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2020 DIGILAW 766 (ALL)

Lakshmania v. D. D. C. Deoria

2020-03-30

J.J.MUNIR

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.P. Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2/1. 2. This writ petition arises out of objections under Section 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, the Act). The petitioner, Smt. Lakshmania, now represented by her heir and legal representative, Harihar, filed objections under Section 9-A(2) of the Act, dated 24.12.1981 before the Consolidation Officer staking exclusive claim to land comprising Khata no.274 of Village Rakaba Dulma Patti, Pargana Sidhua Jogna, Tehsil Padrauna, District Deoria (now District Padrauna). The aforesaid Khata comprises plot nos.1165/22, 1166/56, 1189/20, 1578/50, 1163/30 and 1166/32. This land is hereinafter referred to as the land in dispute. The objections were brought by the petitioner before the Consolidation Officer against the second respondent, Smt. Tetri wife of Balbhadra, and now represented before this Court by her heir and legal representative, Sattan son of Balbhadra, seeking to exclude her name from the land in dispute. These objections were filed against Smt. Tetri, as she was recorded in the Basic Year to the extent of a half share. 3. The objections in substance said that the land in dispute was a personal acquisition of the petitioner's father, the late Gauri, but the second respondent's name has been wrongly entered in the revenue records. The second respondent contested the objections alleging that the land in dispute was the joint holding of Bhajan and Gauri, who were brothers. She was the daughter of Bhajan, whereas the petitioner, Smt. Lakshmania was Gauri's daughter. As such, the second respondent claimed that she was entitled to be recorded to the extent of a half share over the land in dispute. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 04.05.1983 allowed the petitioner's objection, ordered expunction of the second respondent's name from the revenue records with a direction that the petitioner, Smt. Lakshmania wife of Mukhi be recorded as the exclusive tenure holder. 4. It may be mentioned in the passing that by the said order, the Consolidation Officers disposed of two other objections filed by the petitioner against different parties, relating to different lands, but those are not the subject matter of this petition. 5. 4. It may be mentioned in the passing that by the said order, the Consolidation Officers disposed of two other objections filed by the petitioner against different parties, relating to different lands, but those are not the subject matter of this petition. 5. Smt. Tetri, respondent no.2 aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer filed an appeal, being Appeal no.2675, under Section 11(1) of the Act, before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Padrauna, District Deoria. The Appeal was dismissed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, vide an order dated 24.10.1984. 6. Both these orders were impugned by the second respondent before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Padrauna, District Deoria vide Revision no.119. The Revision was heard and allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, by his order dated 04.07.1986. He reversed the orders of both the Authorities below and ordered that Smt. Tetri, respondent no.2 be recorded over a half share in the land in dispute, along with the petitioner. 7. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been brought. 8. It must be remarked here that the objections filed by the petitioner before the Consolidation Officer are very sketchy, bordering on vagueness. It does not say specifically as to how and from whom she had inherited/ acquired the land in dispute. It also does not plead any pedigree of parties, but asserts that the petitioner is in possession of the land in dispute and the second respondent, opposite party to the objections, has no concern with the said land, or she has ever been in possession or is now in possession. It is then said that the second respondent's name was ordered to be expunged from the land in dispute, and that in the Malikan Register the said order is recorded. There is no reference in the objections, even remotely, to the date of that order or about the Court or Authority, by which it was made, or the proceedings where it was recorded. The objections go on to say that the petitioner believed that she was recorded over the land in dispute. During the consolidation operations, she was never served with a copy of CH Form-5. She secured a copy of the relevant record from the Chakbandi Lekhpal, whereupon she came to know that the second respondent had been unlawfully recorded. The objections go on to say that the petitioner believed that she was recorded over the land in dispute. During the consolidation operations, she was never served with a copy of CH Form-5. She secured a copy of the relevant record from the Chakbandi Lekhpal, whereupon she came to know that the second respondent had been unlawfully recorded. It is asserted that the land in dispute is exclusively hers and that she may be recorded after expunging the second respondent's name. 9. A reading of the Consolidation Officer's order shows that at the hearing the case made out by the petitioner was that the land in dispute was self-acquired property of her fathers, one Gauri. After Gauri, it was recorded in the name of her mother, Smt. Domania, widow of Gauri by intestate succession. Upon Domania decease, she was entitled to inherit exclusively, but Smt. Tetri, respondent no.2 got herself wrongfully recorded. It is mentioned in the Consolidation Officer's order, in the part recapitulating the petitioner's case, that an order was passed in Case no.1186/26.10.72/26.4.78 ordering the second respondent's name to be expunged. It is also mentioned in this part that the petitioner's case was that entries prior to the last mentioned order stood in her name and she had been recorded. There is then a reference to evidence filed on behalf of the petitioner, that includes an extract of the Khatauni from 1384 to 1389 Fasli, a copy of the Mutation Bahi for the Fasli Year 1385 and a copy of the Khatauni for the Fasli Year 1372. 10. The Consolidation Officer has noticed the petitioner's contention that in 1372 Fasli in the original Khata, the name of Smt. Lakshmania daughter of Gauri stood recorded and the petitioner's further case that Smt. Tetri's name was ordered to be recorded over this Khata, but that order has now been set aside. It must be remarked here that there is no mention about the proceedings, with reference to which this part of the petitioner's case has been noticed that Tetri's name was ordered to be recorded over the Khata where the petitioner was recorded in the original Khata of 1372 Fasli, and later set aside. It must be remarked here that there is no mention about the proceedings, with reference to which this part of the petitioner's case has been noticed that Tetri's name was ordered to be recorded over the Khata where the petitioner was recorded in the original Khata of 1372 Fasli, and later set aside. It must be said for the sake of clarity that all mention about Tetri's claim is about a half share in the land in dispute whereas the petitioner's claim is about the whole of it, to exclusion of respondent no.2. 11. The Consolidation Officer's order records rival pedigrees set up by parties. The pedigree propounded by the petitioner is depicted thus: Gauri Mst. Domania Mst. Lakshmania (daughter) 12. The Consolidation Officer has also took note of the pedigree pleaded by the second respondent, Smt. Tetri, which is shown below: Jhapsi Bhajan (son) Suryabal (son) Gauri (son) Tetri (daughter) Domania 13. It must again be remarked here that the two pedigrees set up by the petitioner and the second respondent, noticed by the Consolidation Officer has not been the subject matter of decision by him, as to which represents the correct relationship between parties. The pedigree set up by the petitioner from the way it is recorded in the Consolidation Officer's order, could well be regarded as a truncated part of the one that he has noticed on behalf of the second respondent. In any event, the petitioner has not pleaded any pedigree, or even the substance of what the Consolidation Officer has recorded, apparently on the basis of evidence at the hearing. It has not been brought to the notice of this Court, if the pedigree referred to by the Consolidation Officer on behalf of the second respondent, finds place in her pleadings. 