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2020 DIGILAW 782 (JHR)

Nilam Devi v. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (IISCO)

2020-08-19

ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY, APARESH KUMAR SINGH

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JUDGMENT : Learned counsel Mr. Deepak Kumar Sinha for the petitioner and Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Vijay Kant Dubey representing the respondent company are present through Video Conferencing. 2. The substituted petitioner is the widow of the employee who had approached this Court being aggrieved by the order dated 16.03.2018 passed in OA/051/00119/2016 (Annexure-7) by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi. The applicant/employee had approached the learned CAT for a limited relief for payment of salary from 20.04.2004 till he was reinstated on 10.02.2010 on the plea that the respondent/employer had illegally caused his premature superannuation. Being aggrieved by the superannuation notice dated 27.10.2003, which was to the effect that on attaining the age of 60 on 24.04.2004, he will be superannuated from service w.e.f. 30.04.2004, petitioner had approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 5445 of 2007 i.e., after 3 years. Learned Writ Court passed an order on 27.06.2009 in the following terms: “The present writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- I. For quashing the office order/letter dated 27.10.2003 by which the petitioner has been served with a notice that on attaining the age of 60 years on 24.04.2004, he will be superannuated from service w.e.f 30.04.2004, even though according to the date of birth, as mentioned in his matriculation certificate and in other documents, submitted by the petitioner at the time of his appointment on 24.04.1972, the petitioner will attain the age of superannuation i.e.60 years, on 7.6.2014. II. For a direction upon the respondents concerned to immediately re-induct the petitioner into the service of the company along with all legally payable dues, benefits etc. as the respondents are bound to accept the date of birth of an employee as correct and final as per Implementation Instruction No.76 of National Coal Wage Agreement III. In the light of the Full Bench Judgment reported in Kamta Prasad v. B.C.C.L. as reported in 2007 (3) JLJR p.726 followed by several judgments including the judgments of this court the respondents are directed to follow the same in its true letter and spirit and pass a speaking order within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Put up this case after two months”. 3. Put up this case after two months”. 3. The writ petition was kept pending and perhaps has been dismissed for default in 2017 as stated by learned counsel for the respondents. Pursuant to the directions of the Writ Court, employee was reinstated in service vide order dated 10.02.2010. He joined on the same date. However, in the intervening period between 30.04.2004 till the date of his joining on 10.02.2010 pursuant to his reinstatement was treated as “dies non”. In this background, employee approached the learned CAT for salary for the intervening period till his reinstatement. Learned CAT after considering the rival stand of the parties held as under : “11. We noted that although the applicant was superannuated w.e.f. 30.04.2004 he approached the Hon’ble High Court only in 2007 i.e. almost after three years. Therefore the applicant was never prompt in pursuing his remedies. Further, the Hon’ble High Court ordered in 2009, and therefore, it can be safely assumed that applicant was never following the matter diligently having never prayed for early hearing of the matter. However, We noted that the applicant was taken back only in February 2010 i.e. eight months after the order despite the clear mandate of the High Court as on 26.07.2009 to consider and issue speaking order within two months. 12. Nevertheless, we failed to discern any clear direction from the High Court in regard to reinstatement or back wages. We feel that the applicant ought to have sought an order for back wages from the Hon’ble High Court itself. We further noted that in Kamta Pandey (supra) no specific direction for back wages were given. It would be highly unfair on our part to read something into the order that is not granted by the Hon’ble High Court. 13. Be that as it may, the respondents having failed to act in accordance with the mandate of the Hon’ble High Court were deliberately at fault in delaying the matter for a further period of six months. Therefore, in all fairness, for the period, the applicant was prevented from earning salary, he deserved to be compensated appropriately in terms of salary since he was taken back ultimately. 14. Therefore, in all fairness, for the period, the applicant was prevented from earning salary, he deserved to be compensated appropriately in terms of salary since he was taken back ultimately. 14. We further note that the implication of “dies non” is that the period of service between the erstwhile superannuation and the subsequent reinstatement is wiped out from the service period yielding no benefit to the applicant either in terms of salary or as service enuring to his pension. In view of his reinstatement, we modify the treatment of intervening period of “dies non” to that of a period to be reckoned for all other purposes excluding salary but including pension and pensionary benefits. 15. Since the applicant has superannuated by now, the respondents shall appropriately assess his pension by treating the intervening period from 20.04.2004 till his joining as period spent on duty for all purposes other then salary. 