G.S. Kulkarni, J. 1. Heard Mr. Doctor, learned senior counsel for the applicant/appellant and Mr. Ravi Kadam, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Sharan Jagtiani, learned senior counsel and Mr. Gautam Ankhad, for respondent no. 1/plaintiff. 2. This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed by the applicant/original defendant No. 1, being aggrieved by an order dated 8 June 2020 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court at Mumbai in Suit No. Commercial Suit (Stamp) 3765 of 2020. By the impugned order, Notice of Motion No. 1224 of 2020 filed by respondent no. 1/plaintiff for interim reliefs in the suit has been allowed in the following terms: "1. The Notice of Motion Notice No. 1224/2020 is hereby allowed as per prayer clause (B). 2. The Defendant No. 1-ICICI Bank is hereby temporarily restrained from taking coercive action against the plaintiff on the basis of the corporate guarantee dated 9/10/2015 through its agents, servants, officers, or any person claiming through the defendant no. 1 Bank till final disposal of this suit. 3. Defendant No. 1-Bank may submit written statement in details to expedite the hearing. 4. Costs in cause. 5. Notice of Motion No. 1224/2020 is hereby disposed off accordingly." (emphasis supplied) 3. For convenience, it would be necessary to note the prayers as made in the Notice of Motion, which reads thus: "(a) pending the hearing and final disposal of the present suit this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendant no. 1 bank, its agents, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through Defendant no. 1 bank or under them from invoking the Corporate Guarantee dated 9th October 2015 issued by the plaintiff company and given to defendant no. 1 bank, pursuant to the facilities extended by Defendant no. 1 Bank to UIL Hong Kong Limited pursuant to the bank facility agreement dated 30 September 2010 as amended from time to time, outside India; (b) pending the hearing and final disposal of the present suit, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain defendant no. 1 bank, its agent, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank from taking any coercive or perspective action against plaintiff by invoking the Corporate guarantee dated 9th October 2015. (c) interim and ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (a) and (b) above be granted." (emphasis supplied) 4. 1 bank, its agent, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank from taking any coercive or perspective action against plaintiff by invoking the Corporate guarantee dated 9th October 2015. (c) interim and ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (a) and (b) above be granted." (emphasis supplied) 4. On a reading of the relief as granted by the impugned order it is not in terms of what has been prayed for but the relief which is granted in paragraph 2 of the operative order is quite wider as argued by Mr. Doctor learned senior counsel for the applicant/defendant no. 1. 5. Mr. Doctor, learned senior counsel for the applicant/defendant no. 1 would contend that the suit in question was filed by respondent no. 1/plaintiff for a limited relief of a permanent injunction restraining the applicant/defendant no. 1 from invoking the corporate guarantee dated 9 October 2015 issued by respondent no. 1/plaintiff in favour of applicant/defendant no. 1. The other prayers in the plaint were interim prayers. The prayers in the suit read as under: "(a) this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue an order of permanent injunction thereby permanently restraining defendant no. 1, its agents, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank or under them from invoking the Corporate Guarantee dated 9th October 2015 issued by the plaintiff and given to the defendant no. 1 pursuant to the facilities extended by defendant no. 1 to UIL Hong Kong Limited pursuant to the bank facility agreement dated 30 September 2010 as amended from time to time, outside India; (b) pending the hearing and final disposal of the present suit, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendant no. 1 bank, its agents, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank or under them from invoking the Corporate Guarantee dated 9 October 2015 issued by the plaintiff company and given to defendant no. 1 bank, pursuant to the facilities extended by defendant no. 1 bank to UIL Hong Kong Limited pursuant to the bank facility agreement dated 30 September 2010 as amended from time to time, outside India; (c) pending the hearing and final disposal of the present suit, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendant no. 1 bank, its agents, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank to UIL Hong Kong Limited pursuant to the bank facility agreement dated 30 September 2010 as amended from time to time, outside India; (c) pending the hearing and final disposal of the present suit, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the defendant no. 1 bank, its agents, servants, officers and/or any person claiming through defendant no. 1 bank from taking any