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2020 DIGILAW 781 (JHR)

Lalan Prasad Tiwari v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation through its Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi

2020-08-19

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2020
JUDGMENT : The present writ petition is taken up today through Video conferencing. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing and setting aside the demand notice issued by the respondent no. 2 – the Deputy Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi Municipal Corporation (RMC), Ranchi vide letter no. 733 dated 19.03.2020 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), whereby enhanced licence fee and interest has been demanded from the petitioner on the alleged ground that the petitioner has occupied additional area than the area actually settled in his favour. Further prayer has been made for directing the respondent authorities to re-compute and determine the licence fee payable by the petitioner without computing any liability towards interest after taking physical measurement of the settled property/properties in occupation of the petitioner situated at East Circle, Church Road, Ranchi. 2. The respondent-RMC filed a counter affidavit annexing therewith a copy of order dated 29.05.2020 passed by the respondent no. 2. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an interlocutory application being I.A. No. 4063 of 2020 seeking amendment in the writ petition by inserting additional prayer for quashing the order dated 29.05.2020. 3. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that in the year 1974, vide resolution of Land Market Committee contained in memo no.1213 dated 06.11.1974, an area of 60 ft. X 25 ft. land i.e., 1500 sq. ft. situated at plot no. 301, East Circle Church Road, Ranchi was settled in the name of one Panchu Tiwari i.e., the grandfather of the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as “the original licensee”). Subsequently, adjacent area of 26 ft X 12 ft i.e., 312 sq. ft. was also settled in favour of the original licensee, who was doing the business of charcoal and firewood on the said piece of land. After the death of the original licensee, Panna Lal Tiwari (the father of the petitioner) and Hira Lal Tiwari stepped into the shoes of the deceased licensee and continued to pay the licence fee etc. for the total area admeasuring 1812 sq. ft. to the RMC. In the year 2010, Hira Lal Tiwari and Panna Lal Tiwari divided the said premises having total area of 1812 sq. ft. in the ratio of 60:40 and accordingly, Panna Lal Tiwari got an area of 1087.20 sq. ft. of the land and Hira Lal Tiwari got 724.8 sq. ft. of the land in question. ft. to the RMC. In the year 2010, Hira Lal Tiwari and Panna Lal Tiwari divided the said premises having total area of 1812 sq. ft. in the ratio of 60:40 and accordingly, Panna Lal Tiwari got an area of 1087.20 sq. ft. of the land and Hira Lal Tiwari got 724.8 sq. ft. of the land in question. The said division was duly recognized by the RMC and vide letter no. 1426 dated 15.05.2010 and separate licence fee was fixed by the respondent-authorities in favour of the father of the petitioner. In the year 2011, the father of the petitioner died leaving behind the petitioner as his only son and accordingly, the said premises was duly inherited by the petitioner which was also acknowledged by the RMC. The petitioner paid the rent, licence fee etc. upto 2015-16 for the settled premises to the RMC. However, from the financial year 2016-17, the licence fee was not being accepted by RMC from the petitioner as well as his uncle Hira Lal Tiwari. The petitioner repeatedly visited the office of the RMC for acceptance of the licence fee etc. of the settled premises, but the RMC refused to accept the said amount from the petitioner and it was only verbally informed to him that the same was not being accepted on the alleged ground that he was in occupation of certain additional area than the area actually settled in his favour. The petitioner filed a detailed representation dated 28.03.2017 before the Chief Executive Officer, Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi requesting inter alia to carry out physical verification of the premises in question to ascertain as to whether he is in occupation of any additional land or not and to determine the rent payable by him. The respondent-RMC paid no heed to the petitioner’s representation and as such he along with Hira Lal Tiwari filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1661 of 2018 for a direction upon the respondents to accept the yearly rent and licence fee against the settled premises for the year 2016-17 and 2017-18 from them and to renew the licences after accepting the licence fee for the said period. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 23.07.2018 with a liberty to the writ petitioners to prefer fresh representation(s) before the respondent no.1 – the Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi with a direction to the said authority to verify the relevant records and to take appropriate decision in the matter within a period of 12 weeks from the date of filing of the representation. Pursuant to the order dated 23.07.2018, the petitioner filed a representation dated 14.08.2018 before the respondent no. 1, however, no action was taken and as such he filed contempt application being Cont. Case (Civil) No. 117 of 2019 which is still pending. In the meantime, the petitioner has been served a demand notice as contained in letter no.733 dated 19.03.2020 (received on 22.05.2020) issued by the respondent no. 2, wherein he has been directed to pay enhanced licence fee @ 1.5 times of the licence fee payable by him in respect of the said premises on the alleged ground that he has occupied additional premises of 1569 sq. ft. The RMC further demanded @ 2 times of the licence fee for the extra premises allegedly occupied by the petitioner along with interest on the unpaid amount of licence fee for the financial year 2016-17 to 2019-20. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned demand notice is wholly arbitrary, illegal and has been issued in utter violation of the principles of natural justice and as such the same is liable to be quashed. It is further submitted that in the impugned demand notice, it has been alleged that an inspection was carried out by the RMC, wherein the petitioner was found in possession of an area of 2656 sq. ft. land instead of allotted land of 1087 sq. ft. and thus, it was alleged that he is in excess possession of land of 1569 sq. ft. However, no such physical inspection was ever carried out by the RMC which would be evident from the fact that the petitioner was never communicated about such inspection being carried out by the RMC. It is submitted that no official of the RMC has ever visited his settled/licensed premises or has carried out any physical verification of the area occupied by him. It is submitted that no official of the RMC has ever visited his settled/licensed premises or has carried out any physical verification of the area occupied by him. Moreover, no signature was obtained from the petitioner on any document with regard to the alleged physical inspection of the area occupied by him. It is submitted that the petitioner has been in occupation of 1087 sq. ft. of land which has come in his share after division and no additional land has been occupied by him. It is also submitted that due to wrong determination, the petitioner is said to be in possession of excess area than the actual allotted area for which the impugned demand notice has been issued. The impugned demand has an adverse civil consequence on the petitioner and the minimum requirement of granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner has not been fulfilled by the respondent authorities much less any physical inspection. It is further submitted that the petitioner is also not liable to pay interest upon the alleged demand since it would be evident that it was the petitioner who on the earlier occasion raised grievance regarding non-acceptance of licence fee from him w.e.f. financial year 2016-17 onwards and he even approached this Court for issuance of appropriate direction upon the respondent authorities to accept the licence fee etc. from him. Even after passing of the order in W.P.(C) No. 1661 of 2018, the same was not complied by the RMC in its true letter and spirit. Though the respondent no. 1 was directed to examine the relevant records pursuant to the representation, however, the respondent no. 2 straightway saddled the petitioner with a huge amount of enhanced licence fee along with interest. It is further submitted that the petitioner is ready to pay the amount of licence fee @ Rs.4.90 per sq. ft. per month for the allotted premises, however, the same is not being accepted by the respondents. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-RMC submits that a piece of land measuring an area of about 725 sq. ft. was settled to Mr. Hira Lal Tiwari and an area of 1087 sq. ft. was settled in the name of Lalan Prasad Tiwari (the petitioner herein). The rent of these pieces of land was paid till the year 2015-16. In compliance of the office order no. ft. was settled to Mr. Hira Lal Tiwari and an area of 1087 sq. ft. was settled in the name of Lalan Prasad Tiwari (the petitioner herein). The rent of these pieces of land was paid till the year 2015-16. In compliance of the office order no. 3740 dated 12.09.2015, measurement of the settled premises was done and as per the measurement report, the petitioner was found in unauthorized occupation of extra land measuring an area of 1569 sq. ft. which is much more than the land which was earlier settled in his favour. The said extra piece of land was being used by the petitioner for keeping bamboo, wood and other materials for his business purposes. In view of the office order no. 4876 dated 15.12.2015 issued by the RMC, if anybody is found to be in illegal occupation of the land which is in addition or extra to the land originally allotted to a person, the said person shall have to pay rent @ 1.5 times of the land originally settled to him and the rent equivalent to two times for that area which is in his illegal and unauthorized occupation. The petitioner has been charged the penal rent in the light of the said office order. It is further submitted that the representation filed by the petitioner pursuant to the order dated 23.07.2018 passed by this Court was misplaced by the Amin and, therefore, no reasoned order could be passed. However, as soon as the file was traced, the RMC started to review its demand register and it was found that the petitioner and Hira Lal Tiwari had not paid the rent since 2016-17 and as such the alleged demand notice has been served upon the petitioner. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. Admittedly, 1087 sq. ft. land was actually settled in the name of the petitioner by the RMC and the rent of the said land was paid till 2015-16. The claim of the RMC is that an inspection was carried out in the premises of the petitioner in the year 2015, wherein he was found in unauthorized occupation of extra land measuring an area of 1569 sq. ft. being used for keeping bamboo, wood and other materials for his business purposes and thus, in view of the office order no. ft. being used for keeping bamboo, wood and other materials for his business purposes and thus, in view of the office order no. 4876 dated 15.12.2015, the impugned demand notice has been issued to the petitioner which needs no interference of this Court. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the entire allegation levelled against the petitioner is false and concocted. The RMC has never inspected the premises of the petitioner in his presence which would be evident from the fact that no signature of the petitioner was ever obtained on any inspection report. The said contention of the petitioner has not been controverted by the respondent-RMC by placing on record any such document. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that though the respondent-RMC has claimed that pursuant to the office order dated 12.09.2015, measurement of the settled land was taken, yet no date of the said alleged measurement has been mentioned in the counter affidavit. Even a copy of any such inspection report in respect of the alleged measurement has not been annexed with the counter affidavit which itself creates doubt over such statement of the respondent-RMC. No measurement was taken by the respondent-RMC to the best of knowledge of the petitioner and no signature was ever obtained from him on any measurement report. It has also been submitted that the officer order dated 15.12.2015 is not applicable in the case of the petitioner as he is not in occupation of any unauthorized area. 8. In the case of “Kesar Enterprises Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.” reported in (2011) 13 SCC 733 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : 26. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 664 ] R.S. Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of “natural justice”. Referring to a catena of decisions, His Lordship observed thus: (SCC p. 666) “Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem, and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem, and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle—as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application—seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.” (emphasis added) 27. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [ (2005) 6 SCC 321 ] the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. In Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [ (2005) 6 SCC 321 ] the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights, the Court said: (SCC p. 331, para 14) “14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held.” 29. A Bench of three Judges, speaking through one of us (D.K. Jain, J.), explaining the concept of “natural justice” and the principles governing its application, summed up the legal position as under: (Sahara India case [ (2008) 14 SCC 151 ], SCC p. 163, paras 19-20) “19. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. 20. We may, however, hasten to add that no general rule of universal application can be laid down as to the applicability of the principle audi alteram partem, in addition to the language of the provision. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the said principle should be applied. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. Therefore, we refrain from giving an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the said principle should be applied. The question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of all these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined.” 31. Undoubtedly, action under the said Rule is a quasi-judicial function which involves due application of mind to the facts as well as to the requirements of law. Therefore, it is plain that before raising any demand and initiating any step to recover from the executant of the bond any amount by way of penalty, there has to be an adjudication as regards the breach of condition(s) of the bond or the failure to produce the discharge certificate within the time mentioned in the bond on the basis of the explanation as also the material which may be adduced by the person concerned denying the liability to pay such penalty. Moreover, the penalty amount has also to be quantified before proceedings for recovery of the amount so determined are taken. 9. In the case of “Voltas Ltd. Vs. Tahsildar, Thane & Ors.” reported in (2012) 13 SCC 165 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no penal order can be passed without issuing any notice and providing hearing to the affected person. 10. Further, in the case of “Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. Vs. CCE reported in (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 35. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak case [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 ] that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 ] also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Suvarna Board Mills [ (1994) 5 SCC 566 ], this aspect was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 568, para 3) “3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 11. It is well established that the principles of natural justice are quite flexible. These cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. State authorities, while exercising the powers vested in them, must observe the principles of natural justice. It is well established that the principles of natural justice are quite flexible. These cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. State authorities, while exercising the powers vested in them, must observe the principles of natural justice. Irrespective of as to whether the statute provides for notice or not, it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to issue a notice to the person concerned disclosing the circumstances under which a particular proceeding is sought to be initiated against him, failing which the conclusion would be that the principles of natural justice have been violated. It is imperative especially if an action is going to have adverse civil consequences against the affected party. An order passed by a State authority by reasons of which a citizen would be visited with adverse civil consequences, must meet the test of principles of natural justice. 