JUDGMENT M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. - This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the order dt.24.01.2020 passed in Interlocutory Application No.1490 of 2019 in Original Suit No.781 of 2019 on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. 2. The appellant herein is plaintiff in the above suit. 3. The said suit was filed by appellant for specific performance of a registered Agreement of Sale dt.28.09.2011 in respect of 'A' Schedule property, and an oral Agreement of Sale dt.10.10.2014 in respect of 'B' Schedule property. 4. It is not in dispute that respondent nos.1 and 2 are co-sharers of 'A' and 'B' Schedule properties along with several others, and these properties form part of a large property of an extent 50,107 Sq.Yds. bearing Municipal No.14-2-335 [14-2-335/1], 14-2-334, 334/2 and 333, situated at Gyan Bagh Palace, Gosha Mahal, Hyderabad. 5. It is also not in dispute that the Gyan Bagh Palace was originally owned by one Late Raja Narshing Giriji, the great grandfather of respondent nos.1 and 2 / defendant nos.1 and 2, and on his death, the property was settled in favour of Late Raja Dhanraj Giriji by way of a Settlement Deed bearing No.75 of 1923 dt.09.04.1923. The father of respondent nos.1 and 2 / defendant nos.1 and 2 is Dhairyavangir Dhanraj Giriji, a brother of Raja Dhanraj Giriji. 6. It is also not in dispute that O.S.No.76 of 1970 was filed before the Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad by one Raja Mahender Giriji, S/o.Raja Dhanraj Giriji for partition of several properties including this above referred property and a preliminary decree was passed on 24.04.1986. 7. As per the preliminary decree dt.24.04.1986 passed in O.S.No.76 of 1970, the father of respondent nos.1 and 2 Raja Dhairyavangir Dhanraj Giriji got 23% of share in the land, but no final decree was passed in the said suit; and there is no division of the property by metes and bounds on the death of Raja Dhairyavangir Dhanraj Giriji, i.e., the father of respondent nos.1 and 2 on 19.11.1992. The respondent nos.1 and 2 became entitled to 11.5% share each, and this was confirmed in the amended preliminary decree dt.02.04.1993 in the above suit. The case of the appellant/plaintiff 8. It is the case of appellant that respondent nos.1 and 2 approached him and offered to sell 600 Sq.Yds. The respondent nos.1 and 2 became entitled to 11.5% share each, and this was confirmed in the amended preliminary decree dt.02.04.1993 in the above suit. The case of the appellant/plaintiff 8. It is the case of appellant that respondent nos.1 and 2 approached him and offered to sell 600 Sq.Yds. abutting the 40 feet wide road from out of the 25% undivided share of respondent nos.1 and 2 in the 50,107 Sq.Yds. property bearing Municipal No.14-2-335 [14-2-335/1] situate at Gyan Bagh Palace, Gosha Mahal, Hyderabad ('A' Schedule property), and received Rs.45 lakhs towards part consideration out of the total consideration of Rs.90 lakhs; and that they promised that Sale Deed would be executed in favour of the appellant after the partition by metes and bounds of the properties of their family as per the preliminary decree dt.24.04.1986 in O.S.No.76 of 1970. The said Agreement of Sale was registered as Ex.P.1 dt.08.06.2004 by the parties. 9. According to the appellant, the respondent nos.1 and 2 once again approached him and offered to sell another 1000 Sq.Yds. of property bearing Municipal No.14-2-334/2 ('B' Schedule property) forming part of the premises bearing No.14-2-335 [14-2-335/1] for Rs.2.5 crores, and the oral agreement was dt.10.10.2014 pursuant to which the appellant claims to have paid Rs.10 lakhs towards part sale consideration. The appellant also claimed to have financed a sum of Rs.42 lakhs for renovation and re-construction of the premises which was in a dilapidated condition on the request of respondent nos.1 and 2 from 10.10.2014 to 05.03.2019. 10. The appellant claims to have been put in possession of the I Floor of the A schedule property towards part performance of the registered Agreement of Sale dt.28.09.2011 and also oral Agreement of Sale dt.10.10.2014, and the appellant claims to be using the same as a godown after obtaining GST assessment and insurance. 11. The appellant also claims to have made a payment of Rs.1,62,50,000/- in cash to respondent nos.1 and 2 between 2017 to 2018 and alleged that respondent nos.1 and 2 assured that they would execute registered sale deeds soon after final decree was passed, and believing them, the appellant did not insist much because of faith and trust in respondent nos.1 and 2. 12. The appellant further contended that in January, 2019 he came to know that respondent nos.1 and 2 had executed a regd. 12. The appellant further contended that in January, 2019 he came to know that respondent nos.1 and 2 had executed a regd. Sale Deed Ex.P8 dt.18.08.2018 in favour of 3rd respondent in respect of 7042 Sq.yds. along with co-sharers by deliberately mentioning the premises number incorrectly. 13. The appellant claims to have then issued Ex.P.9 - Legal Notice dt.05.03.2019 calling upon respondent nos.1 and 2 to execute the sale deed and register it to which Ex.P.10 - Reply Notice was issued by respondent nos.1 and 2 denying all transactions. 