coercive or perspective action against the plaintiff by invoking the Corporate Guarantee dated 9 October 2015." (emphasis supplied) 6. Mr. Doctor, learned senior counsel for the applicant/defendant no. 1 would submit that the suit came to be filed on 23 March 2020. He would submit that indisputedly on the very same day, the applicant/defendant no. 1 invoked the suit corporate guarantee. Mr. Doctor would submit that Notice of Motion for ad-interim reliefs nonetheless came to be moved on 2 April 2020 on an assumption that the corporate guarantee may be invoked and an ex-parte ad-interim relief came to be prayed for. According to Mr. Doctor, it is apparent that although about 8-9 days prior to such application being moved the corporate guarantee was already invoked by the applicant/defendant no. 1, respondent no. 1/plaintiff never informed the trial court about such invocation on 23rd March 2020. He would submit that this is ex facie apparent from the clear wording of the ad-interim order passed by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Doctor submits that as the corporate guarantee was already invoked not only the Notice of Motion but the Suit itself had become infructuous as the only substantive prayer did not survive. As there are some submissions made on the ad-interim order, it is appropriate that the ad-interim order dated 2 April 2020 is passed by the learned trial judge is also to be noted, which reads thus: 1224/2020 Advocate Priyanka Dube for the plaintiff present. in St. No. 3765/2020 Heard Ld Advocate Priyanka Dube for the Plaintiff at sufficient length. After filing present suit plaintiff has pressed for urgency as defendant no. 1 Bank may invoke Corporate Guarantee which will affect over entire business and cash flow. Perused general directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 25.3.3030 on COVID-19 issue. Considering present situation of lock out due to COVID-19, it is not possible to issues notice to defendant Bank to decide the petition on merit. 1 Bank may invoke Corporate Guarantee which will affect over entire business and cash flow. Perused general directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 25.3.3030 on COVID-19 issue. Considering present situation of lock out due to COVID-19, it is not possible to issues notice to defendant Bank to decide the petition on merit. The Corporate Guarantee of 2010 is extended upto 2019 as described in the plaint. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain the status-quo. more specifically not to invoke Corporate Guarantee. Issue ex-parte ad interim relief to the extent of prayer clause "a" and "b" of Notice of Motion till submission of reply by defendant nos. 1 to 3. Plaintiff to comply under order 39 rule 3-A of CPC, intimate the defendants by RPAD and E-Mail. Defendants may file reply with intimation to plaintiff to decide the Notice of Motion on merit. Ad-interim ex-parte relief as claimed in prayer clause a and b of the Notice of Motion is granted r/o. 8.6.2020 i.e. first working day after vacation: OR any date with intimation to plaintiff by supplying advance copy of reply to plaintiff. Adjourned to 8.6.2020 for Reply to NM. Authenticated copy be issued to Plaintiff." (emphasis supplied) 7. Mr. Doctor would next contend that per se the City Civil Court at Bombay did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant any relief to respondent no. 1/plaintiff in regard to the corporate guarantee in question in view of the specific jurisdiction clause being clause no. 22 as contained in the corporate guarantee. According to Mr. Doctor, the jurisdiction would vest before the Court at Singapore and the parties had also agreed to be governed by the Singapore law. It is submitted that after filing of the suit in question, respondent no. 1/plaintiff has in fact filed a suit before the Singapore Court. He has drawn my attention to Clause 22 of Corporate Guarantee, which provides for the governing law and jurisdiction, as under: "22. GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION 22.1 This Guarantee shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Singapore law. 22.2 The parties to this Guarantee irrevocably agree to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore or of any other court as the Lender may elect. GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION 22.1 This Guarantee shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Singapore law. 22.2 The parties to this Guarantee irrevocably agree to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore or of any other court as the Lender may elect. 22.3 The Guarantor irrevocably waives any objection which it may have now or hereafter to for the determination of any dispute in Singapore which may arise out of or in connection with this Guarantor ("Proceedings") in the courts of Singapore. 22.4 Nothing contained in this clause shall limit the right of the Lender to take action against the Guarantor I any court of competent jurisdiction nor shall the taking of proceedings by the Lender against the Guarantor in one or more jurisdictions preclude the taking of proceedings in any other jurisdiction whether concurrently or not." (emphasis supplied) 8. Mr. Doctor would submit that the jurisdiction clause as construed by the learned trial Judge in the impugned order is wholly misconceived and untenable. This is in as much as, the jurisdiction clause read in whichever manner cannot mean that the Civil Court at Mumbai would have jurisdiction to entertain a suit on any dispute on the corporate guarantee. Mr. Doctor submits that this apart even the suit-corporate guarantee was issued at Singapore as also that respondent no. 1/plaintiff is a company registered in Singapore. 9. Mr. Doctor would submit that the impugned order completely overlooks these basic facets in regard to the jurisdiction of the Court before considering the case of respondent no. 1/plaintiff apart from a complete misreading of jurisdiction clause. It is his submission that a plain commercial meaning which was required to be attributed to Clause 22 has been completely overlooked by the learned trial Judge. 10. On the other hand, Mr. Kadam and Mr. Jagtiani, learned senior counsel for respondent no. 1/plaintiff have made submissions on merits of the dispute to urge that this was a clear case of fraud, although not directly on the corporate guarantee but which would have some bearing on the corporate guarantee. Mr. Kadam has submitted that detailed correspondence to that effect was placed on record and to which there was no answer from the appellant/defendant on merit. 11. Both Mr. Kadam and Mr. Mr. Kadam has submitted that detailed correspondence to that effect was placed on record and to which there was no answer from the appellant/defendant on merit. 11. Both Mr. Kadam and Mr. Jagtiani have pointed out that the reading of jurisdiction clause by the trial Court is the correct reading in as much as in Clause 22.2 the parties have irrevocably agreed to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore. It is submitted that once the parties agreed to a non-exclusive jurisdiction, it cannot be said that the Court in Singapore would have exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain a suit in regard to corporate guarantee in question. It is submitted that the non-exclusive jurisdiction would remain as non-exclusive jurisdiction which cannot be read as an exclusive jurisdiction, in the manner as suggested by the applicant/defendant No. 1. My attention is drawn to various paragraphs of the impugned order, more particularly to paragraph 22, 23, 24 and 32 to point out that the learned trial Judge has appropriately considered the case of respondent no. 1/plaintiff and only on being satisfied that a case for an interim injunction was made out, has granted the interim relief by the impugned order. 12. On hearing learned senior counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that there is much substance in the contentions as urged on behalf of the applicant/defendant no. 1. 13. In so far as the interim injunction as granted by the suit concerned, in my opinion, respondent no. 1/plaintiff ought not to be entitled to the benefit of the relief as granted by the learned trial Judge for the reasons as discussed. 14. At the threshold it needs to be observed that there is an apparent non-application of mind on the part of learned trial Judge to the fact that the Notice of Motion itself had become infructuous when the Corporate Guarantee in question was invoked on 23 March 2020. It is quite clear that on an assumption that the corporate guarantee which was an unconditional guarantee, was yet to be invoked, an ex-parte ad-interim order came to be granted by the learned trial Judge on 2nd April 2020. It is quite clear that on an assumption that the corporate guarantee which was an unconditional guarantee, was yet to be invoked, an ex-parte ad-interim order came to be granted by the learned trial Judge on 2nd April 2020. Once the corporate guarantee itself was invoked and the benefit of the same was commercially available in terms of what the guarantee would provide for, in my opinion, there was no question of any ex-parte ad-interim protection to be granted on 2 April 2020, if the court was to be informed of the invocation at that stage. However, it appears from the record that respondent no. 1/plaintiff did not do so. This was one of the most vital and primary consideration before the learned trial Judge who took up the Notice of Motion for final hearing and decided the same by the impugned order. The learned trial Judge in fact does not feel proper to discuss this plain and simple factual consequence in a manner as judicially expected, but has chosen to have a circuitous discussion without touching this core issue. 15. The impugned order not only confirms the ad-interim order but from the wording of the operative part has certainly gone beyond the prayers as made in the notice of motion. Mr. Doctor would be correct in his contention that the relief granted by the impugned order is much more that what was prayed for by the plaintiff. There was really no need for the learned trial Judge to do so and no special reason is attributed for exercising this additional discretion. Apart from the fact that the relief in the notice of motion issued had become infructuous. 