JUDGMENT Sanjib Banerjee, J. - The plaintiff is in appeal against the dismissal of its claim for recovery of balance loan and interest on the ground of limitation. 2. The receipt of the loan by way of an inter-corporate deposit in May, 1998 is not in dispute. The interest or the rate of interest payable on the deposit is also not in dispute. Between 1998 and October, 2001 the defendant repaid Rs.1 lakh out of the principal amount of Rs.25 lakh and paid the interest due till such date. No payment was made by the defendant from or about October 19, 2001 till or about January 29, 2006. According to the plaintiff, the defendant paid a further sum of Rs.24 lakh between January 29, 2006 and February 3, 2008 but failed to make any payment thereafter, leaving an unpaid balance of Rs.46,57,024/- as at December 31, 2010. The claim was on account of such sum and further interest. 3. According to the plaintiff, a demand notice was issued to the defendant on January 28, 2011, detailing the claim of the plaintiff. The plaint does not refer to any reply having been received to the notice. The suit was instituted on or about February 3, 2011. 4. It is necessary first to notice the pleadings, particularly since the plaint does not refer to any agreement between the parties for the defendant to suspend payment in 2001 and resume the same in January, 2006, a period of more than four years. Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the plaint are relevant in the context: "7. Subsequently after sometimes passed, the repayment of the loan by defendant company became irregular and the principal balance due as on 19 October 2001 was 24,00,000.00 (Rupees Twenty four lakhs only) as would appear by the statement of accounts maintained by the plaintiff company. "8. Thereafter the defendant company stopped paying regular and agreed amount of interest and repayment of the said loan on some or other pretext. "9. The plaintiff states that after repeated requests from the plaintiff company the defendant again started making payment of the dues of the plaintiff company, the first of which was paid on 28 January 2006 for Rs.1,00,000.00 (Rupees one lakh only)." Paragraph 12 of the written statement must also be seen alongside the relevant averments in the plaint: "12. "9. The plaintiff states that after repeated requests from the plaintiff company the defendant again started making payment of the dues of the plaintiff company, the first of which was paid on 28 January 2006 for Rs.1,00,000.00 (Rupees one lakh only)." Paragraph 12 of the written statement must also be seen alongside the relevant averments in the plaint: "12. With reference to paragraphs 7 to 11 of the plaint the defendant states that on the basis of the allegations made therein the purported claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The plaintiff has failed to disclose any payment between 19th October 2001 and 28th January 2006 within 3 years from 19th October 2001. No promise was made by the defendant in writing after 19th October 2001 and signed by any person authorized generally or specially by the defendant in that behalf to pay wholly or in part the alleged debt or the plaintiff. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, the defendant states that in or around January 2006 the plaintiff agreed to accept a sum of Rs.24,00,000/- in full and final settlement of its claim under the said inter corporate deposit in instalments and accordingly the said amount was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in instalments between 28th January 2006 and 4th February 2008. The plaintiff accepted the said payment in terms of the said settlement without any protest. Upon payment of the said amount of Rs.24,00,000/- in instalments as aforesaid, the claim of the plaintiff stood fully discharged and satisfied. Save as aforesaid all allegations to the contrary made in the paragraphs under reference are denied and disputed. It is denied that the defendant accepted or confirmed the purported claim of the plaintiff as alleged or at all. The correctness of the purported particulars mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint is also denied and disputed. It is denied that a sum of Rs.46,57,024.00 or any part thereof on account of principal or interest or otherwise is due or payable by the defendant to the plaintiff." 5. It may also be noticed that paragraph 11 of the plaint contains a chart indicating the amounts outstanding in the first column, the amounts received in the second column, the basis for calculating interest in the next three columns and the quantum of interest in the last column. It may also be noticed that paragraph 11 of the plaint contains a chart indicating the amounts outstanding in the first column, the amounts received in the second column, the basis for calculating interest in the next three columns and the quantum of interest in the last column. The relevant chart details the position from October 19, 2001 till December 31, 2010. It is evident from such chart that from October 19, 2001 to January 29, 2006 no payment was received at all from the defendant. Again, such chart reveals that no payment was made by the defendant to the plaintiff subsequent to February 3, 2008. 