14. The appellant therefore sought the following reliefs in the suit : "V. PRAYER : It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass a Judgment and Decree in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants as follows : (a) to direct the defendant nos.1 and 2 to perform their part of obligations under Agreement of Sale dt.28.09.2011 by receiving the balance sale consideration and executing and registering a Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule 'A' property and also direct defendant no.3 to join the Sale Deed, so as to avoid any further claims; (b) to direct defendant nos.1 and 2 to perform their part of obligations under oral Agreement of Sale dt.10.10.2014 by receiving the balance sale consideration and executing and registering a Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule 'B' property and also direct defendant no.3 to join the Sale Deed, so as to avoid any further claims; (c) in the event, if the defendants fail to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff or his nominees in terms of prayer (a), this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to execute the sale in favour of plaintiff; (d) to declare the Sale Deed bearing No.2980 of 2018 dt.18.08.2018 executed by defendant nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant no.3, as null and void; (e) to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice; and (f) to award costs in the suit. I.A.No.1490 of 2019 - stand of the appellant/plaintiff in the said IA 15. I.A.No.1490 of 2019 - stand of the appellant/plaintiff in the said IA 15. On 26.08.2019, the appellant filed I.A.No.1490 of 2019 in the said suit invoking Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 seeking an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the respondent nos.1 and 2 from alienating, encumbering or creating any third party rights over 'A' and 'B' Schedule properties reiterating the contents of the plaint. The stand of the respondents 1 and 2 in IA 16. Counter-Affidavit was filed by respondent nos.1 and 3 opposing grant of interim relief to appellant. 17. The respondents admitted the ownership of Gyan Bagh Palace by the family of respondent nos.1 and 2 and the passing of the preliminary decree on 24.04.1986 in O.S.No.6 of 1970 and also the shares allotted to them therein. It was admitted that the appellant was a friend of 1st respondent. 18. They denied that they approached the appellant and offered to sell 'A' Schedule property and executed Ex.P.6 registered Agreement of Sale dt.28.09.2011 in favour of appellant. 19. It was admitted that respondent nos.1 and 2 received Rs.45 lakhs from the appellant, but they contended that it was not towards part sale consideration as alleged in the plaint. According to them, for necessity of family the amount was borrowed as a hand loan, and the 1st respondent agreed to repay the amount subject to execution of a security document in the form of Ex.P.6 - dt.28.09.2011. It was also contended that Ex.P.6 cannot be said to be a transaction of agreement of sale because it was in the nature of a contingent contract, and was a void document. 20. According to respondents, an application filed to pass final decree in O.S.No.6 of 1970 was dismissed on 18.12.2015; that the appellant was also aware of it; and since there is no final decree passed in the said suit, the appellant is not entitled to any relief in respect of Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011. 21. According to them, the contingency did not materialize, i.e., there was no partition by metes and bounds through a final decree in O.S.No.6 of 1970; and therefore, Ex.P.6 - Agreement of Sale became unenforceable and void. 22. 21. According to them, the contingency did not materialize, i.e., there was no partition by metes and bounds through a final decree in O.S.No.6 of 1970; and therefore, Ex.P.6 - Agreement of Sale became unenforceable and void. 22. This plea was raised as an alternative to the original defence that Ex.P.6 was only a security for the hand loan, and it was stated that even the amount of Rs.45 lakhs cannot be recovered by the appellant from respondent nos.1 and 2 because the said relief is timebarred. 23. The respondents 1 and 2 denied that there was any oral Agreement of Sale between the appellant and respondent nos.1 and 2 in respect of 'B' Schedule property. They contended that they received payment of Rs.10 lakhs by appellant on 15.05.2009, but it was stated that the said amount was repaid long back by 1st respondent. The receipt of Rs.42 lakhs from the appellant towards repairs and re-construction between 10.10.2014 and 05.03.2019 was denied. The delivery of possession by respondent nos.1 and 2 of 'A' and 'B' Schedule properties to the appellant was denied. It was also denied that the appellant paid Rs.1,62,50,000/- in respect of 'B' Schedule property. 24. It is contended that the Sale Deed executed in favour of 3rd respondent Ex.P.8 dt.18.08.2018 is valid. According to respondents, there is no ambiguity in respect of identity of 7042 Sq.Yds. sold by all the family members in favour of 3rd respondent under Ex.P.8 - Sale Deed dt.18.08.2018. 