ORDER 1. The appellants before this Court have filed this present writ appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 being aggrieved by the order dated 6.1.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 8619/2020 (Tukojirao Puar (deceased) through L.Rs Shrimant Gayatri Raje Puar & Others v. The Board of Revenue & Others). 2. The facts of the case reveal that the appellantss are the legal heirs of Late His Highness Maharaja Tukojirao Puar. In the State of Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh Ceiling Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 (Act No. 20 of 1960) was enacted and it came into force on 1.10.1960. The Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, as already stated earlier, came into force on 1.10.1960 and that relevant point of time, in the territory of erstwhile Dewas Senior State, the agricultural land and forest land were held in the following names:- (a) The grandfather of appellants No.2, His Late Highness Maharja Krishnajirao Puar; (b) Shri Tukojirao Puar, Religious and Charitable Trust (c) Shri Krishnajirao Puar Religions and Charitable Trust; (d) Dewas Farm Project Private Limited. 3. The Royal Family of Dewas, Senior State also owned a palace known as 'Anand Bhawan Palace' and the land attached to the palace was were included in the list of private property of Ex-rulers of the ersthwhile Dewas Senior State. 4. The proceedings were initiated under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 against the predecessor-in-title by the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain exercising power of the competent authority under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 and because the land was partly in Dewas District and partly in Ratlam District, the final order was passed by the competent authority on 18.1.1999. 5. An appeal was also preferred against the order dated 18.1.1999 under section 41 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 before the Board of Revenue, Gwalior and the Board of Revenue allowed the appeal by an order dated 19.5.2006 holding that the order dated 18.1.1999 passed by the competent authority was unlawful and accordingly quashed all action and proceedings against the appellants under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960. 6. The facts of the case further reveal that after a lapse of four years, the Board of Revenue took suo motu cognizance for reviewing the matter on 22.5.2010. 6. The facts of the case further reveal that after a lapse of four years, the Board of Revenue took suo motu cognizance for reviewing the matter on 22.5.2010. A review case registered by the Board of Revenue under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 and was numbered as suo motu review 712/PBR/10-Dewas. On 15.6.2010, the Board of Revenue issued a show-cause notice to late Shri Tukojirao Puar, the predecessor-in-title of the appellants and a reply was filed to the show-cause notice on 20.7.2010 raising preliminary objection regarding maintainability of suo motu review. On the 22.9.2010, an additional reply was also filed and written arguments were also submitted on 22.10.2010. The Board of Revenue on 29.4.2011 rejected the application, by which, preliminary objections were raised. It was held by the Board of Revenue that the Board of Revenue is having jurisdiction under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the review is maintainable. 7. The appellants came before this Court being aggrieved by the exercise of suo motu review initiated by the Board of Revenue and the order dated 29.4.2011, by which, the preliminary objections were rejected. This Court has granted an interim order in the matter, and finally, the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition holding that the review is maintainable keeping in view the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the present writ appeal has been filed. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has raised various grounds before this Court and it has been argued that there is no provision of review under the Mahdya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 and in absence of any specific provision of review, the initiation of suo motu review by the Board of Revenue is bad in law. 9. It has also been argued that merely because the Presiding Officer of the Board of Revenue is changed, the change in Presiding Officer of Board of Revenue does not empower the successor to undertake suo motu review of the orders passed by his predecessor. 10. It has also been argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that unless and until the provision of review is provided under the statute, application for review or suo motu review is not at all maintainable. 10. It has also been argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that unless and until the provision of review is provided under the statute, application for review or suo motu review is not at all maintainable. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Kalabharti Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath reported in (2010) 9 SCC 437 as well as a judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar Gupta v. Government of NCT of Delhi reported in (2019) 9 SCC 416 . 11. It has further been contended that the learned Single Judge has erred in law and facts in borrowing the provisions of review as provided under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1960 for entertaining the review against the order passed under section 41 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960. 12. It has further been aruged that there is no provision either under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 or under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which empowers the Board to exercise the power of review as provided under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 in respect of an order passed under section 41 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Land, 1960. 13. It has also been argued that the learned Single Judge has erred in law and facts in holding that the power of review, which is provided under section 51 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, is also applicable under other enactment placing reliance upon section 56 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 without appreciating that M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 is a complete code in itself and being a special law, does not have provision of review, it does have a provision of appeal and revision only. 14. It has been contended that there was no error apparent on the face of record warranting review or there was no discovery of new or any important fact which after exercise of due deligence was not within the knowledge of Board of Revenue earlier. 15. 14. It has been contended that there was no error apparent on the face of record warranting review or there was no discovery of new or any important fact which after exercise of due deligence was not within the knowledge of Board of Revenue earlier. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Thungabhadra Industries Limited v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 , Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Albam Pishak Sharma reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 , Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 , Parsion Devi v Sumitri Devi reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , Yashwant Sinha v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Others reported in (2020) 2 SCC 338 , Haryaan State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Mawasi & Others reported in AIR 2012 SC 3874 , Haridas v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt.) & Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78 , The State of West Bengal & Others v. Kamal Sen Gupta & Another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 , Inderchand Jain (Dead) through L.R's v. Motilal (Dead) through L.R's reported in (2009) 14 SCC 663 , S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission reported in (2009) 10 SCC 464 , Jain Studio Limited v. Shin Satellite Public Corporation Limited reported in (2006) 5 SCC 501 , Sow Chandrakante v. Sheikh Habib reported in (1975) 1 SCC 674 , Northern India Catereris v. LT. Government of Delhi reported in (1982) 2 SCC 167 , Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320 and Vikram Singh v. The State of Punjab reported in (2017) 8 SCC 518 . His contention is that review is permissible only when there is an error apparent on the face of record and under the guise of review, an authority cannot exercise the appellate power. 16. His contention is that review is permissible only when there is an error apparent on the face of record and under the guise of review, an authority cannot exercise the appellate power. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended before this Court that after a lapse of about four years, the Board of Revenue could not have exercised the suo motu power keeping in view the judgment delivered in the case of Ranveer Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2010 RN 409 = 2010 (3) JLJ 77 = AIR 2011 MP 2017 and a prayer has been made for setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 17. Shri Pushyamitra Bhargav, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh has not disputed the chronology of events, however, he has vehemently argued before this Court that the Board of Revenue was well within its domain to exercise power of review under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. He has argued that under section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, an appeal lies from every original order passed under the Code or the Rules made thereunder and in case of revision, a revision lies under section 50 and power of review lies under section 51, the Board and every revenue Officer may or on its more motion or on the application of any interested parties can review any order passed by itself or by any of its predecessor as it thinks fit. He has argued that power of review has not been confined only in respect of the order passed under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 but the power of review is available in respect order passed under any other enactment by the Board of Revenue. 18. It has further been contended that order, which is illegal, can be reviewed at any point of time and for which no limitation is provided under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Reliance has been placed upon judgments delivered in the case of Hem Singh v. Collector reported in AIR 1976 Rajasthan 187, Aslam Gani Patrawala v. Jasveer Singh (W.P. No.6296/2010) decided on 23.04.2010, Jeevan Lal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2008 RN 327 = 2008 (2) M.P.L.J. 4 and Collector v. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 SC1353. Reliance has been placed upon judgments delivered in the case of Hem Singh v. Collector reported in AIR 1976 Rajasthan 187, Aslam Gani Patrawala v. Jasveer Singh (W.P. No.6296/2010) decided on 23.04.2010, Jeevan Lal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2008 RN 327 = 2008 (2) M.P.L.J. 4 and Collector v. Katiji reported in AIR 1987 SC1353. It has been argued that the Board of Revenue has rightly exercised power of review and no case for interference is made out in the matter 19. Shri Pushyamitra Bhargav has also argued before this Court that the present writ appeal is not at all maintainable. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal and has again placed reliance upon judgments delivered in the cases of Nathuram Sahu v. Municipal Council, Garhakota reported in 1992 R N 43, Ravishankar Dube & Others v. The Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior & Others reported in 1972 SCC OnLine MP 53, Jagdish Prasad v. the Board of Revenue & Others (W.A. No.338/2019) decided on 15.5.2018, Smt. Hansa Devi W/o Punyapal Surana & Another v. Chandar Singh s/o Prem Singh & Others (W.A. No.691/2014) decided on 5.2.2015 and Trustees of H.C. Danda, Trust v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (W.A. No.265/2017) decided on 4.9.2017. 20. The learned Single Judge, after taking into account the arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties, has dismissed the writ petition. The operative paragraphs of the order passed by the learned Single Judge reads as under:- “I have heard Shri A.K. Chitale, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri Vinay Gandhi, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondents/State at length and perused the material available on record. The petitioner has raised purely a legal issue in the present petition. According to the petitioner, order dated 19.5.2006 was passed by the Board of Revenue under the provisions of Ceiling act and thereafter, vide order dated 22.5.2010, the Board of Revenue has suo motu exercised the power of review and re-opened the case against the petitioner. The petitioner has raised preliminary objection about the power of Board of Revenue to exercise the review jurisdiction in absence of any provision under the Ceiling Act. The petitioner has raised preliminary objection about the power of Board of Revenue to exercise the review jurisdiction in absence of any provision under the Ceiling Act. The State Government has enacted the Act called as M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 with a view to provide more equitable distribution of land by fixing ceiling on existing holdings as well as on future acquisition of agricultural lands. The surplus land vesting in Government will be allotted on payment of occupancy price to needy persons and cooperative farming societies in certain priorities. The Ceiling Act provides for imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings, acquisition and disposal of surplus land and matters ancillary thereto. The object of the Ceiling Act is to provide the land to needy or landless persons by the State Government and for giving effective implementation of it, the authorities under the MPLRC have been empowered by way of notification. Section 2(e) of the Ceiling Act defines “competent authority” and it means – in respect of a holder whose entire land is situated within a sub-division, the Sub Divisional Officer may be appointed by the State Government. Likewise, if the land is situated more than one sub-division of same district, the Government may appoint competent authority. U/s. 41 of the Ceiling Act against every order of a revenue officer or competent authority under this Act, an appeal shall lie to the authority competent to hear the appeal under sub-section (1) of section 44 of the MPLRC. Likewise, the power of revision has been vested u/s. 42 of the Ceiling Act with the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner. Section 2(e), sections 41 and 42 of the Ceiling Act are reproduced below “2. Likewise, the power of revision has been vested u/s. 42 of the Ceiling Act with the Board of Revenue or the Commissioner. Section 2(e), sections 41 and 42 of the Ceiling Act are reproduced below “2. Definitions - (e) "competent authority" means -- (i) in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate within a Sub- ivision, the Sub-Divisional Officer and/or such other Revenue Officer, not below the rank of a Deputy Collector as may be appointed by the State Government; (ii) in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate in more than one Sub-Division of the same district, the Collector or the Additional Collector and where there is no Additional Collector for the district such Deputy Collector, as may be empowered by the State Government to exercise the powers of Collector under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) for the purpose; and (iii) in respect of a holder whose land is situate in more than one district such authority as may be appointed by the State Government;” “41. Appeals- Except where the provisions of this Act provide otherwise, against every order of a Revenue Officer or competent authority under this Act or the rules made thereunder, an appeal shall lie: (i) if such order is passed by a Revenue Officer either as competent authority or otherwise to the authority competent to hear appeals under sub-section (1) of section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) from an order passed by a Revenue Officer of the same rank under the said Code; (ii) if such order is passed by the competent authority where such authority is an officer other than a Revenue Officer appointed under sub-clause (iii) of clause (e) of section 2 to the Board of Revenue as if such officer were an Additional Settlement Commissioner appointed under section 65 of the said Code : Provided that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case.” “42. Revision- The Board of Revenue or the Commissioner may on its/his motion or on the application by any party at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any competent authority subordinate to it/him call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such competent authority, and may pass such orders in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit: Provided that it/he shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being heard: Provided further that no application for revision shall be entertained against an order against which an appeal is provided under this Act : Provided also that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case.” The Board of Revenue is established u/s. 3 of the MPLRC and according to which, there shall be a Board of Revenue of Madhya Pradesh consisting of a President and two or more other members as the State Government may, from time to time, think fit to appoint. Section 7 of the MPLRC provides for jurisdiction of Board and according to which, the Board shall exercise the powers and discharge the functions conferred upon it by or under the MPLRC and such functions of the State Government as may be specified by notification issued by the State Government in that behalf and such other functions as have been conferred or may be conferred by or under any Central or State Act. Section 7 of the MPLRC is reproduced below : “7. Jurisdiction of Board. — (1) The Board shall exercise the powers and discharge the functions conferred upon it by or under this Code and such functions of the State Government as may be specified by notification by the State Government in that behalf and such other functions as have been confer red or may be confer red by or under any Central or State Act on the Chief Revenue Author it or the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. (2) The State Government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose, by notification, conferupon, or entrust to the Board or any member of the Board additional powers or functions as signed to the State Government by or under any enactment for the time being in force By way of notification the Board of Revenue is empowered to hear the appeals so also the revisions under the Ceiling Act. section 44 of the MPLRC provides remedy of appeal and appellate authorities and according to which, an appeal shall lie from every original order under this Code or the rules made thereunder, but the same is not there in sections 50 and 51 of the MPLRC under which the Board of Revenue exercises the power of revision and review. U/s. 50 of the MPLRC, the Board of Revenue may, at any time on its own motion or on an application made by any party or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may, at any time on his own motion, call for the record of any case which has been decided or proceedings in which an order has been passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it. This power is not confined to the order passed under the MPLRC. Likewise in exercise of review also, u/s. 51 of the MPLRC, the Board and every Revenue Officer may, either on its own motion or on the application of any party interested review any order passed by itself/himself or by any of its/his predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit subject to certain conditions as per the proviso. The power of review is also not confined to the order passed under the MPLRC. It is not in dispute that the Ceiling Act as well as MPLRC both deals in the field of agricultural lands. The 'order' is defined in section 56 of the MPLRC which means, in this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, expression “order” means the formal expression of the decision given by the Board or a Revenue Officer in respect of any matter in exercise of its/his powers under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force, as the case may be. Therefore, according to conjoint reading of sections 50, 51 and 56 of the MPLRC, the Board of Revenue is empowered to exercise the power of revision as well as power of review of any order passed under the MPLRC or any other enactment for the time being in force. Sections 50, 51 and 56 of the MPLRC are reproduced below : “50. Revision.