JUDGMENT : The petitioner is the plaintiff and the respondents are the defendants in the suit O.S.No.124/2013 on the file of the Sub Court, Kochi. 2. The parties shall be hereinafter referred to according to their status in the suit. 3. The suit is instituted for granting a decree of declaration that the document No. 3539/2010 of the S.R.O., Kochi executed by the plaintiff is null and void and for cancellation of that document. 4. The case of the plaintiff in the suit is that sale deed No. 3539/2010 which was executed by him in favour of the second defendant is only a document executed as security for the amount of Rs.90,00,000/- borrowed by him from the defendants. 5. The first and the second defendants filed separate written statements in the suit. The plea of the first defendant in the suit is that he had not lent Rs.90,00,000/- to the plaintiff and that the consideration shown in the sale deed executed by the plaintiff had nothing to do with the amount legally due to him from the plaintiff. The plea of the second defendant in the suit is that there is no debtor-creditor relationship between him and the plaintiff and the transaction covered by the document executed by the plaintiff is an outright sale of property. 6. Though the suit was instituted in the year 2013, examination of witnesses in the case commenced only on 05.11.2019. The evidence in the suit was closed on 20.11.2019 and the suit was posted for hearing on 26.11.2019. On 26.11.2019, the court did not take up the case for hearing and it was adjourned to 30.11.2019 for hearing. On 30.11.2019, the court below heard the arguments of the counsel for the plaintiff and the case was adjourned to 04.12.2019. On 04.12.2019, the court below heard the counsel for the second defendant and the case was adjourned to 05.12.2019. On 05.12.2019, the case was adjourned to 11.12.2019. But, the presiding officer of the court was on leave on 11.12.2019 and the case was adjourned to 20.12.2019. On 20.12.2019, at the request of the parties, the case was again adjourned to 08.01.2020. 7. On 08.01.2020, the first defendant filed two applications as I.A.Nos.1/2020 and 2/2020 in the suit. The application I.A.No.1/2020 was filed by him praying that the four documents produced by him may be received in evidence on his side. On 20.12.2019, at the request of the parties, the case was again adjourned to 08.01.2020. 7. On 08.01.2020, the first defendant filed two applications as I.A.Nos.1/2020 and 2/2020 in the suit. The application I.A.No.1/2020 was filed by him praying that the four documents produced by him may be received in evidence on his side. The application I.A.No.2/2020 was filed by him praying that the evidence on his side may be re-opened for marking the additional documents which were produced by him. 8. The plaintiff filed counter affidavit in both applications filed by the first defendant and opposed the prayer made therein. 9. As per Ext.P8 order dated 19.3.2020, the learned Sub Judge allowed both applications filed by the first defendant on the condition that the first defendant shall pay an amount of Rs.5,000/- as costs to the plaintiff. 10. The plaintiff has filed this original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and propriety of Ext.P8 order passed by the court below. 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing for all parties and also perused the documents produced in the original petition. 12. The application I.A.No.1/2020 filed by the first defendant is under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'the Code') for receiving in evidence the additional documents which were produced by him. The application I.A No.2/2020 filed by the first defendant is under Order XVIII Rule 17 and Section 151 of the Code, for re-opening the evidence on his side for the purpose of marking the additional documents produced by him. 13. It is significant that, though the application I.A.No.2/2020 filed by the first defendant was under Order XVIII Rule 17 and under Section 151 of the Code, there was no prayer made in that application for re-calling or re-examining any witness. No such prayer is also seen made in the affidavit filed in support of the aforesaid application. However, the parties had treated I.A.No.2/2020 as an application filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code for re-calling and re-examining the first defendant who was examined as DW1. The court below also treated the application I.A.No.2/2020 as an application filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code for re-calling and re-examining DW1 and it passed Ext.P8 order on that basis. The court below also treated the application I.A.No.2/2020 as an application filed under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code for re-calling and re-examining DW1 and it passed Ext.P8 order on that basis. In the penultimate paragraph of Ext.P8 order, the court below has found that the documents which were produced by the first defendant along with the additional list have to be received and an opportunity has to be granted to him to prove those documents by re-opening the oral evidence adduced by him as DW1. Learned counsel for all parties have addressed arguments before this Court on the premise that I.A.No.2/2020 filed by the first defendant in the court below was an application for re-calling and re-examining the first defendant (who was examined as DW1) for the purpose of proving the additional documents produced by him. If the applications filed by the first defendant are treated only as applications filed for the purpose of re-opening the evidence on the side of the first defendant and for receiving in evidence the additional documents produced by him, it would become necessary to remand the matter to the court below and it would result only in further protracting the proceedings in the suit. In such circumstances, in