JUDGMENT N. Kotiswar Singh, C.J. - Heard Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. D. Mozumder, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam assisted by Mr. R. Dhar, learned Government Advocate, Assam appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2; Mr. N. Borah, learned Standing Counsel, Assam State Election Commission for respondent No. 3; Mr. S. Neogi, learned Standing Counsel, Tiwa Autonomous Council for respondent No. 4 and Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. B. Prasad, learned counsel for respondent No. 5. 2. An issue of seminal importance, touching upon the discretionary power of the Governor pertaining to extension of the term of an autonomous council after the term of the council expires, is involved in this appeal, arising out of the judgement and order dated 25/09/2020 passed in W.P.(C) No. 3068 of 2020. Closely related to it, is the issue as to when the election for constitution of a new council has to take place on the expiration of the statutorily provided term of the council, as the statute is silent on it. 3. By the aforesaid impugned order, the learned Single Judge has declined to grant any of the reliefs sought for in the writ petition, including a direction to the Governor for extension of the term of the General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council after the expiry of its term on 08.10.2020 under Section 7(3) of Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995. 4. Section 7(3) of Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995, which is at the centre of the dispute, empowers the Governor in his discretion to extend the term for a period not exceeding one year, after the term of the Council expires, if the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist, which render the holding of election impracticable. Section 7 reads as follows: "7.(1) The term of office of the General Council shall be five years from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members, unless dissolved earlier under section 68. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) above, the Chief Executive Councillor of the Executive Councillors shall cease to hold office as such forthwith if he, for any reason, ceases to be a member. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) above, the Chief Executive Councillor of the Executive Councillors shall cease to hold office as such forthwith if he, for any reason, ceases to be a member. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Governor may, if he is satisfied that circumstances so exist which render the holding of the election, as provided, impracticable, extend the term for a period not exceeding one year." 5. In order to appreciate the issues raised in this appeal in proper perspective, it may be appropriate to refer to certain background facts in brief. 6. Facts IN BRIEF: 6.1 In the State of Assam, there are many areas largely inhabited by scheduled tribe communities, for which provisions have been made by the State Government to constitute Autonomous Councils to enable them to manage their affairs by granting certain autonomy akin to the Panchayati Raj Institutions within the framework of Indian Constitution. Tiwa Autonomous Council is one such Council constituted under the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995, hereinafter referred to as the "Act". 6.2 Tiwa Autonomous Council comprises of areas of Village Councils constituted for blocks of villages as notified by the State Government and the affairs of the Autonomous Council are managed by a General Council and an Executive Council as provided under Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 reads as follows: "3.(1) There shall be an autonomous council to be called the Tiwa Autonomous Council within the State of Assam comprising of the areas of the Village Councils as may be notified by the Government in the Official Gazette. (2) The Tiwa Autonomous Council shall have maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution. (3) The Tiwa Autonomous Council shall have a General Council and an Executive Council as provided hereinafter." 6.3 It has been provided under Section 5 of the Act that the General Council shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers to acquire, hold and dispose of property and contract and shall sue or be sued by its corporate name. 6.4 The term of office of the General Council is for five years from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members under Section 7(1) of the Act unless dissolved earlier as provided under Section 68 of the Act. 6.4 The term of office of the General Council is for five years from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members under Section 7(1) of the Act unless dissolved earlier as provided under Section 68 of the Act. 6.5 However, the said term of five years can be extended for a period not exceeding one year at the discretion of the Governor under the circumstances mentioned in Section 7(3) of the Act, which is at the heart of the dispute amongst the contesting parties. 6.6 The last election to the General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council, of which the appellants are members, was held in 2015 and the first meeting was held on 09.10.2015. As such, the term of the said Council was to expire on 08.10.2020. 6.7 As far as Tiwa Autonomous Council is concerned, as provided under Rule 17 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council (Election) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the "Election Rules") framed under the aforesaid Act, the State Election Commission is required to issue election notification, and where the general election is held for the reason otherwise than dissolution of the General Council, that is, on expiry of the term, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the duration of the General Council would expire. Thus, there is a provision for initiation of the election process before six months of the expiry of the term of the General Council. 6.8 The General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council, about 3 months before the expiry of the term, passed a resolution on 14.07.2020 resolving amongst others, that considering that the term of the General Council was going to expire within a short time, the State Government be requested to hold the election for the General Council within time or if the election cannot be held, the term of the Council be extended as per Tiwa Autonomous Council Act by another year. 6.9 It is an undisputed fact that since the later part of March, 2020 the entire country was on lockdown due to Covid-19 pandemic for several months with varying degrees of restrictions because of which the normal life was thrown out of gear which also cast a shadow on many activities involving mass participation like election etc. 6.9 It is an undisputed fact that since the later part of March, 2020 the entire country was on lockdown due to Covid-19 pandemic for several months with varying degrees of restrictions because of which the normal life was thrown out of gear which also cast a shadow on many activities involving mass participation like election etc. The aforesaid resolution of the Tiwa General Council has to be seen from the above perspective. 6.10 Since there was no favourable response from the State Government to the aforesaid resolution, the appellant petitioners approached this Court by filing a writ petition, being WP(C) No. 3068 of 2020. In the said petition, the learned Single Judge passed an order on 03.09.2020 directing the State Government to take a decision on the said resolution. Relevant portions of the said order passed by the Court on 03.09.2020 are reproduced hereinbelow as it would provide the proper perspective of the issues involved. "2. This writ petition have been instituted seeking a direction that the election to the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council be held within the time or in the alternative to extend the present General Council by another 1 (one) year term as per section 7(3) of the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995. 3. It is stated that a resolution dated 14.07.2020 was taken in the emergent General Council Meeting of the Tiwa Autonomous Council and as per the agenda no. 7 in the said emergent meeting it was resolved to request the Government of Assam to hold General Council Election within time or if the election cannot be held, the term of the present Council be extended as per Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995 by 1 (one) year. 4. It is agreed upon by the learned counsel for the parties that it would more convenient for all, if the Government takes a decision on the said resolution of the Tiwa Autonomous Council, even during the pendency of this writ petition, although in the writ petition one of the relief sought is for implementation of the resolution of the Tiwa Autonomous Council. All the learned counsel for the parties agrees to the aspect that the Government may take a decision on the matter even during the pendency of this writ petition. 5. ........................ 6. All the learned counsel for the parties agrees to the aspect that the Government may take a decision on the matter even during the pendency of this writ petition. 5. ........................ 6. Accordingly, it is provided that the authorities in the Government of Assam shall take a decision on the request made to the Government of Assam in the resolution dated 14.07.2020 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council on or before 08.09.2020 and in the meantime, if so advised, respondent no. 5 may also submit his representation within a day. 7. As agreed, no hearing is required to be given to either of the parties by the Government authorities while taking its decision, but the decision should contain the precise conclusion that the Government may arrive on the matter. However, in doing so, the relevant provisions of the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act shall be kept in mind while taking any decision. Whatever decision is taken, the same be communicated to the respective parties on 08.09.2020. 8.........................." (emphasis added) 6.11 When the matter was taken up again on 15.09.2020, it was submitted on behalf of the State Government based on certain notification issued by the Assam State Election Commission on 01.09.2020 that the State Election Commission is contemplating to issue notification for conducting the election of the Tiwa Autonomous Council after publication of the electoral roll on 22.10.2020. Relevant portions of the aforesaid order passed by the Court on 15.09.2020 are reproduced below: "2. The learned Additional Advocate General for the State has submitted that his instructing counsel has received a communication dated 14.09.2020 to seek 7(seven) days time so as to enable submission of the decision taken by the Government on the resolution dated 14.07.2020 by the Tiwa Autonomous Council. The said instruction is kept as part of the record. The learned Standing Counsel for the State Election Commission has submitted that he has been instructed that as per the letter no. SCC/64/2060/46 dated 14.09.2020, the State Election Commission is contemplating to issue notification for conducting the election of Tiwa Autonomous Council after publication of the electoral roll on 22.10.2020 in consultation with the Government of Assam in accordance with section 52 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995. On query made by the Court, it has been submitted at the Bar that the present term of the Tiwa Autonomous Council would expire on 08.10.2020. 3. On query made by the Court, it has been submitted at the Bar that the present term of the Tiwa Autonomous Council would expire on 08.10.2020. 3. The learned Additional Advocate General for the State has referred to notification dated 01.09.2020, which is kept as a part of the record by which the said Election Commission had fixed 24.09.2020 as the date of publication of the draft Photo Electoral Roll, fixing 09.10.2020 as a last date of receiving claims and objections, fixing 16.10.2020 as a last date of disposal of claims and objections, and fixing 22.10.2020 as the date of final publication of Photo Electoral Roll, further stating therein that for preparation and publication of constituency wise photo electoral roll to the said Council, the date of 01.01.2020 would be qualified date. 4. Be that as it may, the State would now dispose of the resolution dated 14.07.2020 within the extended date of 25.09.2020. The State counsel shall provide a copy of the decision of the Government to the learned counsel on record for the petitioner. 5. As the term of the council shall expire on 08.10.2020, no further adjournment would be granted on the next date." Thus, the Court reiterated the earlier direction to the State Government to dispose of the representation of the General Council. 6.12 Thereafter, the State Government issued an order on 22.09.2020 purportedly in compliance of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 03.09.2020, reiterated on 15.09.2020. The said Government order dated 22.09.2020 mentions of the steps being taken by the State Election Commission, Assam for holding election of the Tiwa Autonomous Council by issuing the notification on 01.09.2020 and accordingly, observed that since, the State Election Commission is the authority to hold election of Tiwa Autonomous Council, the State Election Commission will take necessary action as per law and accordingly disposed of the resolution dated 14.07.2020 of the General Council. 6.13 The said writ petition was finally heard on 25.09.2020 and the learned Single Judge passed the impugned judgment and order dismissing the writ petition. Learned Single Judge took the view that the Notification dated 01.09.2020 issued by the State Election Commission showed that necessary preliminary steps had been already initiated for holding election in the Tiwa Autonomous Council. 6.13 The said writ petition was finally heard on 25.09.2020 and the learned Single Judge passed the impugned judgment and order dismissing the writ petition. Learned Single Judge took the view that the Notification dated 01.09.2020 issued by the State Election Commission showed that necessary preliminary steps had been already initiated for holding election in the Tiwa Autonomous Council. Learned Single Judge also held that the Act does not provide that the election to the General Council has to be held before the expiry of the term of the out-going General Council and in the absence of any such statutory provision, it cannot be presumed that the intention of the legislature is to hold election so that the new General Council can take over immediately on expiry of the tenure of the out-going General Council. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge held that it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 7 of the Act envisages that election to the General Council is mandatorily required to be completed on the date of expiry of the term of the existing General Council. As regards extension of the term of other Autonomous Councils in the past, it was held that such an action in the past would not be sufficient for the Court to issue a mandamus, thereby directing the Government to extend the tenure of the Tiwa Autonomous Council, as a mere delay in holding and completing the election process stands in a different footing than a total inaction on part of the State as well as Assam State Election Commission to hold election. The learned Single Judge also held that in the present case, the process for holding the election had been already initiated and it is not a case that the State has no intention to hold election of the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council. 6.14 The learned Single Judge thus disposed of the writ petition by holding, inter alia, as follows: "8) Upon a perusal of the notification no. 6.14 The learned Single Judge thus disposed of the writ petition by holding, inter alia, as follows: "8) Upon a perusal of the notification no. SEC.54/2020/47 dated 01.09.2020, issued by the Assam State Election Commissioner as per Rule 4 and Rule 16 of the said 2005 Rules, the following time schedule had been notified for preparation and publication of constituency wise photo electoral roll for election to the Tiwa Autonomous Council, viz., (1) date of publication of the draft photo-electoral roll - 24.09.2020; (2) last date for receiving claims and objections - 09.10.2020; (3) last date for disposal of claims and objections - 16.10.2020; and (4) final publication of photoelectoral roll - 22.10.2020. Thus, it is seen that preliminary steps has been taken by the Assam State Election Commission, which is required to be undertaken for holding elections in Tiwa Autonomous Council. 9) It is further seen that there is nothing contained in the said 2005 Act the said 2005 Rules prescribing that the elections to the General Council has to be held before the expiry of the term/ tenure of the out-going General Council. Thus, in the absence of any such statutory provision, there is no material from which the Court can presume that the intention of the legislature is to hold election so that the new General Council can take over immediately on expiry of the tenure of the out-going General Council. Thus, in other words, the Court is unable to presume that the provisions of section 7 of the said 1995 Act and Rule 17(1) of the said 2005 Rules envisages that elections to the General Council is mandatorily required to be completed on the date of expiry of the term of the existing General Council. From the time schedule as notified vide notification dated 05.09.2020, the only presumption that can be drawn is to the effect that the election to the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council is not likely to be held within 08.10.2020, i.e. within the tenure of the present General Council. From the time schedule as notified vide notification dated 05.09.2020, the only presumption that can be drawn is to the effect that the election to the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council is not likely to be held within 08.10.2020, i.e. within the tenure of the present General Council. 10) Therefore, merely because in the past, due to delay in holding elections in two similarly situated Autonomous Council, the Government had extended the tenure of the General Council by exercising power under section 7(3) of the said 2005 Act, yet, such an action in the past would not be sufficient for the Court to issue a mandamus, thereby directing the Government to extend the tenure of the Tiwa Autonomous Council. In the opinion of the Court, a mere delay in holding and completing the election process stands in a different pedestal than a total inaction on part of the State as well as Assam State Election Commission to hold elections. In the present case hand, the timelines for publication of constituency wise photoelectoral roll has been notified. We have not been shown any provisions of law which prescribe that notification for holding election on a particular date can be issued prior to the publication of final electoral roll. Therefore, as on date, there is no material available on record for the Court to presume that the State has no intention to hold elections of the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council. 11) Out of the two alternative prayers made in the writ petition, it is reiterated at the cost of repetition that from the herein before referred notification dated 05.09.2020, the State respondents are seen to have already initiated preliminary steps, essential for the purpose of holding election to the General Council for the Tiwa Autonomous Council. Therefore, there is no immediate need for the Court to issue a direction to the State respondents to exercise power under Section 7(3) of the said 2005 Act and to extend the tenure of the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council, which is the alternative prayer made by the petitioners. 12) Hence, the Court is not inclined to grant any of the two alternative reliefs as prayed for. 12) Hence, the Court is not inclined to grant any of the two alternative reliefs as prayed for. 13) Before parting with the records, it is made clear that although some collateral or consequential issues were urged as to the effect of not holding elections immediately after draft photo-electoral roll is published, but as cause of action for such eventualities has not yet arisen, the Court has not examined any issues other than ones relating to the prayer made in this writ petition." 7. Contentions OF THE APPELLANTS: 7.1 The appellants have accordingly, made the following submissions in assailing the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7.2 The appellants contend that by the impugned order, the learned Single Judge committed error of fact as well as law in holding that the Act does not contain any provision to hold the election before expiry of the tenure. According to the appellants, the provisions of Section 7 and Rule 17(1) mandatorily require holding of election before the expiry of term and the learned Single Judge had erroneously held that as the preparation of electoral roll is in progress, the State has the intention to hold the election and erroneously concluded that the cause of action for extension has not yet arisen. 7.3 The appellants are also aggrieved with the observation of the learned Single Judge that merely because in the past, due to delay in holding elections in two similarly situated Autonomous Councils, the Government had extended the tenure under Section 7(3) of the Act, would not be a sufficient ground for issuing a mandamus by holding that mere delay in holding and completing the election process stands in a different footing than a total inaction on the part of the State as well as the Assam State Election Commission to hold elections and there is no material available on record for the Court to presume that the State has no intention to hold elections of the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council. 7.4 According to the appellants, the order passed on 22.09.2020 by the State Government in terms of the direction of the learned Single Judge on 03.09.2020 in the writ petition referred to above was done in the most mechanical manner tactfully avoiding the issue of grant of extension. 