— (1) The Board may, at any time on its motion or on the application made by any party or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may, at any time on his motion, call for the record of any case which has been , decided or proceeding in which an order has been passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it or him and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if it appears that such subordinate Revenue Officer,- (a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by this Code, or (b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may make such order in the case as it or him thinks fit; Provided that the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of the proceeding, except where,— (a) The order , if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision to the Board, would have finally disposed of the proceedings, or (b) The order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The Board or Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order against which an appeal lies either to the Board or to any Revenue Officer subordinate thereto. (3) A revision, shall not operate as a stay of proceeding before the Revenue Officer except where such proceeding is stayed by the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be. (3) A revision, shall not operate as a stay of proceeding before the Revenue Officer except where such proceeding is stayed by the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be. (4) No application for revision shall be entertained, — (a) against an order appealable under this Code;(b) against an order to the Settlement Commissioner under section 210; (c) unless presented within sixty days to the Board :Provided that where the order, against which the application for revision is being presented, made before the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2011, in such case revision shall be entertained within ninety days from the date of order. (5) No order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the par ties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in 'sub-section (1) ,— (i) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the Board under sub-section (1), no action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof ; (ii) where proceeding in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Collector or the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Board may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the Collector or theSettlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit.” “51. Review of orders.— (1) The Board and every Revenue Officer may, either on its/his own motion or on the application of any party interested review any order passed by itself /himself or by any of it s/hi s predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks f it: Provided that —(i) if the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Board, and if an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order, whether passed by himself or by any predecessor , he shall first obtain the sanction in writing of the authority to whom he i s immediately subordinate;] (i-a) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order; (ii) no order from which an appeal has been made, or which is the subject of any revision proceedings shall, so long as such appeal or proceedings are pending be reviewed; (iii) no order affecting any question of right between private per sons shall be reviewed except on the application of a party to the proceedings, and no application for the review of such order shall be entertained unless it is made within [sixty days] from the passing of the order : Provided that where the order, against which the application for review is being presented, made before the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2011, in such case review shall be entertained within ninety days from the date of order.] (2) No order shall be reviewed except on the grounds provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) . (3) For the purposes of this section, the Collector shall be deemed to be the successor in of f ice of any Revenue Officer who has left the district or who has ceased to exercise powers as a Revenue Officer and to whom there is no successor in the district. (4)An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.” “56. (4)An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.” “56. Construction of order.— In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, expression "order" means the formal expression of the decision given by the Board or a Revenue Officer in respect of any matter in exercise of its/his powers under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force, as the case may be.” When any power and functions under any Central or State Act are conferred on the Board of Revenue by the State Government u/s. 7 of MPLRC, then its orders are covered by section 51 of the MPLRC. When the Board of Revenue has passed the order u/s. 41 or 42 of Ceiling Act, that would be an order passed u/s. 56 of the MPLRC by virtue of power conferred u/s. 7 of the MPLRC by State Government. In the case of N.K. Doongaji v. State of M.P. : 1980 RN 225 (High Court), the Board of Revenue has declined to review its own order passed in Excise Act, the Division Bench of this Court has held that section 51 read with section 56 of MPLRC together conferred the power of review in respect of any order made under the Code or any other enactment. Para 4 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below : “4. As regards the petition filed by Doongaji, the Board of Revenue, by order dated 22nd March 1978, rejected the application for review solely on the ground that there was no power of review under the Excise Act or the rules made thereunder. The Board of Revenue was not right in rejecting the application for review because the power of review is derived from section 51 read with section 56 of M.P. Land Revenue Code. These two sections read together confer the power of review in respect of any order made under the Code or under any other enactment (See Govind Prasad Agarwal v. State of M.P. 1968 R.N. 512). The power conferred is wide enough to embrace orders passed under the rules made under the Excise Act. Misc. These two sections read together confer the power of review in respect of any order made under the Code or under any other enactment (See Govind Prasad Agarwal v. State of M.P. 1968 R.N. 512). The power conferred is wide enough to embrace orders passed under the rules made under the Excise Act. Misc. Petition No.175 of 1978 has, therefore, to be allowed.” Therefore, when the Board of Revenue has been given power of revision, then it can exercise of power of review u/s. 51 of the MPLRC because the revenue authority appointed under the MPLRC has been borrowed as competent authority under the Ceiling Act, hence, that authority or Board comes with all the powers given in the MPLRC. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govind Prasad Agarwal v. State of M.P. : 1969 MPLJ 704 while dealing in the case of Abolition Act has held that the Collector is competent u/s. 51 of the MPLRC to review an order passed by a Dy. Commissioner on 14.5.1957 u/s. 6(2) of the Abolition Act even assuming that no review is permissible under the Abolition Act. The Division Bench has considered the definition of 'order' in section 56 of the MPLRC which include 'order' passed under the MPLRC or any other law and the provisions of section 51 apply to all the orders passed by the revenue authorities. In the case of Ramdeen v. State of M.P. : 1979 RN 553 (High Court), the Division Bench of this Court has held as under : “6. In so far as an appeal is concerned, the Ceiling Act provides that there shall be only one appeal before the Board of Revenue and thereafter the order becomes final. No appeal is provided under the Land Revenue Code against the decision of the Board of Revenue. The finality expressed in the latter part of sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Ceiling Act means that there shall be no further appeal against the decision of the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue is given the power of review by section 51 of the Code. The language of the section does not confine its power to an order made under the M. P. Land Revenue Code along as in the case under section 44. The Board of Revenue is given the power of review by section 51 of the Code. The language of the section does not confine its power to an order made under the M. P. Land Revenue Code along as in the case under section 44. The order of the Board of Revenue passed in appeal under sub-section (3) of section 4 of the Ceiling Act would be as much an order within the meaning of section 56 as any passed under the Code. Section 44 of the Code dealing with the provisions of appeal and appellate authority, by the opening words used in the section confines the rights of appeal in regard to orders made under the Code and the rules made therefore such words curtailing the sweep of the power and restricting itself to the orders under the Code are significantly absent in section 51. The scheme of the Code shows that it was not intended to limit the power of review of a Revenue Officer to orders passed under the Code or rules made thereunder only. The Board of Revenue while passing the order under section 4(3) of the Ceiling Act passed it with all the incidence of an order under section 56 and the order was amenable to section 51 of the Code. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the Board of Revenue would have powers of review in respect of decisions passed by it under the Ceiling Act.” In view of the above discussion, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 29.4.2011 passed by the Board of Revenue. Hence, the writ being devoid of merit and substance is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- (Ten Thousand). 21. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 22. The undisputed facts reveal that in respect of the land under the ownership of the appellants, proceedings were initiated under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 and an order was passed by the competent authority on 18.1.1999. 23. An appeal was preferred against the order dated 18.1.2019 under section 41 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 before the Board of Revenue. 23. An appeal was preferred against the order dated 18.1.2019 under section 41 of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has allowed the appeal by an order dated 19.5.2006 holding that the order dated 18.1.1999 passed by the competent authority was unlawful, and accordingly, has quashed all actions and proceedings against the appellants. 24. The Board of Revenue, after a lapse of about four years, took suo motu cognizance for reviewing the matter on 22.5.2010 and a review case was registered by the Board of Revenue. A show-cause notice was issued on 15.6.2010 and the appellants raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the review. The objection was raised on 20.7.2010 and a reply as well as written arguments were submitted on 22.10.2010. The Board of Revenue, on 29.4.2011, has rejected the application preferred by the appellants raising preliminary objections and it has been held that the Board of Revenue is having jurisdiction under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the review the maintainable. The appellants have preferred a writ petition before this Court and the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. 