ORDER : Ravikumar, J. All the captioned interlocutory applications are filed in A.S.No.689 of 1972, which was disposed of by this Court along with A.S.No.813 of 1972, more than four decades ago, to be precise, on 08.03.1978. A.S.No.689 of 1972 was filed challenging a preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.2 of 1969 of the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The suit was filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying for framing a scheme for Sree Narayana Trust, which is a public trust, and for such other reliefs. As per the impugned preliminary decree passed in the said 0.S, as relates to the issue of framing of scheme, the District Court held that the existing trust deed was not sufficient and that a scheme was to be framed. Thus, the fact is that no scheme was actually framed by the District Court and in the appeal against the said preliminary decree viz., in A.S.No.689 of 1972, this Court framed a scheme for S.N.Trust. Obviously, the said scheme is also appended to the judgment in A.S.No.689 of 1972 and the said appeals were disposed of by modifying the judgment and the preliminary decree. A direction was also given to the District Court as per the judgment in A.S.No.689 of 1972 to dispose of the suit by passing a final decree, in accordance with law and in the light of the findings and the directions made in the said judgment within the time stipulated therein. On verification, it is found that the suit itself was decreed and final judgment and decree were passed on 31.10.1980. 2. Heard the learned counsel on both sides. 3. Clause 34 therein is the source and the enabling provision for moving this Court. Clause 34 of the scheme originally appended to the judgment dated 08.03.1978 was as follows:- "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Honourable High Court of Kerala for appropriate modifications of the Scheme or for other directions, if any difficulty arises in the working of this scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust." The said clause was subsequently amended as per order dated 31.08.1987 in C.M.P.No.16895/1987. Clause 34 after such amendment reads as follows:- "Any member of the Board of Trustees may move the Honourable High Court of Kerala for appropriate modification of the Scheme." Thereafter, I.A.No.368/2016 was moved, also in A.S.No.689/1972, under clause 34 of the scheme read with Section 151 of CPC seeking an order to amend the said scheme further by incorporating another clause as Clause 34A. The said I.A. viz., I.A.No.368/2016 was allowed as per order dated 15.12.2016 passed thereon amendment sought was incorporated in the scheme as clause 34A and the newly incorporated clause 34A reads thus:- "34A. If any 10 members of the Board of Trustees or 100 voters electing the representatives of any denomination other than clause (a) to (c) of clause 3 shall have the right to approach High Court in the event of the office bearers of Trust or the executive committee violates the provisions of Trust Scheme or commit any breach of trust." 4. After allowing I.A.No.368/2016 for amending the scheme, this Court clarified the position thus:- "However, clause 34A will not entitle them to seek any reliefs as set out in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 92 of CPC in such an application, which is legally permissible only by way of a regular suit filed under Section 92, subject to the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 92 of CPC." 5. Clause 34 of the scheme appended to the judgment dated 08.03.1978 in A.S.No.689/1972 and the amendments brought to clause 34 by modification as per order dated 31.08.1987 in C.M.P.No.16895/1987 and the newly incorporated clause 34A as per order dated 15.12.2016 inI.A.No.368/2016 would reveal the jurisdiction retained by this Court in the matter. Vide the unamended clause 34 of the scheme appended to the judgment this Court retained the jurisdiction to consider modification of the scheme and to issue other directions, if any difficulty arises in the working of the scheme or if it is found necessary and expedient for the effective functioning of the Trust. However, for reasons stated in the order dated 31.08.1987 this Court excused itself from entertaining the matter except those which are fundamentally required to be under the control of the High Court only. However, for reasons stated in the order dated 31.08.1987 this Court excused itself from entertaining the matter except those which are fundamentally required to be under the control of the High Court only. In other words, as per the order dated 31.08.1987 the scope of right to move this Court under clause 34 of the scheme was confined to 'any member of the Board of Trustees and that too, only for appropriate modification of the Scheme'. But then, as per order dated 15.12.2016 in I.A.No.368/2016 in A.S.No.689/1972, this Court allowed further amendment and incorporated another clause as Clause 34A. 6. It is obvious that now, under clause 34, any member of the Board of Trustees could move this Court for appropriate modification of the scheme and under clause 34A, any 10 members of the Board of Trustees or 100 voters in the electorate of any denomination other than under clauses (a) to (c) of clause 3 of the scheme could approach this Court in the event of the office bearers of the Trust or executive members of the committee violate the provisions of the Trust Scheme or commit any breach of trust. It is availing the liberty granted, either under clause 34 or clause 34A, that the captioned interlocutory applications have been filed. 