ORDER T.R. RAVI, J. By order dated 01.02.2018, the Kerala Administrative Tribunal dismissed 15 original applications relating to the selection for appointment to the post of Driver Grade-II (LDV) in various Departments of the Government. The 3rd applicant in O.A.No.753 of 2017, which was one of the cases dismissed by the common judgment, filed O.P.(KAT)No.87 of 2018, challenging the judgment; and the other applicants deserted their cause. ZIA 210 of 2018 was filed by one K.M.Haris and 4 others for getting themselves impleaded in the above original petition. The Registry noted a defect that a person who is not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal cannot be a party in the O.P.(KAT). The petition was placed before the Division Bench dealing with the subject. 2. The counsel for the petitioners in the impleading petition contended that they were beneficiaries of the common judgment and that since the applicants in the cases in which they were parties have not challenged the order, they should be afforded the chance to defend the order of the Tribunal. On consideration of the judgments in Gireesh Babu v. Pavithran, reported in [ 2013 (3) KHC 165 ] and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Kumar and another v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan and others reported in [ 2010 (4) SCC 554 ], the Division Bench was of the opinion that, even though the counsel for the petitioner in the original petition submitted that interference with the common order will directly and adversely affect the petitioners who seek to get impleaded, they cannot be permitted to come on record, in view of the above said judgments. 3. Heard Sri Varun C. Vijay on behalf of the impleading petitioners, Sri O.D.Sivadas on behalf of the petitioners in the original petition, Sri P.C.Sasidharan on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 in the original petition and Sri Antony Mukkath, Senior Government Pleader on behalf of the 4th respondent in the original petition. 4. The question that needs to be answered is whether the decision in Gireesh Babu (supra) stands in the way of all persons who seek to get impleaded in a proceeding under Article 227, arising out of a decision of the Tribunal. 4. The question that needs to be answered is whether the decision in Gireesh Babu (supra) stands in the way of all persons who seek to get impleaded in a proceeding under Article 227, arising out of a decision of the Tribunal. They seek impleadment for the reason that they are affected or likely to be affected by the decision in the original petition or they are persons interested in the subject matter. Among the persons who seek impleadment in the case on hand, there are persons who were parties in one or other of the original applications which was considered along with O.A.No.753 of 2017 and dismissed by a common judgment, who were not parties to any proceedings before the Tribunal and persons like the petitioners in I.A.1294 of 2018, who were/are parties to other similar original applications before the Tribunal, which were not considered alongwith O.A.753/2017 and were separately disposed of or are still pending. 5. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L.Chandrakumar v. Union of India reported in [ 1997 (3) SCC 261 ] considered the power conferred on the Tribunals constituted under Articles 323-A and 323-B vis-a-vis the powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In paragraphs 93 and 99 of the judgment, the Bench categorically held that the Tribunals will function as the Court of first instance and it was not open to litigants to approach the High Courts directly. The relevant passages are extracted below. “93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned(Emphasis supplied). xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx 99. ….... …...... …....... The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned(Emphasis supplied). Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 6. In Rajeev Kumar (supra), the appellants before the Supreme Court had filed applications for impleadment before the Delhi High Court in writ petitions filed by one Hemraj Singh Chauhan and others. Sri Hemraj Singh Chauhan and others were applicants before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the writ petition had been filed by them challenging the rejection of the applications by the Tribunal. The High Court allowed Rajeev Kumar and others to intervene and make submissions at the time of hearing of the writ petition. They were also given liberty to file affidavits. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and the judgment of the Delhi High Court was the subject matter of appeal before the Apex Court, at the instance of the intervenors. The Apex Court called upon the appellants/intervenors to convince the Court regarding their locus to participate in the proceedings before the High Court in view of the fact that they were not parties before the Tribunal. After referring to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in L.Chandrakumar (supra), the Apex Court held that the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court fell into error by allowing the appellants to treat the High Court as a court of first instance, without relegating them to the Tribunal. On the said reasoning, the appeal filed by the intervenors was dismissed. 7. The legal issue involved in Gireesh Babu (supra) was whether the respondents, who were the applicants before the Tribunal were entitled to be considered for selection for appointment as Workshop Attender, on the strength of their Diploma in Engineering. On the said reasoning, the appeal filed by the intervenors was dismissed. 