25. According to them, the property covered by the registered Agreement of Sale Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011 is incapable of being identified; and even the 'B' Schedule property is incapable of identification. According to respondents, the properties sold to the 3rd respondent were entirely different from what is being claimed by the appellant in the suit. They, therefore, sought for dismissal of I.A.No.1490 of 2019. The events in the trial court and the order passed by it in IA.1490 of 2019 26. Before the Trial Court, the appellant marked Exs.P.1 to P.13. The respondents did not mark any document. 27. By order dt.24.01.2020, the Court below dismissed I.A.No.1490 of 2019. 28. They, therefore, sought for dismissal of I.A.No.1490 of 2019. The events in the trial court and the order passed by it in IA.1490 of 2019 26. Before the Trial Court, the appellant marked Exs.P.1 to P.13. The respondents did not mark any document. 27. By order dt.24.01.2020, the Court below dismissed I.A.No.1490 of 2019. 28. It observed that there is a dispute whether Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011 is an Agreement of Sale or it was a document executed as a security for a hand loan, and the oral Agreement of Sale dt.10.10.2014 pleaded by appellant was denied by respondent nos.1 and 2, and the same was also in dispute. It held that enforceability of Ex.P.6 is subject to division of property by metes and bounds in O.S.No.76 of 1970 as per the preliminary decree which was amended, and since there is no dispute that final decree petition was dismissed in 2015, whether the Agreement of Sale Ex.P.6 is enforceable or not, would be considered in the suit. 29. It also noted that a suit O.S.No.561 of 2019 was filed for cancellation of Ex.P.6 Agreement of Sale by respondents 1 and 2; that possession of the appellant over the subject property is also denied; that in an order dt.06.02.2019 passed by this Court in C.M.A.No.61 of 2019 arising out of O.S.No.76 of 1970, this Court had directed that there should be no alienation of property, i.e., the subject matter of O.S.No.76 of 1970; and that respondent nos.1 and 2 were also parties in the said C.M.A. as respondent nos.7 and 8. 30. It then concluded that the appellant did not establish prima facie case to the 'A' and 'B' Schedule properties; and that the subject matter of Ex.P.6 - Agreement remains unidentified because the final decree petition was dismissed. The present CMA 31. Assailing the same, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed. 32. The counsel for appellant contended that the Court below erred in dismissing I.A.No.1490 of 2019 and it ought to have allowed it taking note of the fact that the execution of Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011 or receipt of Rs.45 lakhs was not denied. He contended that respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot say that it is only a deed of security for the borrowing of Rs.45 lakhs when the contents of Ex.P.6, which is a registered Agreement of Sale, state otherwise. He contended that respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot say that it is only a deed of security for the borrowing of Rs.45 lakhs when the contents of Ex.P.6, which is a registered Agreement of Sale, state otherwise. It is contended that the Court should have presumed Ex.P.6 - Agreement of Sale to be valid for all purposes and should have granted injunction to respondent nos.1 and 2. It was denied that Ex.P.6 - Agreement of Sale was a contingent contract and it was pointed out that conveyance of title in respect of suit schedule properties to the appellant is not made subject to the result of the final decree proceedings. It was contended that Clause (v) of Ex.P.6 obligates the respondents to do any act necessary to convey effective title, right or interest in respect of suit schedule properties, and the Court should have seen that the Sale Deed in favour of 3rd respondent is fraudulent to defeat the rights of appellant. 33. Sri L. Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent nos.1 and 2 and Sri P. Shiv Kumar, counsel appearing for 3rd respondent, refuted the said contentions and supported the order passed by the Court below. 34. We have noted the contentions of both sides. The consideration by the Court 35. From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the appellant is seeking specific performance in the suit of a document styled as registered Agreement of Sale Ex.A6 dt.28.09.2011 and also oral Agreement of Sale dt.10.10.2014. 36. It may be that respondents have taken a plea that Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011 was not an Agreement of Sale and it was intended to be a document of security for hand loan of Rs.45 lakhs which the appellant had provided to respondent nos.1 and 2. It may also be that respondent nos.1 and 2 had filed O.S.No.561 of 2019 on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking cancellation of Ex.P.6 dt.28.09.2011. 