ORDER : 1. Since the issues involved in all the captioned appeals are the same and the challenge is also to the selfsame order passed by the learned Single Judge, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the Letters Patent Appeal No. 563 of 2020 filed in the Special Civil Application No. 6986 of 2018 is treated as the lead matter. 3. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is at the instance of the Junagadh Municipal Corporation being the unsuccessful writ applicant in a batch of writ applications and is directed against the common judgment and order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 21st June, 2019 in the Special Civil Application No. 6986 of 2018 and allied petitions by which the learned Single Judge rejected all the writ applications filed by the Corporation thereby affirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court in favour of the workmen. 4. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be summarized as under: 4.1 The respondents (workmen) were working as Safai Kamdars with the Junagadh Municipal Corporation. Their services came to be terminated with effect from 14th March, 2014. Each of such workmen, whose services were terminated, raised dispute which, ultimately, came to be referred by way of reference to the Labour Court, Junagadh. The Labour Court, Junagadh passed awards in favour of the workmen by directing the Corporation to reinstate them on the original post without the benefit of continuity in service and back-wages. 4.2 The Corporation, being dissatisfied with the judgments and awards passed by the Labour Court, came before this Court by filing, in all, 27 writ applications, questioning the legality and validity of all the awards. The learned Single Judge, by a common judgment and order dated 21st June, 2019, rejected all the writ applications filed by the Corporation and thereby affirmed the awards passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh. 4.3 The learned Single Judge, while rejecting all the writ applications filed by the Corporation, held as under: “9. Learned advocate Mr. The learned Single Judge, by a common judgment and order dated 21st June, 2019, rejected all the writ applications filed by the Corporation and thereby affirmed the awards passed by the Labour Court, Junagadh. 4.3 The learned Single Judge, while rejecting all the writ applications filed by the Corporation, held as under: “9. Learned advocate Mr. Asit Joshi for the respondent workmen also relied upon the decision of this Court passed in Special Civil Application No. 12941/2017 filed by the petitioner Junagadh Municipal Corporation against one Jayendra Premjibhai Vaghela and another on similar facts of the present case, wherein also this Court dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner Junagadh Municipal Corporation declining to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. Learned advocate for the petitioner has however, fairly submitted that earlier also when the petitioner had terminated the service of similarly situated daily wagers (Sweepers, Safai Kamdars) in the year 2003, the Labour Court passed similar order of holding such termination as illegal and directed the petitioner Corporation to reinstate such workmen on the original post with continuity of service, however, without backwages. Therefore, being aggrieved by such orders, the petitioner Junagadh Municipal Corporation filed Special Civil Application No. 10705/2016 and other cognate matters. Such petitions were dismissed by this Court. The petitioner therefore being aggrieved by dismissal of the petitions preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 1441/2018 and other cognate matters arising from the common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the petitions. Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice Anant S.Dave and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Biren Vaishnav) vide order dated 30.11.2018 was pleased to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the petitioner Junagadh Municipal Corporation after considering all the arguments which were made by the learned advocate Mr. Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice Anant S.Dave and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Biren Vaishnav) vide order dated 30.11.2018 was pleased to dismiss the Letters Patent Appeals filed by the petitioner Junagadh Municipal Corporation after considering all the arguments which were made by the learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw and after considering the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Gauri Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 12 SCC 754 and the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 735/2017 and allied appeals held as under: “8.3 What, therefore, emerges on the perusal of the awards of the Labour Court, so affirmed by the learned Single Judge, is that the Labour Court on appreciation of evidence arrived at finding of fact that the respondents had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 months prior to their discontinuance from service. That such discontinuance amounted to termination as it was without notice and payment of retrenchment compensation. The Labour Court was therefore right that the mandate of Section 25F of the Act was not followed and therefore awarded reinstatement in service. Such finding of fact arrived at by the Labour Court has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge had done so while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that such exercise of powers was in any manner erroneous when they were so done on appreciation of the finding of fact by the Labour Court which recorded valid and cogent reasons to answer the points in dispute.” 