14. In his brief reasoning the Consolidation Officer has held that in 1371 Fasli, the name of Mst. Domania widow of Gauri was recorded. Prior to that there is no evidence to show that the land in dispute was ever recorded in the name of Bhajan or Jhapsi. He has further held that in 1370 Fasli too, Mst. Domania was recorded. It has been held, in particular, that in the Khatauni of 1323 Fasli, the plot numbers of the land in dispute do not tally going by the comparative Khasra (referred to as Fard Mutabikat). 15. He has further held that in 1370 Fasli too, Mst. Domania was recorded. It has been held, in particular, that in the Khatauni of 1323 Fasli, the plot numbers of the land in dispute do not tally going by the comparative Khasra (referred to as Fard Mutabikat). 15. On this finding, it has been said by the Consolidation Officer that it is evident that names of Gauri, Bhajan and Jhapsi were recorded over other numbers (as co-sharers). The findings of the Consolidation Officer further go that after Gauri's death, his widow Domania was recorded, and after Domania her daughter Lakshmania (the petitioner) came to be recorded. He has then concluded on issues nos.2 and 3, that relate to the substance of this objection that the second respondent's name has been wrongly recorded, which ought to be expunged. 16. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation has accepted the pedigree recorded by the Consolidation Officer as propounded by the second respondent, Smt. Tetri. Like, the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation has not determined the relationship between parties, and the way the land in dispute devolved, in case it was inherited from a common ancestor. He has determined the Appeal with a short consideration of the petitioner's case to the effect that the land in dispute was a self-acquired tenure of the late Gauri and after him the name of his widow came to be recorded; after Gauri's widow passed, that is to say, the petitioner's mother (Smt. Domania), the petitioner ought to be recorded. It has further been noticed for the petitioner's case that Smt. Tetri got her name wrongfully recorded. There is also reference to a specific case set up by the petitioner that she had filed Suit no.1186, decided on 26.10.1972, in consequence of which the petitioner was recorded, but the second respondent's name was entered subsequently, that is to say, in the Khatauni of the year 1372 Fasli under an order that ought to be expunged. So much for the parties' case. It must be remarked here that the Appellate Court has not referred to the second respondent's case or her evidence. 17. So much for the parties' case. It must be remarked here that the Appellate Court has not referred to the second respondent's case or her evidence. 17. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation has moved on to record a brief finding to the effect that from a perusal of the Khatauni for the Fasli Year 1371, it is evident that Domania's name was recorded and that there is nothing on record to show that prior to 1371 Fasli, the name of Jhapsi or Bhajan ever found mention. It has been held further that after Domania's decease, her daughter Lakshmania, the petitioner was recorded. Tetri, the second respondent's name has been recorded surreptitiously, and that, therefore, the order of the Consolidation Officer directing expunction of the second respondent's name does not suffer from any error. The Appeal was dismissed with these findings. 18. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has noticed the parties' case very elaborately. It is indeed incongruent that the second respondent has set up a pedigree before the Revisional Authority, very different from the one propounded before the two Authorities below. It is quite another matter that in effect if the land in dispute were inherited from Jhapsi, the devolution would remain the same, according to the second respondent's case. The pedigree urged before the Revisional Authority on behalf of the second respondent, who carried the Revision, is depicted thus: Jhapsi Bhajan Guri Suryabali (died umarried) Tetri (daughter) Domania Lakshmania 19. On the other hand, the pedigree set up by the petitioner before the Revisional Authority may be regarded as a moreful description of the one propounded before the Authority of first instance. The pedigree propounded by the petitioner, before the Revisional Authority, is shown infra: Jhapsi Bhajan (died issuelesse) Suryabali died issuelesse) Guri Domania (wife) Lakshmania (daughter) 20. It must be said here again, that looking to the pedigree put forward on behalf of the petitioner before the Revisional Authority, it could be said that what the petitioner propounded before the Consolidation Officer was but a truncated part of the wholesome urged before the Revisional Authority. The petitioner's case evident from the pedigree canvased before the Revisional Authority stands on the foot that Tetri is no one in the family and could never inherit, even if the land in dispute were to devolve from Jhapsi. The petitioner's case evident from the pedigree canvased before the Revisional Authority stands on the foot that Tetri is no one in the family and could never inherit, even if the land in dispute were to devolve from Jhapsi. The other and the more fundamental limb of the petitioner's case, that the land in dispute was self-acquired property of Gauri, would in any case, render this pedigree or any other irrelevant. 21. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has considered the case of both parties in substantial detail. The second respondent's case that has been considered by the Revisional Authority is this: the right of the second respondent as a co-sharer is founded on the Basic Year Entry, but the Authorities below have not bestowed consideration to this fact, which is improper. Tetri, the second respondent is an heir to Bhajan. The land in dispute in the year 1323 Fasli was recorded jointly in the name of Gauri and Bhajan; in the year 1347 Fasli it was recorded in the name of Domania and Bhajan. Thus, by virtue of being Bhajan's daughter, she would inherit Bhajan's share. Bhajan's son, Suryabali died unmarried. As such, his share was inherited by Tetri being the sister and the sole heir entitled. Tetri's name was recorded in the revenue records under an order of the Judicial Officer. In support of this case, the Khatauni for the Fasli Year 1372 was relied upon, that shows the name of Tapeshari wife of Balbhadra mutated under an order of the Judicial Officer, dated 22.2.1965 (it has been clarified before this Court during hearing that Tapeshari is an alias of Smt. Tetri, without objection from the other side). The Khatauni for the Fasli Year 1371 shows that in the first column the name of Suryabali son of Bhajan is recorded, along with Mst. Domania wife of Gauri, but in the column described in vernacular as 'Khana Kaifiyat' under an order of the Kanoongo, in place of Suryabali (deceased), the name of Tapeshari widow of Balbhadra, by virtue of her right as sister has been entered. The name of Tetri was excluded from the Register Malikan and Lakshmania alone was recorded, where against a Suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act was filed. This Suit abated on account of the notification of consolidation operations under the Act. The name of Tetri was excluded from the Register Malikan and Lakshmania alone was recorded, where against a Suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act was filed. This Suit abated on account of the notification of consolidation operations under