order to avoid any further delay in the proceedings in the suit and to do complete justice to the parties, this Court proposes to consider the application I.A.No.2/2020 filed by the first defendant in the court below as an application under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code for recalling and re-examining DW1 for proving the additional documents produced by him. 14. The applications were filed by the first defendant in the court below after the conclusion of the arguments by the plaintiff. The first defendant had filed four documents along with the application I.A.No.2/2020. Out of them, three documents are certified copy of the registered notices sent by him to the plaintiff in relation to the cheques allegedly issued by the plaintiff in his favour. The fourth document is the certified copy of the letter sent by the plaintiff to the first defendant. 15. Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code reads as follows: “17. The fourth document is the certified copy of the letter sent by the plaintiff to the first defendant. 15. Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code reads as follows: “17. Court may recall and examine witness.-The Court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the Court thinks fit. 16. The scope of the provision contained in Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code was considered by this Court as early as in the year 1987 in Savithri v. Sreenivasan [ 1987 (2) KLT 388 ]. This Court had held as follows: “The powers of the Court to act under Order 18 Rule 17 are very wide. But the power is discretionary and ought to be exercised with the greatest care and only in exceptional circumstances, very sparingly. The rule provides for the recalling of witnesses after their examination has once been finished. The intention of the rule is to afford an opportunity to put such questions to a witness as had not been put to him in the earlier examination due to the inadvertence of a party. Courts cannot recall a witness at the instance of a party under this rule to fill up lacuna in the evidence already let in”. 17. In Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharad Chand Prabhakar Gogate, AIR 2009 SC 1604 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: “In our view, though the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC have been interpreted to include applications to be filed by the parties for recall of witnesses, the main purpose of the said rule is to enable the Court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. ....... The power under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is to be sparingly exercised and in appropriate cases and not as a general rule merely on the ground that his recall and re-examination would not cause any prejudice to the parties. That is not the scheme or intention of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC. ....... The power under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC is to be sparingly exercised and in appropriate cases and not as a general rule merely on the ground that his recall and re-examination would not cause any prejudice to the parties. That is not the scheme or intention of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness under Order 18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the Court either on its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to the suit, but as indicated hereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae in the evidence of the witness which has already been recorded but to clear any ambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination. Of course, if the evidence on re-examination of a witness has a bearing on the ultimate decision of the suit, it is always within the discretion of the Trial Court to permit recall of such a witness for re-examination-in-chief with permission to the defendants to cross examine the witness thereafter. There is nothing to indicate that such is the situation in the present case. Some of the principles akin to Order 47 CPC may be applied when a party makes an application under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC, but it is ultimately within the Court's discretion, if it deems fit, to allow such an application”. 18. In Velusamy v. Palanisamy : (2011) 11 SCC 275 , the Supreme Court has considered in detail the scope of the provision contained in Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code. After referring to the decision in Vadiraj (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows: “Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not a provision intended to enable the parties to recall any witnesses for their further examination-in-chief or cross-examination or to place additional material or evidence which could not be produced when the evidence was being recorded. Order 18 Rule 17 is primarily a provision enabling the court to clarify any issue or doubt, by recalling any witness either suo moto, or at the request of any party, so that the court itself can put questions and elicit answers. Order 18 Rule 17 is primarily a provision enabling the court to clarify any issue or doubt, by recalling any witness either suo moto, or at the request of any party, so that the court itself can put questions and elicit answers. Once a witness is recalled for purposes of such clarification, it may, of course, permit the parties to assist it by putting some questions”. 