7.4 According to the appellants, the order passed on 22.09.2020 by the State Government in terms of the direction of the learned Single Judge on 03.09.2020 in the writ petition referred to above was done in the most mechanical manner tactfully avoiding the issue of grant of extension. 7.5 It has been submitted on behalf of the appellants that, a perusal of the "Preamble" of the Act of 1995 would show that while enacting the Act, the intention was to create the Tiwa Autonomous Council by granting maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution. Further, by providing under Section 5 of the Act that the General Council is a body corporate having perpetual succession, it was meant to allow the elected representatives to manage the affairs of the General Council without interruption. This has been made possible by providing an enabling provision under Section 7(3) of the Act to extend the term of the General Council by one year so that in the meantime necessary election to elect the new members of the General Council can be completed. 7.6 It has been submitted by appellants that a conjoint reading of Section 7(1) and 7(3) clearly indicates that the term of office of the General Council is for 5 years unless dissolved earlier under Section 68, which can be extended by another year, if holding of election becomes impracticable due to certain reasons. According to the appellants, since extension of the tenure is permissible only during the currency of the tenure on the eve of expiry of the term, holding of election during tenure is ingrained in Section 7. According to the appellants, by using the expression "extend the term" in Section 7(3), the Legislature had clearly intended that the election should be held within the subsistence of the 5 years tenure. However, such 5 years tenure could be extended for a period upto one year only in certain circumstances as provided under Section 7(3). According to the appellants, by using the expression "extend the term" in Section 7(3), the Legislature had clearly intended that the election should be held within the subsistence of the 5 years tenure. However, such 5 years tenure could be extended for a period upto one year only in certain circumstances as provided under Section 7(3). 7.7 Thus, the appellants contend that a conjoint reading of Sections 7(1), 7(3) and 68 would indicate that three course of actions are available to the State respondents in respect of the term of the General Council, viz., (i) dissolution before completion of 5 years term as provided under Section 68 of the Act, (ii) holding of election before the 5 years term expires, (iii) in the event, election could not be held within the subsistence of the term, to extend the term of the General Council to the extent of one year for holding the election. 7.8 As per the appellants, there is no scope of exercising the first option of dissolution as the General Council has completed its 5 years term. Referring to the allegations of the private respondent no. 5 that irregularities were committed by the General Council and FIRs were filed against the members of the General Council, since the State Government had all the authority to resort to that option, which was rightly not exercised, the question of these complaints coming in the way of extension of the term does not arise. 7.9 Coming to the second option, it has been submitted by the appellants that the authorities could not have held elections in time as it became impracticable on account of Covid-19 pandemic since the authorities did not prepare and finalize the electoral roll, not to speak of issuance of election notification. 7.10 Under such circumstances, the only recourse available to the State Government is to grant extension of the term of the General Council under Section 7(3). It has been submitted that in the case of dissolution of the General Council under Section 68 of the Act, there is a specific provision under Section 69 of the Act which provides for managing the affairs of the Councils by such authority or persons as may be appointed by the Governor in this behalf. It has been submitted that in the case of dissolution of the General Council under Section 68 of the Act, there is a specific provision under Section 69 of the Act which provides for managing the affairs of the Councils by such authority or persons as may be appointed by the Governor in this behalf. However, no such provision has been made under the Act upon expiry of the tenure of the General Council after 5 years till holding of the fresh election. 7.11 It has been, accordingly, submitted that although as a general rule a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to direct a public authority to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, since there are no other alternatives left to the authorities, a positive direction can be made by this Hon'ble Court. According to the appellants, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide enough to reach injustice wherever it is found and to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. In this regard, the appellants have relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, D-Ward, Kanpur & Anr., (1965) 3 SCR 536 and Controller and Auditor General of India Vs. K.S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 . 7.12 The appellants further contend that even though the word "may" has been used in Section 7(3) to indicate the nature of discretion to be exercised by the Governor, in the present circumstances, wherein no other alternatives are available to the State respondents, the word "may" has to be read as "shall" so as to make the provisions of Section 7(3) mandatory. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh, (1963) AIR SC 1618 in support of his contention. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is no doubt that the word "may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall". But it is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in a particular context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. But it is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in a particular context. It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command. Sometimes the Legislature uses the word "may" out of deference to the higher status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed. In support of the appellants' contention, the decision in The Textile Commissioner of the Government of India Vs. Shri Jagdish Process Pvt. Ltd.,19772 SCC 578 has been also relied upon. 7.13 The appellants further contend that the intention behind incorporating this provision under Section 7(3) is to ensure that the Council is managed by an elected body to the extent it is possible. In fact, for that reason alone, but for premature dissolution under Section 68, no person or authority can be allowed to exercise the powers and functions of the General Council and Executive Council. Since the earlier General Council had the mandate of the voters, it is always desirable that such Council should be allowed to continue even by way of extension, till the time, the newly elected Council assumes office. In this regard, the appellants have drawn attention of this Court to Article 243E of the Constitution of India which provides that every Panchayat unless dissolved sooner shall continue for 5 years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. Pari materia provision is also found in respect of Municipalities at Article 243U, in which it is specifically mentioned that the period of 5 years cannot be extended. It has been submitted that in spite of such constitutional mandate, and also the impracticability of holding election in view of Covid-19 pandemic, the State has not extended the term of the General Council. 7.14 In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishan Singh Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmadabad, (2006) 8 SCC 352 wherein it was held that despite such constitutional mandate there may be certain man made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities, which could distract the authorities from holding the election of the Municipalities. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmadabad, (2006) 8 SCC 352 wherein it was held that despite such constitutional mandate there may be certain man made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities, which could distract the authorities from holding the election of the Municipalities. In such exceptional circumstances, the duration of municipalities can be extended but not as a regular feature and only in exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, it has been submitted that even while there is constitutional bar on grant of extension of the terms of the Panchayats and Municipalities, under exceptional circumstances, which shall also include pandemic like Covid19, the tenure of such Municipalities and Panchayats can be extended. Taking a cue from the aforesaid decision, it has been submitted that in the present case, since the statute itself provides for extension, the State Government could have extended the term of the General Council which the State declined to do without assigning any cogent and valid reasons. 7.15 Relying on the decision in CAG v. K.S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 , wherein it was held that in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion. It has been submitted that in the present case, as the State Government has failed to exercise the discretion, the Court can issue a positive direction or mandamus to the State to extend the term of the General Council. 7.16 The appellants also contend that Article 62 of the Constitution of India provides for an election to fill a vacancy caused by the expiration of the term of office of President before the expiration of the term. Further, as per Article 56 (1), the President shall hold office for a term of 5 years from the date on which he enters upon his office provided inter alia that the President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. Further, as per Article 56 (1), the President shall hold office for a term of 5 years from the date on which he enters upon his office provided inter alia that the President shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. In this regard, the appellants have referred to In Special Reference No.1/1974, 1974(2) SCC 33 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave its opinion on an issue referred to by the President of India as to whether the election to fill the vacancy caused on the expiry of the term of office of the President must be completed before the expiry of the term of office, notwithstanding the fact that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Gujarat is dissolved. While deciding on the issue so referred, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when there is necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law, that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. Where the law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform it without any fault in him and he has no remedy over it, there law will in general excuse him. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances, over which, the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse, although the statutory provisions is not denuded with its mandatory character. The Hon'ble Apex Court, accordingly, answered the reference and the continuance of the President in office as per Article 56(1)(c) was allowed to a case where the successor for the above impossibility has not entered his office and only in such circumstances, a President can continue even after expiry of the period. In the present case, it has been submitted that as holding of election is impracticable due to Covid-19 pandemic, the term of the General Council can be extended. In the present case, it has been submitted that as holding of election is impracticable due to Covid-19 pandemic, the term of the General Council can be extended. 7.17 Based on the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the appellants have submitted that since the intent of the Legislature is that the affairs of the Council should be managed by elected representatives, and if election cannot be held prior to expiry of the tenure, the earlier elected body has to be allowed to manage the affairs of the Council by extending the term under Section 7(3). This is also for the reason that elected body had the mandate of the voters unlike an executive officer, who has no accountability whatsoever to the Tiwa and any other community living within the territorial jurisdiction of the Council. 7.18 Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants also has raised the issue of discrimination in as much as on earlier occasions, when the terms of the Deori Autonomous Council and Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council had expired, their terms were extended vide orders dated 10.07.2015 and 22.07.2016 respectively on the ground that the election of the new General Councils could not be completed in time by the State Election Commission, Assam. It has been contended that though in the case of the Tiwa Autonomous Council it is an admitted fact that the election could not be held in time, yet, the State Government has declined to extend the term as had been done in the case of the aforesaid two Councils. 8. Response OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT: 8.1 In response, Mr. Dilip Mozumder, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, submits that with the issuance of the Notification dated 01.09.2020 by the State Election Commission and order dated 22.09.2020 by the State Government in terms of the direction of this Court dated 03.09.2020, the writ petition had become infructuous. 8. Response OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT: 8.1 In response, Mr. Dilip Mozumder, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, submits that with the issuance of the Notification dated 01.09.2020 by the State Election Commission and order dated 22.09.2020 by the State Government in terms of the direction of this Court dated 03.09.2020, the writ petition had become infructuous. 8.2 Drawing attention of this Court to the reliefs claimed in the petition, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the petitioners had sought for a direction to be issued to the respondents to hold the election of the General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council which had been acceded to by the authorities by issuing the aforesaid Notification dated 01.09.2020 by which the State Election Commission has taken the necessary initial steps for holding the election by notifying the dates relating to preparation and finalisation of photo electoral roll for the purpose of holding election and as such nothing survives for further consideration in this appeal. 8.3 He submits that in paragraph 8 of the writ petition, the petitioners had specifically averred that it is incumbent upon the respondents, more particularly, the State Election Commission to initiate process for holding the next General Council election which had been done. Further in paragraph 9, it has been also alleged by the petitioners that for reasons other than valid and bona fide, no process whatsoever has been initiated either by the State Government or the State Election Commission which the authorities are duty bound to do so, which grievances have been taken care of with the issuance of the aforesaid orders dated 01.09.2020 by the State Election Commission and dated 22.09.2020 by the State Government. It has been contended that the appellant petitioners themselves have stated in paragraph 11 that there are only two options available to the respondents i.e., either to hold election or to grant extension on account of the prevailing pandemic. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that now that the State Election Commission has already initiated the process for election by issuing the notification dated 01.09.2020, the demand of the petitioners has already been met. 8.4 Further, it has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that with the passing of the order dated 22.09.2020, the demand of the appellant petitioners for extension of the term of the General Council has been also dealt with. 8.4 Further, it has been submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that with the passing of the order dated 22.09.2020, the demand of the appellant petitioners for extension of the term of the General Council has been also dealt with. By issuing the said order, the direction of the learned Single Judge passed on 03.09.2020 to consider and dispose of the resolution of the General Council dated 14.07.2020 had been complied with. As no circumstances exist which come in the way of holding election, the question of extension of the term of the outgoing General Council does not arise. However, if the appellant petitioners were aggrieved by the said decision, they were free to do so, which they did not and instead filed this appeal. Accordingly, it has been submitted that this appeal is not maintainable. 8.5 Learned Additional Advocate General submits that as the election process has been already initiated, there is no question of not holding the election, as such, the need for exercising the discretion as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act to extend the term of the General Council does not arise. 8.6 Mr. Mozumder, learned Additional Advocate General submits that a discretion has been given to the Governor to extend the term of the General Council subject to the condition that circumstances exist under which holding the election is impractical. This discretion is related to the impracticability of holding election. In other words, if there is no impracticability of holding elections, the exercise of this discretion does not arise. Thus, the condition precedent for exercising this discretion by the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act is the impracticability of holding election. In support of his contention he relies on the decision in State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri, (1975) 1 SCC 138 . Mr. Mozumder submits that on the contrary, there are overwhelming materials to show that holding of election is practicable and not impracticable. Hence the question of exercising the discretionary power by the Governor does not arise in the present case. 8.7 He contends that, otherwise also, the appellant petitioners have also miserably failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that it was impracticable to hold the elections of the General Council. According to Mr. Hence the question of exercising the discretionary power by the Governor does not arise in the present case. 8.7 He contends that, otherwise also, the appellant petitioners have also miserably failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that it was impracticable to hold the elections of the General Council. According to Mr. Mozumder, the notification issued by the Assam Election Commission clearly shows that the election process has been initiated and that it is possible to hold elections. 8.8 He submits that even if the said discretion of the Governor is considered to be a duty, a mandamus cannot be issued for the reason that there is no failure to perform duty on the part of the Governor. 8.9 Mr Mozumder takes his submission further by contending that even if assuming that holding of elections is impracticable yet this power of the Governor, being discretionary in nature, no mandamus can be issued to compel the Governor to exercise this discretion. He relied on the decision in State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573 in support of his contention. 8.10 He submits that the language used in Section 7(3) is very clear. The word used is "may" rather than "shall" as sought to be interpreted by the appellants. He contends that there is nothing in the Act which would indicate that this discretionary power conferred upon the Governor is a duty or mandatory in nature, in the sense that it is binding upon the Governor to extend the term of the General Council if the elections cannot be held in time. It is merely an enabling provision by which the term of the General Council could be extended if it is impracticable to hold election. 8.11 Mr. Mozumder submits that the entire approach of the appellant petitioners in interpreting the provisions of Section 7(3) is to import words and expressions which are not present in the statute, which is not permissible. He submits that while interpreting the statute, it is not permissible to add words or expression which the appellants are seeking to do so in the present case by insisting that if the elections are not held "immediately" or "within time", the term of the General Council is to be extended. He submits that while interpreting the statute, it is not permissible to add words or expression which the appellants are seeking to do so in the present case by insisting that if the elections are not held "immediately" or "within time", the term of the General Council is to be extended. 8.12 Relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437 , learned Additional Advocate General submits that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. He submits that importing the concept of casus omissus does not arise in the present case as the language is very clear which does not admit of reading into Section 7 (3) words which are not there. He submits that there is no need to read into Section 7(3) additional words of holding elections immediately at the expiry of the term or before expiry of term of the General Council. It cannot be said that without these words, literal constriction of the provisions of Section 7(3) will lead to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. 8.13 Responding to the query of this Court as the meaning of the scope of the word, "authority" as mentioned under Section 52 of the Act, as defined under Section 2(aa) of the Act and whether any such "authority" has been notified by the Government under Section 2(aa), it is been submitted that the Government has notified on 18.05.2020 that the State Election Commission, Assam will act as the Authority to supervise, direct and conduct election of constituencies of General Council of Tiwa Autonomous Council. 