of time that the society on 13.08.2019 addressed a letter to the petitioner that the society had received a letter dated 30.07.2017 addressed by the authorised officer under the Smugglers & Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA Officer), asking the society to supply all information and documents pertaining to the property and also to see that no transfer be made of the property in question without first obtaining an NOC from the department. The Society also together with its letter of 13.08.2019 attached the letter of SAFEMA Officer dated 30.07.2017. On 14.08.2019 and 16.09.2019, the petitioner addressed various letters to the officer for issuing an NOC. The Society also together with its letter of 13.08.2019 attached the letter of SAFEMA Officer dated 30.07.2017. On 14.08.2019 and 16.09.2019, the petitioner addressed various letters to the officer for issuing an NOC. It is also pointed out by the petitioner that the society had informed them that they had registered transfers and recorded names of the petitioners in accordance with the sale deeds. 2.4 Having failed to elicit any response for a request that the petitioner be permitted to transfer the properties to this buyer and an NOC be issued, the petition was filed. On 08.01.2020, this court issued notice to the respondents and it was made returnable on 22.01.2020. It was on 15.01.2020 that the impugned notice and the letter of 20.01.2020 were issued by the authorities which caused the petitioner to amend the petition and challenge these impugned communications. 3. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate for the petitioner has made the following submissions: (I) The provisions of Chapter VA do not apply to the petitioner and hence the notice issued under Section 68H has been without jurisdiction. He would further submit that reliance placed on Section 68A (2)(f) is misplaced. He would submit that Section (f) would cover holders of property referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) or clause (cc) of Section 68 A(2). The present case, even if the allegations are accepted on the face value, the property was held by Mrs. Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal who are covered under Section 68A (2)(d). Therefore, according to Mr. Joshi, the provision is wrongly applied. (II) Issuance of notice has also been without fulfilment of pre-condition provided under Section 68H. Drawing attention to the provisions of Section 68H, it is submitted that at the outset, it can be seen that by virtue of the said section, the applicability of the provisions of NDPS are extended not only to the person to whom the chapter applies but also any other person who holds the property for and on behalf of such person. It may be important to note that the respondent has not invoked the said portion of the provision. It is not the case of the respondent that property is held for and on behalf of someone else or that the petitioner did not have means for purchasing the said property. It may be important to note that the respondent has not invoked the said portion of the provision. It is not the case of the respondent that property is held for and on behalf of someone else or that the petitioner did not have means for purchasing the said property. On the contrary, it is the specific case of the respondent that the petitioner was covered under Section 68A (2) (f), which as pointed hereinabove, was not at all applicable to the facts of the case. (III) Drawing further attention to another requirement of the section, it is submitted that the said section mandates that notice can be issued if having regard to various factors as enumerated therein, the competent authority is of the reason to believe that the property is illegally acquired. The notice as also the reasons enclosed therewith, do not disclose any consideration of the factors mentioned in the said Section. The phrase ‘having regard to’ and ‘reason to believe’ makes the above consideration a mandatory step before the issuance of show cause notice. Failure to adhere to such a jurisdictional fact renders the issuance of show cause notice bad in law and without jurisdiction. A perusal of the case of the respondent on the contrary clearly shows that reason to believe as extended by the respondent, is a clear sham and patently incorrect. The applicability of the provisions of the aforesaid act has a very serious impact over the right of the person on his own property and therefore, the mandate and procedure provided under the Act has to be strictly followed and cannot be invoked in a callous manner. In support of this submission, Mr. Joshi has relied on the following decisions: (a) Fatima Mohd. Amin vs. Union of India reported in 2003 (7) SCC 436 [Para 7, 8 and 9] (b) Rajesh Kumar vs. Dy. CIT reported in 2007 (2) SCC 181 [Para 11, 12 and 53] (c) Aslam Mohammad Merchant vs. Competent Authority reported in 2008 (14) SCC 186 [Para 37 to 42 and 50 to 54] (IV) The respondent has also failed to substantiate the allegation that the property in question was ever owned by Ms. Shantaben and Bhartiben Panchal. Admittedly, the said person had entered into an agreement to sell with the original owner. The said agreement to sell was never taken forward and the land was never sold to them. Shantaben and Bhartiben Panchal. Admittedly, the said person had entered into an agreement to sell with the original owner. The said agreement to sell was never taken forward and the land was never sold to them. It is also not the case of the respondent that the property was ever owned by the convict, Mr. Bipin Panchal. The authorities have thus, failed to show that the convict or Ms. Shantaben and Bhartiben Panchal were ever legal owners of the property in any manner known to law. On the contrary, the admitted facts show that the property was purchased by the petitioner from Dilip Soni under a registered sale deed. The issuance of notice has thus, been without application of mind to the fact that agreement to sell does not automatically tantamount to a sale. (V) Even if the said argument is accepted, the authority has curiously failed to take note of the second agreement to sell entered into with M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. If the agreement to sell is treated as a sale transaction, the property in question was undoubtedly sold to M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. The bonafides of the said transaction have not been doubted or disputed. In such circumstances, all transaction subsequent to the said sale also cannot be doubted and called into question. (VI) The petitioner group has been a bonafide buyer of the property and adequate consideration has also been paid. The respondent in the notice has alleged that inadequate consideration was paid by the petitioner group. To substantiate the said allegation, the respondent has referred to various subsequent transfer. The respondent has however, while raising the said allegation, neither noted nor appreciated that the subsequent transfers were within the petitioner group itself. The respondent authority has also failed to take note of and appreciate the existence of the 2nd agreement to sell, as a consequence to which the property in question came into the possession of the petitioner group for the same consideration. In such circumstances, provisions of Section 68A (2) (f) even otherwise did not apply. The petitioner further submits that such subsequent transfers of the property in question would even otherwise disentitle the respondents from questioning the valuation of the earlier transfers. The suggestion that the valuation of the transfers was not proper is