7. Taking into account all the aforesaid orders and bearing in mind the position obtained from clauses 34 and 34A and above all, the fact that A.S.No.689/1972 is not now pending before this Court, when the captioned interlocutory applications came up for consideration, we put a pointed question as to how such interlocutory applications of substantial nature would lie in a disposed Appeal Suit, inasmuch as none of them partakes the character of a review petition or a clarification petition. Initially, all the petitioners in the interlocutory applications, relying on clauses 34 and 34A of the scheme and the earlier orders passed subsequent to the judgment dated 08.03.1978 in A.S.No.689/1972 contended that despite the disposal of Appeal Suit on 08.03.1978 interlocutory applications are maintainable simply for the reason that those clauses specifically confer right to approach this Court for the specified purposes thereunder, of course, to specified category of persons. We think it only appropriate to state at this juncture, in unambiguous term, that we put the aforesaid question not at all with a view to look into the correctness or otherwise of the liberty, rather, the rights granted to approach this Court under clause 34 or clause 34A, of the scheme. Being a bench of co-equal strength, certainly we know that it is impermissible in law, for us to look into such a question. However, that shall not be a reason or ground for not posing and for not considering the aforesaid specific question which we have specifically put when the interlocutory applications were taken up for consideration, earlier. In that regard, it is to be noted that clauses 34 or 34A of the scheme did not say, either specifically or impliedly, that the right to approach this Court for the specified purposes is the right to move applications, for such purposes, in the disposed of Appeal Suit itself. It merely confers such rights for the purposes specified under those clauses. We may hasten to add that when a scheme is framed by the High Court even in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is exclusively within its domain to reserve any right, as has been reserved under clauses 34 and 34A, of the scheme in question, and once it retains the jurisdiction to consider modification of the scheme or to deal with any particular subject as relates that public trust in respect of which such a scheme was framed, reliefs in respect of such matters cannot be left to any court subordinate to this Court. To put it shortly, in view of the position now obtained, interlocutory applications which falls within the purview of clauses 34 and 34A of the scheme are to be entertained by this Court. We may hasten to add that it does not mean that such applications should be entertained in the finally disposed of Appeal Suit itself. In such circumstances, the question is not one of jurisdiction, but one as how the power retained could be exercised and in other words, how the grantees of such rights could avail the power retained by this Court. 8. In such circumstances, the question is not one of jurisdiction, but one as how the power retained could be exercised and in other words, how the grantees of such rights could avail the power retained by this Court. 8. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao and Ors reported in AIR 1961 SC 1206 as also an order of this Court in Ray Sudhan v. V.Sajeendran reported in 2017 (1) KLT 371 it is contended by learned senior counsel Sri.Sudhi Vasudevan that since clauses reserving right to approach the High Court for modification of the scheme as also in the event of the office bearers of the Trust or the executive committee, violate/violates the provisions of Trust Scheme or committee any breach of trust, are set out in the scheme itself as clause 34 and clause 34A respectively, applications under such relevant clauses could be filed in A.S.No.689 of 1972 itself despite the fact that it was disposed of long ago. Ray Sudhan's decision was rendered by this Court in an interlocutory application, moved in A.S.No.689 of 1972 itself viz., in I.A.No.368 of 2016 and the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raje Anandrao's case (Supra) was also referred to, therein. 9. We have carefully gone through the said decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel. It is also submitted by the learned senior counsel that subsequent to the disposal of A.S.No.689 of 1972, several interlocutory applications were filed and entertained by this Court, in the said disposed of Appeal Suit itself. Before we deal with such submissions made relying on the aforesaid decisions we will refer to an order of this Court passed in I.A.No.4016 of 2004, squarely applicable to answer the moot question, produced along with I.A.No.6 of 2019. It is an order of dismissal of I.A.No.4016 of 2004 in A.S.Nos.689 and 813 of 1972 passed by the Division Bench. It was passed as early as on 14.01.2005. On going through the order dated 14.01.2005, we find that, after taking note of the