8.14 As regards the query of this Court, as to whether any specific provision has been made to take over the functions of the General Council upon completion of its term and before a newly elected/constituted General Council takes over, as in the case of dissolution under Sections 68 and 69, learned Additional Advocate General has submitted Section 65 of the Act enables the State government to take any such action for the purpose of implementation of the Act including such contingencies arising out of completion of the term of the General Council and management of the same till the newly elected members of the Council takes over the rein. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior counsel for the respondent No.5, however, submits that in addition to Section 65 of the Act, Section 76 also enables the State Government to deal with such a situation. 8.15 As regards the contention of the appellant petitioners that by virtue of Section 5 of the Act which postulates the General Council to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and that there should not be any hiatus between the two elected General Councils and the Council should be continued to be represented by elected representatives, it was submitted that the General Council as a body corporate is different from the members who constitute the body corporate. Therefore, even if the entire elected members are no more holding office upon expiry of their term, the body corporate remains in existence. It has been submitted that a body corporate has its own independent existence and is not dependent upon the members constituting the body corporate. In support of his contention that hiatus is permissible, learned Additional Advocate General has referred to the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (2003) 9 SCC 731 . 9. Submission OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 5: 9.1 Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondent no. 5 while endorsing the views of the learned Additional Advocate General emphasises the principle that before exercise of the discretion contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act the condition precedent must be fulfilled, that is, a situation in which holding of elections is impracticable. Therefore, unless a situation prevails where it is impracticable to hold elections, the question of exercising the said discretion does not arise. Therefore, unless a situation prevails where it is impracticable to hold elections, the question of exercising the said discretion does not arise. 9.2 It has been submitted that in the present case, there is no material to show that it is impracticable to hold election and on the contrary, there are sufficient materials to show that it is practicable to hold election as clearly indicated by the Notification issued by the State Election Commission on 01.09.2020. Therefore, the condition precedent for invoking Section 7(3) is absent. Under the circumstances, the question of extending the term of the General Council does not arise. 9.3 It has been submitted that, that apart, for issuance of Mandamus, there must exist an enforceable right and a corresponding duty on the part of the public authority to enforce the duty. In the present case contends Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel, neither there is any enforceable right of the appellant petitioners nor any corresponding duty of the State Government to extend the term of the Council. 9.4 It has been further submitted that a confusion has been generated by the appellant petitioners contending that the election should be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council, which according to the learned Senior Counsel is an imaginary situation. He submits that the statute does not provide for a situation that elections should be held before the expiry of the term of the Council. He contends that situation is not similar as provided under Article 62 or Article 243U. Under Article 243U(3) it has been specifically provided that the election to constitute the municipality shall be completed before expiry of its duration. However no such specific mandate as provided under the Constitution is present in the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, 1995. Learned Senior Counsel accordingly submits that since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, nothing can be read into the statute which is not provided in the statute. Therefore, it is impermissible to read into the statute that the elections must be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council, as sought to be projected by the appellants. 9.5 Referring to affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.5, it has been contended that an FIR had been filed on 11.6.2018 alleging serious malpractices by the elected members of the General Council. Another FIR was also filed on 11.06.2020. 9.5 Referring to affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.5, it has been contended that an FIR had been filed on 11.6.2018 alleging serious malpractices by the elected members of the General Council. Another FIR was also filed on 11.06.2020. Under the circumstances, such tainted elected members should not be allowed to hold office once their term is over. 9.6 In support of his contentions, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following decisions: 1. State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, (1952) AIR SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28 : (1951) 2 MLJ 645 . 2. Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1962) AIR SC 1044:1962 Supp (3) SCR 1 : 3. State of M.P. v. G.C. Mandawar, (1955) 1 SCR 599 : AIR 1954 SC 493 . 4. Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Governing Body of Nalanda College, (1962) 1 LLJ 247 1962 Supp (2) SCR 144 : AIR 1962 SC 1210 : . 5. Mani Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 486 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 166. 6. Lalaram v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2016) 11 SCC 31 . 7. Niranjan Prasad Keserwani Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.,MANU/MP/0118/1974. 9.7 Referring to the decisions cited by the appellant petitioners, Mr. D.K. Mishra sought to distinguish these cases as not applicable in the present case. (a) As regards State of U.P. Vs. Joginder Singh (supra), which has been relied upon by the appellants to contend that the word "may" can be read as "shall", it has been submitted that there is no obligation on the Government to extend the term of the Council and hence this case has no bearing on the present case. (b) Coming to Rangaswami vs. Sagar Textile Mills (supra), it had been submitted that the discretion was coupled with obligation. In that case, though prohibition was issued, but it was without mentioning the period. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case held that the imposition of prohibition could be done only for a limited period. (c) Similarly in respect of Controller and Auditor of India vs. K.S. Jaganathan (supra) the discretion of relaxation was coupled with the duty under Article 335 and there is no such duty associated with exercise of power under Section 7(3). (c) Similarly in respect of Controller and Auditor of India vs. K.S. Jaganathan (supra) the discretion of relaxation was coupled with the duty under Article 335 and there is no such duty associated with exercise of power under Section 7(3). (d) In Re Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33 , the matter pertains to the term of President and cannot be applicable in the present case. (e) Similarly, it has been submitted that other decisions relied in Tehsildar (supra), Hinganghat (supra), Kishan Singh Tomar (supra), and Rameshwar Prasad (supra) are not relevant. 10. The ISSUES and ANALYSIS: 10.1 From the rival contentions, it can be seen that the real issue revolves round the discretion which is to be exercised by the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act, as to whether the term of the General Council which was to expire on 8.10.2020 can be extended or not by the Governor under the circumstances narrated above. 10.2 In the present case, the discretion of the Governor is to be understood as the discretion of the State Government. There is no dispute amongst the contesting parties that the Governor in exercising the discretion under Section 7(3) of the Act does so on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers as provided under Article 163(1) of the Constitution of India and this is not a discretionary power as envisioned under sub-clause (2) of Article 163, as exercised by the Governor in respect of some powers mentioned in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. 10.3 To unravel the legal riddle in this case, a proper understanding of the provisions of Section 7 would be necessary. 10.4 Section 7 of the Act deals with the term of office of the General Council. Sub-section (1) provides that the term of the office of the General Council shall be five years from the date of the first meeting appointed by the Government after the election of the members, unless dissolved earlier under Section 68. Thus, ordinarily the term of the office of the General Council will be for five years only. Sub-section (3), however, provides that the said term can be extended for a period not exceeding one year under the circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, ordinarily the term of the office of the General Council will be for five years only. Sub-section (3), however, provides that the said term can be extended for a period not exceeding one year under the circumstances mentioned therein. Sub-section (3) is an enabling provision for exercise of discretionary power by the Governor for extension of term, if he is satisfied that circumstances so exist which render the holding of the election, impracticable. 10.5 (i) Use of the non obstante clause "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)" in sub-section (3) of Section 7 indicates that even though normally the term of the General Council is only for 5 (five) years, this term can be extended if the circumstances as contemplated under sub-section (3) arise. Thus, there may be a situation, when the term of the General Council can last longer than 5 years, and such extended term is permissible and will not be per se illegal in spite of the term being fixed for 5 years under sub-section (1). (ii) The term can be extended beyond five years in the following manner: (A) The Governor, that is, the State Government has to take a positive decision by way of exercise of the discretion for extension of the term. (B) For doing so the Governor (State Government) must arrive at a satisfaction that, (i) certain circumstances exist which render, (ii) holding of the election impracticable. (C) The extension is for a maximum period of one year. 10.6 It may thus be stated that for invoking provision of Section 7(3) of the Act, the condition which must exist is the impracticability of holding election. The situation of impracticability in holding election must, therefore, be clearly discernible. This situation of impracticability obtaining must be due to one or more verifiable factors contributing for it. The "impracticability" is about "holding of the election" and not any other act or activity. What is then "holding of the election"" The term "holding of the election" comprises of all the steps starting with preparation and publication of electoral rolls culminating in actually conducting the election and announcement of the result. Thus, this expression, "holding of the election" cannot be confined to only a particular phase of the holding election. In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, (1952) SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64 , it was held that, "7. ....................... Thus, this expression, "holding of the election" cannot be confined to only a particular phase of the holding election. In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, (1952) SCR 218 : AIR 1952 SC 64 , it was held that, "7. ....................... As we have seen, the most important question for determination is the meaning to be given to the word "election" in Article 329(b). That word has by long usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions, acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected. In Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami,(1928) AIR Madras 253 the learned Judges of the Madras High Court after examining the question, expressed the opinion that the term "election" may be taken to embrace the whole procedure whereby an "elected member" is returned, whether or not it be found necessary to take a poll. With this view, my brother, Mahajan, J. expressed his agreement in Sat Narain v. Hanuman Prasad,1945 AIR Lahore 85 and I also find myself in agreement with it. It seems to me that the word "election" has been used in Part XV of the Constitution in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate to the legislature. The use of the expression "conduct of elections" in Article 324 specifically points to the wide meaning, and that meaning can also be read consistently into the other provisions which occur in Part XV including Article 329(b). That the word "election" bears this wide meaning whenever we talk of elections in a democratic country, is borne out by the fact that in most of the books on the subject and in several cases dealing with the matter, one of the questions mooted is, when the election begins ................... That the word "election" bears this wide meaning whenever we talk of elections in a democratic country, is borne out by the fact that in most of the books on the subject and in several cases dealing with the matter, one of the questions mooted is, when the election begins ................... The discussion in this passage makes it clear that the word "election" can be and has been appropriately used with reference to the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps, some of which may have an important bearing on the result of the process." 10.7 The preparatory steps of holding elections taken by the State Election Commission in this case towards finalization of the electoral roll are merely part of the process for holding election and this cannot be equated with the complete process of "holding of the election." Therefore, the impracticability in holding of the election refers to the impracticability in concluding the election process beginning with the initial stages of preparing and notifying the electoral roll. Thus, the subjective satisfaction of the Governor (State Government) that, it is not practicable to hold election must relate to the entire election process, and not with merely any part of the election process, for, any other integral part of the election process may derail timely holding of election. The satisfaction arrived at referred to under Section 7(3) must relate to the entire election process from the initial stage of preparing the electoral roll till the holding of election and declaration of result, if the conclusion is that it is practicable to hold election as otherwise, any such satisfaction or conclusion arrived at on the basis of only a part of the electoral process may not be sufficient and incomplete for the purpose of the discretion to be exercised under Section 7(3) of the Act. On the other hand, for arriving at the conclusion that it is not practicable, reference to the hurdle with any part of the electoral process will be sufficient. Since, under Section 7(3), the satisfaction of the Governor relates to existence of circumstances which make it impracticable to hold election, the Governor has to consider the entire electoral process to see if there may be any problem with any stage of the electoral process. Since, under Section 7(3), the satisfaction of the Governor relates to existence of circumstances which make it impracticable to hold election, the Governor has to consider the entire electoral process to see if there may be any problem with any stage of the electoral process. 10.8 The words, "circumstances so exist" used in the sub-section (3) refer to the existing facts or situations or conditions or events which are again objective elements which are ascertainable and which are not conducive for holding election. After an overall assessment of these facts/situations/conditions prevailing at the relevant time the Governor has to come to a conclusion that it is impracticable to hold election which would necessitate extending the term of the General Council. Thus, there must be application of mind on all the relevant factors and considerations before the Governor comes to the conclusion that it is impracticable to hold the election. Only then the Governor is required to take the decision regarding extending the term of the General Council. 10.9 Thus, the important question which has arisen is, whether, for exercise of such discretion by the authority contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act, could a mandamus be issued by this Court" 10.10 It is now well settled that as regards a writ of mandamus, certain conditions need to be satisfied before a writ of mandamus can be issued. Firstly, mandamus is available against any public authority including any state or local body. Secondly, a legal duty must have been imposed by the Constitution or a statute or order which has the force of law on such public authority to perform a particular act. Thirdly, such a person seeking mandamus in his favour must have a legal right to enforce. Thus, a legal right of the person seeking mandamus and legal duty on the public authority to do an act are sine qua non for issuance of writ of mandamus. 10.11 It is also equally settled that if the duty of the public authority has a substantial element of discretion, a mandamus will not lie. 10.12 A related issue is whether the Governor is bound to extend the term or not, for which a mandamus has been sought by the petitioners. The language of Section 7(3) merely provides that the Governor "may" if satisfied, extend the term. It is the use of this word "may" which has generated so much controversy. 10.12 A related issue is whether the Governor is bound to extend the term or not, for which a mandamus has been sought by the petitioners. The language of Section 7(3) merely provides that the Governor "may" if satisfied, extend the term. It is the use of this word "may" which has generated so much controversy. As contended by the respondents, the use of the word "may" clearly indicates that it is the discretion of the Governor whether to extend or not to extend. As a corollary, since it is a discretionary power, no mandamus can be issued. Since the petitioners on the other hand have forcefully argued that in the context of the Act, the word "may" should be read as "shall" and hence the Governor is mandatorily required to extend the term of the General Council if circumstances exist to render holding of election impracticable, this issue requires further consideration of this Court, which will be dealt with at a later stage in more detail. 10.13 However, assuming that this is a discretionary power, in that, it is upto the Governor whether to extend or not to extend the term of General Council under the circumstances mentioned in Section 7(3), the question will always remain as to when and how such a discretion can be exercised by the Governor. Related to this issue is whether such a discretion will be exercised by the Governor suo motu only or at the instance of any other party or person' Who will initiate the process for exercise of the discretion? The statute is silent on it. Obviously, there can be no issue if the Governor (State Government) suo motu does it based on the relevant materials. But the question which needs to be examined also is whether, such a discretionary exercise can be sought for by the members of the General Council, before the expiry of their term? This issue is closely related with the requirement that for seeking a writ of mandamus, the existence of a legal right must be shown by the seeker of this writ, in the present case by the petitioners. This issue is closely related with the requirement that for seeking a writ of mandamus, the existence of a legal right must be shown by the seeker of this writ, in the present case by the petitioners. After all, it is their term and not of others, which can be extended by the Governor, if the Governor is satisfied with the existence of circumstances mentioned in the sub-section (3), though they may not have a vested right to claim for extension of their term after the expiry of 5 (five) years. It may be noted that such a discretion, if at all exercised by the Governor, relates to extension of the term, it must be during the subsistence of the term of the General Council, and not after it has expired, for the question of extending the term of an already expired General Council does not arise, as it would amount to revival of an expired General Council. To that extent the members of the General Council will have locus standi to approach the Governor, though they may not have a vested right to get the term extended, of which we shall be dealing in more detail hereinafter. 10.14 As we proceed further to examine the issue it may be noted that the State Government, either before the learned Single Judge or before this Court has not filed any affidavit. The stand taken by the State all the while, is based on oral submissions made and certain notifications issued as already referred to above. The State Government however, has produced a file stated to be relevant to this case to which we will be referring at the appropriate stage. However, as mentioned above, the plea of the State as submitted orally is that no such circumstances exist which render the holding of election impracticable for the simple reason that the election process has been already initiated indicating that the election can be held. According to the State, the fact that election process has been initiated rules out the impracticability of holding election. Thus, the stand of the State is that as this condition precedent, the impracticability to hold election, has not been fulfilled, the question of extending the term of the General Council does not arise. According to the State, the fact that election process has been initiated rules out the impracticability of holding election. Thus, the stand of the State is that as this condition precedent, the impracticability to hold election, has not been fulfilled, the question of extending the term of the General Council does not arise. 