based on mere presumptions and assumptions and not based on any document in possession of the respondents. The petitioner further submits that such subsequent transfers of the property in question would even otherwise disentitle the respondents from questioning the valuation of the earlier transfers. The suggestion that the valuation of the transfers was not proper is based on mere presumptions and assumptions and not based on any document in possession of the respondents. On the contrary, the valuation adopted for the transfer by the petitioner were in line with the jantri rate and were even otherwise, documented and disclosed on registered sale deeds. The relevant authorities have never questioned such valuation. The petitioner therefore, submits that the allegation of valuation is only a ploy to misguide this Court. (VII) The issuance of notice after almost 15 years also suffers from glaring delay. Though no specific period of limitation is provided under the Act, but the facts of the present case clearly show that the action taken by the respondent has not been bonafide or even within a reasonable period of time. It is a matter of fact on record that in response to the first letter issued by the respondent, all the relevant information was available with it in the month of August, 2007 itself. Despite having all the relevant information with it, the respondent authority consciously did not take any step against the said property for 13 years. It was only as a reaction to the present petition filed by the petitioner, that the impugned notice has been issued by the respondent. Thus, the issuance of notice has not been bonafide and also suffers from gross delay. Various other arguments are raised by the petitioners in the rejoinder/draft amendment which also shows that the initiation of the proceeding has been without any authority of law. 4. Mr. Harsheel Shukla, learned advocate for the respondents would invite the attention of the court to the recitals in the sale deed of 15.03.2000 and read them in context of the affidavit in reply filed by the respondents. He would submit as under: (a) Mrs. Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal – mother and wife of Bipinbhai Panchal who was arrested on 08.11.1993 under the NDPS Act purchased the property in question from Shri Dilipbhai Jasubhai Soni and Shri Sangam Jasubhai Soni. He would further submit that reading of sale deed dated 16.03.2000 would suggest that Shantaben and Bhartiben were confirming party no. Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal – mother and wife of Bipinbhai Panchal who was arrested on 08.11.1993 under the NDPS Act purchased the property in question from Shri Dilipbhai Jasubhai Soni and Shri Sangam Jasubhai Soni. He would further submit that reading of sale deed dated 16.03.2000 would suggest that Shantaben and Bhartiben were confirming party no. 1 and therefore were termed as Affected Parties 2 and Affected Parties 3 whereas Bipin Panchal the person convicted in the year 2003 was Affected Party 1 - the son and the husband of AP 2 and AP 3 respectively. The property then changed hands for the same consideration of Rs. 30 lakhs in the year 2000 when in fact it was owned by Shantaben and Bhartiben through Dilip and Sangam Soni. It was in this context that the letter dated 30.07.2017 was written by the authorities to the society asking them to provide ownership details and also asking them not to allow transfer of the impugned property. (b) 3/4th part of the property was sold by Girishbhai HUF, his wife Bhartiben and his son Arpit AP 7 to Girishbhai Patel for a consideration of 75 lakhs. Again, in the year 2012, Girishbhai Patel AP-4 sold it to the HUF for Rs.1,83,00,000. It was in this context, when the authorities found that the property changed hands in the year 2000 at the same consideration of Rs. 30 lakhs which was paid by Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal, there was reason to believe that the property was illegally acquired by them for inadequate consideration. He would, therefore, submit that since the petitioner was subsequent purchaser and now the holder of illegal property, he was also given the impugned notice dated 15.01.2020. (c) Reading the contents of the affidavit-in-reply, Mr. Shukla would therefore submit that on the basis of the impugned notice, reasons to believe have been recorded by the authorities. It is at the show cause notice stage and the contention of Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel that they are without jurisdiction are misconceived and therefore a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be entertained. (d) In support of his submissions, Mr. It is at the show cause notice stage and the contention of Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel that they are without jurisdiction are misconceived and therefore a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be entertained. (d) In support of his submissions, Mr. Shukla relied on a decision of this court in Special Civil Application No. 4472 of 2018 in the case of Maltiben Bachubhai Aloria and a decision of the Division Bench rendered in LPA No. 1053 of 2003 to contend that the issue is still at a show cause notice stage and therefore no interference is warranted in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. To the submissions so made by Mr. Shukla, learned advocate for the respondent, Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in rejoinder thereto would contend as under: (i) The initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner is even otherwise unwarranted in view of the fact that the same completely disregards the agreement to sell entered into between the erstwhile owners and M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. Drawing attention to the registered sale deed, it is submitted that a perusal of the same in favour of the petitioner clearly reflects that soon after the agreement to sell entered into between the erstwhile owners and Smt. Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal, another registered agreement to sell was entered into between the erstwhile owners and M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals on 23.04.1993 where not only the entire consideration was paid but even the possession of property was handed over to M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. Without prejudice to the submission that mere agreement to sell does not tantamount to be sale of property, it is submitted that if the transaction between the erstwhile owners and Smt. Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal are treated as a deemed sale, the agreement to sell between the erstwhile owner and M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals would also have to be regarded as a transaction of sale. Keeping this in view, it is submitted that it may be appreciated that bonafides of transaction between the erstwhile owners and M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals have not been questioned or doubted. The consideration paid pursuant to the said transaction has also not been questioned. Moreover, despite knowledge of the said agreement to sell, no proceeding has been initiated against M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. The consideration paid pursuant to the said transaction has also not been questioned. Moreover, despite knowledge of the said agreement to sell, no proceeding has been initiated against M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals. Reference in this regard may be made to the second part of clause (f) of sub-section (2) to Section 68A which clarifies that scope of the said provision shall not include present holder or, as the case may be, any one who held such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration. Similar exclusion has also been envisaged under the definition of the term ‘illegally acquired property’ as provided under Section 68B (g) (A) of the Act. As submitted, the bonafides of the transaction with M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals and the consideration paid thereof have not been questioned and, in such circumstances, proceedings could not have been initiated against the petitioners. (ii) In response to the submission regarding delay and laches, the respondents have relied upon the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Competent Authority vs. Mithu Bawa Padhiyar, where this Court has held that delay in issuance of notice should have been considered keeping in view the fact that the no accounts or other relevant materials of the property acquired by the smuggler was kept and it was for conducting such inquiries time was taken. It is submitted that in the said case, the petitioners were also the original accused against whom COFEPOSA proceedings were initiated. The facts of the present case on the other hand are completely different. No case has ever been initiated against the petitioner, M/s Paras Pharmaceuticals, erstwhile owners or even Smt. Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal. Moreover, the respondent authorities have also not alleged or even submitted that some information was hidden or not available with them. The pertinent sale deed through which the property in question was purchased by the petitioners was communicated to the respondent authorities way back in the year 2007. Perusal of the notice issued to the petitioners also reveals that no other information other than what was already mentioned in the said sale deed has been cited and relied upon by the authorities. Perusal of the notice issued to the petitioners also reveals that no other information other than what was already mentioned in the said sale deed has been cited and relied upon by the authorities. The non-initiation of any proceeding despite being equipped with all the relevant information, and also the proximity of it to the notice issued by this Court in the petition filed by the petitioner, clearly reflects that the initiation of the proceeding has not been bonafide and in consonance with the provisions of the law. (iii) So far as the contention of the respondents that petition should not be entertained as it is at the show cause notice stage and requires inquiry and scrutiny of detailed facts, it is submitted that the bar of entertaining petition at the stage of show cause notice is not a complete bar and petition would be maintainable if the concerned authorities have failed to establish the satisfaction of the jurisdictional fact precedent to initiation of the proceeding. In the present case, even if the allegation of the respondents are accepted, it is clear and evident that petitioners are not the persons covered under Section 68A to whom the provisions of Chapter VA apply. Perusal of the notice also reveals that respondent authorities have also not given any regard to the factors which are condition precedent to initiation of any proceeding under Section 68H. Thus, the assertions of the respondents for non-maintainability of the petition is unwarranted and untenable. 6. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties, the issue is that can it be said that the notice dated 15.01.2020 is without jurisdiction and the reasons to believe as explained in the said show cause notice are a sham and patently incorrect? Before going into deciding the issue, it will be pertinent to reproduce the relevant recitals of the sale deed dated 16.03.2000. The recitals read as under: “THIS INDENTURE MADE AT AHMEDABAD this 16th day of March Two Thousand BETWEEN SHRI DILIPBHAI JASUBHAI SONI, Self and as the Karta and Manager of his Hindu Undivided Family, adult of Ahmedabad, Indian Inhabitant, Indian Citizen, represented through his duly constituted Attorneys, Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal, Address: Rang Upavan Society, Opp. The recitals read as under: “THIS INDENTURE MADE AT AHMEDABAD this 16th day of March Two Thousand BETWEEN SHRI DILIPBHAI JASUBHAI SONI, Self and as the Karta and Manager of his Hindu Undivided Family, adult of Ahmedabad, Indian Inhabitant, Indian Citizen, represented through his duly constituted Attorneys, Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal, Address: Rang Upavan Society, Opp. Meghalaya Flats, Naranpura, Ahmedabad – 380 013, hereinafter called 'THE VENDOR' (which expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include its members as at present and from time to time their respective heirs, executors and successors) of the First Part, (1) Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and (2) Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal, both adults, Indian Inhabitants, Indian Citizens, Address: Rang Upavan Society, Opp. Meghalaya Flats, Naranpura, Ahmedabad – 380 013, hereinafter called “THE CONFIRMING PARTIES NO. 1” (which (which expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include their respective heirs, legal representatives, executors and successors) of the Second Part, PARAS PHARMACEUTICALS LTD., a Company formed and registered under the law relating to Companies, represented through its Managing Director, Shri Girishbhai Naranbhai Patel Address: 6/B, Sattar Taluka Society, P.O. Navjivan, Ahmedabad, hereinafter called 'THE CONFIRMING PARTY NO. 2” (which expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include its successors and assigns) of the Third Part AND SHRI GIRISHBHAI NARANBHAI PATEL, adult, Indian Inhabitant, Indian Citizen, Address: 20/476, Satyagrah Chhavani, Satellite Road, Ahmedabad, hereinafter called “THE PURCHASER” (which expression shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include his heirs, legal representatives, executors, successors and assigns) of the Fourth Part. WHEREAS - 1. The Vendor herein and his brother, Shri Sangam Jasubhai Patel, prior to 4th February, 1992, were joint member and share holder of Satyagrah Chhavani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Society registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, under No. GH-1058, on 17th September, 1963 (Hereinafter referred to as the “Society”). They held five shares, each of the face value of Rs. 50=00, fully paid up, bearing. 2. The Vendor and his said brother, as allotted by the Society, held Plot No. 50, in Sector – 3, admeasuring about 500 Sq.yds. They held five shares, each of the face value of Rs. 50=00, fully paid up, bearing. 2. The Vendor and his said brother, as allotted by the Society, held Plot No. 50, in Sector – 3, admeasuring about 500 Sq.yds. equivalent to 418 sq.mts and construction of residential bungalow standing thereon, forming part of the land situate, lying and being at Vejalpur (sim), Taluka City, in the Registration District Ahmedabad and Sub District Ahmedabad – 4 (Paldi), bearing Survey Nos. 1157 and 1158. The said Plot No. 58, and construction of bungalow standing thereon are more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder written (hereinafter referred to as the “Said Plot and Bungalow”). 3. The Vendor and his said brother has purchased the Said Plot and Bungalow with the shares of the Society from one Sushilaben Gaurishanker Joshi, by a Deed of Conveyance, dated 3rd February, 1987, duly registered with the office of the Sub Registrar at Ahmedabad, under Sr.No. 1779. 