decretal portion of the judgment in A.S.Nos.689 and 813 of 1972, as also clause 34 of the scheme, the Division Bench answered the very question which we put forth now, as hereunder:- "I.A.No.4016 of 2004 is filed in view of clause 34 of the scheme for modification of the scheme. A.S.Nos.689 & 813 of 1972 were finally disposed of. No interim application is maintainable in an appeal disposed of finally. Present application is not for a review or clarification of the judgment. The above appeals were disposed of more than three decades ago and all parties in the above appeals are not made parties in the I.A. The relief prayed in this interim application can be given only in a petition filed under Clause 34 of the Scheme and not as an interim order in a disposed of Appeal Suit. So, without prejudice to file an original petition as SPJC, as provided under Clause 34 of the Scheme. this I.A. is dismissed." (underline supplied) Obviously, the existence of this order dated 14.01.2005 has never been brought to the notice of the Court when subsequently moved interlocutory applications, availing the right under Clauses 34 and 34A of the scheme were taken up for consideration. This order is not seen referred to in any of the order passed in subsequently moved interlocutory applications. It is thus obvious that the very mooted question was considered by the Division Bench in I.A.No.4016 of 2004 in A.S.Nos.689 and 813 of 1972 and in unambiguous terms the Division Bench held that in a finally disposed of Appeal Suit an interim application not having the character of a review or a clarification could not be maintained, No specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting to file interlocutory applications sans such characters, was brought to our notice. 10. Now, we will revert to the contention raised relying on the aforesaid decisions, in a bid to maintain the interlocutory applications moved in A.S.689 of 1972 which was finally disposed of, more than 4 decades ago, precisely on 08.03.1978. Firstly, we will refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Raje Anandrao's case (supra). That was a case where the District Judge, Buldana passed an order on 12.04.1954 by which he revised a scheme which had been in force since 1935. The scheme was originally framed for the management of an ancient temple of Balaji at Deolgaon Raja in Buldana District. The pujaris of the temple went in revision before the Nagpur High Court. The High Court considered the question whether District Judge had any power to modify the scheme. The scheme was originally framed for the management of an ancient temple of Balaji at Deolgaon Raja in Buldana District. The pujaris of the temple went in revision before the Nagpur High Court. The High Court considered the question whether District Judge had any power to modify the scheme. The High Court reached the conclusion that if the matters sought to be introduced by modification of the scheme are covered by Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application for modification is not the appropriate remedy and unless the power reserved to the Court under the Code under the scheme is invoked for a purpose analogous to execution of a decree, no modification of the scheme was possible under Section 92. It also came to the conclusion that as the pujaris were not parties to the suit of 1904 or to the scheme that was framed, it was not possible to modify the scheme so as to affect their rights without recourse to Section 92. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision and the scheme framed by the District Court was ordered to be read subject to the order of the High Court. Leave to appeal was then made to the Hon'ble Apex Court and it was obtained. The main question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was: "How far it is open to a court to amend a scheme once framed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where a power to amend the scheme is reserved in the scheme itself". Paragraph 6 of the decision reveals the same and it reads thus:- "6. The main question that arises in this appeal is how far it is open to a court to amend a scheme once framed under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where a power to amend the scheme is reserved in the scheme itself. It is not seriously disputed in this case that the power to amend the scheme has been reserved in view of the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioners already set out above and paragraph 17 of the scheme dated October 16, 1935. It is not seriously disputed in this case that the power to amend the scheme has been reserved in view of the judgment of the Additional Judicial Commissioners already set out above and paragraph 17 of the scheme dated October 16, 1935. The High Court has hold that as the pujaris were not parties to the suit wider s, 92, the scheme could not be amended so as to affect their rights, for even where a power is reserved in the scheme to modify it, it could only be invoked for a purpose analogous to execution of a decree. It is the correctness of this view which has been challenged before us." 11. After referring to the decision of the High Court of Madras in Veeraraghavachariar v. The Advocate General of Madras reported in AIR 1927 Mad 1073 (FB), which supports the view of the