10.15 Certainly, the initial steps taken by the State Election Commission tasked to hold election of the General Council do indicate that the process for holding election has been already set into motion. But does it necessarily indicate that the election will be held soon? Apart from notifying the dates for various initial processes for finalizing the electoral roll, nothing is mentioned about the holding of election. The Commission is yet to notify by publishing in the Official Gazette calling upon the constituencies to elect members as mentioned in Rule 17 of the Election Rules. Rule 17 states that "the Commission shall, by one or more notification, published in the Official Gazette, call upon the Constituencies to elect members in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules and orders made thereunder." What the Government order dated 22.09.2020 mentions is that the Assam State Election Commission has been authorized to supervise, direct and conduct election to the General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council and the said Authority has issued the notification on 28.08.2020 for appointment of DEO/RO/ARO/ERO/AERO in respect of various constituencies for preparation of electoral rolls and the Authority has also notified the time schedule for preparation and publication of constituency wise photo electoral roll for the election and "Since the ASEC is the authority to hold election of Tiwa Autonomous Council, the Assam State Election Commission will take necessary action as per law." The aforesaid order concluded thus that "The petition vide resolution dtd. 14.07.2020 is disposed off accordingly." Though the Assam Election Commission has initiated the process of election, there is no specific decision taken so far that the election is going to be held soon or within an approximate point of time. No notification has been issued to that effect. To that extent, when the election will be held is merely a matter of conjecture at this stage. Mere notification for finalization of electoral rolls does not mean anything as far as the timeline for holding the election is concerned within the meaning of Rule 17 of the Election Rules. No notification has been issued to that effect. To that extent, when the election will be held is merely a matter of conjecture at this stage. Mere notification for finalization of electoral rolls does not mean anything as far as the timeline for holding the election is concerned within the meaning of Rule 17 of the Election Rules. As discussed above, if there are certain debilitating circumstances in the remaining process other than finalizing the electoral rolls, can it still be said that it is practicable to hold election, for our enquiry is directly related to the issue whether it is impracticable to hold election or not. 10.16 In our opinion, the entire legal framework of Section 7(3) is intrinsically bound with the issue of timely holding of election for the reason that while it may be impracticable to hold election within a certain specific period of time but may be practicable within an extended period of time and vice versa, in that while it may be practicable to undertake the initial process of election, yet it may be impracticable to do so with the remaining process. Hence, the issue of the practicability or impracticability of holding election is directly linked with the timeline and period of limitation for holding election. However, Section 7 or for that matter any provision of the Act, as we have discussed above, does not clearly spell out when the election is to be held unlike in the case of Panchayats and the Municipal Councils. The learned Single Judge has also observed in the impugned judgment and order that "We have not been shown any provisions of law which prescribe that notification for holding election on a particular date can be issued prior to the publication of final electoral roll". As discussed above, the contention of the petitioners that the election should be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council has been vehemently opposed by the State on the ground that it would amount to reading in the Act and Rules certain things which are not there. It has been submitted on behalf of the State that as the language of the statute is very clear, there cannot be a case of casus omissus in the present case. It has been submitted on behalf of the State that as the language of the statute is very clear, there cannot be a case of casus omissus in the present case. According to the State, as there is no specific mention of such requirement to hold election before expiry of the term of the existing General Council, it cannot be insisted upon by the petitioners. 10.17 In the present case, though the term of the office of the General Council is only five years from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members as provided under Section 7(1) of the Act, nothing is specifically mentioned in the Act that the elected representatives of the General Council shall have the right to continue after the five years term is over, even if the election to elect new members of the General Council is not held before the expiry of the term of the General Council. Neither, the Act specifically imposes any duty on the part of the Government to extend the term of the General Council, upon the expiry of the five years term, if the election to elect the new members of the General Council cannot be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council. Thus, on the face of it, neither there is any legal right of the elected members of the General Council to remain in office beyond five years tenure nor is there any corresponding legal duty on the part of the State Government to extend the term of the existing members of the Council beyond five years, if the election for electing new members of the Council cannot be held in time. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid statutory provisions and applying the classical legal principles governing the writ of mandamus, the contention of the respondents that the writ of mandamus would not lie in the present case, would on a cursory glance appear to be well founded. 10.18 Similarly, the contention of the State and other respondents that the language of Section 7(3) of the Act is plain and clear and as such it would be impermissible to read into it anything more than what is provided therein, that the election must be held before the expiry of the term of the Council, appears on the face of it unassailable. There is no such specific mentioning in Section 7 that if holding of election is impractical before expiry of the term of the General Council, the term of the General Council shall stand extended beyond five years. There is also no mention in the Act that the election has to be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council. 10.19 But at the same time, it cannot be said that there cannot be any limitation period or time limit for holding election just because the Act and the Rules are silent on this aspect. Thus, in spite of the purported clarity in the language in Section 7, there is an ambiguity as regards the timeframe or limitation for holding election. 10.20 It is also noted that the "satisfaction" of the Governor that "circumstances exist" which render the "holding of the election", "impracticable" are all relative to time and space obtaining at the relevant time. What may be practical at one point of time may not be practicable at another point of time. It cannot be also that the same circumstances will continue to exist without any time limit. Thus, these objective conditions creating the circumstances as to the impracticability of holding election have to understood in the context of specific timeframe in the functioning of elected body like the General Council. It is because of this reason that it becomes imperative to understand the timeframe of holding the election, to ascertain at which point of time the election is to be held when the statute is apparently silent on it. 10.21 This obviously would entail an exercise to ascertain as to when the election is supposed to be held. If the petitioners are able to establish that the election should be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council, certainly they can make a request to the Governor for considering their plea for extension of their term, if the election cannot be held before the expiry of the term as there is an enabling provision for extension of the term, though it is conditional. If the petitioners demonstrate that conditions exist which render holding of election impracticable, they certainly can make a claim before the Governor. To that extent they may have a limited right for consideration for extension of their term. If the petitioners demonstrate that conditions exist which render holding of election impracticable, they certainly can make a claim before the Governor. To that extent they may have a limited right for consideration for extension of their term. The State Respondents have, however, strenuously argued that there is no such mandate under the Act to hold the election before the expiry of the term and as such the petitioners? claim for extension of their term once their term has expired cannot be entertained as they have no such accrued right. 10.22 Thus, the moot question is when is the election supposed to be held and completed for constitution of the new General Council upon completion of the five years' term of the existing General Council? 10.23 Of course, it cannot be the case of anyone including the official respondents that the State Government or the State Election Commission can hold the election whenever, they feel convenient and at any time after the term of five years of the General Council is over. 10.24 As discussed above, this problem has arisen for the simple reason that the Act and the Rules framed thereunder are silent unlike in the case of Panchayats and Municipal Councils as regards the timeline of holding election. The duration of the Panchayat at all the three levels has been stipulated under Article 243-E of the Constitution of India by providing that every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and "no longer". At the same time, the timeframe for holding election has been also clearly mentioned. It has been specifically provided under Clause (3) of Article 243-E that an election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1) and if it is dissolved, before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution. Similar provisions have been made in respect of a Municipal Council under Article 243-U of the Constitution. What one does find in respect of the Panchayats and Municipal Councils is that while the term of these local bodies has been fixed at 5 (five) years, it has been also mandated that the elections must be held before the term of five years is completed, and if dissolved, within six months thereof. What one does find in respect of the Panchayats and Municipal Councils is that while the term of these local bodies has been fixed at 5 (five) years, it has been also mandated that the elections must be held before the term of five years is completed, and if dissolved, within six months thereof. Thus, the intention of the Parliament that such local bodies should not remain unrepresented and that there should be continuity in the representative nature of the bodies is very clearly evident from the aforesaid provisions. 10.25 Unfortunately, there is no such specific time frame provided under the Act or the Election Rules framed. However, this silence cannot be construed to give a carte blanche power to the authorities to hold the election whenever they wish. There ought to be some standard to be applied, and endeavour must be made to ascertain the same from the Act and Rules, and with the help of other relevant statutes and materials, if possible. 10.26 There can be no dispute as contended by the respondents that while interpreting statutes wherever the language used in the statute are clear and unambiguous, it must be understood in its plain meaning without adding or ignoring any part of the statute. However, it is also equally settled that while interpreting a statute, if there be some vagueness or uncertainty about any aspect directly related to the implementation of the statute, it will be permissible to refer to the context as well as the purpose of the Act to dispel any such vagueness. After all, the provisions of the statute must be construed to subserve the purpose and intent of the legislature for enacting such a statute. 10.27 In our view, while doing so, the scope of Section 7(3) of the Act has to be examined also in the larger context of the functioning of elected democratic bodies as we are dealing with an elected representative democratic institution though at the grassroots level. The Autonomous Councils such as the Tiwa Autonomous Council are also grassroot democratic institutions to provide the platform and forum for the scheduled tribes in Assam for their social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement by providing maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution as also mentioned in the Preamble to the Act. The Autonomous Councils such as the Tiwa Autonomous Council are also grassroot democratic institutions to provide the platform and forum for the scheduled tribes in Assam for their social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement by providing maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution as also mentioned in the Preamble to the Act. Thus, this body is to represent the aspirations of the tribals and hence, functioning of representative bodies like the Legislative Assemblies can shed light on the interpretation of the provisions of the Act, keeping in mind the Constitutional norms and vision. 10.28 For ascertaining the time line relating to holding of election for a representative body like the General Council, one may get a clue from the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council (Election) Rules, 2005 which provides for issuing a notification which may not be more than six months from the date of expiry of the term. Rule 17 reads as follows: "Rule 17. (1) For the purpose of constituting the first General Council, and thereafter for constituting a new General Council on the expiration of duration of the General Council or its dissolution under the provisions of section 52 of the Act, the Commission shall, by one or more notification, published in the Official Gazette, call upon the Constituencies to elect members in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and orders made thereunder; Provided that where a general election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing General Council, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the duration of the General Council would expire under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. (2) When a seat of a member elected to the General Council becomes vacant or declared vacant or his election to the General Council is declared void, Commission, shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, call upon the Constituency concerned to elect a person for the purpose of filling the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder." (emphasis added) 10.29 The aforesaid Rule is vital to our understanding of the controversy at hand. What it indicates is that the process of election can start within six months prior to the date on which the term of the General Council would expire. As per Rule 17 a notification calling upon the Constituencies to elect members is to be issued by the Commission on the happening of either of the two contingencies. The first being, for constitution of a new General Council on the expiry of the 5 (five) years term of the General Council and other situation arising out of dissolution of the General Council before completion of its term. The proviso to sub-rule (1) to Rule 17 provides that where the election is to be held otherwise than on dissolution of the existing General Council, which means that when the requirement is for holding election for constituting a General Council on the expiration of the term, such notification cannot be issued more than six months prior to the date on which the duration of the General Council would expire. Meaning thereby that, such a notification can be issued only within the period of six months prior to the date of expiration of the term. Thus, the bar is on issuing any notification for election at any time which is more than six months before the expiration of the duration of the term. But there is no bar in issuing the notification within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of expiry of the term. Rather, such a notification is expected to be issued prior to the date of expiration of the term of the General Council. 10.30 The aforesaid Rule 17 shows that the notification for election "can" be issued within six months prior to the date of expiration of the duration of the term of the General Council, which in turn indicates that the election "can" be held within the period of six months before the expiration of the duration of the General Council, though the statute does not clearly mention to this effect that the election has to be held before expiry of the term of the General Council. In our opinion, even though the expression "before expiry of the term of the General Council" is not found in the Act or the Rules for holding election, the same can be inferred and construed in the light of the provisions of the Election Rules and in the light of parliamentary practices, as will be adverted to hereinafter. 10.31 The fact that the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 provides for issuance of notification within six months prior to the date of expiration of the term of the General Council is clear indication that the election can be held before the expiration of the term for which the State Election Commission can start the process within six months before the expiry of the term of the General Council and as we shall see later on, this enabling provision is to be construed as obligatory provision to hold election before the term of the General Council. 10.32 Another important clue is to be found in Rule 83 of the Election Rules. Rule 83 provides for declaration and publication of the election result and its effect on the functioning of the existing General Council. Rule 83 reads as follows: "83. The Returning officer shall immediately after completion of counting and signing of the result sheet in Form-19 declare in From-2O of Appendix-II, the candidate -securing the largest number of valid votes to be elected under provisions of Section 6(l), read with Section 52 of the Act, and hung up the same in his office and shall send signed copies thereof to the Authority along with a report to that effect. The Commission shall cause the names of the elected candidates published in the Official Gazette by a notification and upon issue of such notification the General Council shall be deemed to be duly constituted under provisions of Section 57 of the Act: Provided that the issue of such notification shall not be deemed - (a) to preclude - (i) the taking of the poll and the completion of the election in any constituency or constituencies in which the poll could not be taken for any reason on the date originally fixed under clause (iv) of Rule 18; or (ii) the completion of the election in any constituency or constituencies for which time has been extended under provisions of Rule 111; (b) to affect the duration of the General council, if any, functioning immediately before the issue of the said notification." (emphasis added) 10.33 The aforesaid proviso (b) to Rule 83 makes it very clear that declaration and notification of the result of the election for the purpose of constitution of the new General Council upon completion of term of five years of the current General Council, shall not affect the functioning of the existing General Council till it completes its five years term under Section 7(1) of the Act. Thus, there will be no curtailment of the term of the outgoing General Council even if the new members are elected and their election is notified for constitution of the new General Council. It will only ensure smooth transition of power. This legal provision incorporated as proviso (b) to Rule 83, thus, contemplates holding of election before the term of the existing General Council comes to an end by clarifying that the declaration and notification of result of the election will not affect the functioning of the current General Council whose term will expire on completion of 5 (five) years. There can be no clearer indication than this provision read with Rule 17 in inferring that ordinarily, election should be held before the expiry of the term of the existing General Council and it will not have the effect of curtailing the term of the existing General Council. There can be no clearer indication than this provision read with Rule 17 in inferring that ordinarily, election should be held before the expiry of the term of the existing General Council and it will not have the effect of curtailing the term of the existing General Council. What it indicates is that at the transitional stage, there would indeed be two General Councils, one, the existing General Council, which is functional and another newly elected and reconstituted General Council, not yet functional, but would become functional after the five years term of the current General Council comes to an end. 10.34 In fact, provision of Section 7(3) itself is a clear indicator of the fact that the election should be held prior to expiry of the term of the General Council as it contemplates extension of the term of the General Council. As discussed above, there could not have been extension of the General Council whose term has already expired. Extension can be made of the term in respect of the General Council whose term is still subsisting. Thus, the impracticability of holding election is to be understood with reference to time period, which is before expiry of the term of the General Council. 