4. The Vendor and his said brother, each having half share, agreed to sell their respective half share in the Said Plot and Bungalow, to the Confirming Parties No. 1, Shantaben Shantilal Panchal and Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal in equal share, by or under an Agreement for Sale, dated 4th February, 1992, duly registered with the office of the Sub Registrar at Ahmedabad, under Sr. No. 7360, at or for the price which calculated at Rs.7,50,000=00 (Rupees Seven lacs fifty thousand only), to be paid by each of the Confirming Parties No. 1 to the Vendor and also to his said brother, in all aggregating to Rs.30,00,000=00 (Rupees thirty lacs only) and on the other terms and conditions contained in the said agreement. 5. Full amount of consideration under the said agreement is duly paid / treated as paid by the Confirming Parties No. 1 to the Vendor and his said brother. Necessary Recording, dated 20th June, 1992 as regards receipt of part consideration of Rs.28,00,000=00 (Rupees twenty eight lacs only) has been executed by the Vendor and his said brother. The balance amount of Rs.2,00,000=00 (Rupees two lacs only) was retained, to be used or appropriated towards the expenses of stamp duty and registration charges on final document of sale, to be borne and paid by the Vendor and his said brother. 6. The balance amount of Rs.2,00,000=00 (Rupees two lacs only) was retained, to be used or appropriated towards the expenses of stamp duty and registration charges on final document of sale, to be borne and paid by the Vendor and his said brother. 6. The Vendor and his said brother handed over the vacant and peaceful possession of the Said Plot and Bungalow to the Confirming Parties No. 1 and necessary Possession Agreement was made and executed simultaneously with the said Agreement for Sale. The Vendor and his said brother also gave Irrevocable Power of Attorney with respect to the Said Plot and Bungalow to the Confirming Parties No. 1, with power to sell – complete sale. 7. Thereafter the Confirming Parties No. 1 agreed for sale of the Said Plot and Bungalow to the Confirming Parties No. 2, by or under an Agreement for Sale, dated 24th April, 1993 duly registered with the office of the Sub Registrar at Ahmedabad under Sr. No. 9082, at or for the same price and on the same terms and conditions. This agreement is also executed by the Vendor and his said brother as the Confirming Party. 8. The possession already received by the Confirming Parties No. 1 as stated hereinafter was also handed over to the Confirming Party No. 2 and necessary Possession Agreement was made and executed by and between the Vendor and his said brother and the Confirming Parties No. 1 herein, dated 23rd April, 1993, attested by Public Notary wherein the reference of Irrevocable Power of Attorney given by the Vendor and his said brother, to the Confirming Parties No. 1 herein was also made. 9. The Confirming Party No. 2 has fully and finally paid the sum of Rs.14,00,000=00 (Rupees fourteen lacs only) to each of the Confirming Parties No. 1 herein and the said balance amount of Rs. 2,00,000=00 to be used and appropriated towards stamp duty and registration charges as aforesaid. 10. The Confirming Parties have requested the Vendor to execute in favour of the Purchaser from his one-half share, conveyance of his one-eighth of his undivided share in the said Plot and Bungalow with similar share in the said shares of the Society, at or for the same price and consideration of Rs.3,75,000=00 (Rupees three lacs seventy five thousand only), which the Vendor has agreed to do in the manner as hereinafter appearing. NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH that IN CONSIDERATION of the premises contained hereinabove AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the hereinbefore recited Agreement for Sale, dated 4th February, 1992 AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the Possession Agreement and Irrevocable Power of Attorney with respect to the Said Plot and Bungalow executed by the Vendor and his said brother in favour of the Confirming Parties No. 1 herien AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the hereinbefore recited Agreement for Sale, dated 23rd April, 1993 AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the hereinbefore recited Possession Agreement, also dated 23rd April, 1993 AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION of the sum of Rs.3,50,000=00 (Rupees three lacs fifty thousand only) (the proportionate eighth share from the total consideration paid under the said agreements) paid by the confirming Parties No. 1 to the Vendor, and paid and reimbursed by the Confirming Party No. 2 to the Confirming Parties No. 1, and paid and reimbursed by the Purchaser to the Confirming Party No. 2 AND IN FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF the sum of Rs.25,000=00 (Rupees twenty five thousand only), consideration proportionately under the said agreements (payment and receipt whereof, the Vendor, the Confirming Parties No. 1 and Confirming Party No. 2 do hereby admit and acknowledge and of and from every part thereof for ever acquit, release and discharge Purchaser)....” 6.1 From the recitals in the sale deed of 16.03.2000, the following chain of transactions concerning the property in question can be culled out. (a) Shantaben Shantilal Panchal (AP-2) – mother of Bipinbhai Panchal (AP-1) and Bhartiben Bipinbhai Panchal (AP-3) – wife of Bipinbhai Panchal (AP-1) were confirming parties no. 1 and constituted attorneys of Dilipbhai Jasubhai Soni. (b) Dilipbhai Soni and Sangam Soni entered into an agreement to sell on 04.02.1992 and the agreed consideration for which the Bungalow was to be sold to Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal was Rs. 30,00,000/-. The sale deed expressly records that full amount of consideration under the said agreement is duly paid/treated as paid by confirming parties no. 1 i.e. AP-2 and AP-3, Shantaben and Bhartiben respectively. (c) A receipt of part consideration of Rs. 28,00,000/- has been executed by the vendor Dilipbhai and his brother and the balance amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- was retained to be used or appropriated towards the expenses of stamp duty and registration charges on final document of sale. 1 i.e. AP-2 and AP-3, Shantaben and Bhartiben respectively. (c) A receipt of part consideration of Rs. 28,00,000/- has been executed by the vendor Dilipbhai and his brother and the balance amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- was retained to be used or appropriated towards the expenses of stamp duty and registration charges on final document of sale. (d) Peaceful and vacant possession of the bungalow and plot were handed over to Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal. A possession agreement was made and executed simultaneously with the agreement to sale. (e) The vendors also gave an irrevocable power of attorney with respect to the plot and the bungalow to Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal with power to sell – complete sale. (f) Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal (AP-2 and AP-3 respectively) under an agreement to sell dated 23.04.1993 executed by Mr. Dilip Soni and Mr. Sangam Soni agreed to sell the plot and the bungalow at the same price and on the same terms and conditions to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals represented through its Managing Director Mr. Girishbhai Naranbhai Patel. The possession of the property which was with Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal was handed over to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals. (g) The property then passed on the pro-rata shares to Mr. Girishbhai Patel and Ms. Bhartiben Patel (AP-4 and AP-6), Girishbhai Patel HUF (AP-5) and Arpit Patel (AP-7) for a consideration of Rs.30,00,000/-, the same at which Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal had purchased for. Both of them were signatories as confirming parties to the sale deed. 6.2 These chain of transactions from the sale deed indicate that : (I) On 04.02.1992, the property was in the hands of Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal. Mr. Dilip Soni and Mr. Sangam Soni had issued a receipt of 20.06.1992 of having received consideration with balance towards stamp duty. Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal were also handed over vacant possession of the plot and the bungalow. They also had the power to sell. (II) It is in this context that both Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal (AP-2 and AP-3) in their capacity as confirming parties no. 1 and in possession of the plot and the bungalow entered into an agreement to sell on 23.04.1993 and handing over possession to Paras Pharmaceuticals (Confirming Party No. 3) for same consideration. (II) It is in this context that both Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal (AP-2 and AP-3) in their capacity as confirming parties no. 1 and in possession of the plot and the bungalow entered into an agreement to sell on 23.04.1993 and handing over possession to Paras Pharmaceuticals (Confirming Party No. 3) for same consideration. Girishbhai Patel (AP-4) was the Managing Director of M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals. (III) On 16.03.2000 though the vendor is projected as Mr. Dilip Soni and Mr. Sangam Soni, the preceding chain of transactions would indicate that the source of the property changing hands was from possession being transferred to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals by Shantaben Panchal and Bhartiben Panchal (AP-2 and AP-3). Girishbhai Patel and Girishbhai Patel HUF then on 16.03.2000 took 1/8th share each for Rs.3,75,000/-. Therefore, Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal who had paid Rs.30,00,000/- in 1992 handed over the possession to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals who in turn sold to AP-4 to AP-7 for the same consideration on 16.03.2000. (IV) If Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal had no interest in the property, they would not have been signatories as confirming parties no. 1 in the sale deed. That albeit, as Mr. Joshi would submit that there was only an agreement to sell inter se between Mr. Dilip Soni/Sangam Soni and Smt. Shantaben Panchal/Bhartiben Panchal on 04.02.1992 with no sale deed. Recitals in the sale deed of 16.03.2000 itself indicate that full consideration was received except expenses towards stamp duty by Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal. Possession was handed over after signing a possession agreement and they had a clear right to deal with the properties. (V) To submit as he did, Mr. Joshi that what the respondents have lost sight of is the fact that in between the property also changed hands as was sold to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals is nothing but a smoke screen. Reading the chain of transactions, it is clear that the property moved from the possession of Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal as owners to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals of which Mr. Girishbhai Patel is the Managing Director to Girishbhai Patel HUF (AP-5) and others for the same consideration. The link between the sale from AP-2 /AP-3 to Girishbhai Patel HUF and others i.e. AP-4 to AP-7 was through M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals for the same consideration. Girishbhai Patel is the Managing Director to Girishbhai Patel HUF (AP-5) and others for the same consideration. The link between the sale from AP-2 /AP-3 to Girishbhai Patel HUF and others i.e. AP-4 to AP-7 was through M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals for the same consideration. (VI) That, both Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal were confirming party no. 1 and M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals as confirming party no. 2 as signatories to such agreements and the sale deed is undisputed which links these transactions. (VII) It is in the background and context of these facts that the various internal transfers on 25.09.2009 and 01.11.2012 have to be viewed. The reference to these transfers on much higher consideration than the past transaction has given the authorities reason to believe that the transfer in favour of AP-2 and AP-3 was for inadequate consideration and the property therefore was illegally acquired property. This reason to believe has also to be viewed from the fact that Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal as owners in 1993 sold the property to Girishbhai Patel HUF after 7 years for the same consideration. That the plot and bungalow were their property as defined under the Act will be clear when we consider them in context of the sections invoked, namely Section 68A and 68H of the NDPS Act, 1985. It is in this context that the authority in its reasons to believe states as under: “8.1 Whereas from the above discussed findings, it transpires that the impugned property purchased by AP-2 and AP-3 on 04.02.1992 for a consideration of Rs.30,00,000/- was sold by executing 8 sale deeds on 16.03.2000 to AP04, AP-5, AP-6 and AP-7 for a consideration of Rs.30,00,000/- only, which shows that there was no change in sale consideration even after 8 years from the date i.e. 04.02.1992 on which the AP-2 and AP-3 purchased the impugned property. The further transactions made in respect of the above said property vide sale deed No. 9321 of 2009 executed on 25.09.2009 and sale deed No. 6541 of 2012 executed on 01.11.2012 makes it apparent that there was a steep rise of 300% and 250% respectively in the sale consideration of the impugned property, though it was sold within the family of AP-4. The property which was purchased by Ap-2 and AP-3 for a consideration of 30,00,000/- in 1992 was transferred to AP-4, AP-5, AP-6 and AP-7 after 8 years in 2000 for the same consideration of Rs.30,00,000/- and 3/4th part of the same property was transferred by AP-5, AP-6 and AP-7 to AP-4 after 9 year in 2009 for 75,00,000 and thereafter the entire property was again transferred by AP-4 to AP-5 after 3 years in 2012 for a consideration of Rs.1.83 crores. This fact lead to a clear inference that property was transferred in 2000 which is an inadequate consideration.” 7. The relevant sections invoked and which are necessary to interpret are as under: 68. Information as to commission of offences.