Nagpur High Court and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Chandraprasad Ramprasad v. Jinabharathi Narayan (AIR 1931 Born. 391); of the Allahabad High Court in Sri. Swami Rangacharya v. Gangaram (AIR 1936 All 97); of the Calcutta High Court in Umeshananda Datta v. Ravaneswar Prasad Singh (2017 Cal WN 841); in Manadananda Jha v. iftrakananda Iha (AIR 1924 Cal 330) and in Srijib Nyayatirtha v. Dandy Swami Jagannat Ashram (AIR 1941 Cal 618) and of the Patna High Court in Mohammed Waheb Hussain v. Abbas Hussain (AIR 1923 Pat 420), which oppose the view of the Nagpur High Court and considering the provisions under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon’ble Apex Court held the view taken by the Madras High Court that insertion of a clause for the modification of a scheme, in the scheme itself is ultravires as incorrect and accepted the view of the Bombay, Calcutta, Allahabad and Patna High Courts. 12. The following recitals from paragraphs 10 and 11 of the decision in Raje Anandrao's case are also relevant in the context of the contentions. They read thus:- "10. Apart from authorities, however, let us see if there is anything in S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure which militates against providing a clause in a scheme framed thereunder for its modification by an application to the court framing the scheme. They read thus:- "10. Apart from authorities, however, let us see if there is anything in S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure which militates against providing a clause in a scheme framed thereunder for its modification by an application to the court framing the scheme. Section 92 permits a suit in the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust to be filed either by the Advocate-General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. Reliefs that can be obtained under that section are- “(a) removing any trustee; (b) appointing a now trustee (c) vesting any property in a trustee; (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; (d) directing accounts and inquiries; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) settling a scheme; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. Further sub-s. (2) of S. 92 bars a suit claiming the above reliefs unless the suit is filed in conformity with S. 92(1). In the present appeal we are concerned only with the modification of a scheme; we are not concerned with appointment or removal of trustees or any other matter enumerated in sub-s. (1) of S. 92. We do not therefore propose to consider whether it would be open to appoint or remove trustees etc, on the ground of breach of trust without recourse to a suit under S. 92. We shall confine ourselves only to the question whether in a case where there is a provision in the scheme for its modification by an application to the court, it is open to the court to make modifications therein without the necessity of a suit under S. 92. We shall confine ourselves only to the question whether in a case where there is a provision in the scheme for its modification by an application to the court, it is open to the court to make modifications therein without the necessity of a suit under S. 92. So far as the scheme is concerned, S. 92 (1) provides for settling a scheme and if a suit is brought, for this purpose it has to comply with the requirements of S. 92(1); but where such a suit has been brought and a scheme has been settled, we see nothing in S. 92 (2) which would make it illegal for the court to provide a clause in the scheme itself for its future modification. All that sub-section provides is that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-s. (1) shall be instituted in respect of a trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that subsection. This sub-section therefore does not bar an application for modification of a scheme in accordance with the provisions thereof, provided such a provision can be made in the scheme itself. Under sub-s. (1) the court has the power to settle a scheme. That power to our mind appears to be comprehensive enough to permit the inclusion of a provision in the scheme itself which would make it alterable by the court if and when found necessary in future to do so. A suit under S. 92 certainly comes to an end when a decree is passed therein. including the settlement of a scheme for the administration of the trust. But there is nothing in the fact that the court can settle a scheme under S. 92(1) to prevent it from making the scheme elastic and provide for its modification in the scheme itself. That does not affect the finality of the decree; all that it provides is that where necessity arises a change may be made in the manner of administration by the modification of the scheme, We cannot agree that if the scheme is amended in pursuance of such a clause in the scheme it will amount to amending the decree. The decree stands as it was, and all that happens is that a part of the decree which provides for management under the scheme is being given effect to. The decree stands as it was, and all that happens is that a part of the decree which provides for management under the scheme is being given effect to. it seems to us both appropriate and convenient that a scheme should contain a provision for its modification, as