JUDGMENT : VIKRAM NATH, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act has been preferred by the original writ petitioners assailing the correctness of the judgment and order dated 13.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 550 of 2020, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy available to the writ petitioner-appellant under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1995 Act”). 2. We have heard Shri M.I. Hava, learned counsel appearing for Shri Moiz Rafique, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Advocate along with Shri M.I. Merchant and Shri Hemang Shah, learned counsels for respondent No. 2. 3. The issue arising in the present appeal is purely legal and may not require any detailed narration of facts. Even otherwise, the facts giving rise to the writ petition as also the appeal have been elaborately recorded by the learned Single Judge and the same have not been disputed by the learned counsel for the parties. As such, we are not repeating the same in detail, however necessary reference to relevant facts have been made at appropriate places. 4. The present appellants preferred Special Civil Application No. 550 of 2020 praying for quashing of the order dated 21.11.2019 issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Gujarat State Wakf Board and the Circular dated 21.09.2019 issued by the Wakf Board, whereby it was ordered that respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to the writ petition and also to the present appeal be appointed as trustees of the trust in question. 5. The order further mentions that any party aggrieved by the said order may approach the Tribunal under Section 83 of the 1995 Act. Before the learned Single Judge, a preliminary objection was raised with regard to the writ petitioners’ having a statutory remedy of filing an appeal under Section 83 of the 1995 Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the order dated 21.11.2019 would be an order passed under Section 63 of the Act and as such the same could be challenged before the Tribunal under Section 83(2) of the 1995 Act. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the order dated 21.11.2019 would be an order passed under Section 63 of the Act and as such the same could be challenged before the Tribunal under Section 83(2) of the 1995 Act. The learned Single Judge dealt with this aspect of the matter in great detail and also considered the relevant case-laws on the point as also the scope of Section 63 of the 1995 Act and was of the firm view that the writ petitioner must avail the alternative remedy rather than approaching the High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. In addition, the learned Single Judge also took into consideration the fact that the same order of the Wakf Board has already been challenged before the Wakf Tribunal by different parties by filing separate appeals which are still pending consideration before the Tribunal. It was also considered by the learned Single Judge that the parties appealing before the Wakf Tribunal when failed to succeed in getting an interim order, the others have approached this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The entire exercise by the writ petitioners as also the pro forma respondents was a collusive exercise. For all the reasons, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are contained in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment which are reproduced below: “12. The Court is in respectful disagreement with the aforesaid proposition as the High Court of Kerala has considered the expression that when there is a vacancy in the office of mutawalli in the following fashion “when there is a vacancy in the office of the mutawalli of a wakf applies to both types of situations viz. there being no one to be appointed under the terms of the deed of the wakf and where the right of any person to act as mutawalli is disputed.” The word “or” appears to have escaped and in place the conjunction ‘and’ is used which is not found in the statute meaning thereby that the High Court of Kerala has proceeded to relate the two contingencies with the vacancy in the office of the mutawalli independent of each other. As explained hereinabove, the use of word ‘or’ under Section 63 of the Act is suggesting that the two contingencies are independent, first contingency depending upon the vacancy in the office of the mutawalli whereas the second contingency is only where there is a dispute with regard to the right of any person to act as a mutawalli. 13. Reliance placed by learned Advocate for the petitioners on the decision in the case of Khadar Shariff and Others (supra) in the opinion of this Court is not well founded as the issue decided by the High Court of Madras was with regard to the power of the Waqf Board to appoint either a Committee or a Executive Officer to manage the Waqf when the muttawali is the in-charge of the Management and administration of Waqf, the same was decided under the provisions of the Waqf Act as it existed prior to 1995. 14. The Court has also taken into consideration the submission of learned Advocates for the respondents that some of the aggrieved persons have already filed three independent Waqf Appeals against the very impugned order where the petitioners are already the respondents the proceedings are very much within their knowledge. It is also submitted that having failed to get any interim order in either of the three Appeals, the present petition is filed. When this Court is dealing with the petition only on the issue of preliminary objection, the Court refrains from entering into the merits and demerits of the case as the avenue of an appeal before the Tribunal is still available to the petitioners and that the same impugned order is a subject matter of challenge in separate Appeals before the Tribunal. Therefore, the observations made in the present case are restricted to the preliminary objections. The Court sustains the preliminary objection and therefore, dismisses the petition. Notice is discharged.