6. Though paragraph 16 of the plaint asserts that no part of the claim is barred by limitation, nothing in the body of the plaint indicates why the payment remain suspended between October 19, 2001 and January 29, 2006 save the solitary sentence as quoted in paragraph 8 thereof. Again, paragraph 8 of the plaint does not refer to any agreement between the parties for the suspension of the payment for any period of time for the clock of limitation to be stopped, so to say. 7. However, before the trial in the suit got underway in right earnest, the plaintiff prepared the judges' brief of documents and forwarded the same to the defendant. The plaintiff also issued a notice to admit for the defendant to accept the veracity of the documents disclosed by the plaintiff in the judges' brief of documents. A belated reply to the notice to admit documents was received from the defendant, though Order XII Rule 2 of the Code as amended now requires the defendant to respond to such a notice to admit within seven days of the receipt thereof. 8. One of the documents that was included by the plaintiff in the judges' brief of documents prepared by it was a writing dated September 19, 2001 apparently addressed by the plaintiff to the defendant and bearing the signature on behalf of the plaintiff and the rubber-stamp and initials of someone on behalf of the defendant. In the defendant's belated reply to the notice to admit, such document of September 19, 2001, which later came to be marked as Exhibit-E along with the objection of the defendant, the defendant declined to admit the document of September 19, 2001. 9. In the defendant's belated reply to the notice to admit, such document of September 19, 2001, which later came to be marked as Exhibit-E along with the objection of the defendant, the defendant declined to admit the document of September 19, 2001. 9. The plaintiff called a solitary witness in support of its claim. Abhay Gandhi, an Accounts Officer working with the plaintiff company since 1993, took to the box to try and establish the plaintiff's claim in the suit. The writing of September 19, 2001 was shown to him in course of his examination-in-chief and he described the document as follows in response to question No.26: "When they (the defendant) repeatedly acquainted us (the plaintiff) about their financial problems we sat together and after discussion we decided to give them time for four years. This is the said letter by which we had given them four years' time to make payment along with interest." 10. In response to two further questions put to him in course of his examination-in-chief, the witness asserted that the defendant had only made a verbal request seeking time to make the balance payment and no written request was received from the defendant in such regard. According to such witness, one Mr Daga of the defendant sought such time on the ground that the defendant was facing financial problems. In response to question No.29 in the examination-in-chief, the witness claimed as follows: "In 2001 all of us, that is, the defendant company and we sat together and decided that in view of their request we would given (sic, give) them a period of four years to the defendant company so that they could to make payment of the amount along with interest. Accordingly we issued this letter." 11. Immediately after such answer was given by the witness, the document dated September 19, 2001 was tendered in evidence with the records showing the objection taken on behalf of the defendant on the ground that it was "beyond the pleading". 12. Before any comment is made as to the evidence pertaining to the questioned document of September 19, 2001, the suggestions put to the witness in course of his cross-examination and some of his answers in the cross-examination may also be noticed. In response to a question in his cross-examination, the witness agreed that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for a moratorium. In response to a question in his cross-examination, the witness agreed that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for a moratorium. The witness also agreed that the moratorium was recorded in the written agreement between the parties. When the witness was required to identify the relevant written agreement, he identified Exhibit-E: the questioned document of September 19, 2001. After identifying the document, the witness reaffirmed that such document was the written agreement between the parties pertaining to the moratorium. The witness was asked if there was any reference to the questioned document of September 19, 2001 in the notice of demand of the January 28, 2011 issued by the plaintiff just before the institution of the suit. The immediate answer was evasive as the notice of demand carried no reference to the questioned document of September 19, 2001. 