that would provide a speedier remedy for modification of the manner of administration when circumstances arise calling for such modification than through the cumbrous procedure of a suit. 11. In Veeraraghavachariar's case ILR 51 Mad 31: (AIR 1927 Mad 1073)(FB) the Madras High Court was cognizant of the two decisions of the Privy Council in which clauses had been inserted in the scheme providing for its modification by an application. But the learned judges were of the view that the point was never raised much less decided by the Privy Council and therefore it could not be said that the Privy Council was of the opinion that such a clause would be infra vires. They thought that inserting such a clause in the scheme would imply that the suit would remain pending for ever. It is not necessary to hold that a suit under S. 92 in which a scheme is framed providing such a clause is pending for ever. The scheme deals with the administration of the trust and for the purposes of the scheme it would not be wrong or improper to treat a suit under S. 92 as analogous to an administration suit. On that view it would in our opinion be just and convenient to provide for a clause in the scheme which is framed for the administration of the trust to allow for its modification by an application. We therefore accept the view of the Bombay. Calcutta. Allababad and Patna High Courts in this matter and hold that it is open in a suit under S. 92 where a scheme is to be settled to provide in the scheme for modifying it as and when necessity arises by inserting a clause to that effect. Such a suit for the settlement of a scheme is analogous to an administration suit and so Ions as the modification in the scheme is for the purposes of administration, such modification can be made by application under the relevant clause of the scheme without the necessity of a suit under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a suit for the settlement of a scheme is analogous to an administration suit and so Ions as the modification in the scheme is for the purposes of administration, such modification can be made by application under the relevant clause of the scheme without the necessity of a suit under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such a procedure does not violate any provision of S.92. The view taken by the Madras High Court that insertion of such a clause for the modification of the scheme is ultra vires is incorrect. It was therefore open to the District Judge in the present case to modify the scheme." (underline supplied) 13. Thus, the decision in Raje Anandrao's case (supra) would reveal that the Apex Court laid down the laws; that a provision for modification of the scheme can be incorporated in the scheme itself, framed in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that modification of the scheme, based on the enabling clause therefore incorporated in the scheme itself, can be made by application under the said relevant clause of the scheme, without the necessity of a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that a suit under Section 92 of CPC is a representative suit and the decision therein binds not only the parties but all those who are interested in the Trust; that insertion of such a clause providing for modification of an application would not imply that the suit would remain pending for ever or that a suit under Section 92 in a scheme is framed proving such a clause would not make the suit as one pending for ever and that amendment of the scheme in pursuance of such a clause in the scheme would not amount to amendment of the decree in the suit. 14. 14. In the decision in Ray Sudhan's case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court, referred to Raje Anandrao's case solely for the purpose of reaching the conclusion that though a suit under Section 92 of CPC would come to an end when a decree is passed thereon, including settlement of a scheme for the administration of the Trust there would be nothing under sub-section (1) of Section 92 which prevents the Court from making the scheme elastic and provide a clause for its modification in the scheme itself and sub-section (2) of Section 92 CPC does not bar an application for modification of a scheme in accordance with the provisions made in the scheme itself. As rightly noted in Ray Sudhan's case the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raje Anandraols case did not deal with the question as to whether it would be open to the Court to appoint or remove trustees any other matter enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 92 without recourse to a regular suit under Section 92 of CPC. Thus, on a careful consideration of the decisions in Raje Anandrao's case (supra) and also Ray Sudhan's case (supra), we are of the considered view that the question that was posed by us, as mentioned hereinbefore and in fact, decided earlier by a Division Bench of this Court as per order dated 14.01.2005 in I.A. No. 4016 of 2014 in A.S. Nos. 689 and 813 of 1972, was never raised much less decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Raje Anandrao's case (supra) and by the Division Bench of this Court in Ray Sudhan's case (supra). The Apex Court held, among other, that modification of a scheme framed by a Court could be made under the