25. The necessary statutory provisions, which are material for adjudication of the present writ appeal under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 are reproduced as under:- “2. Definitions - (e) "competent authority" means -- (i) in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate within a Sub- ivision, the Sub-Divisional Officer and/or such other Revenue Officer, not below the rank of a Deputy Collector as may be appointed by the State Government; (ii) in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate in more than one Sub-Division of the same district, the Collector or the Additional Collector and where there is no Additional Collector for the district such Deputy Collector, as may be empowered by the State Government to exercise the powers of Collector under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) for the purpose; and (iii) in respect of a holder whose land is situate in more than one district such authority as may be appointed by the State Government;” “41. Appeals- Except where the provisions of this Act provide otherwise, against every order of a Revenue Officer or competent authority under this Act or the rules made thereunder, an appeal shall lie: (i) if such order is passed by a Revenue Officer either as competent authority or otherwise to the authority competent to hear appeals under sub-section (1) of section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) from an order passed by a Revenue Officer of the same rank under the said Code; (ii) if such order is passed by the competent authority where such authority is an officer other than a Revenue Officer appointed under sub-clause (iii) of clause (e) of section 2 to the Board of Revenue as if such officer were an Additional Settlement Commissioner appointed under section 65 of the said Code : Provided that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case.” “42. Revision- The Board of Revenue or the Commissioner may on its/his motion or on the application by any party at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any competent authority subordinate to it/him call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such competent authority, and may pass such orders in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit: Provided that it/he shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being heard: Provided further that no application for revision shall be entertained against an order against which an appeal is provided under this Act :Provided also that the surplus land vested in the State Government shall not revert to the holder thereof as a consequence of remand of the case.” 26. The statutory provisions under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which are material for the purposed of adjudication of the present writ appeal are asunder:- “7. Jurisdiction of Board. The statutory provisions under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, which are material for the purposed of adjudication of the present writ appeal are asunder:- “7. Jurisdiction of Board. — (1) The Board shall exercise the power s and discharge the functions confer red upon it by or under this Code and such functions of the State Government as may be specified by notification by the State Government in that behalf and such other functions as have been confer red or may be confer red by or under any Central or State Act on the Chief Revenue Author it or the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. (2) The State Government may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose, by notification, conferupon, or entrust to the Board or any member of the Board additional power s or functions as signed to the State Government by or under any enactment for the time being in force. “50. Revision.— (1) The Board may, at any time on its motion or on the application made by any party or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may, at any time on his motion, call for the record of any case which has been ,decided or proceeding in which an order has been passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to it or him and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if it appears that such subordinate Revenue Officer,- (a) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by this Code, or (b) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) has acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer may make such order in the case as it or him thinks fit; Provided that the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of the proceeding, except where,— (a) The order , if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision to the Board, would have finally disposed of the proceedings, or (b) The order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The Board or Collector or the Settlement Officer shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order against which an appeal lies either to the Board or to any Revenue Officer subordinate thereto. (3) A revision, shall not operate as a stay of proceeding before the Revenue Officer except where such proceeding is stayed by the Board or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be. (4) No application for revision shall be entertained, — (a) against an order appealable under this Code;(b) against an order to the Settlement Commissioner under section 210; (c) unless presented within sixty days to the Board :Provided that where the order, against which the application for revision is being presented, made before the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2011, in such case revision shall be entertained within ninety days from the date of order. (5) No order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in 'sub-section (1) ,— (i) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the Board under sub-section (1), no action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof ; (ii) where proceeding in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Collector or the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Board may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit.” “51. Review of orders.— (1) The Board and every Revenue Officer may, either on its/his own motion or on the application of any party interested review any order passed by itself /himself or by any of it s/hi s predecessors in office and pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks it: Provided that —(i) if the Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer thinks it necessary to review any order which he has not himself passed, he shall first obtain the sanction of the Board, and if an officer subordinate to a Collector or Settlement Officer proposes to review any order, whether passed by himself or by any predecessor , he shall first obtain the sanction in writing of the authority to whom he is immediately subordinate;] (i-a) no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order; (ii) no order from which an appeal has been made, or which is the subject of any revision proceedings shall, so long as such appeal or proceedings are pending be reviewed; (iii) no order affecting any question of right between private per sons shall be reviewed except on the application of a party to the proceedings, and no application for the review of such order shall be entertained unless it is made within [sixty days] from the pas sing of the order : Provided that where the order, against which the application for review is being presented, made before the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 2011, in such case review shall be entertained within ninety days from the date of order.] (2) No order shall be reviewed except on the grounds provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908). (3) For the purposes of this section, the Collector shall be deemed to be the successor in of f ice of any Revenue Officer who has left the district or who has ceased to exercise powers as a Revenue Officer and to whom there is no successor in the district. (4)An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.” “56. (4)An order which has been dealt with in appeal or on revision shall not be reviewed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the appellate or revisional authority.” “56. Construction of order.— In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, expression "order" means the formal expression of the decision given by the Board or a Revenue Officer in respect of any matter in exercise of its/his powers under this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force, as the case may be.” 27. The basic question involved in the present case is whether the Board of Revenue can exercise suo motu review power under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue , 1959 while dealing with a case under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960. 28. The Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 does not provide any provision of review and it an undisputed fact that in absence of a specific power of review of its own order under the Act of 1960, the Board has initiated suo motu review in the matter. 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Kumar Gupta (supra) has dealt in detail the scope of review and it has been held that the power of review can be exercised only when the statutes provide for the same. Paragraph 13 of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as under:- “12. It is settled law that the power of Review can be exercised only when the statute provides for the same. In the absence of any such provision in the concerned statute, such power of Review cannot be exercised by the authority concerned. This Court in the case of Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437 , has held as under:“…………… 12. It is settled legal proposition that unless the statute/rules so permit, the review application is not maintainable in case of judicial/quasijudicial orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act granting an express power of review, it is manifest that a review could not be made and the order in review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [ AIR 1965 SC 1457 ] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 641 ] .) 13. (Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [ AIR 1965 SC 1457 ] and Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh [ AIR 1966 SC 641 ] .) 