16. Secondly, on the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court at Bombay, in my opinion, prima facie the findings as recorded by the learned trial Judge are quite unconscionable and far from satisfactory. The document in question was itself executed at Singapore. The plaintiff is a Singapore based company. It cannot be overlooked that in Clause 22.1 the parties had clearly agreed that the corporate guarantee shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Singapore law and thereafter the parties agreed in Clause 22.2 that the parties to the Guarantee irrevocably agree to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore or of any other court as the "Lender" may elect. It is quite common and not unknown to the commercial jurisprudence that on an appropriate construction of the contractual clause and focused on the intention of the parties a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause may also lead to the clause being accorded the effect of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. This is true in regard to the jurisdiction clause in the present case. Further in Clause 22.3 respondent no. 1/plaintiff (Guarantor) irrevocably waived any objection which it may have, at all times, for the determination of any dispute in Singapore which may arise out of or in connection with the guarantee in question. When on a holistic reading of the jurisdiction clause it was as clear as sunlight, that the jurisdiction in regard to any dispute on the corporate guarantee in question, was agreed to be with the Courts of Singapore and the Singapore law would be administered, no other meaning could have been attributed by the learned trial Judge even at the interim stage, considering that the dispute as brought at the doorsteps of the trial Court was a commercial dispute governed under the rigours of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 and requiring a commercial sensitivity before any orders affecting the parties are passed. This for the reason that any adverse orders in such suits even at the interim stage, are likely to cause serious commercial consequences requiring a very focused application of mind on such core facts going to the root of the matter. 17. Even otherwise considering clause 22.2 of the corporate guarantee, there is no material to point out that the lender (appellant/defendant) had elected Mumbai as Court having jurisdiction. Thus, in my opinion, when wordings of clause 22 were plain, clear and unambiguous, the learned trial Judge could not have construed the clause to attribute a different meaning, something which the parties have not agreed. The first test to be applied in such situation would be to read a clause in a commercial contract as may be understood by the parties in a commercial sense. If this be so, prima facie it is not possible to conceive that the City Civil Court at Bombay could administer the Singapore law as agreed by the parties in Clause 22.1 and for that matter even this Court. If this be so, prima facie it is not possible to conceive that the City Civil Court at Bombay could administer the Singapore law as agreed by the parties in Clause 22.1 and for that matter even this Court. Agreement between the parties (Clause 22) clearly conferred jurisdiction with the Court at Singapore in case any dispute was to arise between them under this Contract. It is not a case that the parties by consent are conferring jurisdiction on a Court which it would inherently lack. The parties, therefore, were bound by the jurisdiction clause they had agreed. It was thus not open to respondent no. 1/plaintiff to choose a different jurisdiction by filing the suit before City Civil Court at Bombay. This would be contrary to the express terms of the agreement, rendering such agreement nugatory. 18. In the above circumstances, prima facie Respondent no. 1/plaintiff selecting the Court at Mumbai for the suit to be filed and seeking an interlocutory relief of an injunction on the benefits of the corporate guarantee in question, looked from any angle does not convince either the judicial mind or the judicial conscience. 19. It is my opinion, the above discussion on jurisdiction suffices to come to a conclusion that the City Civil Court would not have any jurisdiction. However, the learned Senior Counsel for respondent no. 1/plaintiffs would have further submissions in this regard. It is not possible in the present situation to finally decide this appeal, on this issue today. In the circumstances, the interest of justice would require the following order to be passed: (i) The impugned order dated 8 June, 2020 passed by the learned trial Court is ordered to be stayed; (ii) Appeal is admitted to be heard on the jurisdiction of the trial court; (iii) This order is stayed for a period of two weeks from the date it is available 20. Ordered accordingly. 21. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary of this Court. All concerned to act on digitally signed copy of this order.