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2020 DIGILAW 780 (GAU)

Nagiya Sultana Mazumder v. State Of Assam

2020-11-24

MANISH CHOUDHURY, N.KOTISWAR SINGH

body2020
JUDGMENT N.Kotiswar Singh, A.C.J. - Heard Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. M. Nath, learned Standing Counsel, Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Government of Assam, for respondent Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5. Also heard Ms. M. Bhattacharjee, learned Government Advocate Assam, for respondent No.2 and Dr. B. Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent No.7. The interest of the respondent No.6, President of Sonai Anchalik Panchayat can be said to have been taken care of by the other official respondents. 2. The present appeal arises out of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 15.10.2020 in Review Petition No.91/2020. In order to appreciate the facts in issue in proper perspective, it would be necessary to go back to the original order dated 08.09.2020 passed in WP(C) No.3411/2020 out of which the aforesaid review petition arose. 3. Wp(C) No.3411/2020 was filed by the present respondent No.7 who was at the relevant time the President of Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat, Cachar. While serving as such, some of the Members of the Gaon Panchayat, 9 (nine) in number (appellants herein) had submitted a requisition letter to the President of the aforesaid Gaon Panchayat requesting for convening a special meeting under Section 15(1) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 (for short, the "Act") to consider a resolution of no confidence against the President, the respondent No.7. The said requisition was submitted on 03.07.2020. However, as no action was taken by the President of the Panchayat, the Secretary of the Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat approached the President of Sonai Anchalik Panchayat on 20.07.2020 for fixing a date of the special meeting as the President of the Gaon Panchayat failed to fix a date within the stipulated period. Since the President of the Anchalik Panchayat also did not act upon the request for convening a special meeting for moving the confidence motion against the President of the Gaon Panchayat, the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar was moved for doing the needful. Accordingly, the office of the Assistant Commissioner issued a notice on 17.08.2020 convening a special meeting on 21.08.2020 at 2 pm to consider the no confidence motion against the President of Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat. Accordingly, the said meeting was held on 21.08.2020 and the motion was carried through with 9 (nine) in support and 1 (one) against it. Accordingly, the office of the Assistant Commissioner issued a notice on 17.08.2020 convening a special meeting on 21.08.2020 at 2 pm to consider the no confidence motion against the President of Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat. Accordingly, the said meeting was held on 21.08.2020 and the motion was carried through with 9 (nine) in support and 1 (one) against it. Thus, the motion of no confidence was passed by more than 2/3rd votes of the Gaon Panchayat as communicated by the Chief Executive Officer, Cachar Zilla Parishad. 4. After passing of the said no confidence motion against the President, the President filed the said writ petition, WP(C) No.3411/2020 challenging the said motion on various grounds including that proper procedures had not been adopted in terms of the Act for giving proper notice before holding of the meeting in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. It was thus, alleged that the petitioner had been removed from the post of President without fulfilling the requirements of Section 15 of the Act, which requires giving of minimum 15 days prior notice before any such meeting to consider a no confidence motion is held. 5. When the said writ petition was taken up for consideration on 08.09.2020, as regards the aforesaid plea that minimum 15 days notice was not given as required under Section 15(1) of the Act, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents therein (appellants herein) made a statement that there is a possibility that the procedural requirement of Section 15(1) may not have been followed. Accordingly, it was submitted on behalf of the private respondents (appellants herein) that they would like to withdraw the resolution dated 21.08.2020 by which the writ petitioner was removed from the office of President of Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat, Cachar. It appears that such a plea was not objected to by the opposite parties. 6. Learned Single Judge by accepting the contention of the private respondents declared the resolution dated 21.08.2020 to be null and void. It was further observed that as the resolution has not been defeated, but is a case where it has not been pressed upon by the respondents (appellants herein), resulting in its withdrawal, the Court took the view that the private respondents therein (appellants herein) would be entitled to proceed in any manner, as they may be advised under the law against the writ petitioner. 7. 7. It appears that thereafter, the private respondents (appellants herein) submitted another application to the President, Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat on 14.09.2020 for convening a special meeting to consider a no confidence motion against the President. The said requisition was, however, not accepted by the President on the ground of not giving of 15 days prior notice. 