7. The legal issue involved in Gireesh Babu (supra) was whether the respondents, who were the applicants before the Tribunal were entitled to be considered for selection for appointment as Workshop Attender, on the strength of their Diploma in Engineering. The notification called applicants with ITI Certification and the writ petitioners were such certificate holders; who challenged the Tribunal's decision permitting Diploma Holders to apply for the post. The Division Bench as a preliminary question, considered whether, a person who was not a party before the Tribunal, can challenge the order of the Tribunal before the High Court as a person aggrieved. This Court, placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajeev Kumar (supra), held that the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court apply on all fours, and the High Court cannot treat itself as the court of first instance, overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In the case before the Division Bench, none of the petitioners were parties in the proceedings before the Tribunal. We also immediately notice that the original petitioners could also have filed a review petition before the Tribunal, since the Tribunal's decision was against them; unlike in the present case. 8. A reading of the judgments in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra), would clearly show that in both the cases, the court was considering the right of persons, who were not parties before the court of first instance (Tribunal), to either get themselves impleaded in subsequent proceedings before the High Court or to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal before the High Court directly. The facts in the present case are totally different from that of Gireesh Babu. The impleading petitioners here, though similar to those intervenors in Rajeev Kumar; the distinguishing factor is that the petitioners in ZIA 210/2018 are, all except one, persons who were parties in one or other of the original applications, which were all heard together and dismissed by a common judgment. Since all the cases were heard and disposed of together, we are of the opinion that the petitioners in the impleading petition, except, Mr.Haris are parties to the “proceedings” before the Court of first instance (Tribunal) and they cannot be said to have bypassed the court of first instance. Since all the cases were heard and disposed of together, we are of the opinion that the petitioners in the impleading petition, except, Mr.Haris are parties to the “proceedings” before the Court of first instance (Tribunal) and they cannot be said to have bypassed the court of first instance. We also pertinently observe that in the batch of Original Applications before the Tribunal, in two cases, O.A Nos: 736 and 771 of 2017, there were paper publications taken after impleading certain persons in a representative capacity. 9. On a consideration of the totality of these circumstances, the principles laid down in Rajeev Kumar (Supra) and Gireesh Babu (Supra) will not in any way affect the rights of persons who were parties in one or other O.A.'s, to get impleaded in the original petition, even though they were not parties in the particular original application from which the original petition arises. The rights of such persons cannot be treated at par with the rights of persons who were strangers to the proceedings. None of these persons can or need to approach the Tribunal with a review petition or any other petitions, since they are beneficiaries of the judgment of the Tribunal. Even the strangers to the O.A's who would stand affected by the decision of this Court in the O.P. would have a right to seek for impleadment since the respondents before the Tribunal were impleaded in a representative capacity and every person similarly situated is deemed to have been represented before the Tribunal. Hence Haris too has a right to be impleaded and heard, in defense of the order of the Tribunal. 10. There is yet another reason for holding that such persons are entitled to participate in these proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in Anupal Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in [ 2020 (2) SCC 173 ], has considered the question whether the principles of res judicata would apply in the case of common judgments passed by the High Court. In the case before the Supreme Court, 88 petitions were heard by the High Court together, and allowed with certain directions. The judgments in six of these writ petitions alone were subject matter of challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a total number of 21 appeals. In the case before the Supreme Court, 88 petitions were heard by the High Court together, and allowed with certain directions. The judgments in six of these writ petitions alone were subject matter of challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a total number of 21 appeals. The judgments in none of the other cases were under challenge either at the instance of the State or the parties. A contention was taken that the judgments in those cases which have not been challenged, would operate as res judicata. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no merit in the contention, since it is a common judgment and the appeals could not result in an inconsistent decree, particularly, since there is a common operative portion in the judgment under challenge before the Supreme Court. Applying the said principles, the persons who seek to get themselves impleaded in the case before us, will necessarily be affected parties, if there is any variation of the judgment of the Tribunal. 