13. It was then suggested on behalf of the defendant to the witness that the document of September 19, 2001 was not in existence prior to the institution of the suit, that the said purported letter was never received by the defendant, that the document did not bear the signature of any authorised person on behalf of the defendant, that such document did not bear any seal of the defendant and that the initials attributed to any person on behalf of the defendant within the seal was not of any person of the defendant. The witness stoutly disagreed with all the suggestions. To the very last suggestion regarding the initials attributed to a person on behalf of the defendant, the witness' answer was: "I do not agree. How am I supposed to know this." 14. The plaintiff asserts that whether or not the agreement between the parties to suspend the payment by the defendant for some time was specifically referred to in the plaint, it was obvious, on a meaningful reading of the plaint, that the plaintiff had allowed a moratorium, particularly since the hiatus in the payment is evident from the chart set out at paragraph 11 of the plaint and the defendant's admission in paragraph 12 of the written statement that the subsequent payment was made. The plaintiff maintains that once the defendant resumed the payment - a fact which is admitted in the written statement - it was for the defendant to affirmatively establish that the payment made subsequent to the resumption was agreed to be accepted by the plaintiff in full and final settlement of its dues, as asserted at paragraph 12 of the written statement. The plaintiff insists that since the defendant did not examine any witness or make any attempt to establish that the payments made between 2006 and 2008 were in full and final settlement of the balance dues of the plaintiff, the claim virtually stands admitted. 15. According to the plaintiff, even if the document of September 19, 2001 is disregarded, in the absence of the defendant demonstrating the payment made between 2006 and 2008 to be in full and final settlement of the plaintiff's dues, there was no defence to the claim as asserted in the plaint. The plaintiff says that it issued a notice to produce documents to the defendant, in course of the trial, for certain balance-sheets of the defendant to be brought before the court. The plaintiff contends that the balance-sheets of the defendant company for the years ended March 31, 2002, March 31, 2003, March 31, 2004 and March 31, 2005 would have revealed the carrying forward of the outstanding amount as the defendant could not have otherwise resumed the payment subsequently. The plaintiff claims that in the absence of such records, which are in the exclusive possession of the defendant, being produced despite being called upon so to do, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the defendant. 16. In such context, the plaintiff refers to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and seeks to rely on Illustration (g) thereunder. The plaintiff also invokes Illustration (d) under Section 114 of the said Act to assert that the course of conduct between the parties was such that the suspension of payment or the agreement as to the moratorium would be evident therefrom. 17. The plaintiff also invokes Illustration (d) under Section 114 of the said Act to assert that the course of conduct between the parties was such that the suspension of payment or the agreement as to the moratorium would be evident therefrom. 17. It is the further case of the plaintiff that on a conjoint reading of Rules 2 and 2A of Order XII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the defendant is deemed to have admitted the document of September 19, 2001 since its reply to the notice to admit came long after the period of seven days allowed for such purpose had expired. 18. The plaintiff emphasises that despite the defendant being put on notice upon receipt of the judges' brief of documents that the plaintiff would rely on the agreement embodied in the document dated September 19, 2001, the defendant chose not to call any witness or make any attempt to dispute the document or to even establish that the payments that the defendant made between 2006 and 2008 were in full and final settlement of the plaintiff's balance dues. The plaintiff submits that the trial court erred in giving any credence to the objection taken by the defendant to the document dated September 19, 2001. According to the plaintiff, a party has a right to object to a document if such party is taken by surprise; but once the document was brought on record by way of the judges' brief of documents, the objection of the defendant became meaningless. The plaintiff is also critical of the treatment of the document of September 19, 2001 by the trial court and says that there was no occasion for the trial court to have disregarded the document or found it to be suspicious, particularly in the light of the evidence in support thereof brought by the plaintiff. 19. The plaintiff has relied on a judgment reported at ( Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, (1966) AIR SC 735) for the proposition that a mere fact that a plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it, if such plea is satisfactory proved by evidence. Indeed, paragraph 10 of the reported judgment instructs that considerations of form cannot override the legitimate considerations of substance. Indeed, paragraph 10 of the reported judgment instructs that considerations of form cannot override the legitimate considerations of substance. The judgment goes on to hold that if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by some issue by implication and the parties knew that the plea was involved in the trial, the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. However, the immediate following sentence in the reported judgment cautions that the general rule is that every relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. 