JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. (Oral) 1. As a consequence of allowing of application moved by respondent under Section 8 read with Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the civil suit filed by the petitioner was held to be not maintainable. Aggrieved, the petitioner has moved this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 2(i) Petitioner/plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction along with prayer for damages. It was pleaded that respondents/defendants had financed Rs.9,05,150/- to the petitioner for purchase of a vehicle (Tata Truck 1109). This loan amount was to be repaid within 43 equal monthly installments @ Rs.26,332/-. It was asserted that till April 2016 the petitioner had repaid more than Rs.10,56,000/- against due amount of Rs.11,32,276/-. He had defaulted in payment of some installments. The respondents thereafter took forcible possession of the vehicle. Alleging that action of respondents was illegal and arbitrary, civil suit was filed by the petitioner for declaration to the effect that ‘snatching of vehicle by the defendants be declared as illegal and void’. A further prayer was made for a decree of mandatory injunction ‘to direct the respondents to release the vehicle in favour of the petitioner on receiving balance amount of Rs.76,276/-’. Respondents were also sought to be restrained from causing any interference in petitioner’s plying the vehicle. Rs.5,00,000/- on account of damages were prayed for. 2(ii) The respondents moved an application under Section 8 read with Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for referring the parties to arbitration. The gist of the application was that at the time of granting financial assistance in the sum of Rs.9,05,150/- for the purchase of vehicle bearing No. HP-71-1474, the parties had executed a loan agreement on 24.3.2012 whereunder the loan amount was to be repaid in 43 equal monthly installments for Rs.26,332/-. Clause-29 of the agreement provided for settlement of disputes between the parties arising out of the agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter, by Arbitration in accordance with Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In view of Clause-29 the respondents pleaded that dispute between the parties arising out of the written agreement has to be settled by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit. In view of Clause-29 the respondents pleaded that dispute between the parties arising out of the written agreement has to be settled by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit. 2(iii) Learned Civil Judge(Junior Division), Nahan, District Sirmour vide order dated 9.1.2017 allowed the application moved by the respondents and held the suit to be not maintainable. The parties were directed to approach the Arbitrator in terms of Claus-29 of the agreement dated 24.3.2012. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the relief of declaration cannot be adjudicated by the Arbitrator. He further submitted that the petitioner had levelled allegations of fraud against the respondents. In such circumstances, the dispute could not be resolved by the Arbitrator. He thus prayed for restoration of civil suit to its original number for its decision on merits. Learned Counsel for the respondent pleaded no instructions. 4. Position which emerges from record is that:- 4(i) On 24.3.2012 an agreement was executed between the parties whereunder the petitioner was advanced a sum of Rs.9,05,150/- for purchase of a truck. The loan amount was to be repaid in 43 equal installments of `26,332/- per month. The petitioner has himself has relied upon this loan agreement while making factual assertions of regular repayment of the loan amount. Clause-29 of the agreement executed between the parties is reproduced as under: “All dispute, differences and/or claims arising out of this agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter shall be settled by Arbitration in accordance with the provisions of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to the sole arbitration of an arbitrator nominated by the Company. The award given by such Arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties to this agreement. In the event of an appointed Arbitrator dying or being unable or unwilling to act as Arbitrator for any reason, the Company, on such death of the Arbitrator or his inability or unwillingness to act as arbitrator, shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage left by his predecessor. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage left by his predecessor. The venue or arbitration proceeding shall be at Chennai at the Registered Office of the Company which is presently at ‘DARE HOUSE’, No. 2(OLD No. 234) NSC BOSE ROAD, PARRYS, Chennai-600-001 or such other place/location/city which the company at its discretion may decide from time to time.” Further as per terms of the agreement, it is mutually agreed between the parties that court in Chennai shall have exclusive jurisdiction.” The clause clearly provides for adjudication of dispute between the parties by the Arbitrator. In AIR 2015 SCC 1303, titled M/s Sundaram Finance Limited and another v. T. Thankam, it was held in para-15 that ‘Once an application in due compliance of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act is filed, the approach of the civil court should be not to see whether the court has jurisdiction. It should be to see whether its jurisdiction has been ousted. There is a lot of difference between the two approaches. Once it is brought to the notice of the court that its jurisdiction has been taken away in terms of the procedure prescribed under a special statue, the civil court should first see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction in terms or compliance of the procedure under the special statute. The general law should yield to the special lawgeneralia specialibus non derogant. In such a situation, the approach shall not be to see whether there is still jurisdiction in the civil court under the general law. Such approaches would only delay the resolution