11. In view of the aforesaid submissions and settled legal position, it is clear that reliance placed by the learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw on the statements at Annexure-C to the respective petitions to demonstrate that respondent workmen did not work for 240 days is dealt with by the Labour Court in the impugned judgment and award by holding that such statement is without any basis as the petitioner did not produce any attendance register, salary register which were in their possession. Labour Court has therefore, relying upon the cross examination of the witness of the petitioner at Exh.21 came to the conclusion that the respective respondent workmen continuously worked with the petitioner Corporation. Labour Court has therefore, relying upon the cross examination of the witness of the petitioner at Exh.21 came to the conclusion that the respective respondent workmen continuously worked with the petitioner Corporation. The contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner is therefore, not tenable in view of the fact that the petitioner withheld the relevant documents from the Labour Court for the reason best known to it and therefore, the Labour Court had no option but to drawn an adverse inference in favour of the respondents. 12. The Labour Court therefore, on consideration of materials available on record has rightly come to the conclusion that though the respondent workmen were appointed as daily wagers, rigors of section 25F of the Act is applicable as the petitioner did not give any notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation while terminating their services. The Labour Court has further arrived at the conclusion that respondent workman discharged their duties for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months by drawing adverse inference in absence of any documentary evidence produced by the petitioner. The Labour Court has therefore, on appreciation of evidence on record partly allowed the reference in favour of the respondent workmen by passing the order of reinstatement without backwages and without continuity of service. 13. With regard to the contention o the learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw to mould the relief and awarding compensation to the respondent workman, the same contention is negatived by the Division Bench in the judgment rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1441/2018 as under: “7. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we see no reason to dislodge this finding of fact of Labour Court which in turn was affirmed by the learned Single Judge when admittedly the respondent claimants had worked for a period of 240 days in the preceding 12 months and when their services were discontinued without notice or compensation. 8. The other contention of Mr. Munshaw that even if we were to agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge with regard to the breach of Section 25F of the Act, should this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction, agree with the finding that the respondents deserved reinstatement or should this Court, as contended by the learned advocate Mr. Munshaw mould the relief and award compensation. Munshaw mould the relief and award compensation. 8.1 Once it is established that the termination of the respondents-claimants is in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, it cannot be said that merely because the respondents – claimants were daily wagers, such violation should be treated as a technical violation only and therefore compensation rather than reinstatement be awarded. While considering the question whether the High Court was right in modifying the award of the Labour Court of reinstatement by awarding compensation, the Apex Court in the case of Gauri Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 12 SCC 754 observed thus: “22. The Labour Court has rightly followed the normal rule of reinstatement of the workman in his original post as it has found that the order of termination is void abinitio in law for non compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act referred to supra. However, the Labour Court is not correct in denying backwages without assigning any proper and valid reasons though the employer did not prove either its stringent financial conditions for denial of back wages or that workman has been gainfully employed during the period from the date of order of termination till the award was passed in favour of the workman except granting Rs. 2,500/- as compensation for the suffering caused to the workman. The same is erroneously modified by the learned single Judge who recorded the finding of fact for the first time by holding that the workman is a casual employee intermittently working in the respondent Department. 23. The learned single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in the case of Harjinder Singh (supra) wherein this Court has held thus: “21. 23. The learned single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in the case of Harjinder Singh (supra) wherein this Court has held thus: “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: “10......The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import, it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State (State of Mysore vs. Workers of Gold Mines AIR p. 928, para-10). The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in Jasmer Singh vs. State of Haryana.” 14. Division Bench also relied upon the decision rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 735/2017 and allied appeal as well as the decision of Apex Court in case of Mohan Lal vs. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 1253 to hold that the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement is not required to be interfered. 15. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the Labour Court has committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order by directing the petitioner to reinstate the respective respondent workmen to its original post without continuity of service and without backwages. Therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment and award while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment and award while exercising powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The petitions are therefore, devoid of any merit and are accordingly summarily dismissed with no order as to costs.” 4.4 Being dissatisfied with the afore-quoted judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Corporation is here before us by way of these appeals. 5. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in rejecting the petition holding that the termination of the workmen was in breach of the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H respectively of the Act, 1947. Mr. Munshaw would submit that the respondents were appointed purely on temporary basis and the appointment orders were being passed time to time with specific terms and conditions. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Munshaw, the case on hand is squarely covered within the provisions of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act, 1947 and the provisions of Section 25F of the Act would not be attracted in any manner. 6. Mr. Munshaw vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate an important question of fact that no regular recruitment process was ever undertaken at the time of the appointment of the respondents and the appointments were purely contractual and on temporary basis as per the availability of the work. He would argue that the employment offered to the respondents was not on any permanent or sanctioned post. 7. Mr. Munshaw submitted that once the case is covered within the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act, 1947, the question of applicability of Section 25G of the Act, 1947 would not arise. In other words, if a workman is appointed on contractual basis for doing seasonal work, the termination of contract of such a workman does not amount to retrenchment and thus would not attract the compliance of Section 25F of the Act, 1947. 8. Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in rejecting all the writ applications and thereby affirming the awards passed by the Labour Court. Mr. 8. Mr. Munshaw, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Corporation vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in rejecting all the writ applications and thereby affirming the awards passed by the Labour Court. Mr. Munshaw has one common argument to canvass in all this type of matters which come up before us for hearing, and the rhetorical incantation is that none of the workmen had completed 240 days of work in the preceding twelve months prior to their discontinuation from service. In this regard, significant reliance has been placed on a statement/chart which is at Page No. 22, Annexure-C to the paper-book. Mr. Munshaw would argue that the workmen were appointed as daily wagers and the provisions of Section 25F of the Act will have no application. Mr. Munshaw, in the alternative, submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have moulded the relief by awarding lump-sum monetary compensation to each of the workmen rather than affirming the award of the Labour Court, directing reinstatement. Mr. Munshaw, in support of his aforesaid submissions, has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation vs. Jadeja Govubha Chhanubha, 2014 (16) SCC 130 and the judgment and order passed by this Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation vs. Anil Budhabhai Vegad, Special Civil Application No. 13056 of 2009, decided on 16.09.2019. 9. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Munshaw prays that there being merit in his appeals, those be allowed and the impugned common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge be quashed and set aside and all the writ applications filed by the Corporation may be allowed. In the alternative, Mr. Munshaw prays that this Court may award lump-sum monetary compensation to each of the workmen rather than affirming the order of reinstatement in service. 10. On the other hand, all these appeals have been vehemently opposed by Mr. Joshi, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-workmen. He would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned common judgment and order. 11. Mr. Joshi would submit that the reliance placed on the statement annexed at Page-22. Annexure-C has been duly considered by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge. Mr. 11. Mr. Joshi would submit that the reliance placed on the statement annexed at Page-22. Annexure-C has been duly considered by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge. Mr. Joshi would argue that the Labour Court has recorded a categorical finding that such statement, upon which, significant reliance is sought to be placed, is without any basis as the Corporation failed to produce any attendance register as well as the salary register in their possession. Mr. Joshi would argue that there is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court as affirmed by the learned Single Judge that the Corporation was in breach of Section 25F of the Act. Mr. Joshi would argue that indisputably no notice, notice pay or retrenchment compensation was given while terminating their services. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Joshi prays that there being no merit in the appeals preferred by the Corporation, those be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge may be affirmed. ANALYSIS: 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order. 