20. The other judgment carried by the plaintiff is reported at ( R V E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami, (2003) 8 SCC 752 ) on the nature of the objections as to the admissibility of documents in evidence. Paragraph 20 of the report is placed where the Supreme Court made a distinction between two classes of objections as to the admissibility of documents in evidence: an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and, where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence, but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. The Supreme Court opined that in the former case "merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision." The judgment went on to add that, "In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit." According to the plaintiff, the objection to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit-E in this case should be seen to fall in the second category and, since it was accepted as an exhibit, the objection cannot be canvassed any further. 21. 21. In the judgment and decree impugned dated December 9, 2016, the trial court referred to Order VI Rule 2 of the Code and the requirement of the concise statement of the material facts in a plaint to indicate the facts relevant for the plaintiff's claim, but not the evidence by which such facts may be proved. The trial court held that there was nothing in the plaint to suggest that the defendant had requested for a moratorium or that there was any agreement between the parties in such regard. The trial court observed that Exhibit-E was not devoid of suspicion and, as such, the document or the contents thereof were not taken into account in assessing the plaintiff's claim. 22. The defendant refers to Order VII Rule 6 of the Code that mandates that where a suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground on which exemption from such law is claimed. There is a proviso to the Rule that permits the court to allow the plaintiff to claim exemption on any ground not set out in the plaint if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. The defendant submits that nothing in the plaint keeps the claim alive after the expiry of three years from the last of the payments made by the defendant to the plaintiff by or about October 19, 2001. The defendant says that it is true that the defendant made subsequent payments between 2006 and 2008 as indicated in the plaint, but there was no promise on the part of the defendant to pay in respect of the debt that was barred by limitation. 23. As to the questioned document of September 19, 2001, the defendant says that the veracity of the document has not been established as the plaintiff failed to either prove that any person authorised by the defendant had signed the purported document on behalf of the defendant or that the purported document was even made over to the defendant. 24. 23. As to the questioned document of September 19, 2001, the defendant says that the veracity of the document has not been established as the plaintiff failed to either prove that any person authorised by the defendant had signed the purported document on behalf of the defendant or that the purported document was even made over to the defendant. 24. The defendant has relied on several judgments, including those reported at ( Debji Ghelabhai & Brothers v. R. D. Mehta & Co., Asansol, (1935) AIR Calcutta 255) , ( Sha Manmall Misrimall, a firm of Merchants, Madras v. K. Radhakrishnan, Sole proprietor of Libra Agencies, Madras, (1972) AIR Madras 108) , ( Rajgopal v. Kishan Gopal, (2003) 10 SCC 653 ) and ( Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491 ) . 25. In Debji Ghelabhai & Brothers, the defendant, in response to a pre-suit letter by the plaintiff, claimed that a part of the goods supplied by the plaintiff had been rejected as per an amicable settlement between the parties and called upon the plaintiff to remove such rejected goods. The relevant letter was sought to be cited as an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which, in principle, corresponds to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court held that the letter could not be regarded as any acknowledgment of liability. In Sha Manmall Misrimall, the Madras High Court held that the requirement under Order VII Rule 6 of the Code was obligatory. In that case the plaintiff had not relied on particular letters issued by the defendant that may have kept the plaintiff's claim alive. The court held that in such a situation it was not possible for the plaintiff to rely on any exemption not pleaded in the plaint. 26. In Rajgopal, it was held that in the absence of any pleading on any material facet of the claim, it would imply that there was no lis between the parties on such question. The court held that in such a situation it was not possible for the plaintiff to rely on any exemption not pleaded in the plaint. 26. In Rajgopal, it was held that in the absence of any pleading on any material facet of the claim, it would imply that there was no lis between the parties on such question. In Bachhaj Nahar, the Supreme Court held that the Code of Civil Procedure is an elaborate codification of the principles of natural justice to be applied in civil litigation and the object and purpose of pleadings and issues are to ensure that litigants come to trial with all the issues clearly defined and to prevent the case being expanded or the ground being shifted during trial. 