the Act. It is, thus, that these objections have arisen, where title is to be determined. The recorded rights in the Khatauni of the year 1323 Fasli and 1347 Fasli show the land in dispute to be co-shared by Bhajan and Gauri, and after Gauri by Bhajan and Domania, Bhajan's widow. Thus, the petitioner and the second respondent are entitled to a half share each. 22. The petitioner's case canvased before the Revisional Court is noticed in the following terms: the land in dispute exclusively vests in Lakshmania, the petitioner and Tetri has got her name wrongfully recorded, which the Authorities below have undone. Tetri claims herself to be Bhajan's daughter, but she has not led any evidence to that effect. After a specific denial by the petitioner to the factum of Tetri being Bhajan's daughter, it was her burden to prove this fact, which she has not discharged by failing to offer any evidence. The Suit filed by Smt. Tetri under Section 229-B has abated and the order of the Judicial Officer, dated 22.12. (year not indicated but would bear reference to the year 1965) has been set aside, which has become final inter partes. Thus, Tetri has no title or share to or in the land in dispute. The second respondent's name as Tetri, daughter of Bhajan has never been recorded. 23. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has recorded a finding to the effect that from a perusal of the Khatauni for the Fasli Years 1323, 1347 and the Comparative Khasra (Fard Mutabikat), it is clear that the land in dispute in the Fasli Year 1323 was recorded jointly in the name of Gauri and Bhajan, sons of Jhapsi. It has further been held that in the Fasli Year 1347, the land aforesaid was recorded in the name of Domania, widow of Gauri and Bhajan son of Jhapsi. It has been concluded that the finding of the Consolidation Officer that says that the land was never recorded in the name of Bhajan or Jhapsi, cannot be said to be correct. It has been concluded that the finding of the Consolidation Officer that says that the land was never recorded in the name of Bhajan or Jhapsi, cannot be said to be correct. It has been remarked by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that the Consolidation Officer had before him a copy of the Khatauni for the Fasli Year 1323, which shows Gauri and Bhajan to be recorded over some plots. This would oblige the Consolidation Officer to compare the said Khatauni with the Comparative Khasra and to record a specific finding to the effect, that for a fact, the said Khatauni relates to the land in dispute or not. The Revisional Authority has gone on to say that before him the Clerk from the Record Room was examined, where he has said that the Comparative Khasra (Fard Mutabikat) produced before the Consolidation Officer is not a faithful copy of the original, but that the copy of the Comparative Khasra produced before the Revisional Authority is one that accords with the original. The Revisional Authority has gone on to conclude that going by the Comparative Khasra produced before him, the land in dispute is found to be jointly recorded in the name of Bhajan and Jhapsi, and, therefore, their joint property. 24. The Revisional Authority has taken note of the fact that varying pedigrees have been set up by parties. He has noted the fact that the second respondent claims that Suryabali was Bhajan's son whereas the petitioner claims that Suryabali was Bhajan's brother. The Revisional Authority has concluded that on a perusal of copies of the Khatauni for the Fasli Years 1370 and 1371, it is evident that Suryabali is Bhajan's son. It has been reasoned that there is no evidence to the effect led by the petitioner that may show the aforesaid entries in the Khatauni of the years 1370 and 1371 Fasli to be incorrect. As such, in the opinion of the Revisional Authority, there is no reason not to repose faith in these entries. It has been reasoned that there is no evidence to the effect led by the petitioner that may show the aforesaid entries in the Khatauni of the years 1370 and 1371 Fasli to be incorrect. As such, in the opinion of the Revisional Authority, there is no reason not to repose faith in these entries. It has also been held that so as far as the validity of the pedigree relied upon by the second respondent is concerned, the entry in the Khatauni for the year 1371 Fasli through PA (PA Form-11) based on succession, supports the same, inasmuch as, in place of deceased Suryabali, the name of Smt. Tapeshari (an alias for Smt. Tetri) wife of Balbhadra, sister of the deceased has been mentioned. 25. The Revisional Authority has specifically considered this serious issue between parties whether Smt. Tetri, respondent no.2 was a daughter of Bhajan or not. He has gone by the principle that Smt. Tetri was recorded in the Basic Year, and, therefore, burden lay upon the petitioner to dispel that she was not a co-sharer in her right, that she claims through Bhajan. The Revisional Authority has held that there is a presumption about correctness of the Basic Year entry, and one who challenges it, bears the burden to dispel. He has proceeded to take into account, besides the Basic Year entry, the previous record of litigation between parties and rights of Smt. Tetri, recorded in the Khatauni to hold that the petitioner has not been able to discharge her burden, that would go to show that the Basic Year entry was wrong. The Revisional Authority has also considered a copy of the plaint giving rise to Suit no.640, under Section 229-B, decided on 24.10.1980, filed on behalf of the second respondent, where she has described herself as Bhajan's daughter. It has been found with reference to the aforesaid document that the petitioner, Lakshmania was a party to the Suit. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has taken particular note of the fact that Lakshmania has not produced any evidence to show that in the Suit last mentioned, she disputed the factum of Tetri alias Tapeshari being Bhajan's daughter. The Revisional Authority has opined that a mere denial of the fact that Smt. Tetri is not Bhajan's daughter would not suffice to relieve the petitioner of her burden. The Revisional Authority has opined that a mere denial of the fact that Smt. Tetri is not Bhajan's daughter would not suffice to relieve the petitioner of her burden. The Revisional Authority has, in particular, dealt with the second respondent's contention that the order dated 22.12.1965 passed by the Judicial Officer being set aside by the order dated 26.10.1972, the latter has become final inter partes and held that he is not in agreement with the aforesaid contention. The reason assigned is that a perusal of a copy of the plaint in Suit no.640, under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act shows that on 15.08.1973, the Suit was withdrawn by the second respondent with liberty to bring a fresh suit. He has noticed the petitioner's contention in this regard that this liberty could not have been granted, but disposed of that objection with a remark that it was open to the petitioner at the time when the former Suit was withdrawn to object to the liberty granted, which she did not do. Therefore, the liberty stands. It must be remarked here that reference about withdrawal of the Suit with liberty is about an earlier Suit, instituted anterior in point of time to Suit no.640, under Section 229-B, on the basis of which Suit no.640 was instituted. The said fact about the Suit being withdrawn by the second respondent, earlier in point of time to Suit no.640 has not been scripted in very clear terms by the Revisional Authority, but on a reading of his order, it is more than obvious that it is so. 26. It has been held that the second respondent, therefore, had a right to bring Suit no.640, under Section 229-B on the same cause of action, which abated on account of a supervening notification of consolidation operation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has, accordingly, held that post-abatement of Suit no.640 brought by the second respondent, the contention that title of parties was no longer open to adjudication as it stood concluded with the withdrawal of the second respondent's former Suit with liberty, and abatement of the subsequent Suit brought on that liberty, is not tenable. The Revisional Authority held that on the state of proceedings of the two Suits, title of parties was open to be agitation in these objections. The Revisional Authority held that on the state of proceedings of the two Suits, title of parties was open to be agitation in these objections. It did not stand concluded and was open to be determined in these objections, that were before him. The Revisional Authority has said in his concluding remarks on merits that the land in dispute being recorded in the Khatauni of the year 1323 Fasli, jointly in the name of Bhajan and Gauri, and in the year 1347 Fasli, in the name of Bhajan and Domania, going by the pedigree propounded by the second respondent, she was entitled to a half share. 