relevant clause set out in the scheme itself for its modification, by making an application under that relevant cause, without necessity of a suit under Section 92 of CPC. However, that by itself will not and cannot fortify the contention of the petitioners that all interlocutory applications, irrespective of their nature should be entertained by this Court in A.S. No.689 of 1972 itself ignoring the fact that it was finally disposed of as early as on 08.03.1978. However, that by itself will not and cannot fortify the contention of the petitioners that all interlocutory applications, irrespective of their nature should be entertained by this Court in A.S. No.689 of 1972 itself ignoring the fact that it was finally disposed of as early as on 08.03.1978. As noticed hereinbefore, clauses 34 and 34A of the scheme did not state anything as to the manner in which the rights reserved thereunder could be exercised apart from preserving specified rights to specified categories. Though the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the law that modification of a scheme framed in a suit under Section 92 of CPC can be made by application under the relevant clause of the scheme, without the necessity of a suit under Section 92 of CPC, in the decision in Raje Anandrao's case it would not indicate expressly or impliedly as to whether such an application could be entertained in an Appeal Suit which was disposed of finally. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the question is, in what manner the specified rights reserved to specified categories under the scheme framed by this Court could be availed. In other words, how the power reserved to this Court under the scheme could be exercised. The order in I.A. No.4016 of 2014 in A.S.Nos. 689 and 813 of 1972 becomes relevant in the aforementioned context. It was held thereunder that no interim application other than a review or clarification of the judgment could be maintained in an Appeal Suit disposed of finally and that relief, in such an application could be granted only in a petition filed under clause 34 of the scheme and not as an interim order in a disposed of Appeal Suit. It is to be noted that at the time of issuance of the said order clause 34A was not there in the scheme. It is after holding thus that the I.A. was dismissed without prejudice to file an Original Petition as SPX, as provided under clause 34 of the scheme. It is to be noted that at the time of issuance of the said order clause 34A was not there in the scheme. It is after holding thus that the I.A. was dismissed without prejudice to file an Original Petition as SPX, as provided under clause 34 of the scheme. We do not find any reason to think that the said order in anyway, go in conflict with the decision of the Apex Court in Raje Anandrao's case whereas it would be in consonance with law laid down as the finding thereunder is that relief could be given only in a petition filed under clause 34 of the scheme, which is the provision under the scheme in question reserving right to move this Court for modification of the scheme. This is certainly in tune with the law laid down in Raje Anandrao's case that modification of the scheme can be made by an application under the relevant clause of the scheme. We have already noted absence of provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure to file interlocutory applications which are not for review or for clarification or correction of the judgment, in a finally disposed of Appeal Suit filed against a preliminary decree and when final decree was also passed in the suit. 15. In such circumstances, in the light of the order which was passed as early as on 14.01.2005 in I.A. No. 4016 of 2004 in A.S. Nos. 689 and 813 of 1972 as also the position obtained from the decisions referred (supra) relied on by the petitioners, we have no hesitation to hold that the aforesaid interlocutory applications could not be maintained in A.S.No.689 of 1972, which was disposed of finally about four decades ago. 16. The next question is how can the rights, reserved under clauses 34 and 34.A of the Scheme framed by this Court, be exercised if interlocutory applications, except those for review or clarification, are not maintainable in a disposed of Appeal Suit? 16. The next question is how can the rights, reserved under clauses 34 and 34.A of the Scheme framed by this Court, be exercised if interlocutory applications, except those for review or clarification, are not maintainable in a disposed of Appeal Suit? On scanning the order dated 14.01.2005 in I.A.No.4016 of 2004 in the aforesaid appeals and taking note of the decision of the Apex Court in Raje Anandrao's decision that it can be by application under the relevant clause under the scheme we are of the view that the captioned interlocutory applications are liable to be dismissed, without prejudice to file an original petition as SPJC, as provided under clause 34 and 34A of the Scheme, provided the reliefs sought for fall within the purview of those clauses. In the result, all these interlocutory applications are dismissed, without prejudice to the rights of the parties to file original petitions as SPJCs availing the rights under clause 34 or clause 34A of the Scheme, provided they fall within the purview of clause 34 and 34A of the Scheme.