-No officer acting in exercise of powers vested in him under any provision of this Act or any rule or order made thereunder shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to the commission of any offence. *68A. Application. (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply only to persons specified in sub-section (2). (2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are the following, namely:. *68A. Application. (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply only to persons specified in sub-section (2). (2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are the following, namely:. (a) every person who has been convicted of an offence punishable under this Act with imprisonment for a term of 1[ten] years or more; (b) every person who has been convicted of a similar offence by a competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India; (c) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), or under the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (J & K Act XXIII of 1988): Provided that such order of detention has not been revoked on the report of the Advisory Board constituted under the said Acts or such order of detention has not been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction; 2[(cc) every person who has been arrested or against whom a warrant or authorisation of arrest has been issued for the commission of an offence punishable under this Act with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, and every person who has been arrested or against whom a warrant or authorisation of arrest has been issued for the commission of a similar offence under any corresponding law of any other country.] (d) every person who is a relative of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) 2[or clause (cc)]; (e) every associate of a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) 2[or clause (cc)]; (f) any holder (hereafter in this clause referred to as the present holder) of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) 2[or clause (cc)]; unless the present holder or, as the case may be, any one who held such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration. *68B. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,. *68B. Definitions.- In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,. (g) “illegally acquired property”, in relation to any person to whom this Chapter applies, means,- (i) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Chapter, wholly or partly out of or by means of any income, earnings or assets derived or obtained from or attributable to 1[the contravention of any provisions of this Act]; or (ii) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Chapter, for a consideration, or by any means wholly or partly traceable to any property referred to in sub-clause (i) or the income or earning from such property, and includes- (A) any property held by such person which would have been, in relation to any previous holder thereof, illegally acquired property under this clause if such previous holder had not ceased to hold it, unless such person or any other person who held the property at any time after such previous holder or, where there are two or more such previous holders, the last of such previous holders is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration; (B) any property acquired by such person, whether before or after the commencement of this Chapter, for a consideration, or by any means, wholly or partly traceable to any property falling under item (A), or the income or earnings therefrom; (h) “property” means property and assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, derived from, or used in the illicit traffic; (j) “tracing” means determining the nature, source, disposition, movement, title or ownership of property; *68C. Prohibition of holding illegally acquired property.- (1) As from the commencement of this Chapter, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this Chapter applies to hold any illegally acquired property either by himself or through any other person on his behalf. Prohibition of holding illegally acquired property.- (1) As from the commencement of this Chapter, it shall not be lawful for any person to whom this Chapter applies to hold any illegally acquired property either by himself or through any other person on his behalf. (2) Where any person holds any illegally acquired property in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1), such property shall be liable to be forfeited to the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: 1[Provided that no property shall be forfeited under this Chapter if such property was acquired, by a person to whom this Act applies, before a period of six years from the date he was arrested or against whom a warrant or authorisation of arrest has been issued for the commission of an offence punishable under this Act or from the date the order or detention was issued, as the case may be.] *68H. Notice of forfeiture of property.- (1) If, having regard to the value of the properties held by any person to whom this Chapter applies, either by himself or through any other person on his behalf, his known sources of income, earnings or assets, and any other information or material available to it as a result of a report from any officer making an investigation under section 68E or otherwise, the competent authority has reason to believe (the reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing) that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties, it may serve a notice upon such person (hereinafter referred to as the person affected) calling upon him within a period of thirty days specified in the notice to indicate the sources of his income, earnings or assets, out of which or by means of which he has acquired such property, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, should not be declared to be illegally acquired properties and forfeited to the Central Government under this Chapter. (2) Where a notice under sub-section (1) to any person specifies any property as being held on behalf of such person by any other person, a copy of the notice shall also be served upon such other person: 1[Provided that no notice for forfeiture shall be served upon any person referred to in clause (cc) of sub-section (2) of section 68A or relative of a person referred to in that clause or associate of a person referred to in that clause or holder of any property which was at any time previously held by a person referred to in that clause.]” 8. Regarding the argument of Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel that the notice is without jurisdiction as the petitioner was not covered under Section 68A(2)(f) and the allegation is wrong, let us appreciate this in context of the transaction in question. 8.1 The allegation in the notice is that AP-2 and AP-3 who were the purchasers of the property on 04.02.1992 did not have any ostensible source of income and the reasonable belief was that the sum of Rs.30,00,000/- invested for acquiring the impugned property were sourced from the income of AP-1. Further reasons to believe that the property was transferred in the year 2000 to the petitioner was for inadequate consideration. These facts can be reasonably believed on reading the recitals in the sale deed of the year 2000 and subsequent internal transfers. If the authority's reason to believe was restricted to Section 68A(2)(d) and mistaken invocation of Section 68(2)(f) of the Act, then the purpose of the reason to believe that a case of forfeiture of illegally acquired property by the holder i.e. the petitioner would fail. 8.2 The attempt of the authority to fortify its reason to believe that it is Shri Bipinbhai Panchal (AP-1)'s income which is the source of funding consideration for purchase of 1992 and the property was illegally acquired is based on the link in between of the sale of 1993 to M/s. Paras Pharmaceuticals who in turn sold it to the petitioner. The entire exercise of tracing i.e. determining the nature, source, disposition, movement, title or ownership of property needs to be investigated, hence the notice to the petitioners who are the last link in the chain of persons under Section 68A(2) of the Act. Therefore, Mr. The entire exercise of tracing i.e. determining the nature, source, disposition, movement, title or ownership of property needs to be investigated, hence the notice to the petitioners who are the last link in the chain of persons under Section 68A(2) of the Act. Therefore, Mr. Shukla would be right in submitting that the provision of Section 68A(2)(f) cannot be read in isolation. This provision has to be read with Section 68B(g) and Section 68B(h) and Section 68B(j). The authorities have to from all persons under Section 68A(2) elicit details to come to a conclusion whether the property is illegally acquired and therefore the holder is also a recipient of one of the affected persons. It is to get over this, the submission of Paras Pharmaceuticals being the confirming party no. 2 and the end of Smt. Shantaben Panchal and Smt. Bhartiben Panchal's role (AP-2 and AP-3) is pressed into service. 