27. It must be said at the outset that so far as reference to two Suits filed by the second respondent is concerned, it is not very clear as to what was the occasion, or so to speak the cause of action that led the second respondent to institute those Suits. This is so because she was recorded in the Basic Year when these consolidation operations commenced and would, therefore, have been recorded prior to it, under some orders. There is certainly a presumption about the correctness of the Basic Year entry. It appears that there was constant strife between Lakshmania, the petitioner and the second respondent, Tetri about the latter's half share in the land in dispute. At some point of time there appear to be entries favouring the petitioner and excluding the second respondent that have led to the two Suits filed by the second respondent, that remained inconclusive in their result; one owing to a withdrawal with liberty, and the subsequent, on account of abatement due to notification of consolidation operations under the Act. What, however, is not disputed is the fact that the second respondent, Smt. Tetri was recorded as a co-sharer with a half share over the land in dispute in the Basic year, when consolidation operations commenced. None of the plaints or the proceedings of the two Suits filed by the second respondent have been placed on record by either party, and, therefore, this Court must rest content with what the Revisional Authority has opined in this regard, added of course with this Court's opinion, indicated above. 28. None of the plaints or the proceedings of the two Suits filed by the second respondent have been placed on record by either party, and, therefore, this Court must rest content with what the Revisional Authority has opined in this regard, added of course with this Court's opinion, indicated above. 28. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on the fact that the second respondent has produced no evidence to establish that she is Bhajan's daughter and has further said that after Bhajan's death, the petitioner filed a Suit under Section 229-B, in the year 1965, which was decreed in 1972. In terms of the decree passed in the said Suit, the petitioner was recorded as sole owner of the land in dispute. Learned Counsel for the petitioner about this case of his has drawn the Court's attention to paragraph 8 of the writ petition. Paragraph 8 of the writ petition reads thus: “8. That there is no evidence on the record to establish that the respondent no.2 is the daughter of Bhajan as as much after the death of Bhajan the petitioner had filed Suit under Section 229-B in the year 1965 which was decreed in 1972 and the name of the petitioner was recorded as sole owner of the disputed property.” 29. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that by a decree of the competent Court of revenue jurisdiction passed in the year 1972 in the Suit instituted by the petitioner in the year 1965, after the death of Bhajan, her name was recorded as the sole owner over the land in dispute. He submits that this part of her case has not been considered by the Authorities below, particularly, the Revisional Authority, who has held against her. He has urged, therefore, that the impugned judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, in Revision, is vitiated on account of non-consideration of material evidence. The aforesaid submission proceeds on the foot of a reasoning that whatever cloud of doubt over title between the parties' ancestors was there, owing to fallacious revenue entries, stood removed and the petitioner's rights crystallized in terms of the declaratory decree, passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a Suit instituted post Bhajan's death. The aforesaid submission proceeds on the foot of a reasoning that whatever cloud of doubt over title between the parties' ancestors was there, owing to fallacious revenue entries, stood removed and the petitioner's rights crystallized in terms of the declaratory decree, passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a Suit instituted post Bhajan's death. The said decree would, therefore, demolish the second respondent's rights based on the Basic Year entry, that is the product of earlier fallacious entries. It is true that amongst the Authorities below, the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation in Appeal have referred to Suit no.1186, under Section 229-B, decided on 26.10.1972 which led to a decree in favour of the petitioner excluding the second respondent's name from the land in dispute, but both these Authorities except for a mention about the said Suit have not pronounced upon its effect on the rights of parties. The Revisional Authority has not at all referred to this Suit. Indeed, if a decree of this kind passed in a declaratory suit under Section 229-B way back on 26.10.1972 had become final, it would have decisive impact on the rights of parties, decided by the Consolidation Authorities, one way or the other. 30. It is also true that none of the Authorities have considered the impact of this decree. This point has been specifically urged as already said, on the basis of averments made in paragraph no.8 of the writ petition. However, before this case of the petitioners about non-consideration of a very material evidence vitiating the impugned judgment can be accepted, it has to be seen whether this evidence was produced before any of the Authorities below. A reading of the judgments of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation determining the Appeal, leaves this Court in no manner of doubt that though the existence of this decree dated 26.10.1972 passed in Suit no.1186 was brought to the notice of these two Authorities, no record relating to the said Suit, much less the decree of 26.10.1972, was produced in evidence. It is for this reason that the judgments of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, conspicuously bear no reference to any evidence about the Suit or the decree dated 26.10.1972 being before them. It is for this reason that the judgments of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, conspicuously bear no reference to any evidence about the Suit or the decree dated 26.10.1972 being before them. The tenor of those judgments clearly indicate the utter absence of any record of proceedings of Suit no.1186, decided on 26.10.1972. 