13. It is settled position of law that the High Court should interfere with an award passed by the Labour Court only on the procedure level and in cases where the decision of the Labour Court has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court may be justified to interfere with the factual aspects placed before the Labour Court only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting the evidence illegally or has made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary reliefs under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India may amount to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. The learned Single Judge rightly kept this position of law in mind while deciding the writ applications. 14. As Mr. Munshaw has laid much emphasis on Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act, 1947, we propose to say something in this regard. The learned Single Judge rightly kept this position of law in mind while deciding the writ applications. 14. As Mr. Munshaw has laid much emphasis on Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act, 1947, we propose to say something in this regard. Section 2(oo) of the Act, 1947 read with clause (bb) thereto reads as under: “2 (oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include:- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman. (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf. (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.” 15. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions had interpreted this provision to mean that the termination of service of an employer for any reason whatsoever which was covered by any of the exclusion clauses [(a), (b) and (c)] in the aforesaid definition would amount to retrenchment. The path breaking decision of the Supreme Court on this point is rendered in the matter of the State Bank of India vs. Shri N. Sundara Money, 1976 AIR 1111. Interpreting Section 2 (oo) as it stood prior to 18th August, 1984 in the light of its relevant exclusion clauses, late Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Bench in the aforesaid decision has made the following pertinent observations in para-8 of the report: “For any reason whatsoever very wide and almost admitting of no exemption....to retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or cutting. Section 2 (oo) is the master of the situation and the Court cannot truncate its amplitude.” 16. In paragraph 9, it has been observed that, “A break-down of Section 2(oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. ‘Termination...for any reason whatsoever’ are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is-has the employee’s service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. In paragraph 9, it has been observed that, “A break-down of Section 2(oo) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. ‘Termination...for any reason whatsoever’ are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is-has the employee’s service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced.” 17. The aforesaid decision in the case of State Bank of India (supra) has been followed by the Supreme Court in many of its later decisions. We may refer to some of those decisions here: (i) Hindustal Steel vs. Labour Court, AIR 1977 SC 31 (ii) Santosh Gupta vs. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 SC 1219 (iii) Management of K.S.R.T.C. vs. M. Borsinha, AIR 1988 SC 1320 (iv) Mohanlal vs. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd. AIR 1981 SC 1253 18. In view of this constant trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the then existing provisions of the term ‘retrenchment’ as found in Section 2 (oo), the legislature intervened by enacting further exclusive clause, in the form of clause (bb). It, therefore, becomes obvious that the Legislature wanted to remedy the difficulty which was found in the then existing exclusion of Clause (a), (b) and (c) in Section 2 (oo) and that is precisely the reason why the substantive provision excluding from the operation of the term ‘retrenchment’ those occasions which were covered by clause (bb) was enacted. 19. The definition of ‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(oo) and exception provided under Section 2(oo)(bb) came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in M. Venugopal vs. L.I.C. of India, A.P. and Another, (1994) 1 LLJ 597 and the Supreme Court has stated the legal position, thus in para-9, which reads as under at p. 600 of LLJ: “9....This Court from time to time held, that the definition of “retrenchment” being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit, termination of service in any manner and for any reason, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of “retrenchment.” State Bank of India vs. N. Sundara Money and Santosh Gupta vs. State Bank of Patiala. Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2(oo), under Clause (bb) the Legislature has excluded from the purview of “retrenchment” (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry; (ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo)....” 20. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in its judgment reported in Shailendra Nath Shukla vs. Vice-Chancellor, Allahabad University, 1987 L.I.C. 1607 examined the position as to in what cases, Section 2(oo) (bb) can be applied and stated the legal position as under in para-5: “5........Terminations which are included in it are those which are brought about either because of non-renewal of contract or because of expiry of time stipulated in agreement. The meaning is plain and simple. But in a society with so wide gap where bargaining power of employee is nil who is exposed to exploitation, the nature of employment cannot be judged on the letter issued by the employer but on the nature of duties performed. For instance workers employed for doing a particular job which may be for more than 240 days can be said to be covered by this clause as their engagement comes to an end because of completion of work. Similarly a workman employed for a stipulated period or completion of work whichever may be earlier may be covered in this clause. But if contractual employment