9. Reading the definition of 'property' in Section 68B(h) together with 'illegally acquired property' in Section 68B(g) shows that the definition is inclusive and includes any deed and instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property. The sale deed of 16.03.2000 is eloquent of the interest of AP-2 and AP-3 as elaborately discussed hereinbefore. The nexus therefore to come to reasonably believe that AP-1 is the source would bring in the property which is held by the petitioners. 10. A lot of stress was laid on the interpretation of Section 68H inasmuch as it was submitted that the reason to believe has to be with regard to various factors that the property is illegally acquired. The submission was that the notice does not disclose these factors. The factors and the transaction in question and deciphered would indicate otherwise. Reliance therefore placed by Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Counsel on the decision of Calcutta Discount Company vs. Income Tax Officer [ AIR 1961 SC 372 ] would not be of assistance. It cannot be said that the belief of authority is founded on mere suspicions. It is founded on the basis of evidence in terms of the recitals in the sale deeds. The notice therefore cannot be said to be a clear sham and therefore patently incorrect as the same is subject to further replies that may be filed by the petitioner. 11. It is founded on the basis of evidence in terms of the recitals in the sale deeds. The notice therefore cannot be said to be a clear sham and therefore patently incorrect as the same is subject to further replies that may be filed by the petitioner. 11. Unlike in the case of Aslam Mohammed Merchant (supra), it cannot be said that no material has been brought on record to show any nexus or link between the property sought to be forfeited. Reasons to believe recorded in the impugned notice cannot be said to be on the author's own ipse dixit. Based on the material placed before him, the author of the notice cannot be faulted to record reasons so stated which are prima facie. Even otherwise, as submitted by Mr. Harsheel Shukla, learned advocate for the respondent, the Division Bench of this court in the case of Mithu Bawa Padhiyar (supra) rendered a decision in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1053 of 2003 has held as under: “22. Apart from that the proceedings are at the Notice stage only. If the said two properties are acquired out of white money, then the competent authority would pass appropriate orders in that regard. However, considering the past record and criminal antecedents of the original petitioners and when different immovable and movable properties of the original petitioner have already been forfeited in the earlier proceedings arising out of notice dated 26.06.1986, we believe that the original petitioners should be put to the test of scrutiny, as it would also grant them the opportunity to come out with clean hands. 23. Further, the proceedings are at notice stage only. The learned single Judge set aside the impugned notices mainly on the ground that it was issued at a very belated stage. In our opinion, once the show-cause notice was issued, the learned single Judge could have directed the original petitioners to respond to the same and dispose of the writ petitions reserving liberty to them to take recourse to such remedy as may have been considered suitable by it depending upon the final order that the competent authority passed on the said notice. In cases where show cause notice is found to be totally non est in the eye of law for want of jurisdiction, it could be interfered with. In cases where show cause notice is found to be totally non est in the eye of law for want of jurisdiction, it could be interfered with. However, when there is no jurisdictional error, then such notices should not be interfered with, more particularly, when they relate to investigation of facts. Without investigation and enquiry, it is difficult to adjudicate that the immovable properties mentioned in the impugned notices do not come within the purview of the SAFEMA. In the absence of factual foundation, it would be impossible to decide matters of this kind at notice stage. The SAFEMA law is a complete code in itself and hence, it was not appropriate for the writ Court to entertain the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that to at the notice stage. 24. We do not agree with the view of the learned single Judge that an authority cannot issue notice or take action at any time and any number of times, if the statute does not prescribe the time limit for such action. It is true that there is delay in issuing the impugned notices. However, we believe that delay is to be considered inclusively, as it differs from case to case. In service matters, delay is an important aspect but, the same yardstick cannot be applied in matters involving smuggling and foreign exchange manipulations. Persons engaged in such activities do not keep regular and proper accounts with respect to such activities. Evasion of taxes is integral to such activity. In would be difficult for any authority to say, in the absence of any accounts or other relevant material, that among the properties acquired by a smuggler, which of them or portions thereof, are attributable to violation of law. It is probably for this reason that the burden of proving that the properties specified in the show cause Notice are not illegally acquired properties is placed upon the person concerned. The intent of the Legislature is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. For this reason also, the SAFEMA does not prescribe any time limit for issuance of show-cause notice u/s.6(1). 25. The next question that requires consideration is whether the competent authority had “reasons to believe” that the properties of the original petitioners are “illegally acquired properties” under the definition of SAFEMA. For this reason also, the SAFEMA does not prescribe any time limit for issuance of show-cause notice u/s.6(1). 25. The next question that requires consideration is whether the competent authority had “reasons to believe” that the properties of the original petitioners are “illegally acquired properties” under the definition of SAFEMA. Section 6(1) of the SAFEMA provides that the competent authority is empowered to serve a Notice of forfeiture upon such person whom it has reason to believe that all or any of the properties of such person is illegally acquired. The condition precedent for issuing a notice u/s.6(1) is that the authority should have reason to believe that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties and the reasons for such belief have to be recorded in writing. The language of the section does not show that there is any requirement of mentioning any link between the detenue and property ostensibly standing in the name of the person to whom the notice has been issued. Section 8 of SAFEMA states that the burden of proving that any properties specified in the Notice u/s.6 is not illegally acquired property shall be on the person affected.” 