8. After the said requisition was submitted by the appellants on 14.09.2020, the said second requisition was challenged by the President (the respondent No.7 herein) on the ground that such a second requisition within a period of 6 months after the earlier resolution was passed was not permissible being in contravention of the second proviso to the Section 15 of the Act. The respondent No.7 also approached this Court by filing a review petition being, Review Petition No.91/2020 contending, inter alia, that Section 15(1) of the Act bars moving of any subsequent resolution of no confidence once the earlier no confidence motion has been lost within a period of six months thereof and accordingly, sought for modification of the order passed by the Court on 08.09.2020 in WP(C) No.3411/2020. 9. The said Review Petition was allowed by the Court vide impugned order dated 15.10.2020 by clarifying that the earlier motion against the respondent No.7 which was declared to be null and void has to be understood as the motion lost and when the motion is lost, the consequence of the other relevant provisions of law including that there cannot be a further no confidence motion again within a period of six months will also be applicable. 10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in the Review Petition, the present appeal has been preferred. 11. The core issue which has arisen before this Court is whether the Learned Single Judge could make the clarification that when a motion has been declared to be null and void, it has to be understood to be a motion lost and the consequences which will follow on such an interpretation. The connected issue is, if the said motion is declared to be null and void and thus can be said to be "lost", will the rigour of the second proviso to Section 15 come into play? 12. The connected issue is, if the said motion is declared to be null and void and thus can be said to be "lost", will the rigour of the second proviso to Section 15 come into play? 12. As this appeal has arisen out of the order of review dated 15.10.2020, it is, therefore, necessary to understand the meaning and scope of the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 08.09.2020 in WP(C) No.3411/2020. 13. As mentioned above, upon a submission made by the counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) No.3411 of 2020 that there is a possibility that the procedural requirement of Section 15(1) may not have been followed, sought for withdrawal of the resolution dated 21.08.2020 by which the present respondent no. 7 was removed from the post of President of the Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat. On that basis Learned Single Judge declared the resolution to be null and void. At the same time, Learned Single Judge held that as the resolution had not been defeated, the respondents therein (the appellants herein) would be entitled to proceed in any manner. From the above, what can be deduced is that the appellants had submitted that there was the possibility of procedural defect in terms of lack of period for notice. What was conceded was of the procedural deficiency and not relating to lack of mustering sufficient votes to carry the motion. That the motion was carried on that day on 21.08.2020 was not disputed by the writ petitioner in the said writ petition (the respondent no.7 herein). The motion was successful as 9 (nine) members cast their votes in favour of the motion and 1 (one) against it. That is the reason, the Learned Single Judge also recorded that the resolution had not been defeated, though it was declared to be null and void as the appellants sought to withdraw the said resolution and permitted the respondents therein and appellants herein to proceed in any manner as permissible under the law. 14. It was when the respondents therein, the appellants herein, sought to move a fresh no confidence motion against the President, respondent no.7 herein, that the said respondent challenged the same on the ground that it is violative of the second proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act and also sought for modification/review of the order dared 08.09.2020 passed in WP(C) No. 3411 of 2020. As mentioned above, the Learned Single Judge modified the aforesaid order dated 08.09.2020 by the impugned order dated 15.10.2020 in the Review Petition No. 91 of 2020 which is challenged in this appeal. 15. The consideration of the issue necessarily involves ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the said second proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act. Second proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act reads as follows: "15. No confidence motion against the President and Vice-President: (1) Every President or Vice-President shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith when resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of two third of the total members of the Gan Panchayat. Such a meeting shall be .. Provided that the concerned Deputy Commissioner/ . .. Provided further that when a no-confidence motion is lost, no such motion shall be allowed in the next six months." (emphasis added) 16. The bar placed on moving a no confidence motion under second proviso above referred comes into play only when the earlier no confidence motion is "lost". As a corollary, if the earlier no confidence motion is "not" lost, the question of applicability of the bar under the second proviso does not arise. When can a no-confidence motion can be said to be lost within the meaning of the aforesaid proviso was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Forhana Begum Laskar -Vs- State Of Assam, (2009) 3 GauLT 575 . 