of disputes and complicate the redressal of grievance and of course unnecessarily increase the pendency in the court’. While supplementing the judgment in (2016) 10 SCC 386 , titled A. Ayyasamy versus A. Paramasivam and Others, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. in paragraphs-45 (extracted hereinafter) held that once there is an arbitration agreement between the parties then the judicial authority before whom an action is brought covering the subject matter of the arbitration agreement is under a positive obligation to refer the parties to arbitration, there is no element of discretion left in the court or the judicial authority- “45. The position that emerges both before and after the decision in N. Radhakrishnan is that successive decisions of this Court have given effect to the binding precept incorporated in Section 8. The position that emerges both before and after the decision in N. Radhakrishnan is that successive decisions of this Court have given effect to the binding precept incorporated in Section 8. Once there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, a judicial authority before whom an action is brought covering the subject matter of the arbitration agreement is under a positive obligation to refer parties to arbitration by enforcing the terms of the contract. There is no element of discretion left in the court or judicial authority to obviate the legislative mandate of compelling parties to seek recourse to arbitration. The judgment in N. Radhakrishnan has, however, been utilised by parties seeking a convenient ruse to avoid arbitration to raise a defence of fraud.” 4(ii) Learned Counsel for the petitioner then submitted that arbitration agreement executed was the result of fraud practiced upon the petitioner, therefore, also the dispute cannot be adjudicated by the arbitrator. It may be noticed here that no such plea has been specifically taken by the petitioner in his civil suit. Secondly, the question of applicability of arbitration clause vis-a-vis disputes alleged in the nature of frauds etc. is no longer res integra. In (2016) 10 SCC 386 , titled A. Ayyasamy versus A. Paramasivam and Others, the respondents had moved an application under Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 raising an objection to the maintainability of the suit in view of arbitration agreement between the parties. The application was resisted by the appellant with the submission that acts of fraud attributed to the appellant by the respondent/plaintiff could not be adjudicated upon by the Arbitral Tribunal and appropriate remedy was to approach civil Court by filing a civil suit. In following para-14 of the judgment the observation was that disputes relating to fraud were generally considered as nonarbitrable: “14. In the instant case, there is no dispute about the arbitration agreement inasmuch as there is a specific arbitration clause in the partnership deed. However, the question is as to whether the dispute raised by the respondent in the suit is incapable of settlement through arbitration. As pointed out above, the Act does not make any provision excluding any category of disputes treating them as non-arbitrable. Notwithstanding the above, the Courts have held that certain kinds of disputes may not be capable of adjudication through the means of arbitration. As pointed out above, the Act does not make any provision excluding any category of disputes treating them as non-arbitrable. Notwithstanding the above, the Courts have held that certain kinds of disputes may not be capable of adjudication through the means of arbitration. The Courts have held that certain disputes like criminal offences of a public nature, disputes arising out of illegal agreements and disputes relating to status, such as divorce, cannot be referred to arbitration. The following categories of disputes are generally treated as non-arbitrable: (i) patent, trademarks and copyright; (ii) anti-trust/competition laws; (iii) insolvency/winding up; (iv) bribery/corruption; (v) fraud; (vi) criminal matters. Fraud is one such category spelled out by the decisions of this Court where disputes would be considered as nonarbitrable.” In paragraph-18 of the same judgment (reproduced hereinafter) it was held that mere allegation of fraud in the pleadings by one party against the other cannot be a ground to hold that the matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration and should be decided by the civil Court: “18. When the case involves serious allegations of fraud, the dicta contained in the aforesaid judgments would be understandable. However, at the same time, mere allegation of fraud in the pleadings by one party against the other cannot be a ground to hold that the matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration and should be decided by the civil court. The allegations of fraud should be such that not only these allegations are serious that in normal course these may even constitute criminal offence, they are also complex in nature and the decision on these issues demand extensive evidence for which civil court should appear to be more appropriate forum than the Arbitral Tribunal. Otherwise, it may become a convenient mode of avoiding the process of arbitration by simply using the device of making allegations of fraud and pleading that issue of fraud needs to be decided by the civil court. The judgment in N. Radhakrishnan does not touch upon this aspect and the said decision is rendered after finding that allegations of fraud were of serious nature.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-25 (extracted hereinafter) concluded that mere allegation of fraud simpliciter will not be ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties. The judgment in N. Radhakrishnan does not touch upon this aspect and the said decision is rendered after finding that allegations of fraud were of serious nature.