11. We are not considering the merits of the claim for impleadment alone, but a reference of a Division Bench as to whether the cited decisions of this Court and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would act as an inviolable rule that none who are parties before the Tribunal could approach this Court, either as petitioners or seek impleadment as respondents; in the latter case for resisting or supporting the order of the Tribunal. We do not and cannot contemplate all of the situations that may arise. For clarity we consider a few, which could in normal circumstances arise, which only occur when there is outright rejection or acceptance of the claims raised in the Original Application, before the Tribunal. (a) When the Original Application is dismissed by the Tribunal: The applicants before the Tribunal can no doubt approach this Court and challenge the decision of the Tribunal. All the same, persons seeking similar reliefs as the Applicants, are not entitled to get themselves impleaded in the original petition filed by the Applicants, merely to ensure that they too get the benefit of the order of this Court, if there is reversal of the order of the Tribunal. Such persons have to necessarily approach the Tribunal with a review or a fresh original application and only thereafter can they approach the High Court, based on the decision of the Tribunal. Such persons have to necessarily approach the Tribunal with a review or a fresh original application and only thereafter can they approach the High Court, based on the decision of the Tribunal. At the same time, persons identically situated to the respondents in the above said illustration, who were not parties before the Tribunal, will not be entitled to seek impleadment in the original petition filed by the Applicants, to support the dismissal of the Original Application, since that is a case covered by Rajeev Kumar (supra). (b) When the Original Application is allowed by the Tribunal: The respondents in such cases can approach this Court and file an original petition to challenge the judgment of the Tribunal. However, in such original petitions, persons similarly placed like the successful applicants before the Tribunal cannot seek impleadment and claim the same relief as the Applicants. Nor can they get impleaded, for the purpose of supporting the order of the Tribunal. The remedy available to such persons is either to approach the Tribunal with a fresh original application or to wait for the result of the original petition, since they cannot be allowed to bypass the Court of first instance. Whether they choose to file an original application while the original petition is pending or they file it after the original petition is dismissed, it would be for the Tribunal to consider whether they are guilty of delay or laches. As regards, persons similarly situated as respondents, their remedy is not to approach this Court and get impleaded in the original petition filed by the respondents. They will have to seek a review of the judgment before the Tribunal. Such situation is similar to the one in Gireesh Babu(supra). (c) A unique situation that may arise is the one which has occasioned this reference, the facts of which have already been detailed earlier. In such situations, we are of the opinion that all persons who were respondents before the Tribunal in any of the original applications, which has been jointly dismissed by a common judgment, are entitled to get themselves impleaded in an original petition filed against the judgment in one such original application, since they are all persons entitled to be treated as parties to the “proceedings” and are not persons who have bypassed the court of first instance. This would also apply to persons who are interested and are affected, but were not physically present before the Tribunal, since they are deemed to be represented by those respondents impleaded, in a representative capacity, that too after a paper publication. So also, those petitioners in I.A.1294 of 2018, who are similarly situated to such respondents, who also had approached the Tribunal for similar reliefs and have either succeeded before the Tribunal or their original application is pending consideration, are also persons entitled to get themselves impleaded, to support the decision in the original application, since such persons cannot be treated as having bypassed the court of first instance and at the same time are likely to be affected by the decision in the original petition. 12. Here we briefly refer back to the bone of contention before the Tribunal. Whether an applicant to the post of Driver Grade II has to have a driving license and badge, both valid for three years was the question raised. The PSC was initially of that opinion but later permitted every applicant who had a license for three years, with a badge, to be considered, without any period attached to the badge. The Tribunal upheld the view of the PSC. Haris, was not a party before the Tribunal, but he supports the order of the Tribunal. There was a paper publication taken at the stage of adjudication before the Tribunal. Haris did not attempt to implead himself before the Tribunal but he is deemed to have been represented in the proceedings before the Tribunal. 13. The instances referred above are only some situations which may arise for decision. We make it clear that the above situations are not exhaustive. There could be several other situations that may arise and they will have to be considered by the respective benches. We hold that the decisions in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra) will apply only in cases with similar set of facts and cannot be treated as blanket prohibition against third parties to get impleaded in an Original Petition. We are not expressing any opinion on the impleading petitions filed subsequent to the order of reference, which will also have to be considered by the appropriate Division Bench in the light of our finding. 14. We are not expressing any opinion on the impleading petitions filed subsequent to the order of reference, which will also have to be considered by the appropriate Division Bench in the light of our finding. 