17. In the said case of Forhana (supra), a meeting convened on 06.03.2009 on the basis of a requisition submitted by some members on 19.02.2009 to consider a no confidence motion against the President of the Nitainagar Gaon Panchayat which was cancelled on the intervention of the Anchallik Panchayat on that day and instead by a notice issued by the Secretary of the Anchalik Panchayat, another meeting was called and held on 12.03.2009 and the said meeting adopted a resolution against the President. The said meeting held on 12.03.2009 at the instance of the Secretary of the Anchalik Panchayat was challenged. It was argued, amongst others, that cancellation of the meeting scheduled on 06.03.2009 at the instance of the Secretary of the Anchallik Panchayat was illegal and hence the proceedings of the meeting held on 12.03.2009 was null and void. The said meeting held on 12.03.2009 at the instance of the Secretary of the Anchalik Panchayat was challenged. It was argued, amongst others, that cancellation of the meeting scheduled on 06.03.2009 at the instance of the Secretary of the Anchallik Panchayat was illegal and hence the proceedings of the meeting held on 12.03.2009 was null and void. It was also urged that as Section 15 (1) of the Act envisages a single composite process to deliberate upon and decide on the issue of "no confidence" against the President or the Vice President of a Gaon Panchayat, invalidation thereof at any stage for an infringement of the present nature would signify that the motion is lost and, therefore, in terms of the second proviso to this provision, no such motion is allowable in the next six months. 18. In the aforesaid factual context, the Full Bench by referring to various provisions of the Act analysed the meaning of the word, "lost" appearing in the said Section of the Act and held that the word "lost" refers to the loss of no confidence motion which is essentially the rejection of the no-confidence on merit following due deliberations in a meeting convened and held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 15(1) and rendering of any such resolution of no-confidence invalid because of procedural defects or irregularities in convening the meeting or unauthorised intervention of any authority not contemplated under the Act will not amount to loss as to bar any subsequent motion within six months. What the Full Bench emphasised is that every failure to carry the motion will not attract the bar under the second proviso to Section 15(1), more so if it is due to procedural lapses, as held in para 22 of the aforesaid decision in Forhana (supra). "22. The word 'lost' appearing in the 2nd proviso to Section 15(1), in deference to the fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, has to be essentially comprehended in the text and the context in which it appears. When so construed and interpreted, it, to start with, seems to signify a rejection of a no-confidence motion on merits following due deliberations in a meeting convened and held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 15(1). When so construed and interpreted, it, to start with, seems to signify a rejection of a no-confidence motion on merits following due deliberations in a meeting convened and held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 15(1). It cannot be conceived of as an inevitable consequence of any infringement of the prescribed procedural rigour either by a breach of the time frame or unwarranted interference of any authority at any stage of the process or reasons akin thereto. Though, such outrages depending on the nature and extent of the consequential vitiation may render the process illegal, the same per se, would not imply the loss of the no-confidence motion as is contemplated in the 2nd proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Act. A demonstrably conscious act or omission on the part of those supporting the motion resulting in the rejection of the motion on merits or testifying the abandonment of the pursuit would be essential to conclude such a consequence. The bar against the permissibility of initiation of such a motion within next six months after it is lost in the first venture, in our opinion is decisively redolent of this view. The quintessence of the proviso, according to us, is to sanction a temporary reprieve to the President or the Vice President of the Gaon Panchayat, in case the no-confidence motion brought against him/her stands defeated on merit so as to relieve him/her of a fresh ordeal of suffering the same exercise in quick successions. The legislative intendment as discernible is thus that a noconfidence motion brought against the President or the Vice President of the Gaon Panchayat is lost within the meaning of 2nd proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Act, if either it is rejected on due deliberations in a meeting duly convened as enjoined therein or if the motion fails for cause or causes other than procedural defects or irregularities in convening the meeting be it for the violation of the time frame or uncalled for or unauthorized intervention of any authority not contemplated in the scheme statutorily delineated for adherence. Whereas, such an infringement of the time schedule prescribed for the successive stages, or interferences of authorities not envisaged depending on the extent and the nature of the impairment caused thereby, may render an ongoing process vitiated thereby, the inescapable consequence thereof need not necessarily be that the motion would be lost as comprehended in the 2nd proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Act. Such a consequence is also neither discernible nor deductible from Section 15(1). We, thus, cannot lend our concurrence to the plea that each and every non-compliance of the procedural essentials for prosecuting the process of no-confidence motion would, inexorably imply that it (motion of no-confidence) would be lost. In the facts and circumstances of the case, having regard to the nature of the contraventions, we are of the unhesitant opinion that though the proceedings of the meeting dated 12.03.2009 are invalid in view of the unauthorised intrusion of the Anchalik Panchayat in the process, it would not connote that the no-confidence motion thereby, had been lost so as to attract the bar against initiation of a fresh pursuit with the same objective within six months thereafter. The process, in our view subsists and is capable of being furthered from the stage of the receipt of the requisition dated 19.02.2009 expressing the no-confidence against the appellant." 