31. This Court is clear in mind that had a copy of the plaint/ decree been placed on record or any proceedings of the Suit in which the said decree was passed, the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation would have referred to the said decree, even if they did not adjudge its effect. Both these Authorities have read all other evidence led by parties that was before them. It is for the said reason, to the understanding of this Court, that the Revisional Court has not referred to Suit no.1186 or the decree dated 26.10.1972 passed there, as claimed by the petitioner. It is true that the assertion in paragraph no.8 of the writ petition has not been denied in paragraph no.6 of the counter affidavit specifically, but mere non-traverse would not lead to an inference about a state of proceedings or the existence of a decree that has to be established by evidence aliunde. It is held for a principle that the existence of a judgment or a decree or the institution of a certain proceeding inter partes, cannot be inferred from a mere admission in the absence of evidence aliunde to establish that the Suit or proceedings claimed were instituted and the decree of the kind pleaded was passed in that Suit. Before this Court also, paragraph no.8 of the writ petition is bald pleading. It does not disclose even the number of the Suit or the date of the decree. But, those are inconsequential for reason that particulars of the Suit, vaguely pleaded in paragraph no.8 of the writ petition, find mention in the judgment of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation. Nevertheless, like the Authorities below the petitioner has not annexed a copy of the decree dated 26.10.1972 passed in Suit no.1186 or a copy of the plaint or some other proceeding, relating to the Suit. Nevertheless, like the Authorities below the petitioner has not annexed a copy of the decree dated 26.10.1972 passed in Suit no.1186 or a copy of the plaint or some other proceeding, relating to the Suit. Even if he did, it would be a most nonconservative exercise of the writ or the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, to consider and take into account a document or evidence that was not on record of the Authorities below, on a plea about its non-consideration. In any case, that is not to be, since no evidence relating to the decree passed in the said Suit is anywhere on record. 32. At the hearing of this petition, this Court pointed out this fact to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Suresh Chandra Gupta. Sri Gupta brought to the notice of this Court the fact that he has filed a supplementary affidavit, dated 13.09.2018 with leave of the Court, dated 04.04.2018, that was granted in terms of the following order: “Counsel for the petitioner is granted two weeks' time to file supplementary affidavit bringing on record the alleged decree passed in her favour in a suit instituted by her under Section 229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.List after two weeks.” 33. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the supplementary affidavit aforesaid read thus: “2. That this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 04.04.2018 has granted time to file Supplementary affidavit annexing record of decree passed in her favour u/s 229 B U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act and in compliance the deponent has made best efforts to carry out the order passed in suit u/s 229 B U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act 1950 but after creation of newly District Kushinagar, the original Records Padrauna Tehsil has been bidden (sic, weeded out) and no records is available and the name of petitioner is at sr. no.49. Tapeshari vs. Smt. Lakshmania issued to no petitioner on 12.06.2018. The certified copy of the certificate issued by authorities record room Kushinagar dated 12.06.2018 is being annexed as Annexure 1 to this affidavit. 3. no.49. Tapeshari vs. Smt. Lakshmania issued to no petitioner on 12.06.2018. The certified copy of the certificate issued by authorities record room Kushinagar dated 12.06.2018 is being annexed as Annexure 1 to this affidavit. 3. That in view of the order dated 04.04.2018 in the no records in available before record room to bring on copy of order of decree passed in suit under section 229 B U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act so that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to decide the case in terms of the certificate issued by the record Kushinagar.” 34. This Court has perused the certified copy of the relevant part of the Goswara (a kind of status register of suits) annexed as Annexure 1 to the supplementary affidavit. At serial no.149, not serial no.49, Suit no.1, under Section 229 Tapeshari vs. Lakshmania, decided on 22.12.1965 appears to be mentioned. This Suit appears to be one of the suits instituted by respondent no.2 against the petitioner; either the one that was withdrawn with liberty or the one that abated. This slender record about the Suit claimed to be instituted by the petitioner against the second respondent in the year 1965 being Suit no.1186, decided on 26.10.1972 is no evidence about the said Suit. Rather, it is evidence that shows one or the other Suit instituted by the second respondent against the petitioner. Thus, this Court has not the slightest hesitation to hold that there is no iota of evidence anywhere on record that may show the institution or decision of any suit, numbered as 1186, brought by the petitioner against respondent no.2 and decided by a decree dated 26.10.1972. The said case about the decree of 26.10.1972 passed in favour of the petitioner, declaring her to be exclusively entitled to the land in dispute, is a case about which there is not a shred of evidence. 35. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that the impugned order is manifestly illegal, inasmuch as, the Revisional Authority has travelled beyond its jurisdiction to reverse two concurrent judgments of the Authorities of fact below, that is to say, the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, merely taking a different view of the evidence, and, that too, based on additional evidence admitted at the revisional stage. He submits that it is not the province of the Revisional Authority, under Section 48 of the Act, to do a wholesome reappraisal of evidence like a Court of first appeal. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, this is what the Deputy Director of Consolidation has precisely done in this case. He submits that the Deputy Director of Consolidation could have interfered only if the findings of the two Authorities of fact below were perverse or manifestly illegal, but not otherwise. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Sheo Pujan vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors., 1993(1) AWC 172 . He has reposed faith on the principles laid down in paragraph no.8 of the report in Sheo Pujan (supra): “8. Taking into consideration the facts of the present case it may be observed that the expert evidence is led so that the expert witness may put before the Court all materials inclusive of the data which induced him to come to the conclusion and enlightened the Court on the technical aspect of the case so that the Court although not an expert may form its own judgment on those materials after giving due regard to the expert's opinion because once the expert opinion is accepted it is not the opinion of the expert but of the Court. Under the scheme of the U.P. C.H. Act wide powers stand conferred on the consolidation authorities to determine the question of title and possession in respect of agricultural holdings. There may be cases where, in order to decide a question relating to title in the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act or in appeals or revisions arising there under it may become necessary in the interest of justice to bring on record expert evidence and in such a situation a "party cannot be refused permission to lead such an evidence simply on the ground that the provisions of the Act do not contemplate leading of such an evidence. The authority concerned has to apply its mind to the relevancy of the evidence sought to be brought on record and in case the application for such an evidence is a bonafide one and a proper case is made out for bringing on record such an evidence it can certainly be permitted to be brought on record. The authority concerned has to apply its mind to the relevancy of the evidence sought to be brought on record and in case the application for such an evidence is a bonafide one and a proper case is made out for bringing on record such an evidence it can certainly be permitted to be brought on record. I do not find any impediment in the way of bringing on record such an evidence under the scheme of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The power to admit additional evidence, however, at appellate or revisory stage, has to be exercised with care and caution. The rule indicated above does not authorise the admission of additional evidence for the purpose of removing lacunae and filling in gaps in evidence. Additional evidence can be admitted, if the appellate Court finds it needful and necessary for enabling it to pronounce judgment. The principles contained in Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure are general principles of universal application, aimed at securing justice which should be kept in mind while exercising the judicial discretion to admit additional evidence at appellate or revisional stage. The observation in question occurring in the impugned order, therefore, is clearly manifestly erroneous.” 36. That case arose in the context of an application to admit additional evidence to record by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, hearing an appeal from objections under Section 9-A (2) of the Act. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation rejected the said application by the petitioner, who put in issue the said order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director of Consolidation considered the nature of the dispute involved and the evidence sought to be led. He ordered the additional evidence be admitted to record and the appeal decided within three months. It was in the context of those facts, that also involved bringing on record expert evidence that this Court held that bearing in mind general principles in Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, there was authority under the Act, to admit additional evidence at the appellate or the revisional stage. However, that could not be employed to remove lacunae or fill in gaps in evidence. This Court finds that the said authority is far from the point that the petitioner canvases. However, that could not be employed to remove lacunae or fill in gaps in evidence. This Court finds that the said authority is far from the point that the petitioner canvases. Rather, it acknowledges the Revisional Authority's jurisdiction to admit additional evidence, in appropriate cases under the Act, bearing in mind the general principles of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. 37. To the same end, another authority relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is Anar Devi and anther vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2006 (2) AWC 1847 . Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon paragraphs nos.9 to 13 of the report in Anar Devi (supra), that read thus: “9. Above judgment and other case laws on the point referred that in case of production or creation of additional evidence, the principles of Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable in consolidation proceeding also, the same are being reproduced below for ready reference: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if : (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence; be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. 10. Additional evidence could be taken at the Appellate/revisional stage if an application was filed to adduce additional evidence before the Trial court and same was refused to be admitted as additional evidence which ought to have been admitted. 10. Additional evidence could be taken at the Appellate/revisional stage if an application was filed to adduce additional evidence before the Trial court and same was refused to be admitted as additional evidence which ought to have been admitted. As opposite party No. 2 did not move any application before Consolidation Officer to admit additional evidence by way of expert's opinion at revisional stage and as such first condition under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code is not available in the present case. 11. There is no averment in affidavit that thumb impression on which document was not within knowledge of opposite party No. 2 and after exercise of due diligence same could not be produced by him at the time when the order was passed by Consolidation Officer. Affidavit filed by opposite party No. 2 did not make out any of ground as contemplated under Order XLI, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. There is also no material on record to show that the document was not within the knowledge of Opp. party No. 2 or could not be produced even after exercise of due diligence before Consolidation Officer or Settlement Officer, Consolidation. In case the document was already on record and no such application was moved by opposite party No. 2 to get examined the thumb impression contained on the registered will executed in favour of petitioners by expert, no such application could be entertained at Appellate/revisional stage and as such the second ground for production of additional evidence by examining thumb impression by expert is also not available to opposite party No. 2. 12. There is also no such finding in the order that the appellate court/revisional court require any such document to be produced to enable appellate court/revisional court to pronounce the judgment and in absence of any such finding in the order of appellate court/revisional court, third ground as contemplated under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code be also not available to opposite party No. 2. 13. Thus, it is clear that none of the grounds as contemplated under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code for admitting additional evidence at Revisional stage as expert opinion on Thumb impression of Ram Chandra is available to opposite party No. 2. 13. Thus, it is clear that none of the grounds as contemplated under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code for admitting additional evidence at Revisional stage as expert opinion on Thumb impression of Ram Chandra is available to opposite party No. 2. The Revisional Court wrongly and illegally passed the impugned order permitting opposite party No. 2 to get examined thumb of impression of late Ram Chandra by expert at revisional stage. Deputy Director of Consolidation did not record any reason for permitting additional evidence in the form of expert's opinion at revisional stage. Deputy Director of Consolidation being the final court under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act could permit additional evidence if any Of the grounds as contained under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code was attracted and reasons were recorded in this regard permitting additional evidence as an expert's opinion at revisional stage. As the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not contain any reason, this is an additional ground for setting aside the impugned order.” 38. The principle enunciated in Anar Devi (supra) are again to the effect that evidence may not be admitted in a Revision under Section 48 of the Act, except on the general principles of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. In the facts of the case in Anar Devi, it was held that the order of the Revisional Court permitting expert evidence to be led at the revisional stage, without assigning any reason for the order made was bad. It is, however, not disputed for a principle, as evident from paragraph no.13 of the report that the Revisional Court did not lack the power to admit additional evidence, even expert evidence, guided of course, by the principles in Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. Here, as would be presently seen, the Revisional Court had sufficient reason to admit, and more specifically, verify whether the Comparative Khasra relied upon by the Authorities below was a faithful copy of the original, on the basis of which the Authorities below had recorded a finding that the plot numbers mentioned in the Khatauni of 1323 Fasli did not tally with those of the land in dispute. This finding had led the Authorities below to hold that the names of Gauri, Bhajan and Jhapsi were recorded with reference to other plot numbers and not the land in dispute. This finding had led the Authorities below to hold that the names of Gauri, Bhajan and Jhapsi were recorded with reference to other plot numbers and not the land in dispute. It was in the context of these facts that the Revisional Authority admitted additional evidence, by requiring the original of the Comparative Khasra to be proved before him by the Clerk in the Record Room, who on oath testified before the Revisional Authority, that for a fact, the Comparative Khasra before the Authorities below was not a faithful copy of the original. The original showed that entries in the Khatauni of 1323 Fasli, jointly in the name of Bhajan, Gauri and Jhapsi, stood over the land in dispute. If this was the case, it was clearly a sound exercise of jurisdiction by the Revisional Authority under Order XLI Rule 27(1)(b) CPC, that empowers an Appellate Court (including the Revisional Court on extended principle under the Act) to require any document to be produced or “any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause”, to borrow the precise phraseology of the statute. 39. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Kedar Singh and another vs. D.D.C. and others, 2011 (112) RD 705 . Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the report there, reads thus: “14. The admission of the evidence at the revisional stage thus could not have been justified in the present case under the specific embargo contained in the Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is quoted herein under: Order 41, Rule 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. The admission of the evidence at the revisional stage thus could not have been justified in the present case under the specific embargo contained in the Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is quoted herein under: Order 41, Rule 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. -(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court, But if (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission. According to the Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure a party to an appeal is not entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary except where the Trial Court against whose decree the appeal has been filed refused to admit evidence which otherwise ought to have been admitted or the parties seeking to produce additional evidence established that such evidence was not within its' knowledge or could not have been produced despite exercise of due diligence by it before the Trial Court and lastly the Appellate Court itself required certain evidence to be produced before it to advance the cause of justice. 15. In the present case none of the three ingredients envisaged in Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure justifying leading of additional evidence was existing nor they have been recorded. 15. In the present case none of the three ingredients envisaged in Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure justifying leading of additional evidence was existing nor they have been recorded. In fact in the order of the Appellate Court it has been recorded that the respondents had set up a case that certain signatures of the parties had been obtained on blank papers for panchayat which had been illegally used by the petitioners but even at that stage no evidence was led in that regard. As such it could be inferred that the respondents did have the knowledge of such blank papers containing the signatures at the appellate stage but did not produce the same at that stage. Thus they were precluded from leading any such evidence at the revisional stage. The respondents have not been able to justify the leading of such evidence at the revisional stage. As such the admission of the 'blank papers' was not in accordance with law.” 40. In the opinion of this Court, Kedar Singh (supra) does not say anything different from the earlier authorities and for the same reason, as those authorities, is not attracted here. This disposes of the petitioner's submission regarding one part of her objection about the Revisional Court proceeding on the basis of additional evidence, which according to her, ought not to have been done. 41. The next contention urged on behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the Revisional Authority does not possess jurisdiction to reverse findings of fact, recorded by the Authorities of fact below, unless those findings be perverse or manifestly illegal. 42. Learned Counsel for the second respondent has pointed out the wide powers of the Revisional Authority under Section 48 of the Act, relying on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in Sheo Nand and others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, (2000) 3 SCC 103 . He has referred to paragraphs nos.19, 20 and 21 of the report, where it is held: “19. Section 48 of the Act provides as under: “48. He has referred to paragraphs nos.19, 20 and 21 of the report, where it is held: “19. Section 48 of the Act provides as under: “48. Revision and reference.—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than an interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case or proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation (1).—For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation (2).—For the purposes of this section the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding.” 20. The section gives very wide powers to the Deputy Director. It enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the revenue records may be prepared accordingly. 21. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the revenue records may be prepared accordingly. 21. his Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of powers, is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against the weight of evidence, it would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinise the whole case again so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In a case, like the present, where the entries in the revenue records are fictitious or forged or they were recorded in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Land Records Manual or other allied statutory provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power under Section 48 to reappraise or re-evaluate the evidence-on- record so as to finally determine the rights of the parties by excluding forged and fictitious revenue entries or entries not made in accordance with law.” 43. To the understanding of this Court on the principle laid down by their Lordships in Sheo Nand and others (supra), particularly, what is discernible from paragraph no.20 of the report, it is evident that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has wide powers to interfere, where the findings of the Authorities below are perverse, defining that term to mean a finding that is not supported by evidence on record or against the weight of evidence. This would make it clear that the powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, under Section 48 of the Act, entitling him to interfere with findings of fact by the Authorities below, on ground of perversity is extended on principle to assessment of the weight of evidence on record; of course, meaning it to be clearly against the weight of evidence on record. It must be remembered that the decision of their Lordships though on principle always binding, was rendered in a slightly different statutory context. It must be remembered that the decision of their Lordships though on principle always binding, was rendered in a slightly different statutory context. The Act has been amended vide U.P. Act no.3 of 2002, retrospectively w.e.f. 10.11.1980 to add Explanation 3 to Section 48. The amended provisions of Section 48 read thus: “48. Revision and reference.–(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order [other than an interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub section (1). Explanation.– (1) For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation.– (2) For the purposes of this section the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding. Explanation.– (3) The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to reappreciate any oral or documentary evidence.” 