10.35 In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to a decision of the Allahabad High Court rendered in Anand Mohan Vs. Union of India, (1985) AIR Allahabad 114, wherein the notification issued by the President of India on 20.11.1984 in exercise of the powers under sub-section 2 of Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "R.P. Act") calling upon all parliamentary constituencies to elect members of a new Lok Sabha before the expiry of the term of the Seventh Lok Sabha on 20.01.1985 was challenged. According to the petitioner in the said case, the President could take such an action only after the life of the existing House of the People came to an end and not before it. The said contention was negated by the Allahabad High Court by a holistic reading of the provisions of Section 14 of the R.P. Act and harmoniously construing the same with other provisions and held that a general election can take place for the purpose of constituting a new Lok Sabha even before the expiration of the duration of the existing House. 10.36 It may be mentioned that Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 dealing with general election for the purpose of constituting a new Lok Sabha after expiration of the duration of the existing House or on its dissolution is similarly worded to that of Rule 17 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council (Election) Rules, 2005. Proviso to Section 14(2) of the R.P. Act, 1951 also provides that where a general election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing House of the People, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the duration of that House would expire. Rule 14 of the R.P. Act, 1951 reads as follows: "15. Notification for general election to the House of the People. (1) A general election shall be held for the purpose of constituting a new House of the People on the expiration of the duration of the existing Assembly or on its dissolution. (2) For the said purpose, the President, shall by one or more notifications published in the Official Gazette of India on such date or dates as may be recommended by the Election Commission, call upon all Parliamentary constituencies in the State to elect members in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder: Provided that where a general election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing House of the People, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the duration of that House would expire under the provisions of clause (2) of article 63." (emphasis added) 10.37 In the aforesaid case of Anand Mohan (supra), it was held that in case of expiration of the duration of the existing House, election can take place six months in advance, though not earlier than that. Relevant portion of the aforesaid decision reads as follows: "5. The petitioner has urged that sub-s. (1) of S. 14 alone should be taken into consideration for deciding the validity of the action taken by the President in issuing the impugned notification on 20th November, 1984. He has placed great reliance on the words =on the expiration of the duration of the existing House." The argument is not sound. In sub-s. (2) the words "said purpose" have significance. He has placed great reliance on the words =on the expiration of the duration of the existing House." The argument is not sound. In sub-s. (2) the words "said purpose" have significance. These words are referable to the purpose mentioned in sub-s. (1), namely, the purpose of constituting a new House of the People. In sub-s. (2) the President is required to call upon all Parliamentary constituencies to elect members by issuing one or more notifications the notification or notifications have to be published in the Gazette of India. The occasions for the election of the members of the new House of the People are mentioned in sub-s. (1). The first is on the expiration of the duration of the existing House and the second is the dissolution of the existing House. It will be noticed that in S. 14, unlike Art. 83(2), the expiration of the duration of the existing House is not treated as its dissolution. The provisions contained in sub-s. (2) came into play either upon the expiration of the duration of the existing House or on its dissolution. Whichever may be the reason for constituting a new House, either expiration of the duration of the existing House or its dissolution, no general election can take place unless the resident issues the notification in the manner provided for in sub-s. (2). The proviso here is playing its usual role; it is carving out an exception to the provisions contained in sub-s. (2). The exception being a situation wherein general election is being held other than on the dissolution of the House of the People. In other words, it is being applied in a situation where a general election is being held on the expiration of the duration of the existing house. In the proviso the reference to cl. (2) of Art. 83 takes in its sweep not only the period of five years as fixed in cl. (2) of the Article, but also the terms of the proviso thereto. The proviso in Art. 83(2) dealing with an extraordinary situation brought about by the promulgation of emergency. We are not concerned with the provisions contained in the proviso as it is the petitioner's own case that the normal duration of five years of the existing House of the People is to expire on 20th January, 1985. The proviso in Art. 83(2) dealing with an extraordinary situation brought about by the promulgation of emergency. We are not concerned with the provisions contained in the proviso as it is the petitioner's own case that the normal duration of five years of the existing House of the People is to expire on 20th January, 1985. The word =such' used before the word "notification" in the proviso clearly means that a reference is being made to some notification mentioned earlier. There is no mention of the word notification in sub-s. (1). This word is to be found only in sub-s. (2). The terms of the proviso are, therefore, clear and explicit and are free from any ambiguity. They clearly mean that a notification referred to in sub-s. (2) can be issued for calling upon all Parliamentary constituencies to elect members of the new House of the People only within a period or six months from the date of the expiration of the duration of the existing House. In a nutshell, it means that in the case of the expiration of the duration of the existing House elections can take place six months in advance and not earlier than that. To put it differently, an outer limit of six months has been fixed by the Parliament from the date of the expiration of the duration of the existing House. In other words, the Parliamentary constituencies in the country can be called upon to elect members of the House of the People in advance, at any time within six months from the date of the expiration of the duration of the existing House and not before six months. It is thus clear that the provision as contained in sub-s. (1) cannot be read in isolation of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) and the proviso thereto. All the provisions contained in S. 14 have to be read as a whole and harmoniously construed. It is thus clear that the provision as contained in sub-s. (1) cannot be read in isolation of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) and the proviso thereto. All the provisions contained in S. 14 have to be read as a whole and harmoniously construed. We have therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that a general election can take place for the purpose of constituting a new House of the People even before the expiration of the duration of the existing House." (emphasis added) 10.38 We would also like to add that the expression,"on the expiration of the duration of the General Council", used in sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council (Election) Rules, 2005 following the expression "For the purpose of constituting the first General Council, and thereafter for constituting a new General Council ." and which expression, also used in sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the R.P. Act, 1951 that, "A general election shall be held for the purpose of constituting a new House of the People on the expiration of the duration of the existing Assembly or on its dissolution." refers to the inevitable requirement of constituting a new elected body on completion of the term of the elected body. It does not necessarily mean that the election has to be held only after completion of the term of the elected body as was urged also in the case before the Allahabad High Court referred to above and also sought to be urged before us. If the factum of timeline of holding the election is to be tied to the expression, "on the expiration of the duration of the General Council", as an action to be taken after the date of expiry of the term, the confusion can arise as was with the case of the petitioner in the case of Anand Mohan (supra), which was clarified by the Allahabad High Court by referring to the beginning words "For the said purpose" in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the R.P. Act. The aforesaid expression is to be used to clarify and refer to the "reason" or "cause" or "purpose" for holding election, that is, for constitution of a new General Council which is required to be done on expiration of the term of the General Council. The aforesaid expression is to be used to clarify and refer to the "reason" or "cause" or "purpose" for holding election, that is, for constitution of a new General Council which is required to be done on expiration of the term of the General Council. The law requires that a new General Council is to be constituted on the expiration of the term of the existing General Council, for which election has to be held. Thus, the said expression "on the expiration of the duration of the General Council", merely indicates the requirement and purpose of holding election and not to show that the election is to be held only after the expiry of the term of the General Council. It only refers to the reason for holding election, that is, on account of expiry of the term of the General Council so that a newly elected General Council can take over the affairs of the Council. This expression "on the expiration of the duration of the General Council" does not refer to the time schedule of holding election which is to be ascertained from the other parts of the Act as well as the Election Rules and other permissible aids. 10.39 The period of six months is quite significant for the purpose of determining the time line, since, even for a dissolved General Council, the interim arrangement can be made for a period of six months at a time. This is to enable the Authority to hold election within six month from the date of dissolution. Section 68 of the Act provides for dissolution and the interim arrangement to be made by the Governor and desirability of holding election within six month of the date of dissolution. Section 68 reads as follows: "68. This is to enable the Authority to hold election within six month from the date of dissolution. Section 68 of the Act provides for dissolution and the interim arrangement to be made by the Governor and desirability of holding election within six month of the date of dissolution. Section 68 reads as follows: "68. (1) The Governor may, if he is satisfied, on receipt of a report or otherwise and in consultation with the judicial Department of the Government that a situation has arisen in which the administration of the Council Area cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force or the general or the special instructions issued by the Government from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, dissolve the General Council, the Executive Council and the Village Council before the expiry of the term and assume to himself all or any of the powers and functions of the General Council, the Executive Council and the Village Council, the Executive council and the Village councils and declare that such powers and functions shall be exercised by such persons or authority as he may specify in this behalf for a period not exceeding six months at a time. (2) Every order made under sub-section (1) above shall be laid before the state Legislature for approval and unless approved by the State Legislature shall cease to operate on the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the Assam Legislative Assembly first sits after the issue of the orders." What sub-section (1) to Section 68 provides is that exercise of powers and functions by such persons or authority as the Governor may specify in this behalf shall be for a period not exceeding six months at a time. The indication is clear that every effort must be made to hold election within 6 months of the dissolution of the General Council. Though, the present issue does not relate to election upon dissolution of the General Council, the same is being referred to show the anxiety of the legislature in keeping such interim arrangement as short as possible by restricting to six months at any time. Though, the present issue does not relate to election upon dissolution of the General Council, the same is being referred to show the anxiety of the legislature in keeping such interim arrangement as short as possible by restricting to six months at any time. 10.40 That the election for constituting a new elected body of General Council is to be held within six months prior to the expiration of the term of the existing General Council finds support from the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter), (2002) 8 SCC 237 . 10.41 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid opinion in Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra) while dealing with the timeline for election in the case of a dissolved State Assembly made the observation that in the case of a life of the elected body which comes to an end on expiry of the fixed duration, a time limit for holding elections is imperative. Referring to Section 15 of the R.P. Act, 1951, it was observed that when the election is to be held on the expiry of the fixed term, the Election Commissioner knows the date in advance and can accordingly fix the schedule of the election and the dates are to be so fixed that they are not much prior to the expiry of the duration. It may be mentioned that provision of Section 15 of the R.P. Act relating to Legislative Assemblies is similar to that of Section 14 of the R.P. Act related to the House of People which in turn has similar wordings as that of Rule 17 of the Tiwa Election Rules as discussed above. 10.42 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra) observed that for a dissolved Assembly, the Election Commissioner becomes aware only after the dissolution takes place. He cannot, therefore, fix any schedule in advance in such a case. However, it was also observed that the consequential fallout of not holding election for a long time is the functioning of a caretaker Government which is contrary to the principles of responsible government and the caretaker Government is not the solution to deferring elections for unduly long periods. He cannot, therefore, fix any schedule in advance in such a case. However, it was also observed that the consequential fallout of not holding election for a long time is the functioning of a caretaker Government which is contrary to the principles of responsible government and the caretaker Government is not the solution to deferring elections for unduly long periods. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then emphasised the necessity for completing the election expeditiously as enjoined by the Constitution in public and State interest to see that the governance of the country is not paralysed in respect of a dissolved Assembly. In our opinion, the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is quite relevant to decide the issue at hand. Some of the relevant observations of the Supreme Court in aforesaid reference are reproduced hereinbelow: "71. In this context, we have looked into the provisions of the Constitution of India, but we do not find any provision expressly providing for any period of limitation for constituting a fresh Legislative Assembly on the premature dissolution of the previous Legislative Assembly. On our interpretation of Article 174(1), we have already held that it does not provide for any period of limitation for holding elections within six months from the date of the last sitting of the session of the dissolved Assembly. Section 15 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides that general election is required to be held for the purpose of constituting a new Legislative Assembly on the expiration of duration of the existing Assembly or on its dissolution. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that for constituting a new Legislative Assembly, the Governor shall by notification, on such date or dates, as may be recommended by the Election Commission, call upon all Assembly constituencies in the State to elect Members in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules and orders made thereunder. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act provides that where an election is held otherwise than on the dissolution of the existing Legislative Assembly, no such notification shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the dates on which the duration of that Assembly would expire under the provision of clause (1) of Article 172." "104. Therefore, a question may arise that if Article 174 is not applicable to a dissolved Assembly, can the Election Commission postpone election for an indefinite period so as to defeat the democratic form of government? Is there any mandate in the Constitution or in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 prescribing time to conduct the election? Obviously, neither the Constitution nor the Representation of the People Act, 1951 prescribes any time-limit for the conduct of election after the term of the Assembly is over either by premature dissolution or otherwise. Proviso to Section 15(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 states that where a general election is held otherwise than on dissolution of the existing House of the People, no notification for election shall be issued at any time earlier than six months prior to the date on which the duration of that House would expire under the provisions of clause (2) of Article 83. Once there is dissolution of the Assembly, the Election Commission shall take immediate steps to conduct the election and see that the new Assembly is formed at the earliest point of time. A democratic form of government would survive only if there are elected representatives to rule the country. Any delay on the part of the Election Commission is very crucial and it is the constitutional duty of the Election Commission to take steps immediately on dissolution of the Assembly. ................." "105. The Election Commission is vested with the power to decide the election schedule. It can act only in accordance with the constitutional provisions. The election process for electing the new Legislative Assembly should start immediately on the dissolution of the Assembly. There may be cases where the electoral roll may not be up to date and in such case the Election Commission is well within its power to update the electoral roll and the time taken for such updating of the electoral roll shall be reasonable time. Ordinarily, the Election Commission would also require time for notification, calling of nomination and such other procedure that are required for the proper conduct of election. There may be a situation where the Election Commission may not be in a position to conduct free and fair election because of certain natural calamities. Ordinarily, the Election Commission would also require time for notification, calling of nomination and such other procedure that are required for the proper conduct of election. There may be a situation where the Election Commission may not be in a position to conduct free and fair election because of certain natural calamities. Even under such situation the Election Commission shall endeavour to conduct election at the earliest making use of all the resources within its command. Ample powers are given to the Election Commission to coordinate all actions with the help of various departments of the Government including military and paramilitary forces. When an Assembly is dissolved by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, naturally, the Chief Minister or his political party seeks fresh mandate from the electorate. The duty of the Election Commission is to conduct fresh election and see that a democratically elected Government is installed at the earliest and any decision by the Election Commission, which is intended to defeat this very avowed object of forming an elected Government can certainly be challenged before the Court if the decision taken by the Election Commission is perverse, unreasonable or for extraneous reasons and if the decision of the Election Commission is vitiated by any of these grounds the Court can give appropriate direction for the conduct of the election." "146. Can it be said that the framers of the Constitution intended that in case the life of the elected body comes to an end on expiry of the fixed duration, a time-limit for holding elections is imperative, while in the case of a premature dissolution it is not so" 147. Sections 14 and 15 of the RP Act, 1951 deal with notification for general election to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies respectively. It is clearly stipulated that notification for holding the election cannot be issued at any time earlier than 6 months prior to the date on which the duration of the House will expire under provisions of clause (2) of Article 83 or under clause (1) of Article 172 respectively. The obvious purpose is that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is to call upon the electorate to elect Members in accordance with the provisions of the Rules, Act and the orders made thereunder on such dates as may be recommended by the Election Commission. The obvious purpose is that the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is to call upon the electorate to elect Members in accordance with the provisions of the Rules, Act and the orders made thereunder on such dates as may be recommended by the Election Commission. The dates are to be so fixed that they are not much prior to the expiry of the duration. Here also, the underlying object is that the elected Members are to continue for the full term. It has been fairly accepted by learned counsel for the parties who submitted that there is no time-limit fixed that there should always be a responsible Government. Our Constitution establishes a democratic republic as is indicated in the preamble to the Constitution itself and the Cabinet system of government is generally known as responsible government. We may notice here that in a democracy the sovereign powers vest collectively to the three limbs i.e. the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Section 14 of the RP Act, 1951 mandates that general elections shall be held for the purpose of constituting the new House of the People on the expiry of the duration of the existing House or on its dissolution. Similar is in the case of Legislative Assembly in the background of Section 15. When the election is to be held on the expiry of the fixed term, the Election Commissioner knows the date in advance and can accordingly fix up the schedule of the election. The problem arises when there is a premature dissolution. In that case, the Election Commissioner becomes aware only after the dissolution takes place. He cannot, therefore, fix up any schedule in advance in such a case. The consequential fallout of not holding election for a long time is the functioning of a caretaker Government which is contrary to the principles of responsible government. The caretaker Government is not the solution to deferring elections for unduly long periods. 