19. In the present case, it may be noticed that the no-confidence motion moved on 21.08.2020 was not "lost". In fact, it was carried through. The Learned Single Judge in the order dated 08.09.2020 in W.P.(C) No. 3411 of 2020 had very emphatically stated that the resolution had not been defeated. But, as because the counsel for the respondents therein (appellants herein) submitted that they may be permitted to withdraw the resolution for their perceived deficiency in the notice period, the Court declared the resolution null and void. If the movers of the motion seek to withdraw the resolution before the Court, such a resolution could not subsist anymore and in that context the Court declared it as null and void. Therefore, if the said resolution of the no-confidence was invalidated, it was on the ground of procedural deficiency, as perceived and believed by the supporters of the no-confidence motion. The declaration of the said resolution as null and void by the Court was not after it was defeated on merit. Therefore, if the said resolution of the no-confidence was invalidated, it was on the ground of procedural deficiency, as perceived and believed by the supporters of the no-confidence motion. The declaration of the said resolution as null and void by the Court was not after it was defeated on merit. On the contrary, as mentioned above, it was a successful motion and not a defeated one and thus not "lost" so as to attract the bar under the second proviso to Section 15 (1) of the Act. 20. We are thus of the opinion that, understood in the light of the decision in Forhana (supra), the no confidence motion, though declared by the Court as null and void in the earlier order dated 08.09.2020 could not have been held to have been "lost" as held in the subsequent order dated 15.10.2020. Even if it is deemed to be "lost" since it was declared null and void as held by the Court in the subsequent order dated 15.10.2020, certainly, the said loss was not after proper and due deliberations on merit but because of procedural deficiency in not giving notice with 15 days period, as perceived by the appellants. This perception of the appellants can be construed to be conceding on their part that there was procedural deficiency. 21. As regards the impugned order dated 15.10.2020 reviewing the earlier order dated 08.09.2020, we doubt whether any case was made out to review the said order dated 08.09.2020. The essence of the order dated 15.10.2020 which was sought to be reviewed can be found in Para No. 10 of the order relevant portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow: "4. .. The resolution of removing the petitioner from the post President of the Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat has assailed in this writ petition on the ground that the there were irregularities leading to violation of the requirements of Section 15 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994. 7. Mr. P.N. Goswami, appearing for the respondents no. 9 to 17 had made a statement that there is a possibility that the procedural requirement of Section 15(1) may not have been followed. 8. In the circumstance, the learned counsel upon instruction from the respondents no. 7. Mr. P.N. Goswami, appearing for the respondents no. 9 to 17 had made a statement that there is a possibility that the procedural requirement of Section 15(1) may not have been followed. 8. In the circumstance, the learned counsel upon instruction from the respondents no. 9 to 17 has stated that the said respondents desire to withdraw the resolution dated 21.08.2020 by which the petitioner was removed from the post of President of the Sonabarighat Gaon Panchayat, Cachar. 9. Mr. M. Nath, learned counsel for the respondent in the PNRD as well as Ms. K. Phukan, learned counsel for the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar do not object to the stand on the part of the respondents no. 9 to 17. 10. In view of the specific stand of the respondents no. 9 to 17, we are inclined to accept the contention of Mr. P.N. Goswami, and declare the resolution dated 21.08.2020 to be null and void. As the resolution has not been defeated, but is a case where it has not been pressed upon by the respondents, resulting in its withdrawal, we are of the view that the respondents no. 9 to 17 are entitled to proceed in any manner, as they may be advised, under the law against the writ petitioner." 22. The aforesaid order was modified by the subsequent order passed in the review petition vide impugned order dated 15.10.2020, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "4. The respondents No.9 to17 in the writ petition being the members of the Gaon Panchayat who had moved the no confidence against the President conceded to the extent that the requirement of Section 15(1) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 may not have been followed. In the circumstance, the respondent expressed the desire that they may be allowed to withdraw the resolution dated 21.08.2020 by which the President was removed. Upon such statement, the writ petition was closed by allowing the members of the Gaon Panchayat to withdraw the Resolution dated 21.08.2020. But at the same time, we take note of that in paragraph 10 of the order dated 08.09.2020 there was a declaration that the resolution dated 21.08.2020 was null and void. Upon such statement, the writ petition was closed by allowing the members of the Gaon Panchayat to withdraw the Resolution dated 21.08.2020. But at the same time, we take note of that in paragraph 10 of the order dated 08.09.2020 there was a declaration that the resolution dated 21.08.2020 was null and void. The resolution dated 21.08.2020 was passed pursuant to the motion of no confidence instituted by the members of the Gaon Panchayat and when there is a declaration that the resultant resolution passed in such motion is null and void, it has to be understood that the motion was lost. When the motion was lost, the consequence of the other relevant provisions of law including that of that there cannot be a further no confidence motion again within a period of 6(six) moths would also be applicable." 