ORDER 1. This intra-Court appeal under section 2 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is directed against the order dated 26.2.2020 passed in Writ Petition (S) No. 17239/2018. 2. The Writ Petition was directed against the order dated 25.7.2018 passed by Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Singrauli; whereby, the current charge of Executive Engineer (Civil) was withdrawn from the appellant and was handed over to respondent No. 3 Executive Engineer. The appellant had taken exception to said order on the ground that current charge of the Executive Engineer (Civil) ought not to have been taken away and handed over to Executive Engineer (Electrical) which was contrary to the settled practice followed in Municipal Corporation, Singrauli of giving charge of higher post to the incumbent of the same stream. 3. Learned Single Judge on a finding that there is no statutory right in an incumbent to seek conferment of current charge of Executive Engineer (Civil), declined to cause interference. 4. Though an exception is taken on the ground that learned Single Judge grossly erred in non-suiting the appellant ignoring the established practice in Municipal Corporation Singrauli of handing over of current charge of a higher post to incumbent of the same stream and that since it was an arbitrary action on the part of Municipal Corporation, the appellant/petitioner was well within his right in questioning the same. Reliance is placed on the decision in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another [ (1974) 4 SCC 3 ] wherein Their Lordships were pleased to observe “The last two grounds of challenge may be taken up together for consideration. Though we have formulated the third ground of challenge as a distinct and separate ground, it is really in substance and effect merely an aspect of the second ground based on violation of Arts. 14 and 16. Art. 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that Art. 14 as there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. 14 and 16. Art. 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee that Art. 14 as there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Though enacted as a distinct and independent fundamental right because of its great importance as a principle ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment which is so vital to the building up of the new classless egalitarian society envisaged in the Constitution, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14. In other words, Art. 14 is the genus while Art 16 is a species, Art. 16 gives effect to the doctrine of equality in all matters relating to public employment. The basic principle which, therefore, informs both Arts. 14 and 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination. Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose J., "a way of fife", and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any ;attempt to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so Would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed cabined and confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action an( ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action an( ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valent relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would :amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is hit by Arts. 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of Power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice : in fact the matter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Arts. 14 and 16”. 5. On these contentions, the appellant seeks indulgence and a direction to the authorities of the Municipal Corporation to restore him to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil). 6. Respondent Municipal Corporation on their turn have opposed the relief sought by the appellant. It is urged that learned Single Judge was well within its right in non-suiting the petitioner. It is contended that for the post of Executive Engineer there is no separate cadre of Executive Engineer (Civil or Electrical) under Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporations (Appointment and Conditions of Service of Officers and Servants) Rules, 2000. There is only one cadre of Executive Engineer and the additional charge of Executive Engineer (Civil) having been handed over to an incumbent holding substantive post of Executive Engineer (Electrical) does not violate the Rules as would entitle the appellant/petitioner to claim the grant of current charge of higher post. Further referring to the provisions contained in rule 14 of Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (Conduct of Business of the Mayor-In-Council/President-In-Council and the Powers and Functions of the Authorities) Rules, 1998 which empowers that the Chief Executive Officer shall nominate any of his subordinate officers as Head of the department for each department of the Municipality even for more than one department, it is contended that it is within the competence of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Singrauli to have tendered the additional charge of the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) to the respondent No. 3. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has entered appearance and adopts the submissions put-forth on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2. 8. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 has entered appearance and adopts the submissions put-forth on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2. 8. Considered the rival submissions. 9. We are not commended to any Rules/Regulations/ Bylaws of the Municipal Corporation providing for that the current charge of Executive Engineer which is a combined cadre can only be given to an Assistant Engineer of respective stream. 10. In Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India and others [1991 Supp (2) SCC 733], it has been held: “5. The arrangements contemplated by this order plainly do not amount to a promotion of the appellant to the post of Treasurer. The distinction between a situation where a government servant is promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as a promotion. In such a case he does not get the salary of the higher post; but gets only what in service parlance is called a "charge allowance". Such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority do not enter into it. The person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of the higher post essentially as a stop-gap arrangement. 9. The third contention is that appellant's 'in-charge' arrangements in the higher post had continued for so long a period that a determination of equivalence on the basis of his lower substantive post would become arbitrary. This contention ignores the fact that an 'in-charge' arrangement is not a recognition of or is necessarily based on seniority and that, therefore, no rights, 'equities or expectations could be built upon it.' The third contention is also unmeritorious.” 11. Further in State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma ( AIR 1993 SC 2273 ), it has been held: “11. We are constrained to say that the High Court extended its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to a frivolity. No one has a right to ask for or stick to a current duty charge. The impugned order did not cause any financial loss or prejudice of any kind to Sharma. We are constrained to say that the High Court extended its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to a frivolity. No one has a right to ask for or stick to a current duty charge. The impugned order did not cause any financial loss or prejudice of any kind to Sharma. He had no cause of action whatsoever to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It was a patent misuse of the process of the Court.” 12. In view whereof the petitioner who substantively holds the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) has no legal right to seek mandamus for grant of current charge. The observation in E.P. Royappa (supra) in paragraph 85 turns on its own fact, which in our considered opinion in given facts of present case is of no assistance to the appellant. 13. Having thus considered since we perceive no error in the impugned order, no indulgence is caused. Appeal fails and is dismissed.