is resorted to as mechanism to frustrate the claim of employee to become regular or permanent against a job which continues or the nature of duties is such that the colour of contractual engagement is given to take it out from the principal clause then such agreements shall have to be tested on anvil of fairness and bona-fide. An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Clause (bb). An agreement for arm twisting or to perpetuate the policy of hire and fire cannot be deemed to be included in Clause (bb). Because if it is left to employer not to renew contract whenever he likes irrespective of any circumstance then the protection afforded to a workman by treating every termination of service as retrenchment shall be rendered nugatory. It has to be confined to those limited cases where either the work or post ceases to exist or job comes to an end or the agreement for a specific period was bona-fide. It cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee’s work is also satisfactory but periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employees. That would be unfair labour practice (See: H.D. Singh vs. Reserve Bank of India).” 21. In another Division Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court, reported in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Company Limited vs. Ramesh Chandra Gouda and Another, 1994 (2) LLJ 1127, where again, while interpreting Section 2(oo), the Division Bench has stated as under in para-3 at p. 1129: “3....It is hence the general intention of the Legislature that all types of termination of services are to be covered by ‘retrenchment’ except the events excepted in sub-clauses (a) to (c). It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigorous interpretation and only govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in this case to treat any termination of services are retrenchment except what is strictly excepted....” 22. It is well known that exceptions to a general provision are to receive a rigorous interpretation and only govern specifically the situations covered by them and no further. An exception cannot be permitted to frustrate the general provisions of the Act in this case to treat any termination of services are retrenchment except what is strictly excepted....” 22. In another Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Bhikku Ram vs. Presiding Officer Industrial-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, 1996 (3) LLJ (Supp) 1126, the Division Bench has explained the legal position as under at p. 1143: “35.....If the employer resists the claim of the workman and invokes Section 2(oo)(bb), burden lies on the employer to show that though the employee has worked for 240 days in twelve months prior to termination of his service, such termination of service cannot be treated as retrenchment because it is in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment or on account of non-renewal of the contract of employment...only a bona-fide exercise of right by an employer to terminate the service in terms of the contract of employment or for non- renewal of the contract will be covered by Clause (bb). If the Court finds that the exercise of rights by the employer is not bona-fide or the employer has adopted the methodology of fixed term employment as a conduct or mechanism to frustrate the rights of the workman, the termination of the service will not be covered by the exception contained in Clause (bb). Instead the action of the employer will have to be treated as an act of unfair labour practice, as specified in the Fifth Schedule of the Act. ...In all other cases, termination of service will be treated as retrenchment unless they are covered by other exceptions I set out hereinabove.” 23. In yet another Division Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court, reported in Chakradhar Tripathy vs. State of Orissa and Others, 1992 L.I.C. 1813 in a concurring judgment, the Hon’ble Chief Justice B.L. Hansaria as he then was, has stated the position as under in paras-19 and 20: “19. It has been stated in the leading judgment that by taking resort to ‘colourable’ contracts, the protection of Section 25-F cannot be allowed to be frustrated. I think this statement of law takes care of the apprehension of Shri Nanda....” “20. It has been stated in the leading judgment that by taking resort to ‘colourable’ contracts, the protection of Section 25-F cannot be allowed to be frustrated. I think this statement of law takes care of the apprehension of Shri Nanda....” “20. There may be other cases also, these cannot be categories as observed by my learned Sister. All that I would like to emphasise is that the Courts would remove the veil in such cases and see the reality of the matter...” 24. A learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in his judgment reported in Madhya Pradesh Bank Karmachari Sangh vs. Syndicate Bank and Another, 1997 (3) LLJ (Supp) 536 after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, has concluded as under in para-18 at p. 543: “18. From the decisions noted above, it becomes apparent: (i) that the provisions of section 2(oo)(bb) are to be construed benevolently in favour of the workman. (ii) that if the workman is allowed to continue in service by making periodic appointments from time to time, then it can be said that the case would not fall under Section 2(oo)(bb). (iii) that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) are not to be interpreted in the manner which may stifle the main provision. (iv) that if the workman continues in service, the non renewal of the contract can be deemed as mala-fide and it may amount to be a fraud on statute. (v) that there would be wrong presumption of non-applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) where the work is of continuous nature and there is nothing on record that the work for which a workman has been appointed had come to an end.” 25. His Lordship Mr. Justice Srikrishna, as he then was, has interpreted Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) in the following words, in the judgment reported in Alexander Yesudas Maikel vs. Perfect Coil Seals and I.R.P. and Others, 1996 (1) LLJ 533 (Bom) at p. 535: “5.....In any event, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Clause (bb) has itself been restrictively interpreted and judicial consensus appears to be that, if the post 4 continues and the work continues, Clause (bb) cannot be said to operate as a charter for unscrupulous employers to jettison their workmen....” 