JUDGMENT : The first appellant is a statutory body constituted under Section 3 of the Bangalore Development Act, 1976 (for short ‘the said Act of 1976’). The appellant Authority has been constituted by the State Government as required by Section 3 of the said Act of 1976. Therefore, the first appellant is an agency and instrumentality of the State. 2. The respondent is the writ petitioner and the present appellants are the respondents in the writ petition. The respondent acquired the land measuring 60 ft. x 40 ft. in survey No.79 situated at Malathahalli Village, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, Bengaluru. A preliminary notification for acquisition of the said land was issued on 8th April 2003 and a final notification was issued on 9th September 2003. Admittedly on 7th October 2016, the respondent executed a registered deed of relinquishment in favour of the first appellant in respect of the said land. The registered relinquishment deed clearly provides that it was the first appellant which had called upon the respondent to execute the deed. The Second party described therein is the first appellant and the first party is the respondent herein. The relevant part of the said deed reads thus: “Whereas the Second Party has called upon the First Party to execute this deed in this behalf. Now this deed is to the effect that the First Party has handed over to the Second Party Site No.16 in part of Sy.No.79 situated in Mallathahalli Village, Yeswanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore measuring East to West 60’-00” feet and North to South 40’-00” feet as per the schedule agreeing to all the terms and conditions imposed by the Second Party in this behalf. The property mentioned in the schedule was handed over to the Second Party and Second Party hereby agreed and allotted alternate site bearing Number 1112 measuring 108.00 Sq.Mtrs. of site in Banashankari 6th Stage, 11th Block Extension with free of cost as alternate site in lieu of the schedule property relinquished by the first Party.” (Underline supplied) 3. The property mentioned in the schedule was handed over to the Second Party and Second Party hereby agreed and allotted alternate site bearing Number 1112 measuring 108.00 Sq.Mtrs. of site in Banashankari 6th Stage, 11th Block Extension with free of cost as alternate site in lieu of the schedule property relinquished by the first Party.” (Underline supplied) 3. Another admitted fact is that prior to execution of the relinquishment deed, the site No.1112 mentioned therein, which is hereafter described as an alternate site, was agreed to be allotted by the first appellant to the respondent and a total consideration of Rs.16,27,560/-was paid by the respondent to the first appellant by two installments much earlier to the execution of the relinquishment deed. The two installments were paid on 17th November 2015 and 5th January 2016 respectively. Thus, a few months after the payment of the two installments, at the instance of the first appellant, the respondent executed the relinquishment deed and the first appellant voluntarily agreed to allot an alternate site to the respondent, free of cost in consideration of the property relinquished by the respondent in favour of the first appellant. Thus, subsequent to the offer of allotment of the alternate site and payment of price by the respondent, by executing the relinquishment deed, the respondent surrendered the said land to the first appellant by agreeing to all the terms and conditions imposed by the appellant. In lieu of the said land which was surrendered by the respondent, the appellants specifically agreed to allot the alternate site to the respondent free of cost. 4. On the same day on which the relinquishment deed was executed, a sale deed in respect of the alternate site was executed by the first appellant in favour of the respondent. However, the first appellant did not refund the price which was paid much earlier to the deed of relinquishment and, therefore, a writ petition was filed by the respondent before the learned Single Judge for issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the refund of amount of Rs.16,27,560/-with interest. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has directed the refund of the amount. The learned Single Judge directed that on the failure to refund the amount within one month, the amount will carry interest at the rate of 8%. 5. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has directed the refund of the amount. The learned Single Judge directed that on the failure to refund the amount within one month, the amount will carry interest at the rate of 8%. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that there is no provision in law for grant of an alternate site in lieu of the acquired site and the first appellant has been granting alternate sites in such cases in the light of law laid down by this Court in the case of JUNJAMMA AND OTHERS vs. THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE AND OTHERS, ILR 2005 KAR 608. Even the said decision contemplates payment of price of the alternate site by the allottees. Secondly, he submitted that the amount of refund claimed is shown as consideration in the registered sale deed executed and unless the registered sale deed is cancelled under a decree of the Civil Court, the respondent cannot claim refund. Thirdly, he submitted that the respondent cannot approbate and reprobate after having voluntarily paid the consideration