ORDER : B. Vijaysen Reddy, J. 1. The detention order vide proceedings No. 26/PD Cell/CCRB/RCKD/2020 dated 23.06.2020 passed against Vainala Bikshapathi S/o. Saraiah by the 3rd respondent, Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Commissionerate, in exercise of powers conferred under Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Amendment Act No. 13 of 2018) (for short 'the Act') and as confirmed by the State vide G.O. Rt. No. 942 dated 28.05.2020, are challenged in this Writ of Habeas Corpus as being illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Dr. P.B. Karthik Navayan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. T. Srikanth Reddy, learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detenu is falsely branded as immoral traffic offender in Cr. No. 350 of 2020 of Neredmet Police Station registered under Section 370(A) IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1986. The activities of the detenu do not affect public order. There is no material to substantiate that the detenu is indulging in women trafficking, trapping of innocent girls and forcing them into prostitution in the guise of providing jobs. The detention order was passed mechanically based on solitary offence and there is no material to come to the conclusion that detenu has been acting in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Though first crime was registered in the year 2014 and second crime was registered in the year 2020, there is no nexus between the two crimes. On the basis of one solitary case, the detention order could not have been passed. 4. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Home submitted that the detenu was earlier involved in Cr. No. 410 of 2014 of Neredmet Police Station registered for the offence under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1986 and recently committed the offence in Cr. No. 350 of 2020. The detenu was involved in organized crimes. The detenu was involved in trapping innocent women victims hailing from West Bengal State. No. 410 of 2014 of Neredmet Police Station registered for the offence under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1986 and recently committed the offence in Cr. No. 350 of 2020. The detenu was involved in organized crimes. The detenu was involved in trapping innocent women victims hailing from West Bengal State. Many victims, who hail from poorer sections of the society, were brought to Hyderabad on the premise of providing jobs and they were forced into prostitution. The detenu was running a brothel house and when the same was raided by the police, they found four ladies and two male persons. They disclosed their identity and one of the two was a customer, who came to the brothel house for sexual favours. Thus, the acts of the detenu prejudicially affected public order and there is every possibility of detenu indulging similar prejudicial activities. 5. In the impugned detention order, the detaining authority has referred to a solitary criminal case, as a ground for passing the detention order i.e. Cr. No. 350 of 2020 registered under Section 370(A) IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1986 of Neredmet Police Station. The detenu moved two bail petitions, the first bail petition was dismissed and the second bail petition was dismissed against the detenu and partly allowed in respect of A3. 6. The issue whether the detention order can be passed on the basis of solitary offence is no more res integra. Even if the detenu is involved in a solitary offence and it is found that the prejudicial activity of the detenu has the propensity and potential to disturb the peace and tranquility in a locality or within the community thereby disturbing the public order, then the order of preventive detention needs to be sustained. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to nature of the prejudicial activities and the effect such activities will have on public order. Whether the activities of the detenu would affect public order or not has to be tested in the background of such prejudicial activities in each case. 7. In the STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHER Vs. Whether the activities of the detenu would affect public order or not has to be tested in the background of such prejudicial activities in each case. 7. In the STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHER Vs. NABILA AND ANOTHER (2015) 12 SCC 127 the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue as to whether the solitary offence can be the basis for passing the detention order, relied on its earlier judgment in the UNION OF INDIA Vs. CHAYA GHOSHAL (2005) 10 SCC 97 and observed in para 13 as follows: "13. In the instant case, as noticed above, the High Court quashed the order of detention mainly on the ground that the detenu was in remand in connection with the solitary ground case when there was no material before the detaining authority to show that either the detenu himself or his relatives are taking steps to file application for bail in the solitary ground case. In our opinion, the view taken by the High Court while passing the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. This point was considered by this Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. vs. Chhaya Ghosal & Anr., (2004) 10 SCC 97, and observed:- "23. So far as the finding of the High Court that there was only one incident is really a conclusion based on erroneous premises. It is not the number of acts which determine the question as to whether detention is warranted. It is the impact of the act, the factual position as highlighted goes to show that the financial consequences were enormous and ran into crores of rupees, as alleged by the detaining authority. The High Court seems to have been swayed away that there was only one incident and none after release on bail. The approach was not certainly correct and the judgment on that score also is vulnerable. At the cost of repetition it may be said that it is not the number of acts which is material, it is the impact and effect of the act which is determinative. The High Court's conclusions in this regard are therefore not sustainable." 8. The Supreme Court in ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA v. AMRATLAL PRAJIVANDAS (1994) 5 SCC 54 held that preventive detention order can be passed in a solitary offence if the detenu is involved in organized crime. The High Court's conclusions in this regard are therefore not sustainable." 8. The Supreme Court in ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDIA v. AMRATLAL PRAJIVANDAS (1994) 5 SCC 54 held that preventive detention order can be passed in a solitary offence if the detenu is involved in organized crime. "...Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of organised activity. The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon-breaking, theft of signal material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fishplates were held sufficient. Similarly, where the person tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, it was held that such single act warrants an inference that he will repeat his activity in future and, therefore, his detention is necessary to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activity. If one looks at the acts the COFEPOSA is designed to prevent, they are all either acts of smuggling or of foreign exchange manipulation. These acts are indulged in by persons, who act in concert with other persons and quite often such activity has international ramifications. These acts are preceded by a good amount of planning and organisation. They are not like ordinary law and order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be quashed but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention." 9. There cannot be any doubt that immoral trafficking and prostitution is a social menace. It needs to be curbed with an iron hand. Prostitution/organizing immoral activities etc. will have an adverse impact on the peace and tranquility in a locality. There cannot be any doubt that immoral trafficking and prostitution is a social menace. It needs to be curbed with an iron hand. Prostitution/organizing immoral activities etc. will have an adverse impact on the peace and tranquility in a locality. Such activities not only force victims into flesh trade but also create a sense of insecurity and disturb the public morale and social order. It is the fundamental and bounden duty of the State to ensure that there is peace and tranquility in the society and also to see that law and order is properly maintained. Due to unfortunate circumstances like social and economic backwardness, women, young ladies and many times female children fall prey to this menace of prostitution to overcome their financial difficulties. In the instant case, women from West Bengal were brought to Hyderabad and they were made to indulge in prostitution in the guise of providing jobs. Thus, it is a case of organized crime and it can be presumed that there is a big network of offenders who are involved in an organized manner for procuring, transporting, arranging women to these prostitution rackets. Such activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Thus, these activities cannot be termed to come within the purview of law and order but come within the purview of public order. The Supreme Court in KANU BISWAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (1972) 2 SCC 831, while repelling the argument of the counsel for the detenu therein that the activities of the detenu relate to law and order and not public order, observed as under: "The distinction between the concept of public order and that of law and order has been adverted to by this Court in a number of cases. In the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [ (1966) 1 SCR 709 ], Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) said that any contravention of law always affected order, but before it could be said to affect public order, it must affect the community at large. He considered three concepts, law and order, public order and the security of the State, and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them, one should imagine the concentric circles. He considered three concepts, law and order, public order and the security of the State, and observed that to appreciate the scope and extent of each one of them, one should imagine the concentric circles. The largest of them represented law and order, next represented public order and the smallest represented the security order, just as an act might affect public order but not the security of the State. In the subsequent case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [ (1970) 1 SCC 98 ] the Court dealt with the matter in the following words : "Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance, of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of' the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An Act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. The question where a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order, according to the dictum laid down in the above case is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order, or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?" 10. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any merits in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, dismissed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.