26. In another judgment reported in Deputy Director of Health Services, Nashik vs. Lalabai Rajdhar Paturkar, 1996 (3) LLJ (Supp) 602 (Bom) the very same learned Judge has explained the position as under in para-8, at p. 606: “8....It will at once be seen that, just as there are no words of limitation in the main body of the definition, equally, there are no words of limitation in the exception Clause (bb). As long as either of the two contingencies contemplated by the clause is fulfilled, the situation would not amount to ‘retrenchment’ within the main body of the definition in Section 2(oo). However, by a series of judgments of our High Court and of other High Courts import of the words used and the amplitude of this have been whittled down and the judicial consensus on the construction of this clause appears to be that the sweep of Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) cannot be extended to such cases where the job continues and the employee work is also satisfactory and yet periodical renewals are made to avoid regular status to the employee, where the circumstances indicate that the letter of appointment is a camouflage to circumvent the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or the benefit of permanency on workers who have worked continuously for a period of more than 240 days.” 27. The Supreme Court in S.M. Nilajkar and Others vs. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 2 LLJ 359 , has set out the necessary ingredients to be satisfied for the application of Section 2(oo)(bb) in the following words in para-13 at p. 364 of LLJ: “13. The termination of service of a workman engaged in a scheme or project may not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Sub-clause (bb) subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the workman was employed in a project or scheme of temporary duration. (ii) the employment was on a contract, and not as a daily-wager simpliciter which provided inter-alia that the employment shall come to an end on the expiry of the scheme or project. (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract. (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment.” 28. (iii) the employment came to an end simultaneously with the termination of the scheme or project and consistently with the terms of the contract. (iv) the workman ought to have been apprised or made aware of the abovesaid terms by the employer at the commencement of employment.” 28. Further in para-14, the Supreme Court made it clear that at p. 364 of LLJ: “14....To exclude the termination of a scheme or project employee from the definition of retrenchment it is for the employer to prove the abovesaid ingredients so as to attract the applicability of sub-clause (bb) abovesaid....” 29. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Surat Mahila Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. vs. Mamtaben Mahendrabhai Joshi, (2001) 2 GLR 1248 . The relevant observations read thus: “18. Considering the view of the Apex Court and the various High Courts, Section 2 (oo)(bb) cannot be resorted to when employer has exercised power in a mala-fide, arbitrary and abused/misused the power with a view to see that the workman may not be entitled to the benefit and protection available under Sec. 25-F of the I.D Act. However, merely because employer has a right to terminate the service of an employee by satisfying the three conditions enunciated under Sec. 25-F of the Act the same cannot give him an unrestricted right. It is the duty of the employer to establish the fact that such termination is justified in the circumstances of the case. So, without justification of such termination, even in case of complying the provisions of Sec. 25-F such termination is bad, mala-fide, arbitrary and amounts to unfair labour practice. It is clear that Sec. 25-F has given no positive and unregulated right of retrenchment to the employer. They impose condition precedent before making retrenchment. It is noteworthy that the language of section 25-F is couched in a negative form. The section does not expressly provide that on compliance of the three conditions referred to in the section, the employer shall have an unrestricted right to retrench the workman. The unjustified retrenchment seems to have been effected more in furtherance of a plan to get good reduance of elements deemed undesirable.....The language of this Sec. 25-F is significant. The section does not expressly provide that on compliance of the three conditions referred to in the section, the employer shall have an unrestricted right to retrench the workman. The unjustified retrenchment seems to have been effected more in furtherance of a plan to get good reduance of elements deemed undesirable.....The language of this Sec. 25-F is significant. The termination of service in colourable exercise of power or a result of victimization or unfair labour practice or caprice should be prevented as otherwise some of the fundamental rights and principles which have been noticed above would be violated. Arbitrary conduct or unnecessary harshness on the part of the employer, judged by the normal standard of a reasonable man may be cogent evidence of victimization or unfair labour practice. It is open for the employee to question the ‘retrenchment’ even in case of compliance of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act on the ground of want of benefit or victimization or unfair labour practice or caprice or unnecessary harshness of the employer. Therefore, in such circumstances, the employer shall have to satisfy the Court that there is a compliance of Sec. 