14. While considering the issue referred, we have come across two judgments passed by two different Division Benches of this Court. In S.Prabha v. S.A.Kareem, reported in [2016 SCC OnLine Ker 11769], the Division Bench was considering an original petition filed by persons who were not parties before the Tribunal, on the ground that the relief granted by the Tribunal affects their rights detrimentally. The contention of the petitioners was that since they were necessary parties, who ought to have been impleaded and since the order is passed without them on the party array, the order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside, as violative of the principles of natural justice. They also contended that they cannot seek a review of the judgment of the Tribunal, since the same has become barred by limitation. The respondents before the Court contended that the original petition was not maintainable placing reliance on Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (Supra). The Division Bench held that in both Rajeev Kumar (Supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra), the persons who approached the Court were persons who were entitled to seek reliefs from the Tribunal, who wanted this Court to grant them the reliefs, but the case before the Bench was one in which the petitioners were not in a position to invoke the remedy of filing a Review petition. The Court also held that since the petitioners were necessary parties, and an order to their detriment was obtained without them on the party array, it was a case of violation of the principles of natural justice and as such an original petition was maintainable. The Division Bench allowed the original petition and remitted the case to the Tribunal for a fresh decision after bringing on record the affected parties. The Division Bench took note of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which says that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of reviewing its decisions. The Division Bench took note of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which says that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of reviewing its decisions. The Court also took note of Rule 21 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010, which says that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order, of which the review is sought. The Division Bench was of the opinion that since a review petition has to be filed within 30 days, the petitioners before the Court cannot maintain a review petition. 15. In Rajesh v. Sabu, reported in [ 2019 (2) KLT 98 ], another Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether an original petition is maintainable at the instance of persons who were not parties before the Tribunal, since they could have filed a review petition as parties aggrieved. The Division Bench held that the original petition was maintainable, placing reliance on S.Prabha (supra) and the decision in Gopalbandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty reported in [ (1998) 4 SCC 447 ]. The Division Bench held that a third party cannot be compelled to apply for review of an order of the Tribunal which had attained finality. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the decisions in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra) are not authority for the proposition that a third party who suffers an adverse order behind his back can only apply for review and no other course is open. 16. With all due respect to the Division Benches, even though we are in agreement with the principle that an order passed behind the back of necessary parties is bad in law, we do not agree with the reasoning adopted in the decisions to distinguish the judgments in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu(supra). We are also unable to agree with the observation of the Division Benches, that the Tribunal cannot entertain a petition for Review beyond the period of 30 days. 17. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 stipulates the period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the Division Benches, that the Tribunal cannot entertain a petition for Review beyond the period of 30 days. 17. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 stipulates the period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal. Section 21(3) says that an application may be admitted after the period of limitation, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the period prescribed. Section 21(3) is similarly worded as Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 21 has to be read along with Section 29 of the Limitation Act which says that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 22(3)(f) says that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for reviewing its decisions. There is no exclusion in the statute; of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and the powers conferred being that under the CPC, there can be inferred an application of the Limitation Act. 18. The limitation as noticed, in the above decisions, is from the Rules and we hence look at the rule making powers conferred under the Statute. Section 35 of the Administrative Tribunals Act empowers the Central Government to make rules. Section 35(1) says that the Central Government may, subject to provisions of Section 36, make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. Section 35(2) says that without prejudice to the generality of sub clause (1), the rules may provide for certain specified matters. Section 35 of the Administrative Tribunals Act empowers the Central Government to make rules. Section 35(1) says that the Central Government may, subject to provisions of Section 36, make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. Section 35(2) says that without prejudice to the generality of sub clause (1), the rules may provide for certain specified matters. One such matter specified in Section 35(2)(e) are rules subject to which a Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure under sub-section (1) of Section 22 and the additional matters in respect of which a Tribunal may exercise the powers of a Civil Court under clause (i) of sub-section (3) of that section. That is to say, clause(f) of sub-section (3) of Section 22, providing for power of review has not been included within the purview of Section 35. Section 36 of the Administrative Tribunals Act empowers the appropriate Governments to make rules which also does not take in power to make rules to regulate a review application. The reason according to us is apparent, since the power granted is the power to review under the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions relating to Review in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are contained in Section 114 and Order XLVII. Article 124 of the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation for a petition for review under the Civil Procedure Code as 30 days. However, since the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also applicable and a Review Petition can be filed beyond the period of 30 days, if the petitioner is able to show sufficient cause for the delay. 