148. As noted above, due to unforeseen contingencies it may become impossible to constitute a new House of the People or a Legislative Assembly. Deferring an election is an exception to the requirement that elections should be held as early as practicable. The requirement of summoning the House has inbuilt in it the existence of a House capable of being summoned. As noted above, due to unforeseen contingencies it may become impossible to constitute a new House of the People or a Legislative Assembly. Deferring an election is an exception to the requirement that elections should be held as early as practicable. The requirement of summoning the House has inbuilt in it the existence of a House capable of being summoned. Therefore even in the case of premature dissolution, effort of the Election Commission should be to hold elections in time so that a responsible Government is in office. At the cost of repetition it may be indicated that where free and fair election is not possible to be held, there may be inevitable delay. But reasons for deferring elections should be relatable to acts of God and normally not acts of man. Myriad reasons may be there for not holding elections. 149. In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the importance of the provision, the relation of the provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to get the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending the whole scope of the provision to be construed. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus impotentia, "the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole". [See Bratt v. Bratt,1826 3 Adda 210 (Addams at p. 216).]" "150. The necessity for completing the election expeditiously is enjoined by the Constitution in public and State interest to see that the governance of the country is not paralysed. 151. The impossibility of holding the election is not a factor against the Election Commission. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogitadimpossibilia. Impotentia excusatlegem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogitadimpossibilia. Impotentia excusatlegem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. "Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him." Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like an act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance with the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., at pp. 1962-63 and Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn., p. 268.) These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 19746. Situations may be created by interested persons to see that elections do not take place and the caretaker Government continues in office. This certainly would be against the scheme of the Constitution and the basic structure to that extent shall be corroded.? 6 (1974) 2 SCC 33 : (1975) 1 SCR 504 10.43 In the present case, the Authorities knew in advance of the impending expiration of the term of the General Council on 08.10.2020 and nothing prevented the Authorities to plan in advance the holding of election within six months before expiry of the term as also observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra), more so when the General Council reminded the State Government as per their resolution dated 14.07.2020. 10.44 One may argue that the above referred cases of Anand Mohan (supra) and Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra) merely indicate that it is permissible to hold the election before the expiry of the term of the Assembly, and it is nowhere stated that it is not permissible to hold the election after expiry of the term of the Assembly, and neither, it is stated that the election should be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council. 10.45 In our view, however, the consequence of holding election before the expiry of the term of the Assembly and consequence of holding election after the expiry of the term of the Assembly are quite different for the reason that if the election is held before the expiry of the term of the election, upon expiry of the term of the older Assembly, the new elected members of the Assembly can continue the Assembly without any interruption. On the other hand, if the election of the Assembly is held after the expiry of the expiration of the term of the Assembly, there is bound to be hiatus or breach inasmuch as there would be a period in which the House/Assembly will remain unrepresented by elected members. Ordinarily, an Assembly unless dissolved earlier is to continue to function with elected members, which is in consonance of the basic parliamentary practice of keeping such elected bodies represented by elected representatives. This breach in the continuity of the representative character of the Assembly, though not necessarily impermissible or unavoidable in certain circumstances, but should be avoided to keep the representative character of the House in continuity which is the very purpose of setting up of such elected bodies. 10.46 We are also of the opinion that provision of Section 7(3) itself is indicative of the requirement for holding election before the term of the General Council comes to an end. According to us, under Section 7(3) of the Act, it is only when it is impracticable to hold election before the expiry of the term of the General Council that the question of extension of the term of the existing General Council will arise. According to us, under Section 7(3) of the Act, it is only when it is impracticable to hold election before the expiry of the term of the General Council that the question of extension of the term of the existing General Council will arise. If the election is to be held on a posterior date of expiry of the term of General Council, extending the term of a non existent General Council does not arise, for, after the expiry of five years term, the General Council will become non existent and functus officio. A General Council after expiry of its term is as good as a dissolved Council and hence the question of extending the term of the non-existent General Council perhaps does not arise. From this, one can note the intrinsic relationship between the holding of election before the expiry of the term of the General Council and extension of its term if the election could not be held before the expiry of the term. 10.47 It may also be noted that the absence of any specific provision like Section 69 (which provides for interim management of the affairs of the Council in case of dissolution of the Council), for a situation arising after the expiry of the term of the Council, would indicate that the legislature did not really contemplate arising of such a similar situation after the expiry of the term of the Council, as on the expiry of the term of the Council, it was expected that the old Council would be replaced by the newly constituted Council with the new elected members. That is the reason, perhaps the legislature did not provide in the Act for any such interim arrangement for management of the affairs of the Council on the expiry of the term of the Council as by that time the newly constituted General Council would have come into existence. However, the legislature certainly did contemplate such a situation which may arise when the Council is dissolved, for which Section 68 was specifically provided in the Act. However, the legislature certainly did contemplate such a situation which may arise when the Council is dissolved, for which Section 68 was specifically provided in the Act. On the other hand, as contended by the State, if the law intended that the election has to be held only after expiry of the term of the Council, obviously there would be a period when the election is being held which would remain unrepresented by any elected members, in which event there has to be an alternative arrangement as provided in case of dissolution under Section 69 of the Act. This would clearly indicate that the legislature never contemplated any such gap or period between old Council and new Council, though such a gap could be anticipated every five years. Accordingly, the legislature did not make any such arrangement as provided under Section 69 of the Act to deal with such a period after the expiry of the term of the General Council till the constitution of the new General Council on election. 10.48 Though, Section 65 of the Act could be invoked by the State Government to deal with such contingency as contended by the learned Additional Advocate General, it could have dealt with the case of dissolution as well. Yet, the legislature in its wisdom specifically provided Section 69, in spite of the fact that the dissolution of the Council could not be a normal and regular occurrence but rare action to be resorted to. On the other hand, holding of election for reconstitution of the Council every five years would be a routine occurrence which can be anticipated every five years. Thus, if the plea of the State Government is to be accepted that the election can be held only after the expiry of the term of the Council, the aforesaid gap till reconstitution of the Council after election would be always an inevitable consequence every five years, in which case the legislature would have certainly provided similar provision to deal with such a period as has been done in respect of dissolution of the Council by inserting Section 69 of the Act. Thus, absence of similar provision like Section 69 to deal with such situation arising out of expiration of the term of the Council during which period the Council which will remain unrepresented by elected members, would indicate that the legislature never contemplated such a situation. Thus, absence of similar provision like Section 69 to deal with such situation arising out of expiration of the term of the Council during which period the Council which will remain unrepresented by elected members, would indicate that the legislature never contemplated such a situation. The inference that can be drawn from such a view is that ordinarily and in normal course there would not be any gap between the old Council and the new Council which can be avoided only when the election is held before the expiry of the term of the old Council so that the new Council can be constituted without causing any breach. 10.49 We would, therefore, hold that, ordinarily and under normal circumstances, the election has to be held before the expiry of the term of the Council so that the newly elected members of the Council can take over the affairs of the Council without there being any interruption, exceptions being made when there is dissolution of the Council for which the arrangement has been made as provided under Section 69 of the Act, or when any such extraordinary situation arising which is beyond the control of anybody such as the Covid-19 pandemic or any such natural calamity which could be considered to be an act of God as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishan Singh Tomar (supra). Otherwise, there ought not to be any hiatus between the old and new Councils. In our view, other than the aforesaid exceptional situations, there ought not to be any hiatus between the old and new Councils, which can be ensured only when the election is held in time and before the expiry of the term of the old Council. 10.50 We would like to observe that provisions of Section 65 and Section 76 of the Act are meant to deal with such exigencies and situations which are not normally contemplated and for unforeseen circumstances. However, if the stand of the State that the election is to be held only after the expiry of the term of the Council, the situation obtaining is foreseeable and easily predictable and cannot be said to be unforeseen circumstance. Hence, application of these provisions for such predictable situation is not contemplated. However, if the stand of the State that the election is to be held only after the expiry of the term of the Council, the situation obtaining is foreseeable and easily predictable and cannot be said to be unforeseen circumstance. Hence, application of these provisions for such predictable situation is not contemplated. Thus, the only plausible explanation can be that such a situation arising out of expiry of the term was not contemplated and hence no specific provision has been provided. The natural corollary is that the legislature also never contemplated any gap or hiatus between the outgoing and incoming Councils which can be ensured by timely holding of election before the expiry of the term of the Council. 10.51 This view is amply supported by the own actions of the State as evident from the orders dated 10.07.2015 and 22.07.2016 passed by the State Government in extending the terms of Deori Autonomous Council and Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council. In the order dated 10.07.2015 issued for extending the term of Deori Autonomous Council, it has been mentioned that the term of the existing General Council will expire on 11.07.2015 and that the State Government entrusted the State Election Commission, Assam to supervise, direct and conduct election of constituencies of General Council of the Deori Autonomous Council vide order dated 18.04.2015 and the State Election Commission initiated the process of conduct of election by taking steps for preparation and updating the electoral roll. However, because of certain order passed by this Court in a writ petition, WP(C) No.3566 of 2015 suspending the Government order providing for reservation of seats for women on rotation basis, the State Government took the view that the election of the new General Council of the Deori Autonomous Council could not be completed in time by the State Election Commission, Assam. Accordingly, by invoking provisions of Section 7(3) of the Deori Autonomous Council Act, which is in pari materia with the Section 7(3) of the Tiwa Autonomous Council Act, the Governor extended the term of the General Council of the Deori Autonomous Council by holding that "the election of the new General Council of the Deori Autonomous Council could not be completed in time by the State Election Commission, Assam" and accordingly ordered as follows: "Therefore, in exercise of power conferred under Section 7(3) of the Deori Autonomous Council Act, 2005, the Governor of Assam is pleased to extend the term of the office of the General Council of Deori Autonomous Council till it is practically possible to hold the election of the Deori Autonomous Council or for a period not exceeding one year, which is less." From the aforesaid extension order dated 10.07.2015, it is clearly evident that the State Government as well as the State Election Commission initiated the process for holding election on 18.04.2015 prior to the date of expiration of the term of the Deori Autonomous Council so that the election could be held in time knowing fully well that the term was expiring on 11.07.2015. Thus, the use of the words "in time" in the aforesaid order underscores the understanding of the State Government to complete the election before expiry of the term of the General Council. Thus, the words "in time" refers to the period before the end of the term. Because of certain order passed by this Court, the Governor took the decision on 10.07.2015 in terms of Section 7(3) of the Deori Autonomous Council Act, 2005 before the expiry of the term of the said Autonomous Council on 11.07.2020. The State Government had thus taken the position that inability to hold election before the term of the General Council amounts to inability to hold election "in time". So, when the appellants requested the State Government for holding election "in time", it meant that they were requesting the State Government to hold the election before the expiry of the term of the Tiwa Autonomous General Council. So, when the appellants requested the State Government for holding election "in time", it meant that they were requesting the State Government to hold the election before the expiry of the term of the Tiwa Autonomous General Council. 10.52 Similarly, in respect of Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council, the term of the existing General Council was to expire on 22.07.2015 and the State Government entrusted the State Election Commission, Assam to supervise, direct and conduct election of constituencies of General Council of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council vide order dated 18.04.2015 and the State Election Commission initiated the process for conduct of election by taking steps for preparation and updating the electoral roll. However, because of certain order passed by this Court in a writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 3566 of 2015 suspending the Government order providing for reservation of seats for women on rotation basis, the State Government then took the view that "the election of the new General Council of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council could not be completed in time by the State Election Commission, Assam." Accordingly, by invoking provisions of Section 7(3) of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council Act, 2005, which is in pari materia with the Section 7(3) of the Tiwa Autonomous Council, the Governor extended the term of the General Council of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council for 1 (one) year vide notification dated 22.7.2015. However, as the election could not be conducted during the aforesaid extended term, the Governor appointed the Commissioner as the Administrator of the said Council till the process of election was completed vide order dated 22.07.2016. In the case of the aforesaid Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council also, the term of the General Council was expiring on 22.07.2015 and though the election process was initiated on 18.04.2015 which is more than 3 (three) months before the date of expiry of the term, because of some order passed by this Court, the election could not be completed before the expiry of the term of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council, because of which the Governor invoked Section 7(3) of the Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council Act to extend the term of the General Council before expiry of its term. Thus, these orders of extension of term of General Councils of two Autonomous Councils were issued before the expiry of their term and it is also seen that the election processes were initiated long before the date of expiry of the term of these General Councils, clearly indicating the stand of the State and practice of the State Government that election ought be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council, which practice is in consonance with the practice of other elected bodies like the House of People and Legislative Assemblies. We have already noted that in respect of the Panchayats and Municipal Councils, the Constitution itself mandates to hold election before the expiry of the term. The overarching purpose is to continue to keep the representative bodies to be represented by elected members continuously as far as possible, except for rare occasions due to dissolution or breakdown of governance or such extraordinary situations as discussed above. Merely because there was a stay order passed by this Court in that case does not render holding of election impracticable unless it was reference to a particular limitation period as the interim order could have been vacated in due course. However, since the State considered that the election was to be held before expiry of the term, in the context of the said timeline, it was considered that holding of election was impracticable. Thus, the impracticality of holding election was with reference to that timeframe. Otherwise, the State could have got the interim order vacated and or got the writ petition decided early and hold the election. 