37. But there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed and is prima facie valid in law. The onus of proof would be on the respondents to prove otherwise and they need to lead evidence to rebut the presumption [See Prem Singh and others vs. Beebal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 Para 27] 38. It is admitted by respondents 1 and 2 that they had received Rs.45 lakhs from the appellant. The onus of proof would be on the respondents to prove otherwise and they need to lead evidence to rebut the presumption [See Prem Singh and others vs. Beebal and others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 Para 27] 38. It is admitted by respondents 1 and 2 that they had received Rs.45 lakhs from the appellant. The contents of Ex.P.6 when taken in totality do not indicate prima facie that it is a document which is in the nature of a security for a hand loan. Under this Ex.P.6, it is clearly mentioned that respondent nos.1 and 2 had agreed to part with title to 600 Sq.Yds as and when it is ultimately divided / partitioned wholly or partly by metes and bounds by the Civil Court in O.S.No.76 of 1970 for consideration of Rs.90 lakhs. This recital in Ex.P.6 cannot be ignored by the Trial Court by merely observing that the nature of Ex.P.6 as an Agreement of Sale is disputed. 39. It is also the plea of respondent nos.1 and 2 that Ex.P.6 is a contingent contract, and that since the final decree was not passed in O.S.No.76 of 1970, it is incapable of enforcement. 40. Ex.P.6 document does not say that execution of Sale Deed pursuant to the agreement in Ex.P6 is subject to the result of the final decree petition. 41. In Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788 the Supreme Court declared: "14. A preliminary decree determines the rights and interests of the parties. The suit for partition is not disposed of by passing of the preliminary decree. It is by a final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes and bounds. After the passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues until the final decree is passed." 42. So when O.S.No.76 of 1970 is a partition suit and only a preliminary decree has been passed therein delineating the shares of the family members of respondent nos.1 and 2, there is a necessity to pass a final decree as well. 43. The legal position is also that as per the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, initiation of final decree proceedings does not depend upon filing of an application for final decree for such initiation and the Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate the procedure of filing of an application for final decree. 43. The legal position is also that as per the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, initiation of final decree proceedings does not depend upon filing of an application for final decree for such initiation and the Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate the procedure of filing of an application for final decree. When a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit, a final decree would have to be passed, which is the duty and function of the Court. Performance of such function does not require a reminder or nudge from the litigant. [See Shub Karan Bubna vs. Sita Saran Bubna, (2009) 9 SCC 689 ] 44. Clause (v) of Ex.P.6 states that respondent nos.1 and 2 should undertake and execute all such further or other things which may be required by the appellant for the better and more effectual conveyance of his right, title or interest arising out of or in relation to the 'A' Schedule property. The respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot therefore wash their hands off their obligations under Ex.P.6 prima facie, by stating that a final decree petition filed by somebody else got dismissed by the Trial Court. Indeed, it was the duty of respondent nos.1 and 2 to do things further to ensure that such final decree is passed. 45. In Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden vs. Dr. C.L. Katial and others, (1964) AIR SC 978 the Supreme Court held that if there is a condition in an agreement that the vendor would obtain the sanction of Chief Commissioner to a transaction of sale and the vendor did not do so, still it was held that specific performance cannot be rejected. It upheld the order of the High Court which granted decree of specific performance by directing the vendor to apply for sanction to the Chief Commissioner because the vendor had withdrawn such application. It held that the vendor was blame-worthy for not carrying out her part of the contract. It held: "4. The main ground of attack on this appeal is that the contract is not enforceable being of a contingent nature and the contingency not having been fulfilled. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. So far as the parties to the contract are concerned, they had agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. So far as the parties to the contract are concerned, they had agreed to bind themselves by the terms of the document executed between them. Under that document it was for the defendant-vendor to make the necessary application for the permission to the Chief Commissioner. She had as a matter of fact made such an application but for reasons of her own decided to withdraw the same. On the findings that the plaintiffs have always been ready and willing to perform the part of the contract, and that it was the defendant who willfully refused to perform her part of the contract, and that time was not of the essence of the contract, the court has got to enforce the terms of the contract and to enjoy upon the defendant-appellant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner. It will be for the Chief Commissioner to decide whether or not to grant the necessary sanction. 