ORDER : 1. These writ petitions are directed against the order dated 05.07.2018 passed by the II Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC-II, Dharwad (for short, ‘trial Court’) on IA No.IV in OS No.321/2015 confirmed by the learned III Addl. Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Dharwad (for short, ‘first appellate Court’) in MA No.10/2018 vide order dated 27.04.2019 whereby the defendants No.17 to 27 have been restrained from alienating the suit properties till disposal of the suit. 2. Respondents No.1 to 5 herein had filed Suit in OS No.321/2015 before the trial Court seeking for (a) partition and separate possession of the plaintiffs’ 3/8th share in the suit property bearing R.S.No.113 measuring 8 acres 21 guntas situated at Kelageri village, Taluk and District Dharwad, (b) to declare that the sale deeds executed in respect of defendants 17 to 27 are not binding on the share of the plaintiffs and (c) to appoint a Commissioner for effecting the partition. In the said suit proceedings, IA No.IV was filed by the respondents 1 to 5 herein under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC seeking to restrain the defendants 17 to 27 from alienating the suit properties which came to be allowed. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners herein filed MA No.10/2018 before the first appellate Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed with costs confirming the order of the trial Court. Hence, the present writ petitions. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Land Tribunal, Dharwad vide order dated 06.10.2007 had conferred the occupancy rights in respect of the land in question in favour of the legal heirs of Mehabub Khan and Mohammed Khan Shivalli. WP No.17784/2007 filed by Smt. Mariyambi, one of the legal heirs of Rustumbsab Rajesab Kurhatti came to be disposed of on 18.8.2009 in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties. Review Petition No.1595/2009 filed against the said order has also been dismissed. The defendants 18, 19, 20 and 25 to 27/petitioners herein have purchased 5 acres 11 guntas of land in the total extent of 8 acres of the suit properties vide registered sale deed dated 14.06.2012 from the legal heirs of Shivalli since they were declared as absolute owners of the properties in question in terms of the order passed in WP No.17784/2007. 4. 4. It was argued that the petitioners after getting conversion order and approval of the layout plan had taken steps to form the residential plots and 51 sale deeds have been executed in respect of the plots formed in the layout. Though the plaintiffs themselves pleaded these aspects and had produced the relevant documents along with list of documents, the Trial Court without noticing the same had granted temporary injunction much against the well settled principles of law, merely observing that the name of Rustumsab Rajesab Kurhatti was found in the record of rights relating to the year 1975-80. The first appellate Court ignoring the material aspects confirmed the order of the first appellate Court which has resulted in miscarriage of justice causing great hardship to the petitioners and the purchasers of the plots from the present petitioners. It was argued that knowing well that the petitioners have sold the plots to the purchasers without impleading necessary parties, temporary injunction was sought and same has been granted by the trial Court and confirmed by the first appellate Court much against the material on record. Learned counsel argued that the elementary tests required to be satisfied while granting an interlocutory temporary injunction during the pendency of the suit namely viz. (1) prima facie case (2) balance of convenience (3) irreparable injury/hardship are not satisfied by the plaintiffs. On the contrary, these aspects are in favour of the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 would submit that the plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the original owner Rustumsab Rajesab Kurhatti. Smt. Mariyambi, one of the other legal heirs of Rustumsab Rajesab Kurhatti had compromised the matter in WP No.17784/2007 sans impleading the plaintiffs. The compromise decree and the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioners herein by the legal heirs of Mohammed Khan Shivalli is not binding on them. The petitioners having formed the layout are alienating the properties purchased, as such it was inevitable for the plaintiffs to seek for temporary injunction restraining the petitioners herein from alienating the suit schedule properties. The trial Court having considered the factual aspects of the matter in extenso keeping in mind the well settled principles of law has rightly allowed the application IA No.IV filed by the plaintiffs and the same has been confirmed by the first appellate Court after examining the material on record. The trial Court having considered the factual aspects of the matter in extenso keeping in mind the well settled principles of law has rightly allowed the application IA No.IV filed by the plaintiffs and the same has been confirmed by the first appellate Court after examining the material on record. Concurrent findings of both the Courts would not call for any interference by this Court in exercising the writ jurisdiction. 6. Learned counsel in support of his arguments has placed reliance on the following judgments: (a) Wander Limited and Another Vs. Antox India Private Limited (1990 Supp. SCC 727) (b) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Sriman Narayan and Another, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 760 7. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 8. The main thrust of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners would indicate that the petitioners have purchased 5 acres 11 guntas out of total extent of 8 acres of the suit schedule properties subsequent to the order passed by this Court in WP No.17784/2007 dated 18.08.2009 whereby the compromise was entered into between the parties therein inasmuch as occupancy rights granted by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad. It is not in dispute that subsequent to purchase of the said land, the petitioners have sought for conversion and developed the property by forming the layout. Several plots are formed and same are sold to 44 purchasers (out of total 51 purchasers) well before the order of the temporary injunction granted by the trial Court. 9. The plaintiffs are claiming their rights through original owner Rustum Rajesab Kurhatti on the premise that they are the legal heirs of Rustumsab Rajesab Kurhatti through his first wife. It is their grievance that without impleading them as necessary parties to the writ petition proceedings, compromise was entered into between the parties at their back. As such, sale deed said to have been executed by the legal representatives of Mohammed Khan Shivalli on the pretext of right vested to them in terms of the compromise petition is not binding on the plaintiffs. These issues necessarily require to be adjudicated by the Civil Court after holding full-fledged trial. 10. As such, sale deed said to have been executed by the legal representatives of Mohammed Khan Shivalli on the pretext of right vested to them in terms of the compromise petition is not binding on the plaintiffs. These issues necessarily require to be adjudicated by the Civil Court after holding full-fledged trial. 10. In the circumstances, it is ex-facie apparent that in terms of the pleadings made by the plaintiffs and the documents submitted, certain plots were already sold to different persons before granting of temporary injunction order by the trial Court. It is significant to note that the plaintiffs are claiming 3/8th share in the suit schedule properties measuring 8 acres. It appears that the petitioners have purchased 5 acres 11 guntas of land in the said suit schedule properties. 11. In this context, it is apt to refer to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4. a) In the case of Wander Limited and Another supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the principles while granting interlocutory injunction, it is observed thus: “(1) Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The Court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status-quo, the rights of the parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case consideration is somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court’s exercise of discretion.” (b) In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed thus: “7. It is elementary that grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of the legal proceeding is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the court. While exercising the discretion the Court normally applies the following tests: (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) Whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed.” 12. In the light of these judgments, it is clear that the relief by way of interlocutory injunction being equitable relief would rest in judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Certain guidelines are generally stated to be pre-requisite factors for the grant or refusal of such temporary injunction which is ordinarily followed by the Courts. Applying these guidelines/tests, temporary injunction can either be granted or refused. 13. Certain guidelines are generally stated to be pre-requisite factors for the grant or refusal of such temporary injunction which is ordinarily followed by the Courts. Applying these guidelines/tests, temporary injunction can either be granted or refused. 13. In the circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the interest of justice would be sub-served keeping in mind the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable damage that would be caused to the parties in restricting the order of temporary injunction passed by the trial Court confirmed by the first appellate Court to the extent of land excluding the extent of property sold by the petitioners in favour of 44 purchasers i.e. prior to passing of the order of temporary injunction dated 05.07.2018 subject to the result of OS No.321/2015. If any plots are sold subsequent to passing of the order of temporary injunction, such transaction would not be saved by this order. No further alienation shall be made by defendants 17 to 27 relating to the suit schedule property. 14. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petitions stand disposed of. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the original suit in an expeditious manner preferably within a period of nine months.