19. In exercise of power conferred under Section 35(2)(d), (e) and (f) and Section 36(c), the Central Government has promulgated the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010. Rule 21 of the Rules says that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order of which the review is sought. As already observed, the rule making power does not take in power to make rules for fixing a period of limitation for filing a review application. Such a prescription of 30 days, which is the same as the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, for filing a review petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, was totally unnecessary and uncalled for. Such a prescription of 30 days, which is the same as the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, for filing a review petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, was totally unnecessary and uncalled for. Even without Rule 21, the review application ought to be filed within 30 days. Since the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 21 is the same as that applicable for a review petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, we do not think it is necessary to strike down Rule 21. All the same, Rule 21 has to be necessarily subject to the provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act which specifically says that provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply to a prescription of limitation under any special or local law. That is to say, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay in preferring a Review Petition is maintainable. 20. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has in the decision in Union of India & others v. Central Administrative Tribunal and Another reported in [2002 SCC OnLine Cal 597] held that the Central Administrative Tribunal can entertain a review petition beyond the period of 30 days. In arriving at the decision, the Full Bench has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthenpurayil Aboobacker reported in [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], wherein the Apex Court had held that as long as the principle Act does not exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, a petition for condonation of delay is maintainable. The Full Bench held that there is no specific exclusion of the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, in the Administrative Tribunals Act. As a matter of fact, Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act provides for condonation of delay, for the purpose of filing an original application before the Tribunal. We also note that the same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the decision in Akshaya Kumar Parida (expired) and others v. Union of India & others reported in AIR 2015 Orissa 49. We also note that the same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the decision in Akshaya Kumar Parida (expired) and others v. Union of India & others reported in AIR 2015 Orissa 49. On a reading of Section 21 and Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, we are in respectful agreement with the Full Bench decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Orissa High Court and are of the opinion that the Administrative Tribunals Act does not exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 21. Sri Antony Mukkath, Senior Government Pleader, brought to our notice an unreported decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & others vs. Chitra Lekha Chakraborty in Civil Appeal No.6213 of 2008, wherein the Apex Court held that since there is a specific provision in Rule 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Rules for filing of Review applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Section 5 of Limitation Act was not applicable to a petition under Rule 17. The relevant passages of the judgment, which deal with the issue of review petition are extracted below: “The respondent herein had participated in the selection in the year 1984 and her name was not found in the selection list and she filed a representation to the Railway authorities in the year 1991 and her representation was not replied by the railway authorities whereafter she filed an Original Application before the C.A.T., Calcutta. The C.A.T. has allowed the O.A. During the pendency of the O.A. before the Tribunal, the Chairman of the Railway Recruitment Board issued a direction to appoint the respondent and she was consequently appointed. Thereafter the O.A. filed by the respondent was disposed of on 8.1.1996 with the direction that the Chairman of the Railway Recruitment Board shall, within two months from the date of communication of the order, convey to the petitioner therein to specify the specific position of the petitioner in the panel selected for the purpose of determination of her inter se seniority amongst those appointed from the said panel and it was also directed that the relative position of the petitioner of such panel shall be ascribed keeping in view her aggregate marks and the relative aggregate marks of other candidates who had already been appointed from the panel. Thereafter the appellant Union of India (Ministry of Railways) has filed a review petition before the C.A.T. and the same was rejected on the ground that it was filed beyond 30 days as prescribed under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 (for short the 1987 Rules). The appellant has challenged the same before the High Court and the High Court confirmed the order passed by the C.A.T. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been filed by the Union of India. Learned Addl.Sol.General for the Union of India contended that the review petition filed by the appellant should have been allowed as there was sufficient cause for extending the period of limitation prescribed under Rule 17 of the 1987 Rules. Learned Addl.Sol.General has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises Vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Dept. & Ors., reported in 2008(7) SCC p.169, wherein it was held that Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable to an application submitted under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It was further held that as per Section 43 of the Arbitration Act, the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable to the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for setting aside the award. In other words, a specific provision was made in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for application of Limitation Act. In the instant case a specific provision in Rule 17 of 1987 Rules has been made for filing a review application before the C.A.T. and therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to a petition filed under Rule 17. The High Court was justified in concluding that the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application filed beyond 30 days.” 22. In our humble opinion, with all the respect at our command, we are of the considered view that the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent since it falls under both the exceptions viz. per incuriam and sub silentio. We have already indicated the statutory provisions which govern the filing of a review petition before the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decision was not apprised of the statutory provisions, which relate to the power of review available with the Tribunal. per incuriam and sub silentio. We have already indicated the statutory provisions which govern the filing of a review petition before the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decision was not apprised of the statutory provisions, which relate to the power of review available with the Tribunal. In fact the application for review is not one filed under Rule 17 but under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 22 of the Act which says that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as that of a civil court for reviewing its decisions was not considered. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and that of the Limitation Act, which governs the power of review were also not considered. Even if Rule 21 is to be treated as the specific provision prescribing limitation, the fact that the said prescription is subject to Section 29 of the Limitation Act was also not considered. 23. The legal proposition that a decision which is rendered per incuriam and sub silentio cannot be treated as a binding precedent is no longer res integra. In paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., reported in [ (2001) 6 SCC 356 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “20. This Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] in para 42 has quoted the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt [(1947) 2 All ER 270 (KBD)] and Penny v. Nicholas [(1950) 2 All ER 89 (KBD)] to the following effect: “‘Per incuriam’ are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetful-ness of some inconsistent (sic) statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.” 21. This Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. [ (1991) 4 SCC 139 ] in para 40 has observed thus: “40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [(1944) 2 All ER 293 : 1944 KB 718] )” 24. In paragraph 14 of the judgment in N.Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala, reported in [ (2004) 13 SCC 217 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: “14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the Probation Act, it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said Act clearly rules out application of the Probation Act to a case covered under Section 5(2) of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the accused-appellant's plea relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The decision in Bore Gowda case [ (2000) 10 SCC 260 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1244] does not even indicate that Section 18 of the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at from any angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal which we direct.” (emphasis supplied). 25. In paragraph 41 of the judgment in State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. reported in [ (1991) 4 SCC 139 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. “A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.” (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. “A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind.” (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. [(1941) 1 KB 675, 677 : (1941) 2 All ER 11] the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered ‘without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority’. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. [ (1989) 1 SCC 101 ]. The bench held that, ‘precedents subsilentio and without argument are of no moment’. The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi (emphasis supplied).” 