JUDGMENT Lalitha Kanneganti, J. - This petition is filed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.") seeking pre-arrest bail to the petitioner/A-19 in the event of his arrest in connection with Crime No.523 of 2020 of Bommuru Police Station, East Godavari District registered for the offences punishable under Sections 408 and 420 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'I.P.C.') and Section 16(i) of Rule9-B of the Andhra Pradesh Mines & Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short APMMC Rules). 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 29.06.2020 the complainant i..e the Inspector of Police, Special enforcement Bureau Team, Rajamahendravaram Urban reported that on credible information about the illegal transportation of sand, the complainant along with his staff while conducting vehicle check near O-point, Gamon Bridge Road, Diwancheruvu Village, Rajanagaram Mandal, they noticed that three sand loaded lorries bearing registration Nos.AP 31 TW 2133, AP 16 TG 4636 and AP 05 TF 1788, unloaded the sand at Beejapuri Township and they caught hold of two unloaded sand lorries, one sand loaded lorry and in the meantime, one person by name Pawan Kumar who was present in a car bearing registration No.AP 39 BY 9561 got down from the car and approached the de facto complainant and confessed that he purchased 500 metric tons of sand for an amount of Rs.3,50,000/- from the persons namely Ramakrishna, Naga Venkateswara Rao and Data Entry Operator Chandra Sekhar, Aditya, Manikumar, Dattu, Kasi, Manepalli Venkatesh, Bhadra, Badam Apparao, Manikanta and some others involved in supply of huge quantity of sand and caused loss to the State. Basing on the said complaint, the present crime was registered. 3. Heard Sri Rambabu Koppineedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the respondentState. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that either in the complaint or in the remand report the name of the petitioner is not mentioned and the name of Manikanta is mentioned as A-10 in remand report. But there is no mention about the present petitioner. But the petitioner was arrayed as A-19. He further submits that even assuming that the petitioner has committed the offence as alleged, it will not attract the provisions under the IPC and they have to be dealt under the APMMC Rules. 5. But there is no mention about the present petitioner. But the petitioner was arrayed as A-19. He further submits that even assuming that the petitioner has committed the offence as alleged, it will not attract the provisions under the IPC and they have to be dealt under the APMMC Rules. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor on instructions submits that A-19 is working in various sand ramps in Seethanagaram Mandal as Data Entry Operator and supporting the other accused who are obtained bulk orders of sand and transporting the same to the customers in black market. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied on the judgment in Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another,2019 SCCOnLineSC 1652 and submits that there is no bar for registering the complaint and to take cognizance: 15. We would again advert to the decision in Sanjay (supra) which had overruled the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Seema Sarkar v. State17 wherein the High Court held the proceedings to be invalid and illegal as the Magistrate had taken cognizance on the basis of a charge-sheet submitted by the police under Section 21(2) of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC, observing that the cognizance was one that cannot be split or divided. The High Court had further observed that as the complaint was not made in terms of Section 22 of the Mines Regulation Act, the cognizance was bad and contrary to law. We have already noted the decision of the Delhi High Court which had directed that the FIR should not be treated as registered under Section 379 of the IPC but only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act. These decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Delhi High Court were reversed and set aside by this Court in Sanjay (supra) after referring to Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and the meaning of the expression 'same offence', to observe that the offence under Section 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act and Section 379 of the IPC are different and distinct. The aforesaid reasoning compels us to reject the contention of the appellant that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law. The aforesaid reasoning compels us to reject the contention of the appellant that the action as impugned in the FIR is a mere violation of Section 4 which is an offence cognizable only under Section 21 of the Mines Regulation Act and not under any other law. There is no bar on the Court from taking cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC. We would also observe that the violation of Section 4 being a cognizable offence, the police could have always investigated the same, there being no bar under the Mines Regulation Act, unlike Section 13(3)(iv) of the TOHO Act. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would uphold the order of the High Court refusing to set aside the prosecution and cognizance of the offence taken by the learned Magistrate under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. We would, however, clarify that prosecution and cognizance under Section 21 read with Section 4 of the Mines Regulation Act will not be valid and justified in the absence of the authorisation. Further, our observations in deciding and answering the legal issue before us should not be treated as findings on the factual allegations made in the complaint. The trial court would independently apply its mind to the factual allegations and decide the charge in accordance with law. In light of the aforesaid observations, the appeal is partly allowed, as we have upheld the prosecution and cognizance of the offence under Section 379 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act. There would be no order as to costs. 6. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court arises from the High Court of Allahabad and the Rules of State of Andhra Pradesh and State of Uttar Pradesh are different and when in the State of Andhra Pradesh there are specific rules and in view of the specific rules there is a bar for criminal prosecution. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the Government has hired the petitioner and other people as Data Entry Operators and they are colluded with the accused by illegally transporting the sand and creating great loss to the State. These types of offences are increasing rampantly in the State. 7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the Government has hired the petitioner and other people as Data Entry Operators and they are colluded with the accused by illegally transporting the sand and creating great loss to the State. These types of offences are increasing rampantly in the State. He further submits that as the punishment for the offences alleged in the present crime are below seven years, the police are following the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 . 8. In fact A-1 was already issued notice under Section 41-A as per the orders of the Court below and in respect of the other accused also contemplating to issue notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. 9. Recording the submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, this Criminal Petition is disposed of. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.