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-25 (extracted hereinafter) concluded that mere allegation of fraud simpliciter will not be ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties. It is only in those cases where the court finds that there are very serious allegations of fraud which make it a virtual case of criminal offence that it becomes essential for decision of such complex issue to be rendered by civil court on appreciation of evidence that the Court can sidetrack the arbitration agreement and can dismiss the application under Section 8. “25. In view of our aforesaid discussions, we are of the opinion that mere allegation of fraud simplicitor may not be a ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties. It is only in those cases where the Court, while dealing with Section 8 of the Act, finds that there are very serious allegations of fraud which make a virtual case of criminal offence or where allegations of fraud are so complicated that it becomes absolutely essential that such complex issues can be decided only by the civil court on the appreciation of the voluminous evidence that needs to be produced, the Court can sidetrack the agreement by dismissing application under Section 8 and proceed with the suit on merits. It can be so done also in those cases where there are serious allegations of forgery/fabrication of documents in support of the plea of fraud or where fraud is alleged against the arbitration provision itself or is of such a nature that permeates the entire contract, including the agreement to arbitrate, meaning thereby in those cases where fraud goes to the validity of the contract itself of the entire contract which contains the arbitration clause or the validity of the arbitration clause itself. Reverse position thereof would be that where there are simple allegations of fraud touching upon the internal affairs of the party inter se and it has no implication in the public domain, the arbitration clause need not be avoided and the parties can be relegated to arbitration. Reverse position thereof would be that where there are simple allegations of fraud touching upon the internal affairs of the party inter se and it has no implication in the public domain, the arbitration clause need not be avoided and the parties can be relegated to arbitration. While dealing with such an issue in an application under Section 8 of the Act, the focus of the Court has to be on the question as to whether jurisdiction of the Court has been ousted instead of focusing on the issue as to whether the Court has jurisdiction or not. It has to be kept in mind that insofar as the statutory scheme of the Act is concerned, it does not specifically exclude any category of cases as nonarbitrable. Such categories of non-arbitrable subjects are carved out by the Courts, keeping in mind the principle of common law that certain disputes which are of public nature, etc. are not capable of adjudication and settlement by arbitration and for resolution of such disputes, Courts, i.e. public fora, are better suited than a private forum of arbitration. Therefore, the inquiry of the Court, while dealing with an application under Section 8 of the Act, should be on the aforesaid aspect, viz. whether the nature of dispute is such that it cannot be referred to arbitration, even if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties. When the case of fraud is set up by one of the parties and on that basis that party wants to wriggle out of that arbitration agreement, a strict and meticulous inquiry into the allegations of fraud is needed and only when the Court is satisfied that the allegations are of serious and complicated nature that it would be more appropriate for the Court to deal with the subject matter rather than relegating the parties to arbitration, then alone such an application under Section 8 should be rejected.” While supplementing the above judgment, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. held in para 45.2 as under: “45.2 Allegations of fraud are not alien to ordinary civil courts. Generations of judges have dealt with such allegations in the context of civil and commercial disputes. Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. held in para 45.2 as under: “45.2 Allegations of fraud are not alien to ordinary civil courts. Generations of judges have dealt with such allegations in the context of civil and commercial disputes. If an allegation of fraud can be adjudicated upon in the course of a trial before an ordinary civil court, there is no reason or justification to exclude such disputes from the ambit and purview of a claim in arbitration. The parties who enter into commercial dealings and agree to a resolution of disputes by an arbitral forum exercise an option and express a choice of a preferred mode for the resolution of their disputes. The parties in choosing arbitration place priority upon the speed, flexibility and expertise inherent in arbitral adjudication. Once parties have agreed to refer disputes to arbitration, the court must plainly discourage and discountenance litigative strategies designed to avoid recourse to arbitration. Any other approach would seriously place in uncertainty the institutional efficacy of arbitration. Such a consequence must be eschewed.” In the instant case allegations of fraud have not been specifically raised in the civil suit. In fact the petitioner had himself relied on the agreement dated 24.3.2012 to factually assert regular payments of loan installments till April 2016 in lieu of loan advanced by the respondents under the agreement. Whether in such circumstances he can even take the plea of fraud is questionable. Nonetheless the plea taken by him in the present petition is not such which will come in the way of enforcement of Clause-29 of the agreement. The case is squarely covered by the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in A. Ayyasamy’s case supra. In view of above, the civil suit filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. There is no infirmity in the impugned order relegating the parties to approach the Arbitrator. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to seek appropriate redressal/remedy with respect to his any other grievances relating to the arbitration agreement. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.