5. In this view of the matter, the High Court was entirely correct in decreeing the suit for specific performance of the contract. The High Court should have further directed the defendant to make the necessary application for permission to the Chief Commissioner, which was implied in the contract between the parties. As the defendant-vendor, without any sufficient reasons withdrew the application already made to the Chief Commissioner, the decree to be prepared by this Court will add the clause that the defendant, within one month from today, shall make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner or to such other competent authority as may have bean empowered to grant the necessary sanction to transfers like the one in question, and further that within one month of the receipt of that sanction she shall convey to the plaintiffs the property in suit. In the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to the damages as decreed by the High Court. ... ... ..." 46. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the passing of a final decree in OS.76 of 1970 has become impossible because it is possible that if there was a challenge to the earlier order passed dismissing the final decree petition on 18.12.2015, there could have been a different view from that taken by the trial court. ... ..." 46. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the passing of a final decree in OS.76 of 1970 has become impossible because it is possible that if there was a challenge to the earlier order passed dismissing the final decree petition on 18.12.2015, there could have been a different view from that taken by the trial court. But admittedly the respondents did not challenge the said order of the trial court refusing to pass final decree in the High Court to get the said decision reversed or modified. 47. It is settled law that there can be more than one preliminary decree and more than one final decree in a partition suit. In Rachakonda Venkat Rao v. R. Satya Bai, (2003) 7 SCC 452 the Supreme Court had held: "10. It is settled law that there can be more than one preliminary decrees in a suit. Similarly, there can be more than one final decrees in a suit." 48. It is not the case of the respondents 1 and 2 that they had attempted to get any final decree passed in the suit by filing an application either. 49. Therefore prima facie they cannot contend that Ex.P6 is a contingent contract, that the contingency failed and it has therefore become unenforceable. 50. In Hardeo Rai v. Sakuntala Devi, (2008) 7 SCC 46 the Supreme Court had held that once the share of a coparcener is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenery property; that the parties would be "tenants in common" and not "joint tenants"; and such a coparcener can also alienate his share. It held: " 21. Once the share of a coparcener is determined, it ceases to be a coparcenary property. The parties in such an event would not possess the property as "joint tenants" but as "tenants-incommon"...... 23. Where a coparcener takes definite share in the property, he is owner of that share and as such he can alienate the same by sale or mortgage in the same manner as he can dispose of his separate property." 51. Therefore since under Ex.P1, the respondents 1 and 2 have sold 600 sq.yds out of their 23% share in the above property subsequent to the preliminary decree being passed, it cannot be said such an alienation is contrary to law prima-facie. 52. Therefore since under Ex.P1, the respondents 1 and 2 have sold 600 sq.yds out of their 23% share in the above property subsequent to the preliminary decree being passed, it cannot be said such an alienation is contrary to law prima-facie. 52. In this view of the matter, any alienation of specific portion of the property which is subject matter of O.S.76 of 1970 by the respondents and rest of the share holders under Ex.P8 dt.18.8.2018 might potentially affect the prior right created in appellant under Ex.P6 agreement of sale dt.28.9.2011 as there is every possibility of the land sold to 3rd respondent including/covering the land which the appellant might get if his suit were to be decreed. This would cause serious prejudice to the appellant. 53. Therefore we are of the opinion, that the view of the trial court that the appellant did not make out prima facie case for grant of injunction as regards 'A' schedule property, is unsustainable. 54. However coming to 'B' schedule property, since the appellant had pleaded only an oral agreement of sale, we are of the view that the appellant has not made out at this stage prima facie case and that he is entitled to a temporary injunction. 55. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in part and allow IA No.1490 of 2019 in part and grant temporary injunction pending suit restraining all the respondents from alienating, encumbering or creating any third party rights over the A schedule property which is subject matter of OS No.781 of 2019. The plea of appellant for temporary injunction pending suit restraining all the respondents from alienating, encumbering or creating any third party rights over the B schedule property is however rejected. No order as to costs. 56. The Court below shall decide the suit uninfluenced by the observations made by us in this order and also the observations contained in the impugned order. 57. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any in this Appeal, shall stand closed.