13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [ (1971) 3 SCC 844 : AIR 1970 SC 1273 ] , Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan [ (1979) 1 SCC 321 ], Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [ (1987) 4 SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491: AIR 1987 SC 2186 ], State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land Records and Settlement [ (1998) 7 SCC 162 ] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain [ (2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either expressly/specifically or by necessary implication and in the absence of any provision in the Act/Rules, review of an earlier order is impermissible as review is a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review can be derived only from the statute and thus, any order of review in the absence of any statutory provision for the same is a nullity, being without jurisdiction.” The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the aforesaid matter, has taken into account the judgment delivered in the case of Kalabharti Advertising v. Hemant Vimal Nath (supra). 30. In another case decided by Full Bench of our own High Court in the case of Himat Singh Kuber Singh v. The Board of Revenue reported in 1966 RN 78= 1966 JLJ 119 = AIR 1966 MP 43 this Court, while dealing with Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, has held that when the Act does not contain any provision giving to the Board of Revenue the powers to review its decision or order, the order cannot be reviewed. The power of review is not an inherent power with the Board of Revenue and it can only be exercised if permitted by the statute. In the present case, the statute has permitted an appeal and revision before the Board of Revenue, and therefore, once the parent statute has not conferred the power of review, section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 could not have been invoked by the Board of Revenue in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 31. In the present case, the statute has permitted an appeal and revision before the Board of Revenue, and therefore, once the parent statute has not conferred the power of review, section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 could not have been invoked by the Board of Revenue in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 31. This Court in the case of Ghanshyam Singh & Others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others reported in 2000 RN 193 = 2000 (1) MPHT 684 in paragraph – 7 has held as under:- “7. Admittedly and as pointed out in Chitra Rekha Bai (supra), there existed no provisions under the M.P. Act, 1960 conferring power of review on any revenue authority. There is also no provision in the Act providing for taking recourse to the provisions of M.P.L.R. Code, 1959 while dealing with the proceedings under the Act. The S.D.O. Jaora as also Collector Ratlam clearly acted illegally and without any jurisdiction in taking suo motu review of granting permission for review of the order passed earlier by the S.D.O. under sections 11 & 12 of the M.P. Act, 1960. The order Annexure D and the entire proceedings taken in consequence thereof, therefore, deserve to be quashed.” 32. In the aforesaid case, it has been held that in absence of any provision under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 conferring powers of review, the review by any authority is not permissible. There is no provision under the Act of 1960 for taking recourse to the provision of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1960 for review while dealing the cases under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960. 33. The Hon'ble Su[reme Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thaker Singh & Others v. Praduman Singh Ji Arjun Singh Ji reported in (1971) 3 SCC 844 has held that review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. In the present case also, no statutory provision of law under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 has been brought to our notice, which empowers the Board of Revenue to review its own order. 34. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. In the present case also, no statutory provision of law under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960 has been brought to our notice, which empowers the Board of Revenue to review its own order. 34. Other important aspect of the case is that the Board of Revenue has passed an order on 19.5.2006 and proceedings for suo motu review were initiated on 22.5.2010 i.e., after a lapse of about four your years under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code. 1959 without there being any specific provision for review under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960. 35. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ranveer Singh & Anther v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2010 RN 409 = 2010 (3) JLJ 77 = AIR 2011 MP 27 , while dealing with the limitation issue of review, has held that the revisional authority should exercise its power within 180 days from the date of knowledge. In the present case, the power has been exercised for review after about four years by the same Board of Revenue. Merely because the officer in the Board of Revenue has changed and a new Presiding Officer has been posted, it does not mean that the Board of Revenue was not having knowledge of the order dated 19.5.2006. 36. In the case of Rajendra Tiwari v. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2014 RN 191 = 2014 (1) MPLJ 253 , initiation of review by the Board of Revenue after two years and five months' was held to be bad in law. 38. Another important aspect of the case is that the Board of Revenue, while allowing the appeal of the appellants, has passed a cogent and reasoned order and the Board of Revenue is in fact exercising its review jurisdiction under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 as if it is hearing an appeal. A review is by no mean an appeal in disguise and an erroneous decision cannot be set aside in review. 39. The apex Court in the case of Thungabhadra Industries Limited (supra) has held that the review by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected. A review is by no mean an appeal in disguise and an erroneous decision cannot be set aside in review. 39. The apex Court in the case of Thungabhadra Industries Limited (supra) has held that the review by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected. The review is available only in case there is an error apparent on the face of record. 40. The power of review has definitive limits. It may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made or it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of record is found. But it cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision is erroneous on merits. In case, the decision is erroneous on merits, it is the province and function of the Court of appeal. In the present case, the Board of Revenue has earlier passed a reasoned order considering the facts and grounds raised by the parties, and now suo motu review has been initiated by the Board of Revenue, meaning thereby, it has acted as an appellate authority. 41. The apex Court in the case of Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Bank (Smt) & Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78 in paragraph 13 and 20 has held as under :- 13. In order to appreciate the scope of a review, section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it “may make such order thereon as it thinks fit”. The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. This Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. held as follows: “There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. … where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.” 20. When the aforesaid principles are applied to the background facts of the present case, the position is clear that the High Court had clearly fallen in error in accepting the prayer for review. First, the crucial question which according to the High Court was necessary to be adjudicated was the question whether Title Suit No. 201 of 1985 (sic 1 of 1986) was barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. This question arose in Title Suit No. 1 of 1986 and was irrelevant so far as Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 is concerned. This question arose in Title Suit No. 1 of 1986 and was irrelevant so far as Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 is concerned. Additionally, the High Court erred in holding that no prayer for leave under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was made in the plaint in Title Suit No. 201 of 1985. The claim of oral agreement dated 19.8.1982 is mentioned in para 7 of the plaint, and at the end of the plaint it has been noted that the right to institute the suit for specific performance was reserved. That being so, the High Court has erroneously held about infraction of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. This was not a case where Order 2 Rule 2 CPC has any application. In the aforesaid case, the apex Court has held that rehearing of a case can be done on account of some mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. In the present case, there is no error apparent on the face of the record and the Board of Revenue in fact under the guise of review is hearing the matter as an appellate Court. 42. Similarly the apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal & Others v. Kamal Sengupta & Another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 in paragraphs 21, 22 and 35 has held as under :- “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court earlier. 22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. 22. The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the Court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the Court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision. 35. The principles which can be culled out from the abovenoted judgments are: (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil Court under section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior Court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/tribunal earlier.” In the aforesaid case the apex Court has held that a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record means a mistake or an error which is prima facie visible and does not require any detail examination. In the present case the learned counsel for the State has not been able to point out any error apparent on the face of the record, on the contrary the Board has decided the case earlier on merits. 43. The apex Court again dealing with the scope of interference and limitation of review in the case of Inderchand Jain (dead) Through LRs v. Motilal (dead) Through LRs reported in (2009) 14 SCC 663 in paragraphs 7, 22, 24, 29, 31 and 33 has held as under :- “7. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) provides for a substantive power of review by a civil Court and consequently by the appellate Courts. The words “subject as aforesaid” occurring in section 114 of the Code mean subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration. Section 114 of the Code although does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the Court but such limitations have been provided for in Order 47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as under: “17. The power of a civil Court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: ‘1. The power of a civil Court to review its judgment/decision is traceable in section 114 CPC. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under: ‘1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order.’ 22. Whereas the appellants-defendant filed a review application confined to the question that he was entitled to the restitution of the property and mesne profit in respect whereof the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not pass any specific order, the application for review filed by the respondent was on the merit of the judgment. The relevant grounds of review which have been placed before us relate to: (i) Unconditional withdrawal of some amount by one of the creditors of the defendant as also the defendant himself. (ii) The defendant's application before the executing Court that he was ready and willing to get the sale deed executed on receipt of amount in cash and the said admission allegedly was not brought to the notice of the Court. (iii) While holding that there was no agreement to reduce the sale consideration, the High Court had ignored the fact that it was an admitted case of the parties, as stipulated in the contract, that the defendants would get the premises vacated from the tenants within three months. (iv) The appellants had prayed for an alternative relief viz. that he was ready to get the decree for specific performance of contract by paying Rs 1,15,000. (iv) The appellants had prayed for an alternative relief viz. that he was ready to get the decree for specific performance of contract by paying Rs 1,15,000. The Court did not consider the evidence of DWs 1 to 6 in their proper perspective. (v) The Court did not consider that the property could not be restored back to the appellantsdefendant and as such the Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction. 24. An appeal is a continuation of the suit. Any decision taken by the appellate Court would relate back, unless a contrary intention is shown, to the date of institution of the suit. There cannot be any doubt that the appellate Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction would be entitled to take into consideration the subsequent events for the purpose of moulding the relief as envisaged under Order 7 Rule 7 read with Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same shall, however, not mean that the Court would proceed to do so in a review application despite holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to grant of a decree for specific performance of contract. 29. Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code stipulates that filing of an appeal would not amount to automatic stay of the execution of the decree. The law acknowledges that during pendency of the appeal it is possible for the decree-holder to get the decree executed. The execution of the decree during pendency of the appeal would, thus, be subject to the restitution of the property in the event the appeal is allowed and the decree is set aside. The Court only at the time of passing a judgment and decree reversing that of the appellate Court should take into consideration the subsequent events, but, by no stretch of imagination, can refuse to do so despite arriving at the findings that the plaintiff would not be entitled to grant of a decree. 31. Contention of Mr Venugopal that the defendant having accepted novation of contract but only the quantum of the amount being different, the Court could have asked the respondent-plaintiff to deposit a further sum of Rs 24,000 cannot be accepted for more than one reason. 31. Contention of Mr Venugopal that the defendant having accepted novation of contract but only the quantum of the amount being different, the Court could have asked the respondent-plaintiff to deposit a further sum of Rs 24,000 cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Apart from the fact that such a contention had never been raised before the appellate Court, keeping in view the finding of fact arrived at that there had in fact been no novation of contract, such a course of action was not open. In any view of the matter, the same would amount to reappreciation of evidence which was beyond the review jurisdiction of the High Court. 33. The High Court had rightly noticed the review jurisdiction of the Court, which is as under: “The law on the subject—exercise of power of review, as propounded by the apex Court and various other High Courts may be summarised as hereunder: (i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. (ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions. (iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. (iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an advocate. (v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit.” In our opinion, the principles of law enumerated by it, in the facts of this case, have wrongly been applied.” The Apex Court while dealing with the scope of review has held that re-appreciation of evidence and rehearing of case without there being any error apparent on the face of the record is not permissible in light of provisions as contained u/s 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 44. 44. The apex Court in the case of S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission reported in (2009) 10 SCC 464 in paragraphs 12 and 26 has held as under :- “12. An error contemplated under the Rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. In other words, it must be an error of inadvertence. It should be something more than a mere error and it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. When does an error cease to be mere error and becomes an error apparent on the face of the record depends upon the materials placed before the Court. If the error is so apparent that without further investigation or enquiry, only one conclusion can be drawn in favour of the applicant, in such circumstances, the review will lie. Under the guise of review, the parties are not entitled to rehearing of the same issue but the issue can be decided just by a perusal of the records and if it is manifest can be set right by reviewing the order. With this background, let us analyse the impugned judgment of the High Court and find out whether it satisfies any of the tests formulated above. 26. As held earlier, if the judgment/order is vitiated by an apparent error or it is a palpable wrong and if the error is self-evident, review is permissible and in this case the High Court has rightly applied the said principles as provided under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In view of the same, we are unable to accept the arguments of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court.” 45. Shri Pushyamitra Bhargav has placed heavy reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Board of Revenue in the case of Nathuram Sahu v. Municipal Council, Garhakota (supra). Shri Pushyamitra Bhargav has placed heavy reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Board of Revenue in the case of Nathuram Sahu v. Municipal Council, Garhakota (supra). It was a case under the Municipality Act, 1961 and under the Municipality Act, 1961, the revisional powers were delegated to the Board of Revenue under the section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and the Board of Revenue has held that even though there is no provision of review under the M.P. Municipality Act, 1961, a review can be done by the Board of Revenue under section 51 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. 46. It is very unfortunate that judgment of Board of Revenue has been cited before this Court for deciding the present writ appeal. In the present case, as there is no specific provision of review under the statute i.e., under the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, 1960, the Board of Revenue could not have exercised the powers of review in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and therefore, the judgment relied by learned Additional Advocate General is of no help. 47. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Ravishakar Dubey (supra) and his contention is that review is certainly very much maintainable before the Board of Revenue. Paragraph – 2 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- “2. The Division Bench, which referred to the larger Bench this case for decision, found conflicting views expressed by earlier Division Benches. The questions arising for our decision, which have to be determined on a true construction of sections 41 and 42 of the Ceiling Act and sections 44 and 50 of the Revenue Code, are:-- (1) Whether a second appeal lies under section 44 (2) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, from an order passed in an appeal under section 41 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960. (2) Whether the powers of revision under section 50 of the Revenue Code can be invoked and exercised against an order passed under the Ceiling Act.” The Full Bench has decided the matter only in respect of the aforesaid two specific issue and the issue of review by the Board of Revenue was not at all involved in the aforesaid case. 48. 48. Learned Additional Advocate General has also argued before this Court that writ appeal is not maintainable. He has placed reliance upon judgments delivered in the cases of Jagdish Prasad v. The Board of Revenue & Others (W.A. No.338/2018) decided on 15.5.2018, Smt. Hansa Devi w/o Punyapal Surana & Another v. Chandar Singh S/o Prem Singh & Others (W.A. No.691/2014) decided on 5.2.2015 and Trustees of H.C. Danda, Trust v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (W.A. No.265/2017) decided on 4.9.2017. 49. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Shailendra Kumar v. Divisional Forest Officer & Another 2017 (3) JLJ 282 = (W.A. No.286/2017) decided on 6.7.2017 in paragraphs – 9 to 19 has held as under:- “09. In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others reported as (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Supreme Court delineated the difference of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The scope of writ of certiorari was summarized as under:- “10. Article 226 of the Constitution of India preserves to the High Court the power to issue writ of certiorari amongst others. The principles on which the writ of certiorari is issued are well-settled. It would suffice for our purpose to quote from the 7-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. – (1955) 1 SCR 1104 . The four propositions laid down therein were summarized by the Constitution Bench in Custodian of Evacuee Property Bangalore v. Khan Saheb Abdul Shukoor etc. – (1961) 3 SCR 855 as under :- "……the High Court was not justified in looking into the order of December 2, 1952, as an appellate Court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. – (1961) 3 SCR 855 as under :- "……the High Court was not justified in looking into the order of December 2, 1952, as an appellate Court, though it would be justified in scrutinizing that order as if it was brought before it under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of certiorari. The limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing writs of certiorari was considered by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque 1955 - I S 1104 : (s) AIR 1955 SC 233 ) and the following four propositions were laid down :- " (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction; (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision." 