for the alternate side. Lastly, he submitted that after having taken the benefit of the sale deed, the respondent cannot seek refund. In any event, he submitted that the claim for refund, if any, will lie before the Civil Court and not before the Writ Court, especially when the first appellant was under no obligation to allot the alternate site to the respondent free of cost. 6. We have considered the submissions. In this case, the facts are admitted. The said land owned by the respondent was subjected to compulsory acquisition. The first appellant offered an alternate site to the respondent at the cost of Rs.16,27,560/-which was paid by the respondent to the appellant. After payment of the said amount, it is at the instance of the first appellant that the relinquishment deed dated 7th October 2016 was executed by the respondent. We have already quoted the relevant part of the relinquishment deed. 7. The relinquishment deed specifically records that the respondent has handed over the said land subject matter of the acquisition to the appellant agreeing to all the terms and conditions imposed by the appellant. The relinquishment deed does not talk about the payment of any compensation whatsoever to the respondent. 7. The relinquishment deed specifically records that the respondent has handed over the said land subject matter of the acquisition to the appellant agreeing to all the terms and conditions imposed by the appellant. The relinquishment deed does not talk about the payment of any compensation whatsoever to the respondent. It is not the case of the first appellant that against the acquisition of the said land subject matter of the relinquishment deed, the respondent had received any compensation on account of compulsory acquisition. The relinquishment deed specifically contains a clause that the property subject matter of the relinquishment deed was handed over to the appellant and that the appellant agrees to allot the alternate site free of cost “in lieu of the schedule property relinquished by” the respondent. Hence, in consideration of the respondent surrendering the said land subject matter of the relinquishment deed without claiming any compensation that the first appellant voluntarily agreed to allot the alternate site free of cost in lieu of the said land. The consideration amount which is ordered to be refunded by the learned Single Judge was paid by the respondent much prior to the execution of the relinquishment deed. What will prevail is the act of the respondent of voluntarily surrendering the said land to the first appellant and the act of the first appellant of voluntarily agreeing to allot the alternate site free of cost to the respondent. This is not a case where the price of the alternate site was paid by the respondent after execution of the relinquishment deed. It has been paid much prior to the date of execution of the relinquishment deed. As an agency and instrumentality of the State, the first appellant is expected to act fairly. In any event in law, the first appellant is bound by the clause in the deed of relinquishment and cannot resile from the same. The sale deed was executed in favour of the respondent in respect of the alternate site on the same day on which the respondent surrendered the said land in favour of the first appellant. 8. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid covenant under which the first appellant agreed to allot the alternate site to the respondent free of cost, the first appellant cannot withhold the money paid by the respondent prior to the execution of the relinquishment deed. 8. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid covenant under which the first appellant agreed to allot the alternate site to the respondent free of cost, the first appellant cannot withhold the money paid by the respondent prior to the execution of the relinquishment deed. If the first appellant wanted to avoid compliance with its obligation of allotting the alternate site at free of cost, it ought to have offered to the respondent to cancel the deed of surrender and place the respondent in possession of the said land which was subject matter of the relinquishment deed. The first appellant obtained benefit of surrender of the land by the respondent without payment of any compensation. Therefore, there is every justification for passing an order of refund of the amount of consideration. 9. When the first appellant which is an agency or instrumentality of the State argues that the subsequent sale deed is binding upon the respondent, it forgets that the earlier relinquishment deed executed by the respondent admittedly at the instance of the first appellant equally binds the first appellant. 10. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is always an equitable jurisdiction. A very equitable order has been passed by the learned Single Judge which ensures that the first appellant is bound by the covenants and the clauses in the relinquishment deed of which the first appellant has taken advantage by taking over the said land of the respondent free of cost. 11. Hence, we find no error in the impugned judgment and order and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. We make it clear that notwithstanding the delay in preferring the appeal, we have gone into the question on the merits of the impugned order. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 12. The pending interlocutory applications do not survive for consideration and stand disposed of.