27. It is elementary that a suit for recovery of balance loan can be instituted and pursued within three years of the last part payment or three years of the acknowledgement of liability or within three years of even an acknowledgement of the jural relationship between the parties when the other grounds of exemption are not invoked. Section 18 of the Act of 1963 requires an acknowledgment in writing and such acknowledgement to be within the period of limitation for a fresh period of limitation to be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was made. Section 19 of the said Act provides for a fresh period of limitation to be computed from the time any part payment on account of a debt is made. Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 contemplates that a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation may be made in the circumstances indicated in such provision. In the present case, there is no whisper in the plaint as to any agreement between the parties to defer the time for the balance payment after the payment of October 19, 2001 was made. 28. There are several reasons why the questioned document of September 19, 2001 cannot be accepted. The most obvious ground that may be cited is that the document was not referred to the plaint nor any exemption sought on such basis. Further, the document is not even referred to in the pre-suit demand notice of January 28, 2011. 28. There are several reasons why the questioned document of September 19, 2001 cannot be accepted. The most obvious ground that may be cited is that the document was not referred to the plaint nor any exemption sought on such basis. Further, the document is not even referred to in the pre-suit demand notice of January 28, 2011. The plaintiff's witness proved his signature on the document and it may even be accepted that it was such Accounts Officer who signed the document on behalf of a director of the plaintiff. However, the witness could not even indicate who had signed the document on behalf of the defendant. No evidence was led as to whether any representative of the defendant, carrying the defendant's rubberstamp, had come to the office of the plaintiff to execute the document. The evidence does not reveal that the document was executed on behalf of the plaintiff and was thereafter despatched to the defendant, whether by post or otherwise. Nothing comes out in the evidence as to how the document may have been received back from the defendant. No attempt was made to identify the person who may have signed the document on behalf of the defendant or even to demonstrate that the seal or rubber-stamp attributed to the defendant in the document matched the usual seal or rubber-stamp of the defendant. Quite plainly, the veracity of the questioned document of September 19, 2001 was not established and the trial court was justified in disregarding the same particularly since there was no reference to such document in the plaint. 29. Significantly, paragraph 8 of the plaint says that after October 19, 2001 "the defendant company stopped paying regular and agreed amount of interest and repayment of the said loan on some or other pretext". Though nothing in the plaint refers to any payment having been made by the defendant on or about October 19, 2001, it is curious why such date - about a month after the purported document of September 19, 2001 was allegedly executed - has been mentioned in more than one place in the plaint. Further, if there was, indeed, an agreement between the parties for the suspension of payment for a period of three or four years after September 19, 2001, the words "on some or other pretext" used in paragraph 8 of the plaint militates against there being such an agreement. Further, if there was, indeed, an agreement between the parties for the suspension of payment for a period of three or four years after September 19, 2001, the words "on some or other pretext" used in paragraph 8 of the plaint militates against there being such an agreement. Clearly, the purported document of September 19, 2001 runs contrary to the case made out in the agreement and could not have been accepted. 30. Once the defendant had declined to admit the document, it was for the plaintiff to affirmatively establish the genuineness and veracity of the document for the plaintiff to be entitled to rely on the contents thereof. The plaintiff has hopelessly failed in establishing the veracity of the document. In the absence of any agreement between the parties to suspend the future payments, there was no live claim for the plaintiff to pursue by October, 2004 and the fact that the defendant subsequently made payments could not wipe out the bar of limitation that had set in. In such a scenario, it was open to the defendant to go on repaying its past dues to the extent that it chose, but as long as the defendant did not make any promise to pay the debt barred by limitation, the balance claim could never have been enforced against the defendant by the plaintiff. It is for such reason that the plaintiff's claim fails. 