12. In the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction the High Court proceeds on an assumption that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject- matter has the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. The High Court would not, therefore, for the purpose of certiorari assign to itself the role of an appellate Court and step into re-appreciating or evaluating the evidence and substitute its own findings in place of those arrived at by the inferior Court. xxx xxx 20. Authority in abundance is available for the proposition that an error apparent on face of record can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. xxx xxx 20. Authority in abundance is available for the proposition that an error apparent on face of record can be corrected by certiorari. The broad working rule for determining what is a patent error or an error apparent on the face of the record was well set out in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, (1960) 1 SCR 890 . It was held that the alleged error should be self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or an error in a longdrawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be called a patent error. In a writ of certiorari the High Court may quash the proceedings of the tribunal, authority or Court but may not substitute its own findings or directions in lieu of one given in the proceedings forming the subject-matter of certiorari. 21. Certiorari jurisdiction though available is not to be exercised as a matter of course. The High Court would be justified in refusing the writ of certiorari if no failure of justice has been occasioned. In exercising the certiorari jurisdiction the procedure ordinarily followed by the High Court is to command the inferior Court or tribunal to certify its record or proceedings to the High Court for its inspection so as to enable the High Court to determine whether on the face of the record the inferior Court has committed any of the preceding errors occasioning failure of justice.” 10. On the other hand, while examining the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was held that the powers of superintendence so conferred on the High Court is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person or may even be exercised suo motu. In Paragraph No.24, the Court noticed the difference between the writ of certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. However, the finding in Paragraph No.25 that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice, was doubted and was referred to Larger Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others - (2009) 5 SCC 616 when it was said to the following:- “32. However, the finding in Paragraph No.25 that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice, was doubted and was referred to Larger Bench in the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others - (2009) 5 SCC 616 when it was said to the following:- “32. The essential distinctions in the exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out in Surya Dev Rai and with that we have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai that judicial orders passed by a civil Court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ Court under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai, is contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar – AIR 1967 SC 1 and the ratio in Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra – (2002) 4 SCC 388 .” The Larger Bench in its judgment reported as Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others - (2015) 5 SCC 423 held as under:- “11. It is necessary to clarify that the expression “judicial acts” is not meant to refer to judicial orders of civil Courts as the matter before this Court arose out of the order of the Election Tribunal and no direct decision of this Court, except Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , has been brought to our notice where writ of certiorari may have been issued against an order of a judicial Court. In fact, when the question as to scope of jurisdiction arose in subsequent decisions, it was clarified that orders of the judicial Courts stood on different footing from the quasi-judicial orders of authorities or tribunals. 13. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1 : (1966) 3 SCR 744 a nine-Judge Bench judgment, a judicial order of the High Court was challenged as being violative of fundamental right. This Court by majority held that a judicial order of a competent Court could not violate a fundamental right. Even if there was ncidental violation, it could not be held to be violative of the fundamental right. Gajendragadkar, C.J., observed: (AIR pp. This Court by majority held that a judicial order of a competent Court could not violate a fundamental right. Even if there was ncidental violation, it could not be held to be violative of the fundamental right. Gajendragadkar, C.J., observed: (AIR pp. 11-12, paras 38-39 & 42) “38. The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate Court. But it is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article 19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy between the parties brought before the Court and nothing more. If this basic and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial verdict pronounced by Court in or in relation to a matter brought before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 19(1). 39. … Just as an order passed by the Court on the merits of the dispute before it can be challenged only in appeal and cannot be said to contravene the fundamental rights of the litigants before the Court so could the impugned order be challenged in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, but it cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The character of the judicial order remains the same whether it is passed in a matter directly in issue between the parties or is passed incidentally to make the adjudication of the dispute between the parties fair and effective. The character of the judicial order remains the same whether it is passed in a matter directly in issue between the parties or is passed incidentally to make the adjudication of the dispute between the parties fair and effective. On this view of the matter, it seems to us that the whole attack against the impugned order based on the assumption that it infringes the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19(1), must fail. *** 42. It is true that the opinion thus expressed by Kania, C.J., in A.K. Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 : (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1383 : 1950 SCR 88 ] had not received the concurrence of the other learned Judges who heard the said case. Subsequently, however, in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi [ AIR 1951 SC 270 : (1951) 52 Cri LJ 904 : 1951 SCR 451 ] , AIR at p. 272 the said observations were cited with approval by the Full Court. The same principle has been accepted by this Court in Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [ AIR 1958 SC 578 : 1959 SCR 12 ] , AIR at p. 618 and by the majority judgment in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 232 : (1961) 1 SCR 809 ] , AIR at pp. 255- 56.” 18. While the above judgments dealt with the question whether judicial order could violate a fundamental right, it was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders could lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not by way of a writ under Articles 226 and 32. 26. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227 stood almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain quartersthat the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including Waryam Singh and another v. Amarnath and another – AIR 1954 SC 215 , Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir – (2002) 1 SCC 319 , Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil – (2010) 8 SCC 329 and Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal – (2013) 9 SCC 374 . 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 31. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal Courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law.” 11. Later another Bench of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as (2015) 9 SCC 1 – Jogendrasinhji Vijay Singhji v. State of Gujarat and others held as under :- “18. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law.” 11. Later another Bench of the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as (2015) 9 SCC 1 – Jogendrasinhji Vijay Singhji v. State of Gujarat and others held as under :- “18. The aforesaid authoritative pronouncement makes it clear as day that an order passed by a civil Court can only be assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the parameters of challenge have been clearly laid down by this Court in series of decisions which have been referred to by a three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra), which is a binding precedent. Needless to emphasize that once it is exclusively assailable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, no intra-Court appeal is maintainable. 19. The next aspect that has to be adverted to is under what situation a letters patent appeal is maintainable before a Division Bench. We repeat at the cost of repetition that we have referred to series of judgments of this Court which have drawn the distinction between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the threeJudges Bench in Radhe Shyam (supra) has clearly stated that jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, a letters patent appeal or an intraCourt appeal in respect of an order passed by the learned Single Judge dealing with an order arising out of a proceeding from a civil Court would not lie before the Division Bench. Thus, the question next arises under what circumstances a letters patent appeal or an intra-Court appeal would be maintainable before the Division Bench. 30. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically clear that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. Barring the civil Court, from which order as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition can lie only under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution. Barring the civil Court, from which order as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition can lie only under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Article 227 or both, needless to emphasise, would depend upon various aspects that have been emphasized in the aforestated authorities of this Court. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The Division Bench would also be required to scrutinize whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. Be it stated, one of the conclusions recorded by the High Writ Appeal No.624/2020 44 Court in the impugned judgment pertains to demand and payment of Court fees. We do not intend to comment on the same as that would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court.” 12. A Division Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as 2008 (1) MPHT 181 – Kanchhedi Lal v. Presiding Officer and another held that an order passed by the Labour Court in violation of principles of natural justice can be interfered with in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and intra Court appeal would be maintainable. The Court held as under :- “17…………..In quintessentiality, it cannot be put in a straitjacket formula that any order of the learned Single Judge that deals with an order arising from an Inferior Tribunal or the Subordinate Court is an order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not an order under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held as under :- “17…………..In quintessentiality, it cannot be put in a straitjacket formula that any order of the learned Single Judge that deals with an order arising from an Inferior Tribunal or the Subordinate Court is an order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not an order under Article 226 of the Constitution. It would not be an overemphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exit, overlap or imbricate. In this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the learned Single Judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that Article 226 of the Constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. It will depend upon factual matrix of the case.” 13. The aforesaid judgment of this Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench in a judgment reported as 2016 (1) MPLJ 643 – Superintendent, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Regional Agricultural Research Station, Ujjain v. Hussaini Bee W/o Kalluji. The Division Bench, considering many judgments of the Supreme Court held that the writ appeal is not maintainable against an order passed by the learned Single Bench in writ petition directed against an award of the Labour Court as such order is an order under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Division Bench held as under :- “14. This Court however, finds that the writ appeal is not maintainable although the writ petition was filed Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The case was covered under head note III and head note VI of the case of Jogendrasinghji Vijaysinghji (supra) whereby the Apex Court held that the High Court was required to ascertain whether facts justify assertions made in writ petition to invoke jurisdiction under Article 227 or Article 226 or under both/whether Single Judge exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 or Article 226 or under both having regard to nature, contour and character of his order. And considering the above, we find that this Court was of the considered view that the writ Court as well as the Supervisory Board have both exercised the powers under Article 227 in their supervisory jurisdiction and a writ of certiorari cannot be issued. 15. In the case of Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others - (2009) 5 SCC 616 the Apex Court held that "judicial orders passed by civil Court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by a writ of certiorari and the Court had held that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and Courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal Courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law." Then in the instant case we find that such is not the case and recently this Court under similar circumstances in the matter of Smt. Hansa Devi and another v. Chandar Singh and others in Writ Appeal No.691/2014 on 5.2.2015 held that when it is clear power of superintendence has been exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the writ appeal cannot be entertained. And in the present case also, we find that the Writ Court has exercised his power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, when it has considered the findings of the facts arrived by the Collector and the Board of Revenue.” 14. We find that the Division Bench has not applied the principles laid down in the case of Jogendrasinhji Vijay Singhji (supra) in a correct perspective. The Supreme Court held in Paragraph No.30, that maintainability of Letters Patent Appeal would depend upon pleadings in the writ petition nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. The only exclusive bar was in respect of an order passed by the Judicial Court which could be challenged only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The only exclusive bar was in respect of an order passed by the Judicial Court which could be challenged only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in terms of Jogendrasinhji Vijay Singhji’s case, it is a question of fact in each case as to whether intra Court appeal would be maintainable in respect of the orders passed by the judicial or quasi judicial Tribunals constituted under any Act could be challenged under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 or both. 15. A writ of certiorari is maintainable against any authority or body of persons constituted by law or having legal authority to adjudicate upon questions affecting the rights of a subject and enjoined with a duty to act judicially or quasijudicially is amenable to the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court. The writ of certiorari as delineated in Surya Dev Rai’s case (supra) can be said to be exercised in the following instances:- (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction; (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice; (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari if it is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. (5) The certiorari may be and is generally granted when a Court has acted (i) without jurisdiction, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings or from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the Court itself may not have been legally constituted or suffering from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings or from the absence of some preliminary proceedings or the Court itself may not have been legally constituted or suffering from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances. (6) Certiorari may also issue if the Court or tribunal though competent has acted in flagrant disregard of the rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. (7) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari subject to the following factors being available if the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law but a mere wrong decision is not amenable to a writ of certiorari.” 16. Therefore, we find that an order of the Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal is amenable to the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. In exercise of writ of certiorari, the High Court demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The Constitutional Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported as T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 , held as under:- “7………………The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior Court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person [Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall's Overseers v. London and North Western Railway Co., (1879) 4 AC 30, 39.]” 17. The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person [Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall's Overseers v. London and North Western Railway Co., (1879) 4 AC 30, 39.]” 17. But issuance of the directions after setting aside an order passed in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226, is only under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Court exercises composite jurisdiction which will make intra Court appeal maintainable. Thus the order passed by the Division Bench in Superintendent, Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Regional Agricultural Research Station, Ujjain’s Case (Supra) does not lay down correct principal of law and is thus overruled. 18. We may clarify that the orders passed by the Judicial Courts, subordinate to a High Court even in criminal matters when challenged in proceedings before the High Courts are only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus no intra Court appeal would be maintainable against an order passed by the Learned Single Judge in proceedings arising out of an order passed by Judicial Courts, may be civil or criminal proceedings. 19. Since the question of law has been answered, the writ appeal be posted for hearing before an appropriate Bench as per roster.” 50. In the present case, the writ petition was certainly for issuance of writ of certiorari as the Board of Revenue has committed a manifest error apparent on face of proceedings with clear disregard to the provisions of law. It was a patent error, which can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. An error apparent on the face of record can be corrected by writ of certiorari, and therefore, the writ appeal, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, is very much maintainable. 51. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Board of Revenue has transgressed its jurisdiction by issuing a notice for suo motu review after a lapse of four years in absence of there being any provision of review, and therefore, the notice dated 5.6.2010, order rejecting the objections dated 29.4.2011 and the entire proceedings in respect of the review in Case Number suo motu review 712/PBR/10- Dewas are hereby set aside. The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 6.1.2020 in W.P. No.8619/2020 is also set aside. The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 6.1.2020 in W.P. No.8619/2020 is also set aside. With the aforesaid, the present writ appeal stands allowed. ........................