19. No doubt, Vadiraj (supra) and Velusamy (supra), hold that the provision contained in Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code does not enable a party to fill up the omissions or lacunae in evidence already recorded. But, in Velusamy (supra), the Apex Court has also held as follows: “9. There is no specific provision in the Code enabling the parties to re-open the evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Code to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In the absence of any provision providing for re-opening of evidence or recall of any witness for further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other than securing clarification required by the court, the inherent power under section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to re-open the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. This inherent power of the court is not affected by the express power conferred upon the court under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code to recall any witness to enable the court to put such question to elicit any clarifications”. The Apex Court has proceeded to hold as follows: “16. We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. The Apex Court has proceeded to hold as follows: “16. We may add a word of caution. The power under section 151 or Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not intended to be used routinely, merely for the asking. If so used, it will defeat the very purpose of various amendments to the Code to expedite trials. But where the application is found to be bonafide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit the fresh evidence. But if it does so, it should ensure that the process does not become a protracting tactic. The court should firstly award appropriate costs to the other party to compensate for the delay. Secondly the court should take up and complete the case within a fixed time schedule so that the delay is avoided. Thirdly if the application is found to be mischievous, or frivolous, or to cover up negligence or lacunae, it should be rejected with heavy costs. If the application is allowed and the evidence is permitted and ultimately the court finds that evidence was not genuine or relevant and did not warrant the reopening of the case recalling the witnesses, it can be made a ground for awarding exemplary costs apart from ordering prosecution if it involves fabrication of evidence. If the party had an opportunity to produce such evidence earlier but did not do so or if the evidence already led is clear and unambiguous, or if it comes to the conclusion that the object of the application is merely to protract the proceedings, the court should reject the application”. 20. The Code, previously, contained a specific provision in Order XVIII Rule 17A for production of evidence which was previously unknown or for evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. This provision was however deleted with effect from 1.7.2002. Nevertheless, such an exclusion does not prevent the Court from recalling a witness who has been examined. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all after a party closes his evidence. In Velusamy (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows: “11. This provision was however deleted with effect from 1.7.2002. Nevertheless, such an exclusion does not prevent the Court from recalling a witness who has been examined. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all after a party closes his evidence. In Velusamy (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows: “11. The Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. It enabled the court to permit a party to produce any evidence even at a late stage, after the conclusion of his evidence if he satisfied the court that even after the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him when he was leading the evidence. That provision was deleted with effect from 1.7.2002. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. Another reason for its deletion was the misuse thereof by the parties to prolong the proceedings under the pretext of discovery of new evidence”. 21. The principles laid down in Vadiraj (supra) and Velusamy (supra) have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bagai Construction v. M/s Gupta Building Material Store ( AIR 2013 SC 1849 ). 22. The principles to be followed in invoking the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code have been summarized in Ram Rati v. Mange Ram : AIR 2016 SC 1343 . The question arose for consideration in that case was whether a witness can be recalled under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code for “further elaboration of aspects left out in evidence” already closed. The Apex Court answered this question in the negative, by holding as follows: “The basic purpose of Rule 17 is to enable the Court to clarify any position or doubt, and the Court may, either suo motu or on the request of any party, recall any witness at any stage in that regard. The Apex Court answered this question in the negative, by holding as follows: “The basic purpose of Rule 17 is to enable the Court to clarify any position or doubt, and the Court may, either suo motu or on the request of any party, recall any witness at any stage in that regard. This power can be exercised at any stage of the suit. No doubt, once the Court recalls the witness for the purpose of any such clarification, the Court may permit the parties to assist the Court by examining the witness for the purpose of clarification required or permitted by the Court. The power under Rule 17 cannot be stretched any further. The said power cannot be invoked to fill up omission in the evidence already led by a witness. It cannot also be used for the purpose of filling up a lacuna in the evidence. 'No prejudice is caused to either party' is also not a permissible ground to invoke Rule 17. No doubt, it is a discretionary power of the Court but to be used only sparingly, and in case, the Court decides to invoke the provision, it should also see that the trial is not unnecessarily protracted on that ground. ...... The rigour under Rule 17, however, does not affect the inherent powers of the Court to pass the required orders for ends of justice to reopen the evidence for the purpose of further examination or cross -examination or even for production of fresh evidence. This power can also be exercised at any stage of the suit, even after closure of evidence”. 