12. In the present case, it is alleged by the respondent-RMC that the petitioner has encroached excess area than the area actually allotted to him, however, the said allegation has outrightly been denied by the petitioner. Since the dispute surfacing in the matter was purely factual in nature, the respondent-RMC was required to make spot verification/measurement of the land in question in the presence of the petitioner so as to adhere to the principles of natural justice. Though the respondent-RMC has claimed that a spot verification has been done by its officials, it has failed to bring on record sufficient evidence in support of its contention more so when the said fact has been denied by the petitioner. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent-RMC has tried to justify the action taken by the RMC contending that the representation of the petitioner was misplaced by the Amin and, therefore, a reasoned order could not be passed, however, as soon as the file was traced, the order dated 29.05.2020 has been passed. Interestingly, the representation of the petitioner filed before the respondent no. 1 pursuant to the order dated 23.07.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1661 of 2018 was kept pending and the impugned demand notice dated 19.03.2020 was issued meanwhile to the petitioner. After the filing of the present writ petition, the respondent no. Interestingly, the representation of the petitioner filed before the respondent no. 1 pursuant to the order dated 23.07.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1661 of 2018 was kept pending and the impugned demand notice dated 19.03.2020 was issued meanwhile to the petitioner. After the filing of the present writ petition, the respondent no. 2 has passed the order dated 29.05.2020 and the demand raised vide notice dated 19.03.2020 has been confirmed post facto. 14. In the case of “H.L. Trehan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1989) 1 SCC 764 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the post decisional opportunity of hearing does not subserve the rules of natural justice. The authority who embarks upon a post decisional hearing will naturally proceed with a closed mind and there is hardly any chance of getting a proper consideration of representation at such a post decisional opportunity. 15. In the present case, it is evident from the conduct of the respondent-RMC that the impugned order dated 29.05.2020 has been passed merely as an eyewash only to justify the impugned demand notice. Thus, the respondent-RMC appears to have acted in a prejudiced manner while deciding the representation of the petitioner. Moreover, the interest charged by the RMC on the due rent and licence fee for the premises in question also appears to be arbitrary and illegal as it has failed to show before this Court that any demand notice for the alleged amount was earlier raised which the petitioner failed to pay. On the contrary, it is evident that the petitioner himself preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1661 of 2018 seeking direction upon the RMC to accept rent and licence fee for the premises in question which in fact supports the stand of the petitioner that he was always ready and willing to pay the due rent and licence fee and it was the RMC who was at fault in not realizing the said amount from him. Since in the present case, enhanced licence fee and interest has been demanded from the petitioner without providing any opportunity of hearing to him, I am of the considered view that the impugned demand notice being violative of the principles of natural justice, is liable to be quashed and set aside. 16. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the impugned demand notice issued by the respondent no. 16. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the impugned demand notice issued by the respondent no. 2 vide letter no. 733 dated 19.03.2020 as well as the order dated 29.05.2020 passed by the respondent no. 2 are quashed and set aside. 17. The respondent-RMC is directed to fix a date to carry out a site inspection of the premises in question in presence of the petitioner or his authorized representative so as to maintain transparency and fairness and thereafter to prepare a site inspection report on the spot which shall be signed by the inspecting team as well as the petitioner or his authorized representative. If the petitioner is found having occupied excess area than actually settled with him, the competent authority of RMC shall issue notice to the petitioner to explain his case and thereafter pass an informed order. Based upon the said order, the respondent-RMC shall raise a fresh demand for the due rent and licence fee after adjusting an amount of Rs. 5 lacs deposited by the petitioner with the RMC on 20.06.2020 in terms with the interim order dated 08.06.2020 passed by this Court. In case the petitioner is found not occupying any excess area, a fresh demand shall be raised on normal rate after adjusting the amount already paid by the petitioner. 18. The present writ petition is accordingly disposed of. I.A. No. 4063 of 2020 also stands disposed of.