44. In this case, the objections were filed in the year 1981, and, therefore, the amended provisions of Section 48, operative retrospectively, would squarely apply. Under the amended statute, the Revisional Court has been conferred with unique powers by virtue of the added Explanation 3 to go into the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by an Authority below, whether on fact or law, and includes the powers to appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. Under the amended statute, the Revisional Court has been conferred with unique powers by virtue of the added Explanation 3 to go into the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by an Authority below, whether on fact or law, and includes the powers to appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. Thus, to the understanding of this Court, in view of the added Explanation by U.P. Act no.3 of 2002, retrospectively w.e.f. 10.11.1980, the Revisional Court is in no manner inhibited from examining any question of fact or law, or appreciating evidence whether documentary or oral, virtually like any other Court of fact and law. It is a unique position that the Revisional Authority enjoys, under Section 48 of the Act, conventionally not associated with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 45. Learned Counsel for the second respondent has further relied on the decisions of this Court in Jhandu vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 2014 (123) RD 176 : 2014 (1) ADJ 24 and also on a decision of this Court in Mursuthi vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 2018 (10) ADJ 793 . The said decisions do not detract from the view that this Court has taken, and it would, therefore, be futile to dilate on the principles there. 46. Learned Counsel for the second respondent has submitted that apart from all other evidence, the objections filed by the petitioner on which these proceedings have commenced are woefully vague. It is urged that on this ground, if no other, the Revisional Authority ought to have affirmed. This Court, in the opening part of the judgment has remarked that the objections are indeed very sketchy, bordering on vagueness. But, at the same time it must not be forgotten that there are principles laid down by high authority that say that pleadings, particularly in Mufassil Courts, ought not to be strictly construed. It would hold all the more true for Consolidation Courts. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships in Madan Gopal Kanodia vs. Mamraj Maniram and others, (1977) 1 SCC 669 , where in paragraph 13 of the report it has been held: “13. In the written statement filed by the plaintiff under Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the particulars and essential details of the 21 bales of cloth were clearly mentioned in para 1(b). In the written statement filed by the plaintiff under Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the particulars and essential details of the 21 bales of cloth were clearly mentioned in para 1(b). Further more, counsel for the plaintiff gave a statement before the trial court onessential September 5, 1952 where also all the details regarding the 200 bales of cloth were given. In the statement the counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff had received the sale proceeds of 179 bales of cloth and that 21 bales of cloth remained unaccounted for. In the evidence also the plaintiff has sought to prove the very case set up in the plaint as also in the written statement filed later under orders of the Court. We are unable to see any substantial variation between the pleadings of the plaintiff and the evidence led by him at the trial. It is well settled that pleadings are loosely drafted in the courts, and the courts should not scrutinise the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in genuine claims being defeated on trivial grounds. In our opinion, the finding of the High Court that there was wide gap between the pleadings and the proof is not at all borne out from the record of the present case.” (Emphasis by Court) 47. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pratap Narain vs. Fifth Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1998 SCC OnLine All 215, where in paragraph 7, it has been held thus: “7. Law relating to pleadings is very clear. Theyqare not to be so strictly construed like a pieceqof legislation. In District Courts pleadings areqoften loosely drafted as such a liberalqconstruction has always to be given to suchqpleadings and the intention of the party shouldqbe gathered to. The courts should look to theqsubstance rather than the wordings of theqpleading and the manner in which they have beenqplaced. Pleadings should be read and construed asqa whole and not in piece-meal. It would be a badqconstruction and may end in startling results ifqany particular word or sentence is picked up andqused for or against the party pleading inqisolation of other part of the pleading. Pleadings should be read and construed asqa whole and not in piece-meal. It would be a badqconstruction and may end in startling results ifqany particular word or sentence is picked up andqused for or against the party pleading inqisolation of other part of the pleading. The trueqimport of the pleading can be ascertained only ifqit is read as a whole and it is not permissibleqto pull out a sentence or a passage to read itqout of the context, in isolation see Udhav Singhqv. Madhav Rao Scindia. [ (1977) 1 SCC 511 ] The whole object of the pleadingsqis that the opposite party must know the case heqhas to meet and should not be taken by surprise.qThe courts should look to the substance ratherqthan to the loose words used her and thereinqother part of the pleadings. Rules of procedureqare meant to subserve and not to govern the causeqof justice. When it a given case a questionqarises whether a party should be held bound by anqadmission contained in the pleadings in looseqwords or language, it is the duty of the court toqlook to the pleadings as a whole and not toqdissect a fact out of the pleadings.” 48. In view of the above principle, it is clear that it would be not very wise to go after the rather vaguely worded objection, that the petitioner has brought. The findings of the Revisional Authority are clear and categorical. He has considered the relevant evidence, particularly, recorded evidence in the Khatauni for the Fasli Years 1323 and 1347, which show the ancestors of parties to be recorded as co-sharers. In addition, the Revisional Authority has also considered an entry in the Khatauni, that shows the second respondent to be recorded on the basis of an entry in PA Form-11, which says that Smt. Tetri has inherited her brother, Suryabali's share. The Revisional Authority has also concluded rightly in favour of the pedigree set up before him by the second respondent, though slightly at variance with the one before the Authorities below, which shows that Smt. Tetri is the daughter of Bhajan. These are findings of fact, based on evaluation of evidence that the Revisional Authority was entitled to record. There are further findings to show clearly that on additional evidence admitted, the Revisional Authority has found the ancestors of parties to be co-sharers in the land in dispute. These are findings of fact, based on evaluation of evidence that the Revisional Authority was entitled to record. There are further findings to show clearly that on additional evidence admitted, the Revisional Authority has found the ancestors of parties to be co-sharers in the land in dispute. There is no perversity or such manifest illegality about these findings as may call for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 49. This writ petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs. 50. The interim order dated 11.09.1986 is hereby vacated. 51. Let this order be communicated by the Office to the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria and the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Padrauna for compliance.