10.53 We do not see any reason why the State Government made a departure in the present case in not initiating the election process in advance before the date of expiry of the term of the General Council on 08.10.2020 which they knew much in advance, so that the election could be held before the expiry of the term of the General Council. Perhaps, the Covid-19 pandemic could have been a reason for not initiating the process for holding election, which the petitioners were presuming. Perhaps, the Covid-19 pandemic could have been a reason for not initiating the process for holding election, which the petitioners were presuming. Yet, the State Government never mentioned the Covid-19 pandemic to be any impediment in holding of timely election, in which event, it could have been argued by the petitioners that circumstances exist which would render holding of election impracticable, thus making out a case for exercise of discretion by the Governor for extension of the term of the General Council under Section 7(3) of the Act. It may be noted that the learned Additional Advocate General has not even whispered about the existence of Covid-19 pandemic to be causing any difficulty in holding the election. In fact, it was vehemently argued on behalf of the State that there is no material to show that any circumstance exists which would render holding of election impracticable and the petitioners also failed to show any such circumstance. In such a situation, we also fail to understand why the State Government did not take any step earlier or urge the State Election Commission for holding election as in the case of Deori Autonomous Council and Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council, if the Covid-19 pandemic was not a hurdle for timely holding of election. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we may also presume that existence of Covid-19 pandemic does not amount to creating any problem or hurdle in holding of election. 10.54 In this backdrop, one may take judicial notice of some of the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts dealing with elections for constitution of new State Legislative Assemblies, in which the elections were held within six months prior to the date of expiration of the term of the existing Assemblies. In our opinion these decisions are equally relevant to the present case for the reason that similar to the Act, the Constitution and the R.P. Act are also silent as to the timeline and limitation of holding of election for reconstitution of new House of People or the State Legislative Assembly after expiry of the term of the Houses. (i) In Ram Deo Bhandari v. Election Commission of India, (1995) 2 SCC 153 , it was observed as follows: "1. (i) In Ram Deo Bhandari v. Election Commission of India, (1995) 2 SCC 153 , it was observed as follows: "1. Article 168 of the Constitution provides that every State shall have a legislature and Article 172(1) provides that every Legislative Assembly of every State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and not longer and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly. Under this article the five-year term of the Legislative Assemblies of two States, namely, the States of Bihar and Orissa will expire on 15-3-1995. It is obvious that on the expiration of the said term of five years on 15-3-1995, the Assemblies of the said two States will stand dissolved. To satisfy the mandate of Article 168 it is necessary that elections should be held in the aforesaid two States in a manner that the election results are declared before 15-3-1995. The latest Press Note issued by the Election Commission on 8- 12-1994 states that the elections in the States of Bihar and Orissa would be completed before 10-3-1995. Ordinarily no objection can be raised by either of the States to the schedule of elections fixed with a view to completing the same before 15-3-1995.........". (emphasis added) (ii) In Election Commission of India v. State of Karnataka,2013 5 LW 41(JS) , it was observed that, "1. The term of the Legislative Assembly of Karnataka will expire on 03.06.2013. By virtue of its powers, duties and functions under Article 324 read with Article 172(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 15 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the Election Commission of India is required to hold elections to constitute the new Legislative Assembly in the State of Karnataka before expiry of its present term. Therefore the Election Commission recommended to the Governor of the State to issue notification for the General Elections to the Assembly under the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. They also gave schedule for General Election to the Assembly. In that regard, the Election Commission of India issued a Press Note on 20.03.2013 enclosing schedule for General Election to be held on 05.05.2013. They also gave schedule for General Election to the Assembly. In that regard, the Election Commission of India issued a Press Note on 20.03.2013 enclosing schedule for General Election to be held on 05.05.2013. The Model Code of Conduct came into effect immediately from the date of Press Note on 20.03.2013." (emphasis added) (iii) In T.A. Ahammed Kabeer and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala,2016 SCCOnLineKer 23603, it was observed in the aforesaid case that, "13. Could the 14th Kerala Legislative Assembly have been constituted even before the dissolution of the 13th Kerala Legislative Assembly is the next question to be considered by us. Certain passages from the book "How India votes, Election Laws, Practice and Procedure" by V.S. Rama Devi and S.K. Mendiratta are really illuminating. V.S. Rama Devi was the Chief Election Commissioner of India and S.K. Mendiratta was the Consultant to the Election Commission of India who have authored the book. The passages are extracted below:- "Prior to 1967, lame duck sessions of Parliament used to be held with the old House of the People even after almost all the results of the general elections to constitute new House were available. Now, by convention, the existing house is dissolved as soon as the new house is in a position to be constituted on the completion of the general election, so that a new Government may be installed on the basis of the verdict given by the electorate at the general election and Parliament convened with the new House of the People............ If a general election has been held for constituting a new State Legislative Assembly to replace the existing Assembly on the expiration of its normal duration of five years, the new Assembly can be constituted as soon as may be after the completion of the general election. Likewise, the new Assembly can be brought into existence, if the earlier assembly already stands dissolved by the Governor under Article 174(2)(b) and the State has not been placed under President's Rule in terms of Article 356 ........ Though the due constitution of the new assembly will not affect the normal life of the existing assembly, the new assembly is generally constituted after the dissolution of the existing assembly. Though the due constitution of the new assembly will not affect the normal life of the existing assembly, the new assembly is generally constituted after the dissolution of the existing assembly. A healthy convention has been developed, of late, whereby the existing assembly is prematurely dissolved as soon as the general election is complete and the Election Commission is in a position to constitute the new assembly. As a matter of fact, in almost all cases, the notification of the Governor dissolving the old assembly and the notification of the Election Commission constituting the new assembly are published in the same issue of the official state gazette, one after the other. 14. The present convention therefore is to dissolve the existing Assembly prematurely as soon as the general election is complete and the Election Commission =is in a position' to constitute the new Assembly. (emphasis added) (iv) In Udai Narain Sinha Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1987) AIR Allahabad 203 1986 SCC OnLine All 54 : , it was held that, "An elector, who appears in person, has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to challenge the existence of the current Legislative Assembly the Ninth Legislative Assembly. 2. The term of the Eighth Legislative Assembly was to expire on 27th June, 1985. The Governor of Uttar Pradesh, in the purported exercise of powers under S. 15 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) issued a notification on 30th Jan. 1985, calling upon all the Assembly constituencies in the State to elect members in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the orders made thereunder. The Election Commission on 10th March, 1985, issued a notification purporting to be under S. 73 of the Act notifying the names of the members elected in the various constituencies barring a few constituencies where elections could not be held for one reason or the other. On the same date, the Governor, in the purported exercise of powers under cl. (b) of Art. 174(2) of the Constitution, issued a notification dissolving the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly with effect from that date. On the same date, the Governor, in the purported exercise of powers under cl. (b) of Art. 174(2) of the Constitution, issued a notification dissolving the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly with effect from that date. A notification issued on the same day announced that the Governor accepted the resignation of Sri Narain Dutt Tewari, the then Chief Minister, and the members of his cabinet with effect from the afternoon of the said day, and directed that the Chief Minister should continue to function along with his cabinet till a new cabinet was constituted. On 11th Mar. 1985, a notification was issued to the effect that the Governor appointed Sri Narain Dutt Tewari as the Chief Minister. The provisions of Section 15 of the Act are in pari materia with those contained in S. 14. In Anand Mohan v. Union of India, 1985 All 114 we had the occasion of considering the question whether a general election could be held for constituting a new House of the People even before the expiration of duration of the existing House. We took the view that the parliamentary constituencies in the country could be called upon to elect members of the House of the People in advance, at any time within six months from the date of expiration of the duration of the existing house but not before six months. We have already indicated that the Eighth Legislative Assembly had its life till 27th June, 1985. The notification dt. 30th Jan., 1985, having been issued well within six months was perfectly valid." (emphasis added) 10.55 This Court has also taken judicial note of the fact that the process of election for the Bihar Legislative Assembly is already underway and that the election held in three phases on 28.10.2020, 03.11.2020 and 07.11.2020 and counting of votes will be on 10.11.2020 as the term of the present Bihar Legislative Assembly is going to expire on 29.11.2020. 10.57 The aforesaid cases and instances clearly indicate that the parliamentary practice in this country is that elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies are generally held before the expiry of the term of these Houses and the Election Commission of India which is mandated to supervise and conduct the elections usually do so by notifying and holding elections before the expiry of term of the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies so that a new Lok Sabha or the State Assembly is in place by the time the term of the old Lok Sabha or the State Assembly comes to an end, even though the Constitution or the relevant statutes are silent on this aspect that the elections for constitution of the new the Lok Sabha or the State Legislative Assemblies are to be held before the expiry of the term of the current Houses. This practice is in consonance with the Constitutional vision of this country of being governed by elected representatives and also to avoid any such hiatus as far as may be practicable. As far as Panchayats and the Municipal Councils are concerned, there are specific Constitutional mandate to hold election before the expiry of the term of these bodies. Thus, as far as the parliamentary practice for election to the representative bodies is concerned, it is seen that elections are held before the expiry of the term of the body so that a newly elected body can take over the function of the representative body. 11. Conclusion: 11.1 It is well settled that while interpreting statutes, if two views are possible, the one which subserves the purpose of the statute and which is in conformity with the general practice in the related field and Constitutional norms should be preferred and any vagueness can be clarified with reference to similar legal provisions and practices. 11.2 Therefore, keeping the aforesaid parliamentary practice and Constitutional vision in mind as also highlighted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra), we are of the considered opinion that even if it is not specifically mentioned under the Act or the Election Rules of the specific timeline and the limitation period for holding election for constituting the new General Council, the same should be held before expiration of the term of the current General Council. To that extent it is obligatory unless, holding of election is made impracticable for reasons to be recorded as such a decision will certainly be subject to judicial review. The process of the subjective satisfaction to be arrived at under Section 7(3) that circumstances exist which renders holding of election impracticable will be amenable to judicial review. 11.3 In our opinion, it would thus be legitimate to clarify the vagueness in the Act and the Rules governing the Tiwa Autonomous Council of the timeline or timeframe for holding election for constitution of the new General Council by holding that the State Election Commission should initiate the process for holding election in respect of Tiwa Autonomous Council within six months before the date of expiration of the term of five years. As regards dissolved General Council, though it is not an issue before us, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Reference No.1 of 2002 (supra) has held that the election should be held in respect of the dissolved legislative assembly within six months of the date of dissolution, which in our opinion should apply to Autonomous Council as well, and hence election in respect of a dissolved General Council should be held within six months of the date of the dissolution. 11.4 Under the circumstances, for the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Authority/the Assam State Election Commission was under legal obligation to initiate the process of holding election within six months before the date of expiration of the term of the General Council on 08.10.2020, that is, any time after 07.04.2020 by issuing the necessary notification under Rule 17 of the Election Rules, which the Authority had not done. 11.5 It is only when holding of election within six months before the expiration of the term of the existing General Council, becomes impracticable because of existence of certain circumstances, that the Governor has to exercise the discretion for extension of the term of the General Council under Section 7(3) of the Act. 11.6 We, now, accordingly, proceed to deal directly with the issue as to whether the Governor had exercised discretion under Section 7(3) of the Act in the present case. 11.6 We, now, accordingly, proceed to deal directly with the issue as to whether the Governor had exercised discretion under Section 7(3) of the Act in the present case. 11.7 A careful reading of the order dated 22.09.2020 issued by the State Government, does not indicate that the Governor (State Government) has taken any decision that the Governor is satisfied that circumstances do not exist which render the holding of the election impracticable, so as not to extend the term for a further period not exceeding one year as sought for by the petitioners. 11.8 The aforesaid order dated 22.09.2020 merely states that the Assam State Election Commission has already taken certain initial steps and will take necessary action as per law. True, the State Election Commission is the sole authority to decide on the date and holding of election. Under such circumstances, as the State Government has no direct control over holding of election, once the State Election Commission takes over responsibility of conducting election, and unless the State Election Commission intimates, the State Government will not know whether the election can be held or not within a reasonable time. Vice versa, if certain circumstances exist which render holding of election impracticable according to the Governor, the same information or the subjective satisfaction of the Governor must be intimated to the State Election Commission to enable it to take proper decision for holding smooth election accordingly, and in the meantime, the Governor in exercise of the power conferred under section 7(3) of the Act could extend the term of the General Council. 11.9 Be that as it may, the Act places the onus on the Governor (State Government) and not on the State Election Commission to decide whether it is impracticable to hold election or not in terms of the provision under Section 7(3) of the Act. The aforesaid order dated 22.09.2020 issued by the State Government, in our opinion, does not amount to any decision taken by the Governor as regards the discretionary power as conferred upon the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act. The Governor, that is, the State Government, in our opinion, has to take a specific decision that the Governor is satisfied that circumstances do not exist which render the holding of the election, impracticable, so as not to extend the term of the General Council, which is missing in the order dated 22.09.2020. The Governor, that is, the State Government, in our opinion, has to take a specific decision that the Governor is satisfied that circumstances do not exist which render the holding of the election, impracticable, so as not to extend the term of the General Council, which is missing in the order dated 22.09.2020. 11.10 We are of the opinion also that order dated 01.09.2020 issued by the State Election Commission is not the notification for holding election as contemplated under Rule 17 of the Election Rules. Had it been so, there would have been a simultaneous issuance of notification under Rule 18 calling upon a constituency to elect a member. In fact, till the date of final hearing, no such notifications under Rules 17 and 18 had been issued. Had such notifications been issued, it could also have supported the claim of the State that there is nothing to indicate that holding of election is impracticable. 11.11 Further, the State Respondents have forcefully asserted that, this power conferred under Section 7(3) for extending the term of the Council being discretionary in nature, no mandamus will lie and this Court ought not issue any direction to the Governor/the State Governor to extend the term. 11.12 There can be no dispute that for issue of a writ of Mandamus, there must be a legal right to claim and a corresponding legal duty of the public authority to discharge such a duty. Similarly, when the duty to perform is essentially discretionary in nature, normally a mandamus will not lie. 11.13 We have already held that, though the Act is silent as to when the election for constitution of the new General Council is to be held upon completion of the five years term, a harmonious reading of the Act and the Rules and in the light of the parliamentary practices as noted through numerous decisions, the election is to be held within 6 (six) months prior to the expiration of the duration of the term of the General Council. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the State/Authority has the legal duty to hold the election within 6 (six) months prior to the expiration of the duration of the term of the General Council. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the State/Authority has the legal duty to hold the election within 6 (six) months prior to the expiration of the duration of the term of the General Council. The State Government or the State Election Commission does not have to wait for the term to come to an end before taking of steps for holding election. The law does not contemplate such a course of action, though there is also no specific bar mentioned in the Act. But such a course of action is not supported by any judicial decision nor the parliamentary practice. Accordingly, we conclude that the State/Authority has a legal duty to hold the election within six months prior to the expiration of the term of the General Council as this interpretation is in consonance with the scheme of the Act and Election Rules and in tune with the parliamentary practice as mentioned above. 11.14 In that context, even if the power to extend the term is discretionary in nature, the Governor (State Government) has a legal duty to consider if any claim is made by the members of the outgoing General Council for extension of term, even if they do not have a vested right to get their term extended. We have already held that it is the duty of the Authority to hold the election within 6 (six) months prior to the expiry of the term of the outgoing General Council. If so, there is a corresponding duty also to consider extension of the term of the General Council if circumstances exist making it impracticable to hold election. 11.15 This right to be considered for a claim may flow out of the statute or by implication or by way of legitimate expectation or such practices in the past, as discussed above. We are of the view that even if the members of the General Council do not have a legal right or a vested right to get their term extended beyond five years on completion of the term, since there is an enabling provision under the Act empowering the Governor to extend the term if circumstances so warrant as provided under Section 7(3) of the Act, the elected members of the General Council whose term only can be extended, have a legitimate right to be considered for extension of their term. To that extent, we are also of the view that the petitioners have a limited right of consideration for extension of the term beyond five years. 