26. While considering the principle of per incuriam, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra reported in [ (2018) 3 SCC 412 ], in paragraphs 206, 210 and 211 held as follows: “206. The concept of “per incuriam” signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or of some authority binding on the court concerned. In other words, the concept means that a given decision is in disregard of the previous decisions of the court itself, or that it was rendered in ignorance of the terms of an applicable statute or of a rule having the force of law. xxxx xxxx xxxx 210. In MCD v. Gurnam Kaur [MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 ], it was held that decision of ignorance of rule is per incuriam, the Court has observed: “11. … A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute.” 211. … A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute.” 211. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 : AIR 2011 SC 1989 ], this Court has observed: “67. Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrably wrong.” 27. In the manner in which we have understood the decisions in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra), we are not in a position to accept the propositions of law laid down in S.Prabha (supra) and Rajesh (supra) and we overrule the judgments in so far as they hold that that the original petition was maintainable directly to the High Court at the instance of third parties. With all due respect to the Division Bench, we are of the opinion that entertaining the original petition at the instance of third parties, was against the dictum laid down in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra). We are of the considered opinion that both the Division Benches in S.Prabha (supra) and Rajesh (supra), if they were in disagreement with the judgment of the Division Bench in Gireesh Babu (supra) ought to have referred the matter to a Full Bench. 28. Before parting with the case, we note that even though Article 227 does not spell out the procedure to be followed while entertaining an original petition, the Kerala High Court has issued the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). Chapter XI of the Rules relates proceedings under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution. Rules 148 and 152 of the Rules are extracted below; “148. Addition of parties.- All persons directly affected shall be made parties to the petition. Chapter XI of the Rules relates proceedings under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution. Rules 148 and 152 of the Rules are extracted below; “148. Addition of parties.- All persons directly affected shall be made parties to the petition. Where such persons are numerous, one or more of them may with the permission of the court on application made of the purpose be impleaded on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so affected; but notice of the Original Petition shall, on admission, be given to all such persons either by personal service or by public advertisement as the Court in each case may direct. Provided that in cases where the State Government is a party the Secretary to the Government Department concerned shall be arrayed as party representing the Government. Provided further that if the subject matter of the petition relates to two or more Government Departments or, if the petition is of such a nature, the disposal of which warrants information from two or more Government Departments, the Chief Secretary to Government and the Secretaries to those Government and the Secretaries to those Government Departments shall be made as party representing the Government. xxxx xxxx xxxx 152. Hearing of third parties.- (1) The Court may order notice of the petition to any person not made party thereto. (2) At the time of hearing of the petition for admission or at a later stage, any person, who desires to be heard in the matter and appears to the Court to be a proper person to be heard, may be heard, notwithstanding that he is not a party, but subject to such conditions as to costs or otherwise as the court may deem fit to impose.” 29. A reading of Rule 148 would show that it applies more aptly to a proceeding under Article 226. In original petitions filed under Article 227 challenging the correctness of the proceedings before Courts and Tribunals over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, normally only persons who were parties in the proceedings before the Court/Tribunal below are made parties in the original petition. As far as petitions under Article 226 are concerned, it is well settled that all affected persons have to be made parties to the proceedings. When it comes to Rule 152, it speaks of hearing third parties. As far as petitions under Article 226 are concerned, it is well settled that all affected persons have to be made parties to the proceedings. When it comes to Rule 152, it speaks of hearing third parties. The Court can choose to hear a person who appears to it to be a proper person notwithstanding that he is not a party. We are referring to the above Rules only to show that Court is not helpless when it feels that there is a necessity to hear a person, during the course of the proceedings. However that person does not get a right to challenge the decision rendered, since he is not properly impleaded in the proceedings. 30. The reference is answered holding that the judgments in Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra) will not in any way affect the rights of persons who were parties before the Tribunal in cases disposed of in their favour, to get themselves impleaded in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court, initiated by persons who have lost their cause before the Tribunal, even if they were not parties in the particular original application against which the original petition is preferred before the High Court. Rajeev Kumar (supra) and Gireesh Babu (supra) do not lay down an inviolable rule and it is for the Court before whom impleadment is sought, to consider whether the said decisions apply and even otherwise the parties seeking to come on record, could be impleaded or not. The original petition is directed to be posted before the appropriate Bench for further steps.