12. Even in the issue of maintainability of a petition against a show cause notice this court in the case of Maltiben Bachubhai Aloria (supra) rendered in Special Civil Application No. 4472 of 2018 has held as under: “5. The principles relating to interference by the courts, especially by the writ court, at the stage of show-cause notice, are not far to seek. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahm Datt Sharma [ (1987) 2 SCC 179 ], the Supreme Court observed in relation to a service matter that “when a show cause notice issued to a government servant under a statutory provision, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law”. It was stated that the purpose of issuing a show-cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the addressee of the notice and once the cause is shown, it is open to the government to consider the matter in light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. The Apex Court clearly stated that interference by the court before that stage could be premature. 5.1 In Union of India v. Kunisitty Satyanarayana [ (2006) 12 SCC 28 ], the Supreme Court stated again that a writ petition impugning the show-cause notice or charge-sheet could be premature and not maintainable except in a rare case. The Court observed that at such stage no right could be said to have been violated. “A writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.” (Para 14) 5.2 A show-cause notice almost invariably involves investigation into facts and since the questions raised in the show-cause notice would require inquiry and investigation after assessing the rival facts, it would have to be decided by the authorities concerned only and it would be improper for the High Court to interject at such stage in a writ jurisdiction. This principle was highlighted in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation Limited [ (1998) 9 SCC 576 ]. Also in Union of India v. Baja Tempo Limited [ (1998) 9 SCC 281 ] the Supreme Court was concerned with show-cause notice issued by the excise authority. Instead of reply such notice, the assessee filed writ petition denying the liability to pay the excise duty demanded. It was held that such a writ petition since involved the questions of fact, the appropriate remedy for the assessee was not to file a writ petition but to reply to the show-cause notice and thereafter only the assessee could approach the Tribunal or the High Court. 5.3 In response to every show-cause notice, the foundational facts are required to be established which could be done by responding to and filing reply to the show-cause notice, stated the Supreme Court in Coca Cola India Inc. 5.3 In response to every show-cause notice, the foundational facts are required to be established which could be done by responding to and filing reply to the show-cause notice, stated the Supreme Court in Coca Cola India Inc. v. Additional Commissioner of Income-Tax [(2010) 15 SCC 215]. There, instead of replying to the show-cause notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, writ petition was filed questioning the jurisdiction of the authorities to issue the show-cause notice. The Court relegated the assessee to exhaust statutory remedies asking to file reply to view that unless the foundational facts are cleared and established, no questions could be gone into in the writ jurisdiction. 5.4 A petition to challenge the action of the authorities at the pre-decisional stage was held to be premature by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Mesco Steels Limited [ (2013) 4 SCC 340 ]. It was held that at the pre-decisional stage, the facts stated could not be said to have constituting a decision and when the rights and obligations of the parties were not decided, the action must be treated as premature and High Court would not be justified in issuing mandamus but should allow the completion of decision making process in accordance with law. 5.5 The following was observed from the facts of that case. “It is obvious from a conjoint reading of letter dated 12-1-2006 and communication dated 19-9-2006 sent by the Director of Mines in response thereto that a final decision on the subject had yet to be taken by the Government, no matter the Government may have provisionally decided to follow the line of action indicated in its communication dated 12-1-2006 issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Department of Steel and Mines. It is noteworthy that there was no challenge to the communication dated 12-1-2006 before the High Court nor was any material placed before us to suggest that any final decision was ever taken by the Government on the question of deduction of the area granted in favour of the respondent so as to render the process of issue of show cause notice for hearing the respondent-company an exercise in futility.” (Para 19) 5.5.1 The Apex Court ruled, “On the contrary, the issue of the show-cause notice setting out the reasons that impelled the Government to claim resumption of a part of the proposed lease area from the respondent Company clearly suggested that the entire process leading up to the issue of the show-cause notice was tentative and no final decision on the subject had been taken at any level. It is only after the Government provisionally decided to resume the area in part or full that a show-cause notice could have been issued.” (Para 20) 5.6 Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Manan Mehta was entirely right in highlighting the similar principle from the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Vijaybhai N. Chandrani [(2013) 14 SCC 661] where the show-cause notice for re-assessment of income to the assessee was challenged before the High Court and the High Court had set aside the show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that there was no justification to resort to the remedy before the High Court at the first instance without invoking alternative remedy and the assessee could have addressed his grievance by way of responding to the show-cause notice and thereafter if the alternative remedy is available, ought to have availed the same. 5.7 When an authority issues a show-cause notice to a party asking and calling upon him to explain certain allegations or aspects raised in the show-cause notice, such action does not determine any right or obligation, nor have any adversarial effect as such until the final decision pursuant to the show-cause notice is taken, which would be normally after considering the stand of the party.” 13. Merely because the authority has issued this notice after filing of the petition would not make it bad only on that count. That is an additional ground that can be urged in response to the notice. Merely because the authority has issued this notice after filing of the petition would not make it bad only on that count. That is an additional ground that can be urged in response to the notice. The practice of entertaining writ petitions questioning the legality of the show cause notices which eventually stall inquiries as proposed has been deprecated by the Apex Court in various decisions. The petitioners can always respond to the show cause notice and take all contentions which are raised in the writ petition before the Authority. The very purpose of issuance of a show cause notice which record prima facie reasons is to seek a reply for the proposed actions thereunder, before initiation of adjudication proceedings. 14. For the reasons as aforesaid, petition being bereft of merits is dismissed. No order in Civil Application and the same is also disposed of accordingly.