11.16 In this regard, one may refer to the decision rendered in State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573 wherein it was held as follows: "Mandamus To issue licence 30. The legislature when confers a discretionary power on an authority, it has to be exercised by it in its discretion, the decision ought to be that of the authority concerned and not that of the court. The court would not interfere with or probe into the merits of the decision made by an authority in exercise of its discretion. The court cannot impede the exercise of discretion of an authority acting under the statute by issuance of a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus can be issued in favour of an applicant who establishes a legal right in himself and is issued against an authority which has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so, but such a legal duty should emanate either in discharge of the public duty or operation of law. We have found that there is no legal duty cast on the Commissioner or the State Government exercising powers under Section 14 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the 1975 Rules to grant the licence applied for. The High Court, in our view, cannot direct the State Government to part with its exclusive privilege. At best, it can direct consideration of an application for licence. If the High Court feels, in spite of its direction, the application has not been properly considered or arbitrarily rejected, the High Court is not powerless to deal with such a situation that does not mean that the High Court can bend or break the law. Granting liquor licence is not like granting licence to drive a cab or parking a vehicle or issuing a municipal licence to set up a grocery or a fruit shop. Before issuing a writ of mandamus, the High Court should have, at the back of its mind, the legislative scheme, its object and purpose, the subject-matter, the evil sought to be remedied, the State's exclusive privilege, etc. and not to be carried away by the idiosyncrasies or the ipse dixit of an officer who authored the order challenged. Before issuing a writ of mandamus, the High Court should have, at the back of its mind, the legislative scheme, its object and purpose, the subject-matter, the evil sought to be remedied, the State's exclusive privilege, etc. and not to be carried away by the idiosyncrasies or the ipse dixit of an officer who authored the order challenged. Majesty of law is to be upheld not by bending or breaking the law but by strengthening the law. ................................................ ............................................... 32. Discretionary power leaves the donee of the power free to use or not to use it at his discretion. (Refer DrigrajKuer v. Amar Krishna Narain Singh17.) Law is well settled that the exercise of statutory discretion must be based on reasonable grounds and cannot lapse into the arbitrariness or caprice anathema to the rule of law envisaged in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is trite law that, though, no citizen has a legal right to claim a distillery licence as a matter of right and the Commissioner or the State Government is entitled to either not to entertain or reject the application, they cannot enter into a relationship by arbitrarily choosing any person they like or discriminate between persons similarly circumscribed. The State Government, when decides to grant the right or privilege to others, of course, cannot escape of the rigour of Article 14, in the sense that it can act arbitrarily. In such a situation, it is for the party who complains to establish that a discriminatory treatment has been meted out to him as against similarly placed persons but cannot demand a licence for establishing a distillery unit, as a matter of right. 33. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal18, this Court held that: (SCC p. 604, para 33) "33. ......No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot escape [from] the rigour of Article 14 [of the Constitution,] it cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will." 11.17 It may be apposite to note here that the petitioners were seeking extension of their term, by filing the writ petition, W.P.(C) No. 3068 of 2020 which was resisted by the State. Though the learned Single Judge did not pass any order on merit or issue any direction to the State Government for extension of the term, nevertheless directed the State Government by an order dated 03.09.2020 to take a decision as regards the resolution dated 14.07.2020 of the Tiwa Autonomous Council by which the State Government was requested to hold the General Council election within time or if the elections cannot be held, the term of the exiting Council be extended as per the Act by one year. This direction of the Court issued on 03.09.2020 was in essence a direction to consider the claim of the petitioner requesting for holding the election in time or to extend their term in the event the election is not held in time. 11.18 This order of the Court was not opposed by the State Government and purportedly in compliance with this order, the State Government issued the order on 22.09.2020 and it has been contended that the State Government has taken necessary decision as regards the claim of the petitioners for invoking provision of Section 7(3) of the Act. The stand of the State Government in essence is that by issuing the aforesaid order, it can be said that the State Government had declined the request of the petitioner for extension of their term beyond 5 years for the reason that no case has been made out for extension, as the question of any such circumstances rendering holding of election impracticable do not exist. The State Government is categorical in their stand that no such circumstances exist in which holding of election is impracticable, as the State Election Commission, Assam which has been assigned the task of holding election for the General Council, has already initiated the process for holding election by notifying the date of publication of the draft photo electoral roll, last date for receiving claims and objections, last date for disposal of claims and objections and final publication of photo electoral roll. Under the circumstances, the issue of holding of election being impractical does not arise, in which event, the question of invoking the discretionary power of the Governor for extending the term of the General Council also does not arise. Under the circumstances, the issue of holding of election being impractical does not arise, in which event, the question of invoking the discretionary power of the Governor for extending the term of the General Council also does not arise. 11.19 At this stage it would require to be clarified whether the word "may" indicates discretion on the part of the Governor, as contended by the State respondents, in that, it is not necessary that the Governor has to extend the term of the General Council beyond 5 years, even if circumstances exist to show that it is impracticable to hold election, as the Governor may decline to extend the term in his discretion. From the aforesaid perspective, being a discretionary power, the Governor may or may not extend the term of the General Council even if it is found that it is impracticable to hold election. According to the State, it is merely an enabling power of the Governor that under certain circumstances, the Governor may extend the term of the General Council. Of course, it is well-settled that even such discretionary power of the Governor will be subject to judicial review, of which we may not dwell into it for the reason that the Governor is yet to exercise such a discretionary power. 11.20 We are, however, of the considered view that there is a legal obligation on the part of the Governor to undertake the exercise to consider extending the term of the outgoing General Council by examining whether any such circumstances exist to render holding of election impracticable, more so when such a request is made as in the present case by the petitioners. The moot question which remains is that once the Governor has arrived at the conclusion that circumstances exist which render the holding of election impracticable, is the Governor bound to extend the term of the General Council? It is, perhaps here that the real discretionary power of the Governor comes into play. For this, the Governor has to take a decision based on all the relevant and germane materials. 11.21 We are of the opinion that normally and ordinarily, the term of the outgoing General Council under such circumstances should be extended. It is, perhaps here that the real discretionary power of the Governor comes into play. For this, the Governor has to take a decision based on all the relevant and germane materials. 11.21 We are of the opinion that normally and ordinarily, the term of the outgoing General Council under such circumstances should be extended. Non extension of the term of the outgoing General Council should be done only under extraordinary circumstances akin to that when the power of dissolution of the General Council is invoked under Section 68 of the Act, whereunder, if the Governor is satisfied on receipt of a report or otherwise and in consultation with the Judicial Department of the Government that a situation has arisen in which the administration of the Council area cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being force or the general or special instructions issued by the Government from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette dissolve the General Council, the Executive Council and the Village Councils before the expiry of the terms. In our opinion, the term of the outgoing General Council should be extended, unless situation prevails similar to as contemplated under Section 68 of the Act necessitating dissolution, in which event, the Governor would have the discretion not to extend the term of the General Council, in spite of existence of circumstances which render holding of election impracticable. 11.22 We hold so for the reason that even if the term of the outgoing General Council is extended, the reserved power of the Governor to dissolve the same by invoking the provisions of Section 68 always remains. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that normally and ordinarily, the term of the outgoing General Council should be extended if circumstances exist, which render the holding of election impracticable, unless the General Council is itself responsible for creating such circumstances, as no one can take advantage of his own wrong doing. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that normally and ordinarily, the term of the outgoing General Council should be extended if circumstances exist, which render the holding of election impracticable, unless the General Council is itself responsible for creating such circumstances, as no one can take advantage of his own wrong doing. If circumstances exist as mentioned under Section 7(3) which make it impracticable to hold election and the extension has to take place, and if the General Council is not responsible for creation of such circumstances, obviously the General Council could not be placed in a worse or disadvantaged position and the General Council would have a legitimate right to expect extension of their term and it cannot be left to the ipse dixit of the State Government not to extend the term. Thus, if any of the factors responsible for making holding of election difficult does not pertain to the functioning of the General Council or the General Council is not responsible for such circumstance, naturally and in ordinary course, the Governor cannot refuse to extend the term of the General Council, for the discretion has to be exercised only for public good and upholding the Constitutional norm. 11.23 We have gone through the file produced by the learned Additional Advocate General. Perusal of the file merely indicates that as per verbal order of the Secretary (of the Department), the speaking order was issued in connection with the Court's order dated 03.09.2020 and 15.09.2020 in W.P.(C) No.3068 of 2020. Nothing is mentioned in the file about any discussion or decision about the discretion to be exercised by the Governor and about the existence or non existence of such circumstances for the purpose of extension of the term of the General Council or for holding the election within a time bound period. As discussed above, the order dated 22.09.2020 is devoid of any decision or discussion about holding election in time within 6 (six) months period of the expiry of the term of the General Council or extension of the term of the General Council beyond 5 (five) years as sought by the petitioners. 11.24 We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the said order dated 22.09.2020 was not issued as a consequence of the exercise of the discretionary power of the Governor as contemplated under Section 7(3). 11.24 We are, thus, of the considered opinion that the said order dated 22.09.2020 was not issued as a consequence of the exercise of the discretionary power of the Governor as contemplated under Section 7(3). We would, thus, hold that if the State Government claims that order dated 22.09.2020 is the result of the exercise of discretionary power under Section 7(3), it is certainly vitiated with non application of mind by the Governor (State Government) on the request of the petitioners for seeking a decision on holding of election in time or extension of the term of the General Council. In short, no exercise was undertaken by the Governor (State Government) as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act. 11.25 We may also observe that any action of the Governor (State Government) in exercising the power under Section 7(3) of the Act is not immune from judicial review by this Court. Any such decision taken under Section 7(3) must be based on relevant materials and considerations. However as the Governor has not yet exercised the said discretion, there is no need to further dwell into the judicial reviewability of any such discretion. [See Nabam Rebia & Bamang Felix v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1 about the scope of judicial review of the discretionary power of the Governor]. 11.26 We may summarise our conclusion with reference to the issues raised herein as follows:- (i) Exercise of discretionary power by the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act is intrinsically linked with the issue of the timeframe of holding election in the Tiwa Autonomous Council and we hold that election is required to be held within six months before the date on which the duration of the General Council would expire on completion of its five years term as provided under Section 7(1) of the Act. (ii) There cannot be any postponement or delay in holding of election except for exceptional circumstances such as, rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections, and such other circumstances beyond the control of the authorities. (ii) There cannot be any postponement or delay in holding of election except for exceptional circumstances such as, rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections, and such other circumstances beyond the control of the authorities. (iii) Consequently, this discretion under Section 7(3) is to be exercised by the Governor during the aforesaid period of six months and in any event, before the expiry of the term of the General Council and as a corollary, invoking of the discretionary power under Section 7(3) of the Act does not arise in respect of a dissolved General Council. (iv) For exercise of discretion under Section 7(3) of the Act, it is the essential prerequisite that the Governor must first arrive at the satisfaction that circumstances exist which render holding of election impracticable. This is a subjective satisfaction of the Governor which must be arrived based on assessment of the objective materials, situation obtaining and consideration and the relevant factors. This satisfaction to be arrived at by the Governor under this provision without any doubt, can be, subject to judicial review. (v) Having arrived at the conclusion by the Governor that the circumstances exist which render holding of the election impracticable, the Governor will be required to undertake another discretionary exercise as to whether the term of the General Council which is going to expire on completion of five years term, ought to be extended beyond five years or not. (vi) Normally, the term of the General Council, which is going to expire on completion of five years as provided under Section 7(1) of the Act should be extended under Section 7(3) unless the General Council itself is in any way responsible for creating such circumstances which render holding of the election impracticable. Similarly, the term of such General Council is required to be extended under Section 7(3) of the Act, unless there is a situation obtaining akin to that which warrants invoking power of dissolution under Section 68 of the Act. (vii) Even if the term of the General Council is extended beyond five years under Section 7(3) of the Act, the reserved and inherent power of the Governor to dissolve even a General Council under extended term by invoking Section 68 of the Act subsists. (vii) Even if the term of the General Council is extended beyond five years under Section 7(3) of the Act, the reserved and inherent power of the Governor to dissolve even a General Council under extended term by invoking Section 68 of the Act subsists. (viii) Exercise of this discretionary power of the Governor to extend the term of the General Council under Section 7(3) of the Act will be also amenable to judicial review. (ix) The extension of the term of the General Council can be for a maximum period of one year only and the fresh election should be held and completed within the aforesaid period of one year. 12. Decision: 12.1 As a consequence and for the reasons discussed above, we direct the State Government to take a decision as regards the claim of the petitioners for extension of their term as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the Act keeping in mind that the election for constitution of the new General Council was expected to be completed within 6 (six) months prior to 08.10.2020. However, since the aforesaid timeline has already lapsed, and since the clock cannot be put back, it is directed that the election should be completed at the earliest but within a period not beyond 6 (six) months from 08.10.2020. We make it clear that this direction to complete the election process for constitution of a new General Council within the aforesaid period cannot be treated as a precedence for the reason that it would be contrary to our decision that the election should have been completed within a period of 6 (six) months prior to the date of expiration of the term. This direction has been issued as an exception because of circumstances now beyond the control of anybody, which was primarily because of the lack of clarity on the issue of the timeline for holding election for constitution of a new General Council which was required to be done on completion of its full term of 5 (five) years by holding the election prior to completion of five years term of the outgoing General Council. 12.2 We are also conscious of the fact that we had passed an interim order on 08.10.2020 for maintaining status quo as regards the term of General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council which has been continued till date. 12.2 We are also conscious of the fact that we had passed an interim order on 08.10.2020 for maintaining status quo as regards the term of General Council of the Tiwa Autonomous Council which has been continued till date. The statutory obligation to consider extension of the term of the General Council had to be exercised before expiry of the term of the General Council and order dated 22.09.2020 cannot be said to be an order passed pursuant to exercise of discretionary power by the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act. 12.3 Accordingly, we direct that the present General Council will continue to function till appropriate order is passed by the Governor (State Government) as regards their request for extension of their term in terms of Section 7(3) of the Act. In this regard, the State Government may keep in mind that by afflux of time and for reasons now beyond the control of anybody, it remains a fait accompli that election cannot be held within 6 (six) months before the expiry of the term of the General Council on 08.10.2020 and accordingly, the election has to be held within a period of six months from 08.10.2020. The State Government has also to keep in mind that existence of Covid-19 pandemic was never considered nor pleaded to be a circumstance which would create difficulties in holding the timely election. In fact, it was stressed that there is nothing to show that circumstances exist which would render holding of election impracticable. 12.4 We have already held that the discretion to be exercised by the Governor under Section 7(3) of the Act is to be exercised during the subsistence of the term of the Governing Council as the extension of the term will mean only continuation of the term by way of extension. Once the term of the General Council has lapsed, the members of the General Council will become functus officio and the question of extending their term does not arise once they have demitted office due to expiry of their term. Any extension of term of a General Council once the term has lapsed would amount to revival of the General Council which is not contemplated under law. Any extension of term of a General Council once the term has lapsed would amount to revival of the General Council which is not contemplated under law. Hence, since the Governor has not undertaken the exercise for invoking his discretionary power under Section 7(3) of the Act, during the subsistence of the term of the outgoing General Council, the term of the existing General Council shall stand extended till the Governor (State Government) takes any decision in this regard. 12.5 Accordingly, we direct that the outgoing General Council shall continue to be in office till appropriate decision is taken by the Governor (State Government) under Section 7(3) of the Act which the Governor (State Government) will do within a period of three weeks from today. 12.6 Issues canvassed before this Court and not decided by this judgment are left open to be decided in appropriate case. 12.7 The writ appeal is accordingly allowed in terms of the above observations and directions.