23. The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code can be invoked by the Court at any stage of the suit. In Velusamy (supra), it has been held as follows: “The learned counsel for respondent contended that once arguments are commenced, there could be no re -opening of evidence or recalling of any witness. This contention is raised by extending the convention that once arguments are concluded and the case is reserved for judgment, the Court will not entertain any interlocutory application for any kind of relief. The need for the Court to act in a manner to achieve the ends of justice (subject to the need to comply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reserved. The need for the Court to act in a manner to achieve the ends of justice (subject to the need to comply with the law) does not end when arguments are heard and judgment is reserved. If there is abuse of the process of the Court, or if interests of justice require the Court to do something or take note of something, the discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments are heard, either fully or partly. The convention that no application should be entertained once the trial or hearing is concluded and the case is reserved for judgment is a sound rule, but not a straitjacket formula. There can always be exceptions in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of Court, subject to the limitation recognized with reference to exercise of power under Section 151 of the Code”. 24. The following principles can be culled out from the decisions referred to above. The power of the Court to invoke the provision under Order XVIII Rule 17 is discretionary and ought to be exercised very sparingly. The discretion shall be exercised judicially and on well accepted principles and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The power can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, that is, before pronouncing judgment. The main purpose of this rule is to enable the Court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. It is not a provision intended to be used to fill up omissions or lacunae in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. The power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code can be exercised by the Court either on its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to the suit. It will not be proper to invoke the power under this provision merely for the reason that recalling a witness at the instance of a party will not cause any prejudice to the opposite party. It will not be proper to invoke the power under this provision merely for the reason that recalling a witness at the instance of a party will not cause any prejudice to the opposite party. But, the inherent power of the court under Section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to re-open the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination and it is not a power which is affected by the express power conferred upon the court under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code. The power under Section 151 of the Code shall be sparingly exercised when the Court feels that it is absolutely necessary to do so. Where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice, and the court is satisfied that non-production of such evidence earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit such additional evidence. But, in such cases, the Court shall ensure that delay in the proceedings in the suit is avoided and that the party affected is compensated by payment of costs. Deletion of the provision contained in Order XVIII Rule 17A from the Code does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. But, an application under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code, for recalling a witness for further cross-examination on points left out earlier, cannot be entertained by the Court. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged Ext.P8 order mainly on three grounds. They are: (1) Recall and re-examination of DW1 (the first defendant) for proving the additional documents produced by him would result in filling up the lacuna in the evidence adduced by the first defendant. (2) The first defendant was already in possession of the additional documents proposed to be proved by him and he has not shown sufficient cause for the non-production of the documents earlier. (3) The applications were filed by the first defendant at a highly belated stage after the conclusion of the final arguments by the plaintiff and granting him permission to adduce additional evidence at a belated stage would cause prejudice to the plaintiff. 26. (3) The applications were filed by the first defendant at a highly belated stage after the conclusion of the final arguments by the plaintiff and granting him permission to adduce additional evidence at a belated stage would cause prejudice to the plaintiff. 26. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertains to filling up the lacuna in the evidence adduced by the first defendant. In this context, it is to be noted that, the plaint itself contains averments to the effect that the first defendant had filed three cases against the plaintiff under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not disputed the fact that the plaintiff had received the statutory notices sent by the first defendant demanding payment of the amount of the cheques from the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also not disputed the correctness of the submission made by the counsel for the first respondent before this Court that, during the cross-examination, the plaintiff had admitted receipt of the aforesaid notices from the first defendant. There is also no dispute with regard to the fact that the plaintiff had sent a letter dated 04.04.2011 to the first defendant. In such circumstances, adducing additional evidence as to these documents will not amount to filling up any lacuna in the evidence already brought on record by the first defendant. It would only amount to supplementing the evidence already adduced by him. 27. The first defendant has offered plausible explanation for the non-production of the documents by him earlier. It is his plea that he had produced the documents in the Magistrate's Court concerned in the cases filed by him against the plaintiff under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and he had to obtain certified copies of the documents from that court. True, the first defendant could have taken steps well in advance to obtain certified copies of the documents and produced them in the suit before commencement of evidence. But, as far as this case is concerned, the delay in production of the documents cannot be a sufficient ground to shut out material evidence. Payment of costs to the plaintiff would compensate the hardship caused to him by such delay. 28. The first defendant filed the application for adducing additional evidence only after the conclusion of arguments in the suit by the plaintiff. Payment of costs to the plaintiff would compensate the hardship caused to him by such delay. 28. The first defendant filed the application for adducing additional evidence only after the conclusion of arguments in the suit by the plaintiff. The documents were produced by him only at a belated stage. But the fact remains that, in the suit instituted in the year 2013, evidence commenced only in the year 2019. Even after the closure of evidence in the suit, there were several adjournments even at the instance of both parties. The plaintiff was very well aware of the existence of the additional documents proposed to be proved by the first defendant. Three of such documents are certified copies of the notices which he had received from the first defendant and the other document is the certified copy of the letter sent by him to the first defendant. The plaintiff would not have taken by surprise on production of the documents by the opposite party. Therefore, no question of causing any prejudice to the plaintiff arises. 29. As held by the Apex Court in Velusamy (supra), if interests of justice require the Court to do something or take note of something, the discretion to do those things does not disappear merely because the arguments were heard, either fully or partly. Where the application is found to be bona fide and where the additional evidence, oral or documentary, will assist the Court to clarify the evidence on the issues and will assist in rendering justice and when the Court is satisfied that non-production of documents earlier was for valid and sufficient reasons, the Court may exercise its discretion to recall the witnesses or permit fresh evidence, on awarding appropriate costs to the other party. 30. In the instant case, it cannot be found that Ext.P8 order passed by the court below is the result of arbitrary exercise of discretion or that it is perverse or that it has been passed without jurisdiction or not within the limits of jurisdiction. Even in a case where two views are possible and the trial court has taken one view which is a possible and plausible view, merely because another view is attractive, this Court cannot not interfere with the finding of the trial court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 31. Even in a case where two views are possible and the trial court has taken one view which is a possible and plausible view, merely because another view is attractive, this Court cannot not interfere with the finding of the trial court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 31. However, it is to be noted that the amount of costs awarded to the plaintiff by the court below is only Rs.5,000/-. Considering the period of delay that occurred on the part of the first defendant in taking proper steps for adducing additional evidence, I find that it is only proper to enhance the amount of costs payable by him to the plaintiff to Rs.10,000/- 32. Truth is the foundation of justice. The function of the court is to find out the truth. The Court has to always keep in mind that 'every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the quest'. In order to bring on record a relevant fact, the court has to play an active role; no doubt within the bounds of the statutorily defined procedural law (See Maria Margarida v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria : AIR 2012 SC 1727 ). Procedure is to be seen as a mechanism to advance the course of justice and by no means to thwart the process. 33. Consequently, the original petition is disposed of as follows. The prayer for setting aside Ext.P8 order is rejected. However, the first respondent/first defendant shall pay an additional amount of Rs.5,000/-(Rupees five thousand only) as costs to the plaintiff. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 30.09.2020. The first respondent/first defendant shall deposit the additional amount of Rs.5,000/-(Rupees five thousand only) in the court below on or before that date. If he fails to deposit the amount within that period, the applications filed by him as I.A.No.1/2020 and I.A.No.2/2020 in the suit shall stand dismissed. It is made clear that, if the first defendant (DW1) is recalled and re-examined pursuant to Ext.P8 order, further examination-in-chief and further cross-examination of him shall be confined to relevant facts relating to the four additional documents produced by him. The trial court shall dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible.