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2020 DIGILAW 756 (ALL)

Md. Arshad Khan v. State Of U. P. Through Additional Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary, Home

2020-03-17

RAMESH SINHA, YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

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JUDGMENT : Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 1 of 2020 1. er considering the submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties and upon perusing the application for condonation of delay, it appears that sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay in filing of the appeal and as such, the delay is condoned. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly, allowed. 2. Office is directed to allot regular number to this defective appeal. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. The present intra court appeal has been filed seeking to assail the judgment and order dated 30.09.2019 passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ A No. 13935 of 2019 (Md Arshad Khan Vs. State of U.P. and others), whereby the writ petition has been dismissed. 2. The writ petitioner is the appellant before us. 3. The matter pertains to the process of recruitment under the Police Constable and Constable PAC (Male) Direct Recruitment2015. The relief sought in the writ petition was for quashing of the medical examination result dated 27.02.2019 and the appellate medical board result dated 08.04.2019, where under the petitioner had been declared medically unfit on the ground that he suffered from the disability of 'flat foot'. 4. The learned Single Judge has taken note of the fact that pursuant to an order passed by this Court on 16.09.2019, the petitioner had been medically examined by a Medical Board constituted in terms of the direction issued and had been again found to be unfit due to 'flat foot'. The report of the Medical Board produced by the learned Standing Counsel was taken on record. 5. In view of the fact that the Medical Board, constituted in terms of the direction issued by this Court, had reaffirmed the view taken by the District Medical Board and the Appellate Medical Board, the learned Single Judge held that no interference in the matter was called for, and the writ petition was accordingly dismissed. 6. The scope of interference in matters relating to assessment of fitness by a Medical Board constituted under the statutory rules in exercise of powers under writ jurisdiction, in our opinion, would be extremely limited. 7. The Courts have, time and again, emphasised the need for caution when candidates seek to assail the correctness of the findings of a Medical Board constituted under a recruitment process adopted by the State authorities. 8. 7. The Courts have, time and again, emphasised the need for caution when candidates seek to assail the correctness of the findings of a Medical Board constituted under a recruitment process adopted by the State authorities. 8. We may observe that although the powers of the Court under Article 226 are wide enough to issue directions in appropriate cases but such powers are required to be wielded with caution and circumspection. Matters relating to the medical evaluation of candidates in a recruitment process involve expert determination and the Court should exercise caution in supplanting the process adopted by the recruiting agency and substituting it by a Court mandated further medical evaluation. 9. Any such exercise in acceding to requests of candidates who are not found to be medically fit for reassessment on the basis of procedures other than those envisaged by the recruiting agency under the relevant rules would result in the recruitment process being derailed, which would ordinarily be not permissible. 10. In a case where the recruitment process has been carried out as per prescribed statutory rules where under a procedure has been prescribed for testing the medical fitness of candidates by a duly constituted Medical Board, the report of the Medical Board is not to be normally interfered with, solely on the basis of a claim sought to be set up by a prospective candidate. 11. In the instant case, the writ petitioner having been granted another opportunity by providing for a medical examination by the Medical Board constituted in terms of directions of this Court, and having again been found to be medically unfit thereby reaffirming the view taken by the District Medical Board and the Appellate Medical Board, set up by the recruiting agency, no further indulgence is required to be granted to him in this regard. This is, more so, since it is not the case of the petitioner that the decision of the Medical Board was arbitrary, capricious or not in accordance with the procedure under the relevant statutory recruitment rules. 12. No material has been placed on record, or otherwise referred, to suggest that the opinion of the Medical Board or the Appellate Medical Board could in any manner be said to be casual, inchoate, perfunctory or vague. 12. No material has been placed on record, or otherwise referred, to suggest that the opinion of the Medical Board or the Appellate Medical Board could in any manner be said to be casual, inchoate, perfunctory or vague. We are therefore of the view that the Medical Board being an expert body, its opinion is entitled to be given due weight, credence and value. 13. A similar view has been taken in a recent judgment of this Court in Vivek Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and others Special Appeal Defective No. 117 of 2020, decided on 13.02.2020 wherein it was held that matters relating to medical evaluation of candidates in a recruitment process involve expert determination and it may not be desirable to supplant the procedure prescribed therefor as laid down under the relevant recruitment rules and taking any other view may have the effect of derailing the recruitment process. 14. In an Intra-Court Special Appeal, no interference is usually warranted unless palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order. 15. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on a plain reading of the impugned judgment and order, we do not notice any such palpable infirmity or perversity. As such, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 30.09.2019. 16. For reasons stated above, the Special Appeal is liable to be dismissed and stands, accordingly, dismissed.