31. The plaintiff's contention that the questioned document is deemed to have been admitted by the plaintiff upon the plaintiff failing to respond to the notice to admit the documents disclosed within seven days of the receipt thereof, is wholly unacceptable. It is true that Order XII Rule 2 of the Code requires a notice to admit documents to be replied to within seven days of the receipt of such notice, but the consequence of the failure to adhere to the statutory requirement is not as harsh as the plaintiff suggests. The failure to respond within seven days results in the party in such breach having to bear the costs incurred by the adversary of proving the relevant document or documents. Order XII Rule 2A is the deeming provision, but it applies to a document which is not specifically or by necessary implication stated to be not admitted in the reply to the notice to admit documents. Order XII Rule 2A is the deeming provision, but it applies to a document which is not specifically or by necessary implication stated to be not admitted in the reply to the notice to admit documents. As noticed earlier, a belated reply to the notice to admit documents was issued on behalf of the defendant in this case; where the questioned document of September 19, 2001 was specifically not admitted. 32. In the context of the quality of the evidence on such aspect that has been brought by the plaintiff, the further discussion as to the consequence of the document not being referred to in the plaint becomes unnecessary. To repeat, the plaintiff could not prove the existence or veracity or issuance of the purported document of September 19, 2001. In the absence of such proof, the agreement as to suspension of payment or the moratorium that the purported document otherwise reveals is of no consequence and has not been established. 33. The nature of the objection taken by the defendant to the questioned document of September 19, 2001 would fall within the first category of objections as enunciated in R V E Venkatachala Gounder. It must be appreciated that a two-fold objection was taken by the defendant to the questioned document: in its reply to the notice to admit documents, the defendant declined to admit the same; and, when the questioned document was sought to be tendered in evidence, the defendant objected to the same on the ground that it had not been referred to in the pleadings. 34. The effect of the denial to admit the document amounted to the defendant denying the receipt and even the veracity of the document. Ordinarily, when a document is referred to in the pleadings and such document is subsequently disclosed at the time of the trial as being intended to be tendered in evidence, the denial thereof by the other party is qualified by the nature and quality of the denial as evident from such party's pleadings. Ordinarily, when a document is referred to in the pleadings and such document is subsequently disclosed at the time of the trial as being intended to be tendered in evidence, the denial thereof by the other party is qualified by the nature and quality of the denial as evident from such party's pleadings. But when a document not referred to in the pleadings is disclosed by a party and the admission thereof is declined by the other party and it is specifically pointed out at the time of the document being tendered into evidence that such document had not been referred to in the pleadings, the denial as to the existence and admissibility of the document is as wholesome as possible. Implicit in such objection on the ground that the document had not been referred to in the pleadings is that the party objecting to the document was not afforded an opportunity to indicate the nature of its objection. As a consequence, all possible objections to the document may be taken, starting from the very existence of the document to the denying party's awareness of such document, not to speak of the contents thereof. The wholesome objection of the defendant to the questioned document did not pertain to merely the mode in which the plaintiff attempted to prove the document; such objection went to the root of the very existence and authenticity of the document. 35. The trial court, however, committed a minor error in perceiving the suit to have been instituted after February 3, 2011. It is apparent from the records that the suit was lodged in this court on February 3, 2008, within three years of the plaintiff having received the last payment on February 3, 2008. However, since, on the plaintiff's showing, the claim was already barred by limitation by October, 2004, the subsequent payments made by the defendant between 2006 and 2008, beyond the period of limitation, could not have resurrected the plaintiff's right to pursue the claim by virtue of such subsequent payments. 36. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. The judgment in support of the decree is not interfered with in view of the additional grounds in support indicated in this judgment. 37. Apd 40 of 2019 fails and is dismissed. 38. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 39. 36. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. The judgment in support of the decree is not interfered with in view of the additional grounds in support indicated in this judgment. 37. Apd 40 of 2019 fails and is dismissed. 38. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 39. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities. I agree. (Kausik Chanda, J.)