23. We have perused the grounds taken by the review petitioners in the review petition which were essentially on two grounds. Firstly, it has been contended that as the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Act is very clear that when the requisition becomes a finality, then noconfidence motion cannot be brought within the next six months. Secondly, the respondents no. 9 to 17 (appellants herein) could not have been permitted to withdraw the resolution, as such an withdrawal can be allowed only at the requisition stage stage and when it has culminated into a resolution and since the Court declared the resolution dated 21.08.2020 as null and void, it is obvious that the no-confidence motion was lost. 9 to 17 (appellants herein) could not have been permitted to withdraw the resolution, as such an withdrawal can be allowed only at the requisition stage stage and when it has culminated into a resolution and since the Court declared the resolution dated 21.08.2020 as null and void, it is obvious that the no-confidence motion was lost. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid grounds taken could not have been relevant for the purpose of reviewing an earlier order, inasmuch as the aforesaid grounds taken do not come within the purview of the principles contained in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC which would also generally apply to a writ proceeding as these are not case of discovery of new and important matter on evidence which could not be produced in time when the earlier order was passed nor can it be said to be any mistake or error which is apparent on the face of the record, as held in Union of India v. B. Valluvan, (2006) 8 SCC 686 , that, "The High Court, indisputably, has a power of review, but it must be exercised within the framework of Section 114 read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 24. Moreover, an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and in exercise of the review jurisdiction it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected" as was held in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 , as follows: "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., (1964) AIR SC 1372 : (1964) 5 SCR 174 (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined: "What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. of A.P., (1964) AIR SC 1372 : (1964) 5 SCR 174 (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined: "What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error." (emphasis ours) 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 while quoting with approval a passage from AribamTuleshwar Sharma v. AribamPishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389 this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". Thus, even if, the Learned Single Judge felt that there was sufficient reason to review the earlier order, it really amount to correcting an "erroneous" order passed earlier. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". Thus, even if, the Learned Single Judge felt that there was sufficient reason to review the earlier order, it really amount to correcting an "erroneous" order passed earlier. The earlier decision of the Court in the order dated 08.09.2020 was that though the resolution dated 21.08.2020 was declared null and void, the resolution had not been defeated. On the contrary, in the subsequent review order, impugned herein, the finding of the Court was that when there is a declaration that the resultant resolution passed is null and void, it has to be understood that that the motion lost. In our view, that change in the decision could have done in an appeal and not by way of review. In the present case, in fact, there was no "erroneous" decision in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Forhana (supra). The view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 15.10.2020 cannot be said to the correct view of the legality of withdrawn resolution of no-confidence motion. In our view, the resolution which was already passed by the overwhelming majority of the members present, though was declared null and void, cannot be said to have been defeated or lost for the purpose of activating the bar in the second proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act. Consequently, if the aforesaid resolution taken on 21.08.2020 cannot be said to have been "lost" within the meaning of Section 15(1) of the Act, the bar on bringing another no-confidence motion within a period of six months cannot apply. We, accordingly, are not able to agree with the clarification made by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order to the effect that when there is a declaration that the resultant resolution passed in the motion is null and void, it has to be understood that the motion was lost and that when the motion was lost, the consequence of other relevant provisions of law including that there cannot be a further no confidence motion again within six months would also be applicable. Thus, the decision rendered in the review order can be said to be erroneous in law being contrary to the decision in Forhana (supra). 25. Thus, the decision rendered in the review order can be said to be erroneous in law being contrary to the decision in Forhana (supra). 25. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find merit in the writ appeal and allow the same by setting aside the impugned order dated 15.10.2020 by clarifying that since the resolution dated 21.08.2020 passing the no-confidence motion cannot be said to have been "lost" within the meaning of Section 15 (1) of the Act, the bar in bringing no-confidence motion against the President within six months thereof will not apply. 26. With the above observations, the Appeal is allowed.