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has made similar submissions as was made before the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the observations made in the present case are restricted to the preliminary objections. The Court sustains the preliminary objection and therefore, dismisses the petition. Notice is discharged.” 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has made similar submissions as was made before the learned Single Judge. In addition, learned counsel has placed before us the judgments relating to the scope of Sections 42, 43, 63 and 83 of the 1995 Act and also to the effect that the availability of alternative remedy does not preclude or is not a bar for this Court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution under given circumstances as has been laid down by the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, since there was lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Tribunal, as such this Court may entertain the writ petition and the order of the learned Single Judge be set aside and the matter be heard and decided on merits. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon the following judgments: 1. Kerala Waqf Board, Ernakulam vs. Alam Aboobacker Sait and Others, AIR 1987 Ker. 176 2. Khadar Shariff and Others vs. Tamil Nadu State Waqf Board and Others, 1986 SCC Online Madras 176 3. Mohammed Sulaiman and Another vs. Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board and Another, AIR 1997 A.P. 387 4. Shaik Ghouse Mohiuddin vs. A.P. State Waqf Board and Others, 2002 (1) APLJ 154 5. Abdul Rahlman Musaliar (Died) and Another vs. T.K. Muhammed Sahib and Another, AIR 2003 Ker. 84 6. Subina Rizvi vs. State of U.P. through Prin. Secy. Deptt. of Waqf and Another, 2015 SCC Online All 5984 7. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Others, 1998 (8) SCC 1 8. Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka and Others 9. Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza Waqf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 10. Punjab Waqf Board vs. Sham Singh Harike and Others, (2019) 4 SCC 698 11. Raza Textiles Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, Rampur, (1973) 1 SCC 633 12. Hassam Abbas Sayyad vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad and Others, (2007) 2 SCC 355 13. Samar Kumar Roy vs. Jharna Bera, (2017) 9 SCC 591 14. Syeda Nazira Khatoon vs. Syed Zahiruddin Ahmed Baghdadi and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 522 15. Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyapputa Pookoya and Another vs. Pattakal Cheriyakoya and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. Hassam Abbas Sayyad vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad and Others, (2007) 2 SCC 355 13. Samar Kumar Roy vs. Jharna Bera, (2017) 9 SCC 591 14. Syeda Nazira Khatoon vs. Syed Zahiruddin Ahmed Baghdadi and Others, (2019) 9 SCC 522 15. Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyapputa Pookoya and Another vs. Pattakal Cheriyakoya and Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 9587-9588 of 2019, judgment dated 01.08.2019 16. Noor Mohammed vs. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, 2003 (11) SCC 782 8. On the other hand, Shri Shalin Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error which may warrant interference in appeal. It is further submitted that as there are disputed questions of fact which need to be examined and could be better and properly scrutinized and examined by the Wakf Tribunal as the scope under Article 226 of the Constitution to deal with question of fact is not permissible in judicial review, it would be appropriate that the appellants approach the Tribunal for redressal of their grievance and may not be permitted to by-pass the statutory remedy. 9. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. We do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The reasoning given by the learned Single Judge is just, sound and proper and does not call for any interference in appeal. 10. It is not in issue that the order impugned before the learned Single Judge was an order passed by the Wakf Board under the provisions of the 1995 Act. Any change, removal addition, appointment of Mutawalli, maintenance of Wakf Register by the Board/Chief Executive Officer which incorporates the name of Mutawalli and any change made therein are all part of the powers conferred under the 1995 Act. Section 83 is more than clear in stating that any Mutawalli or any person interested in a Wakf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under the Act or rules made thereunder may make an application within the time specified by the Tribunal for determination of a dispute, question or any other matter relating to the Wakf. Section 83 is more than clear in stating that any Mutawalli or any person interested in a Wakf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under the Act or rules made thereunder may make an application within the time specified by the Tribunal for determination of a dispute, question or any other matter relating to the Wakf. Once the order passed by the Wakf Board adding or removing the Mutawalli, the same would be under the provisions of the 1995 Act and anyone aggrieved would have a right to approach the Wakf Tribunal under Section 83(2) of the 1995 Act. The insistence of the learned counsel for the appellants that writ petition itself may be entertained without the appellants availing the statutory remedy, does not inspire any confidence and the case laws relied upon starting from Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Others, 1998 (8) SCC 1 and the subsequent judgments on the self imposed restriction regarding entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution even though there being a statutory remedy available, would not come to the aid of the appellants inasmuch as there are enough facts which are not admitted rather disputed which need to be examined by the statutory authority. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution is too limited and may also not be in the best interest of the appellants as also the other parties. As such, we do not find any error in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submission that no application or appeal would lie to the Tribunal has to first justify that the order impugned in the writ petition is not an order under the provisions of the 1995 Act. Learned counsel for the appellants has utterly failed to convince us even to the slightest degree that an order of the Wakf Board adding or removing Mutawallis would be an order outside the scope of the 1995 Act, from all these statutory provisions namely, Sections 32, 37, 42, 43, 63 and 64 of the 1995 Act. Learned counsel for the appellants has utterly failed to convince us even to the slightest degree that an order of the Wakf Board adding or removing Mutawallis would be an order outside the scope of the 1995 Act, from all these statutory provisions namely, Sections 32, 37, 42, 43, 63 and 64 of the 1995 Act. We may also record here that at so many places, the learned counsel for the appellants admits that the impguned order passed by the Wakf Board is an order passed under the various provisions of the 1995 Act. 12. By another judgment of date passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1206 of 2019, we have already dealt with the scope of relevant sections of the Wakf Act, 1995 dealing with appointment, removal of Mutawalli, addition and removal of Mutawalli, change of Mutawalli, the power of the Wakf Board and all other aspects relating thereto and for those reasons also we do not find any merit in the present appeal. 13. We may also record here that we have also examined the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. None of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have any application to the facts of the present case and are clearly distinguishable. These judgments do not extend any benefit to the appellants. They are discussed hereinafter in brief: (i) The case of Kerala Wakf Board (supra) deals with the question as to whether the Board has rightly exercised the power under Section 42 of the 1995 Act. As such, the said judgment cannot be of any benefit to the appellants for not approaching the Tribunal where it can very well agitate that the order of the Wakf Board is bad in law. (ii) In the case of Khadar Shariff and Others (supra), the question was whether the Wakf Board could have appointed a Committee or an Executive Officer to manage the Wakf, when the Mutawalli was managing the administration of the Wakf. This judgment also has no relevance to the present case, as again the interpretation was with regard to the powers conferred under Sections 15(2) and 43 of the 1995 Act. (iii) In the case of Mohammed Sulaiman and another (supra), the question again was regarding appointment of Mutawalli under Section 42 of the 1995 Act. This judgment also has no relevance to the present case, as again the interpretation was with regard to the powers conferred under Sections 15(2) and 43 of the 1995 Act. (iii) In the case of Mohammed Sulaiman and another (supra), the question again was regarding appointment of Mutawalli under Section 42 of the 1995 Act. As such, this judgment again would not extend any benefit to the appellants. (iv) In the case of Shaik Ghouse Mohiuddin (supra), it was the action of the Board whether rightly or wrongly exercised while exercising powers under Section 63 of the 1995 Act. As such, said judgment would not be of much help to the appellants for bypassing the statutory remedy available to them. (v) The judgments of Abdul Rahiman Musaliar (Dead) and another (supra), Subina Rizvi (supra), Whirlpool Corporation (supra) and Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. (supra) have been relied upon for the proposition that if there was violation of principles of natural justice, the order would be void ab initio and a writ petition could have been entertained. We are not disputing the said proposition, but then the same would depend upon the facts of each case. Once the learned Single Judge has already considered the aspect of the matter in detail and having rightly exercised the discretion of not entertaining the writ petition, no manifest error can be said to be affecting the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (vi) The judgments of Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) (supra), Punjab Waqf Board (supra), Hassan Abbas Sayyad (supra) and Samar Kumar Roy (supra) have all been relied upon for the proposition that as the impugned order of the Wakf Board although purporting to be in exercise of power under Section 63 of the 1995 Act being illegal, non-est, ultra vires, without jurisdiction, arbitrary and bad in law cannot be said to be an order under the Act and therefore, an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 83 of the 1995 Act would not be tenable and as such, the alleged availability of alternative remedy would not be a bar to the filing of the writ petition. We are afraid that the proposition as alleged can be accepted and none of the judgments referred to above law down the proposition as submitted by the appellants. We are afraid that the proposition as alleged can be accepted and none of the judgments referred to above law down the proposition as submitted by the appellants. They all relate to the same principles as have been laid down in the Whirlpool Corporation (supra) regarding the maintainability of a petition by passing the statutory remedy on three grounds namely, violation of principles of natural justice, the order suffering from lack of inherent jurisdiction and the order being malicious which in our opinion is to be applied only in the facts of the case and as already held above, the judgments do not help the appellants. (vii) The reliance placed upon the judgments in the case of Syeda Nazira Khatoon (supra) Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyapputa Pookoya and Another (supra) and Noor Mohammed (supra) have been relied upon for the purpose of appointment of Mutawalli which question in our considered opinion can very well be examined by the Tribunal and does not in any way help or support the appellants to maintain a writ petition directly against an order of Wakf Board. The merits of the matter regarding the order passed by the Wakf Board can be very well gone into by the Tribunal. 14. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the connected Civil Application also stands disposed of.