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 and also to satisfy that there is no mala-fide, arbitrariness, unnecessary harshness, unfair labour practice or victimization while terminating the service of the workman, and in such cases, the Labour Court shall have to consider these aspects also, while adjudicating the Industrial dispute against the termination of workman. Mere compliance of Sec. 25-F cannot prove or held that termination is bona-fide and genuine. Now, in view of the above observations, the facts of the present case are required to be considered.” 30. The above referred to decisions on the interpretation of Section 2(oo)(bb) explain the legal position to the effect that a claim of an employer on a term based employee providing for automatic termination whether within the terms fixed or on expiry of the said term, cannot be taken for granted to sustain the order of termination. On a plain reading of Section 2(oo)(bb), it is quite clear that such term based employment would fall outside the scope of ‘retrenchment’ so long as the requirement of such fixed period of employment was bona-fide required by the employer. On a plain reading of Section 2(oo)(bb), it is quite clear that such term based employment would fall outside the scope of ‘retrenchment’ so long as the requirement of such fixed period of employment was bona-fide required by the employer. It was therefore, repeatedly pointed out that such excepted categories required a rigorous test rather than accepting the plea of employer on its face value or otherwise it would cause serious prejudice to an employee, who can be taken for a ride by unscrupulous employers by contending that the term of employment was for specific period though as a matter of fact such period of employment lasted quite for a long spell. In other words even though the requirement of employment was perennial by adopting the methodology of employing a person for a specific period as many a times, an unscrupulous employer can always resort to abusing the provision contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) to thwart the other statutory protection available to an employee under Section 2(oo), namely, in the case of a ‘retrenchment’ vis-a-vis the consequential” benefits contained under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, when such extraordinary circumstances are brought out in the matter of employment and termination is resorted to by taking umbrage under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the interest of justice, we are of the view that a close scrutiny of the real position will have to be necessarily made to rule out the possibility of any injustice being caused to an employee. It cannot be lost sight of that Section 2(oo)(bb) is specifically meant to cover only such employment which would be needed for an employer for a specific period alone and beyond which the requirement will not be there and even on such occasions, the employer should not be put into an unnecessary predicament of facing the other consequences that would normally occur while resorting to retrenchment. The benefit of the said exception will have to be strictly restricted to such specific situations alone and the same cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by the employers even in regard to cases where the nature and requirement of employment is perennial. 31. The benefit of the said exception will have to be strictly restricted to such specific situations alone and the same cannot be allowed to be misused or abused by the employers even in regard to cases where the nature and requirement of employment is perennial. 31. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, it cannot be said that there is a material infirmity or jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, warranting interference at our end in this appeal. 32. We are also not impressed by the alternative submission canvassed by Mr. Munshaw that instead of reinstatement in service, this Court may award lump-sum monetary compensation to each of the workmen. This aspect has also been well dealt with by the learned Single Judge in Para-13 of the impugned judgment referred to above. Once it is established that the termination of the respondents/claimants is in violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, it cannot be said that merely because the respondents/claimants were daily wagers, such violation should be treated as a technical violation only and, therefore, compensation rather than reinstatement be awarded. In this regard, the learned Single Judge has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gauri Shanker vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 12 SCC 754 , wherein the Supreme Court did not approve the approach of the High Court in that case in modifying the award by granting lump-sum monetary compensation. The Supreme Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India in the matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Dispute Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Para-IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. 33. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge could not be said to have committed any error much less an error of law in affirming the awards passed by the Labour Court in favour of the workmen. 34. All these appeals, being devoid of any merit, should fail and are hereby dismissed. 35. As all the appeals have been ordered to be dismissed, the connected civil applications for stay would also not survive and are disposed of accordingly.