16. In the aforesaid backdrop let appropriate order revising the pension, be issued within three months and the arrear salary for the period (two months from the date of judgment till reinstatement) be released in favour of the applicant within one month thereafter.” 4. The impugned directions did not satisfy the grievance of the petitioner for full back wages during the intervening period from his retirement 30.04.2004 till his reinstatement on 10.02.2010. That is why, he has approached this Court and during pendency of the writ petition, unfortunately passed away. His widow is the present petitioner. 5. Whether the denial of back wages is proper in the eyes of law and whether the impugned decision of the learned CAT suffers from any error on facts or law warranting interferencing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are the questions to be decided herein. Mr. Deepak Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner, in particular, has referred to the decision of full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kamta Pandey Vrs. BCCL reported in 2007 (3) JLJR 726 . He submits that respondents have committed an error in superannuating him prematurely, though the official documents including the matriculation certificate were pointing to a different date of birth. As such, employee should not be made to suffer for the fault of the employer by denying him the back wages for the intervening period. He submits that respondents have committed an error in superannuating him prematurely, though the official documents including the matriculation certificate were pointing to a different date of birth. As such, employee should not be made to suffer for the fault of the employer by denying him the back wages for the intervening period. He further submits that there was no delay in approaching the writ court in 2007 since the employee was faithfully pursuing his representation before the respondent. The respondent alsotook 8months’time topass the orderof reinstatement, though they were obliged to pass speaking order within a period of 2 months from the date of receipt of the representation. The widow now is being made to suffer in monetary terms because of denial of back wages though the learned CAT has directed the intervening period to be counted for the purpose of pensionary benefits. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Indrajit Sinha has countered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that learned CAT has weighed the pros and cons of the case of both the parties and passed a balanced order. He submits that the employee was himself not diligent in raising his grievance and approached the writ court after 3 years in 2007. The employer passed an order of reinstatement in compliance of the directions of the writ court in 2010. The writ petitioner is in the second round of litigation. Such a prayed was there in the first writ petition W.P.(S) No. 5445 of 2007, as has been quoted in the order dated 27.06.2009 (Annexure-1) also, but the learned Writ Court consciously did not allow such prayer. As such, present relief would be barred by res judicata. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in case the directions of the learned CAT has yet not been carried out, so far as counting of the service of the intervening period for pensionary benefit is concerned, respondent would comply it within a reasonable time in the event that the order has attained finality. 7. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties, relevant pleadings on record and gone through the impugned order as well. We are of the opinion that on a proper consideration of the conspectus of the facts, learned CAT has taken a considered view of the matter and balanced the equities. 7. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties, relevant pleadings on record and gone through the impugned order as well. We are of the opinion that on a proper consideration of the conspectus of the facts, learned CAT has taken a considered view of the matter and balanced the equities. The order of reinstatement discounting the total period from 30.04.2004 till his reinstatement on 10.02.2010 as “dies non” was obviously not fair and proper on the part of the employer, once they had rectified their decision and reinstated the petitioner in service. That is why the learned CAT chose to set aside that part of the order of reinstatement dated 10.02.2010 and directed the intervening period till his reinstatement to be counted for all other purposes including pensionary benefits except salary. The employee had himself caused delay for 3 years in approaching the writ court in 2007 after his premature retirement in 2004. The Learned CAT has however ordered for payment of the salary for six months or the period the respondent delayed the matter in passing the speaking order despite a clear direction by the writ court to do so within two months. The impugned direction appears to be proper and equitable taking into account all the relevant circumstances in mind. Reliance placed on the decision of Kamta Pandey (supra) is not of any help to the petitioner in the fact of the present case since the award of back wages cannot be said to be automatic in all cases but are dependent upon host of factors. In the fact of the present case, the decision of the Learned CAT for counting of services for the intervening period till his reinstatement for pensionary benefits except salary meets the ends of justice and cannot be found fault with by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 8. We do not find any merit in the instant petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed.