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2020 DIGILAW 787 (KAR)

Muniraju Gowda P. M. v. Munirathna

2020-03-20

DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD

body2020
JUDGMENT Dixit Krishna Shripad, J. - Petitioner-Muniraju Gowda, a candidate defeated in the General Elections 2018 to the 15th Karnataka Legislative Assembly from 154 Rajarajeshwarinagara Constituency, Bengaluru has presented this Petition seeking to lay a challenge to the election of the 1st respondent Munirathna (hereafter 'Returned Candidate') inter alia on the ground of corrupt practice; he has also sought for an extraordinary relief vide Prayer (c) in the petition to the effect that he be declared as duly elected, in the stead of Returned Candidate; similarly, another person too has laid a challenge in connected Election Petition, which is for the time being kept apart, since the applications filed therein need a separate consideration, as suggested at the Bar. 2. After service of notice, all the respondents having entered appearance through their counsel have filed the Written Statements resisting the Election Petition; the Returned Candidate has filed amongst other, the following applications which are the subject matter of consideration, presently: i) I.A. No. 2/2019 under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Sections 81, 83, 86 and 87 of the R.P. Act, 1951 seeking an order for striking out the pleadings in paragraph Nos. 8 to 30 and the aforesaid prayer (c) in the Election Petition; ii) I.A. No. 3/2019 under Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) read with Section 151 of CPC, seeking an order for rejection of the Election Petition on the ground that it lacks the substratum and a choate cause of action; and iii) I.A. No. 4/2019 under Section 151 of CPC read with Sections 86 & 87 of R.P. Act for an order for striking out prayer (c) specifically requesting that this application be taken up for consideration prior to the aforementioned two applications. 3. The petitioner too has filed the following two applications which too are taken up for consideration along with those filed by the Returned Candidate: a) I.A. No. 1/2020 under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC read with Section 101 of R.P. Act seeking leave to amend the Election Petition by introducing additional pleadings/statement allegedly amplifying the existing pleadings. b) I.A. No. 4/2020 under Order XIII Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, 1908 read with Section 87 of the R.P. Act seeking leave to produce copies of eight documents; 4. b) I.A. No. 4/2020 under Order XIII Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, 1908 read with Section 87 of the R.P. Act seeking leave to produce copies of eight documents; 4. The above applications filed by the petitioner and the Returned Candidate are opposed by each other by filing objections; some of the respondents too have opposed the applications of the petitioner; the court after hearing the parties for some time, vide order dated 26.02.2020 had received the subject documents enlisted in petitioners application in I.A. No. 4/2020 observing specifically 'whether they will become full-fledged record, would depend upon what turns out to be in the next stages of these Election Petitions.' 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on all these applications; I have perused the Petition Papers; I have also adverted to the Rulings cited at the Bar; I am of a considered opinion that petitioners application in I.A. No. 1/2020 seeking leave to amend his pleadings deserves to be favoured, albeit in part, as mentioned herein below; his application in I.A. No. 4/2020 seeking leave to produce additional documents, needs to be favoured; similarly, the application in I.A. No. 4/2019 filed by the Returned Candidate for striking out petitioners Prayer (c) also deserves to be granted; however, his other two applications i.e., I.A. No. 2/2019 for striking out paragraph Nos. 8 to 30 in the Election Petition, and in I.A. No. 3/2019 seeking rejection of Election Petition need to be disallowed; the reasons for these opinions are as under: I) AS TO PETITIONERS APPLICATIONS IN I.A. NO. 8 to 30 in the Election Petition, and in I.A. No. 3/2019 seeking rejection of Election Petition need to be disallowed; the reasons for these opinions are as under: I) AS TO PETITIONERS APPLICATIONS IN I.A. NO. 1/2020 FOR AMENDMENT OF ELECTION PETITION: a) In I.A. No. 1/2020, petitioner has sought for leave of this Court u/o VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908 r/w Section 101 of the Act for amending the Petition by way of introducing paragraph 30(a)', wherein it is inter alia alleged that the Returned Candidate, his agent and others with consent had distributed 'Gift, Clothes, Cookers, Cooking Tavas and Water Cans' and thereby, won the election in an unethical manner; he alleges 'It is pertinent to state that the petitioner received majority of valid votes, but for votes obtained by the Respondent No. 1 by corrupt practice, the petitioner definitely would have obtained a majority of valid votes...' [sic]; the amendment also reiterates illegal collection of EPIC Cards, Voters ID, etc; b) petitioner has in several paragraphs of his Petition already taken up the averments relating to corrupt practices such as distribution of household articles, clothes, water-cans, etc; thus, what is now sought to be included [barring one aspect which is discussed infra], is not much new; at para 7 of the Petition, he has mentioned about illegal collection of original Voter Cards, manipulating fake Election Identity Cards, Form No. 6 Acknowledgements, etc; at paragraphs 11, 12 & 13, he has mentioned about cookers, cooking tavas, sarees and water-cans given or to be given to the voters, some of which the Nandini Layout police have allegedly seized in Crime No. 169/2018; at paragraphs 16 to 19, petitioner has mentioned about the employees/agents of the Returned Candidate working with laptops, scanners, printers, xerox machines, lamination machines, rubber stamps, handbill, booklets, visiting cards, etc., in connection with fabricating fake identity cards and acknowledgements; therefore, the objection of the respondents that the amendment seeks to introduce virgin 'material facts', only now, is difficult to agree with; however, this Court hastens to add that the amendment is not being sanctioned in a whole sale way, but it is only selectively permitted; c) petitioner has sought leave to include an averment that but for the alleged corrupt practice, the Returned Candidate would have been defeated and eventually, he would have emerged victorious; true it is, although the petition contains Prayer (c), but in support of that, there was no statement of 'material facts', pleaded in the petition as originally filed; when the hearing of the applications filed by the Returned Candidate was half a through, petitioner has moved the Amendment Application and thus, obviously the diligence which the law expects is lacking, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel Mr. Ashok Haranahalli, appearing for the Returned Candidate; no plausible explanation is offered for the delay brooked in filing the application, either; it is not in dispute that all 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, the object being the enablement of the opponent to know the case which he needs to meet; in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence, is well established; to put it in other words, an Election Petition invariably has to contain a concise statement of 'material facts', which supports the prayer made therein, vide: Anil Vasudev Salgoankar v. Naresh Kushani Shiggaonkar, 2009 (9) SCC 310 ; this position of law militates against leave being granted for amendment for introducing a statement of 'material facts' since apparently it is time barred; d) the fact that the petitioner has now moved the amendment application for introducing the 'material facts' itself shows that they were lacking in the petition, as originally instituted, the contra contention of his counsel, notwithstanding; despite turning page after page of the petition, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Vijay Shankar appearing for the petitioner, could not locate even one line of averment which can even by wild imagination be construed as constituting 'material facts' in support of Prayer (c), as required u/s. 101(b) of the Act for substantiating his stand that what is now being introduced by way of amendment is only 'material particulars' as contradistinguished from 'material facts'; therefore, Mr. Haranahallis reliance on Samanth N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandes, (1969) 3 SCC 238 comes to the aid of Returned Candidate; the Apex Court at Para 33 of the said decision observed as under: '33. To begin with it must be realised that as is stated in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others the statutory requirements of the law of Election in India must be strictly observed. It is pointed out in that case that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but a purely statutory proceeding unknown to common law and that the Court possesses no common law power. It is pointed out in that case that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but a purely statutory proceeding unknown to common law and that the Court possesses no common law power. Although the power of amendment given in the Code of Civil Procedure can be invoked because Section 87 makes the procedure applicable, as nearly as may be, to the trial of election petitions, the Representation of Peoples Act, itself enacts some rules which override the Civil Procedure Code. General Power of amendment of the power derived from the Code of Civil Procedure must be taken to be overborne in so far as the election law provides. In a large number of cases it has been laid down by the High Courts in India that the material facts, must make out a charge and it is only then that an amendment to amplify the charge can be allowed or new instances of commission o corrupt practice charged can be given. If no charge is made out in the petition at all the addition of particulars cannot be allowed to include indirectly a new charge. ' e) there is force in the contention of Mr. Vijay Shankar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that in construing the pleadings of the parties, one cannot keep the common sense in cold storage; the case of the parties has to be gathered from the collective reading of entire pleadings; it is true that the Court has to adopt an approach which advances due adjudication of the lis, and not the one that scuttles it; this is the grand norm that governs amendment of pleadings in a suit proceeding; however, the provisions of CPC, 1908 relating to amendment of pleadings in a suit do not proprio vigor apply to the adjudication of the election disputes of the kind, as already mentioned above and as reiterated in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 ; therefore, the amendment to the extent of introducing the substratum contemplated u/s. 101(b) of the Act, for supporting Prayer (c) is impermissible; however, there is no impediment for sanctioning the remaining portion of amendment since it is apparently amplificatory and a bit repetitive of what is already pleaded; this apart, it does not cause any prejudice to the other side, more specially when an Addl. Written Statement can be filed by the respondents resisting the new averment. II) AS TO PETITIONERS APPLICATION IN I.A. NO. 4/2020 SEEKING LEAVE TO PRODUCE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: The petitioner has sought leave for the production of eight documents which have the characteristics of public documents/public records; except the first two enlisted in the application namely ECI Notice dated 11.09.2014 and petitioners Reply dated 03.04.2018, all other documents have come into existence only in the recent past and long after the filing of Election Petition; apparently, these documents are the products of exercise of statutory power vested in the Election Commission of India under Sections 10A & 11 of the Act; thus, they have statutory character; in fact, the Returned Candidate too referred to the said six documents in support of his applications for rejection of the petition, and for striking out Pleadings & Prayer (c); such a reference itself shows that these documents bear prima facie relevance; if leave to produce the same is denied, petitioner would be put to a manifest injustice; conversely, if leave is accorded, no prejudice would be caused to the other side; in the considered opinion of this Court, the production of these documents would facilitate due adjudication of the lis at hands; therefore, this application deserves to be favoured. III) AS TO APPLICATION OF RETURNED CANDIDATE FOR STRIKING OUT PRAYER (c) FROM THE ELECTION PETITION: a) Petitioner in addition to making the prayer for setting aside the Election of the Returned Candidate, has also sought for a further relief in terms of Prayer (c) in the petition 'To declare the petitioner as duly elected to the seat of Karnataka Legislative Assembly, Rajarajeshwarinagar Constituency No. 154;' he has founded this prayer on the premise of corrupt practice; the averments to be taken up in the petition, relating to any corrupt practice need to be reasonably sufficient to constitute a cause of action for maintaining such an extraordinary prayer; b) It is a settled legal position that all 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, the object being the enablement of the opposite party to know the case which he has to meet; in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence, is long settled; in other words, an Election Petition invariably has to contain a concise statement of 'material facts', which supports the prayer made therein, vide: Anil Vasudev Salgoankar , supra; whether there is a statement of material facts supporting Prayer (c) in the Petition, needs to be examined; it is basic to the law of elections and Election disputes that in a democracy, the mandate of people as expressed at the hustings must prevail and be respected, as already stated above; ordinarily, the election of a successful candidate is not lightly interfered with; the heavy onus lies on the election petitioner to make out a cogent case for setting aside the election of a successful candidate, and the heaviness of this onus can be likened to the one that lies on the prosecution in Criminal Jurisprudence; thus, the proof is not by the preponderance of probability as in ordinary civil cases vide: R.P. Moidutty supra. c) Section 101 of the Act provides for seeking a relief in terms of Prayer (c) as made in the petition; however, the Apex Court in Prakash Khandre v. Dr. c) Section 101 of the Act provides for seeking a relief in terms of Prayer (c) as made in the petition; however, the Apex Court in Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre (2002) 5 SCC 568 having examined the conspectus of this Section has held that this provision has two ingredients, viz., the first provides that after declaring election of the Returned Candidate to be void, the High Court may declare the petitioner or such other candidate to have been duly elected inter alia depending upon the error in counting of valid votes, or that the petitioner or such other candidate has received a majority of valid votes; and, the second ingredient provides for establishing that the votes obtained by the Returned Candidate were secured by corrupt practices and that but for such votes, the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a majority of valid votes; it is also open to an Election Petitioner to plead and prove that, the votes secured by the Returned Candidate by perpetrating the corrupt practice would have been otherwise cast in his favour or other candidate, but for the corrupt practice, although it may be much difficult to establish when multiple candidates were in the fray as is the case at hands. d) I have examined the tenability of Prayer (c) in the light of legal position as briefly stated in the above paragraphs; nowhere in the Election Petition, there is any statement of material facts or plea which Section 101 of the Act contemplates for maintaining a Prayer that the Petitioner be declared to have been elected; despite all endeavors, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Vijay Shankar after turning page after page of the Petition could not point out that there is such a plea, howsoever loosely emerging from the collective reading of all its paragraphs; the contention that in the amendment, such a plea is now taken with the leave accorded by the Court, does not avail in view of specific rider in the order allowing the amendment application. e) When an Election Petition inter alia containing an Additional Prayer for declaring that the petitioner or some other candidate be declared elected is pending, ordinarily the elections are deferred for such a constituency till after the disposal of the case, even when there arises a vacancy because of removal, resignation, death or disqualification of a victorious candidate; presently, the constituency in question has no elected candidate because of Speakers Disqualification Order dated 28.07.2019 under the Tenth Schedule to, r/w Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India, which is later modified by the Apex Court relaxing the embargo against the disqualified candidates facilitating their entry to the electoral fray; post relaxation of disqualification, the elections to all other constituencies have been conducted saving the constituency in question is not in dispute; thus, people of this constituency alone do not have a popular representative; Democracy amongst other being a basic feature of the Constitution, law abhors the absence of an elected representative, indefinitely. f) The trial & disposal of the challenge to the election in question by their very nature would take considerable time, especially when there is one more challenge laid by another in connected Election Petition; the pleadings are bulky and the documents are huge; presumably, several persons need to be examined as witnesses; thus, this legal battle would take its own time to reach the culmination point; permitting Prayer (c) to continue in the petition sans factual substratum contemplated as a sine qua non u/s. 101(b) of the Act, for prima facie maintaining the same, would virtually amount to depriving the subject Constituency of the opportunity of electing its representative, for an indefinite period of time; this is not a happy thing to do; therefore, this Court has to pave way for the Election Commission of India to conduct election to this Constituency; holding election before long is therefore eminently desirable lest the remainder of the tenure of the prospective electee should become unreasonably short; the shortness of the tenure will have its own ill-effects, needs no elaboration. g) There is yet another aspect which the counsel for the Returned Candidate, Mr. g) There is yet another aspect which the counsel for the Returned Candidate, Mr. Haranahalli vociferously argued; the petitioner suffered an order dated 09.01.2019 made u/s. 10A of the Act whereby he was disqualified from contesting the election for a period of six years; however, on his appeal u/s. 11, the Election Commission vide order dated 17.10.2019 although upheld the disqualification, reduced its period up to the date of said order i.e., 17.10.2019; the Counsel banking upon Article 191(1)(e) of the Constitution contended that, once there is such a disqualification order, petitioners prayer for declaring him elected in terms of Section 101(b) of the Act is constitutionally rendered untenable; this contention is bit difficult to countenance because: (i) Article 191 of the Constitution has a heading which reads: 'Disqualifications for Membership.' Clause 1(e) of this Article reads: 'A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State-if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.' True it is that the disqualification which the petitioner incurred fits into this provision; however, the said disqualification which was initially directed for a period of six years vide Order dated 09.01.2019 made by the ECI u/s. 10A of the Act, came to be abridged by and up to the date of the Appellate Order i.e., 17.10.2019 made u/s. 11 of the Act; the relevant portion of the Appellate Order reads: '...that the disqualification imposed on 9th January, 2019, under Section 10A of the said Act, on Shri Muniraju Gowda P be reduced to the period up to and including the date of this order and the said disqualification shall not be operative with effect from 18th October, 2019 onwards ..... ' Countenancing the contention of the kind advanced on behalf of the Returned Candidate would virtually amount to giving effect to the original order of disqualification in militant disregard of variation brought about by the Appellate Order; (ii) the text of Article 191(e) of the Constitution empowers the Parliament to enact law providing for disqualification and accordingly, Chapter III is introduced to the Act vide Amendment Act 1966 w.e.f. 14.12.1966; the disqualification incurred under Section 10A as enacted in this Chapter shall be for a period of three years from the date of the order; Section 11 empowers the Election Commission to remove or reduce the period of disqualification; petitioner suffered a disqualification u/s. 10A and got some reprieve u/s. 11, is the case put forth at the Bar; Section 7(b) as enacted in this Chapter defines the word 'disqualified' to mean 'disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a Member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State.' A short disqualification that intervenes and vanishes like a speeding comet in the sky during the pendency of an Election Petition cannot operate as an absolute bar for maintaining an Additional Prayer for a declaration that an Election Petitioner or some other candidate is elected in terms of Section 101(b); (iii) a different intention consistent with the contention of the Returned Candidate does not emerge from the text & context of this Section and therefore, such a contention cannot be countenanced without little manhandling this Section; the Apex Court in Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1 reiterating Jyoti Basu supra held that the right to elect fundamental though it is to democracy is anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right; outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected, no right to dispute an election; being statutory creations, these rights are subject to statutory limitations; as such, the RP Act is regarded as a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute; thus, the limitation which the Returned Candidate intends to clamp on the defeated one cannot be read into the Act, by interpretative process. (iv) The contention of Mr. Haranahalli and Mr. (iv) The contention of Mr. Haranahalli and Mr. Nanjunda Reddy that the disqualification howsoever short, would render Prayer (c) in the petition untenable and infructuous, is not supported by the text of Article 191 of the Constitution, either; if the Constitution Makers intended that once there comes such a disqualification regardless of its shortness, an Election Petitioner cannot maintain a prayer for the declaration that he or any other candidate be declared elected, a suitable provision to that effect would have been enacted; such a provision is conspicuously absent; as already mentioned above, the area of legislation relating to disqualification inter alia of the kind in question has been entrusted to the Parliament, which too in its wisdom has not made a provision which the Returned Candidate could have derived succor from; their contention that what if the Election Petition was disposed off on the day the original order of disqualification was in force, does not merit consideration since the Election Petition staring at the hypothesis still pends and that the disqualification apparently has spent itself; in construing the election law as enacted, ordinarily, the 'ifs and buts' need to be kept at a bay; (v) the general norm of adjudication that the rights of the parties should be adjudicated as they existed on the date of institution of the case, too does not come to the rescue of the Returned Candidate; perhaps the contention of the kind would have merited deeper examination, again subject to result of the Appeal filed or contemplated against the disqualification if the petition were to be disposed off during the subsistence of disqualification; this can be better visualized if it is assumed that the Appeal of a disqualified candidate filed u/s. 11 of the Act was allowed absolutely and the disqualification order made u/s. 10A was removed ab inceptio. Note: The contention structured on the basis of the aforesaid Disqualification Order made by the Speaker even otherwise pales into insignificance since the Prayer (c) is being struck off on the sole ground that there is no statement of material facts pleaded in the Petition, in support thereof. In the above circumstances, the application filed by the Returned Candidate namely Sri. Munirathna in I.A. No. 4/2019 u/s. 151 of CPC r/w Sections 86 & 87 of R.P. Act for striking out the Prayer (c) from the petition deserves to be allowed. In the above circumstances, the application filed by the Returned Candidate namely Sri. Munirathna in I.A. No. 4/2019 u/s. 151 of CPC r/w Sections 86 & 87 of R.P. Act for striking out the Prayer (c) from the petition deserves to be allowed. IV) AS TO APPLICATIONS OF THE RETURNED CANDIDATE IN I.A. NO. 2/2019 FOR REJECTION OF PETITION AND IN I.A. NO. 3/2019 FOR STRIKING OUT PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 30 OF THE PETITION: a) It is a settled legal position that all 'material facts' must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, the object being the enablement of the opposite party to know the case which he has to meet; in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence; in other words, an Election Petition invariably has to contain a concise statement of 'material facts', which supports the prayer made therein, vide: Anil Vasudev Salgoankar v. Naresh Kushani Shiggaonkar, 2009 (9) SCC 310 . b) It is basic to the law of elections and Election Petitions that in a democracy, the mandate of people as expressed at the hustings must prevail; that is why the election of a successful candidate is not lightly interfered with; a heavy onus lies on the election petitioner to make out a cogent case for setting aside the election of a successful candidate both in terms of pleadings and at the trial, as the consequences flowing from the proof of such electoral practice are serious; the proof is not by the preponderance of probability, but on the strict norm that the guilt should be proved to the hilt, as obtaining in criminal jurisprudence vide: R.P. Moidutty v. P.T. Kunju Mohammed (2000) 1 SCC 481 . c) The above apart, a charge of corrupt practice has a two-dimensional effect: its impact on the Returned Candidate has to be viewed from the point of view of the candidates future political and public life, and from the point of view of the electorate to ensure the purity of the election process; there can, therefore, be no doubt that such an allegation involving corrupt practice must be viewed very seriously and the compliance with requirement of Section 83 of the RP Act has to be ensured before the trial commences vide F.A. Sapa v. Singora, AIR 1991 SC 1557 . d) The Apex Court in F.A. Sapa supra while considering the validity of affidavits that an Election Petition should be supported with, has observed as under: 'From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges-(i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same.....'. e) The above legal position and propositions set the tone for consideration of the applications filed by the Returned Candidate seeking rejection of the petition, and in the alternative for striking out paragraph Nos.8 to 30 therein; petitioner at several paragraphs has stated about the corrupt practices allegedly perpetrated by the Returned Candidate; paragraph No.7 mentions about illegal collection of voter identity cards/EPIC cards, manipulation of election identity cards and Form No.6 Acknowledgements; paragraph Nos.11, 12 & 13 mention about the Returned Candidate gifting cookers, cooking tavas, water-cans and sarees for influencing the voters; they also mention about seizure of these and other things by Nandini Layout police vide Crime No.169/2018. f) Paragraph Nos. 16 to 19 speak about the Returned Candidate employing the workforce for fabricating fake identity cards and acknowledgements by using laptops, Scanners/printers, xerox/lamination machines, rubber stamps, etc; paragraph No.13 mentions the names of recipients of these gifts allegedly distributed by Returned Candidate till 03.05.2018; paragraph Nos.18, 19 & 25 mention of persons engaged by the Returned Candidate for influencing the voters of the Constituency; paragraph No.23 mentions about the material seized by the police from SLV Apartment in Jalahalli; paragraph No.29 states about gifting of food grains, clothes, kitchen articles, calendars, sugar, etc., that were seized by the Kamakshi police vide Crime No.222/2018. g) The contention of the Counsel for the Returned Candidate that all and whatever allegations levelled against him relate to a period anterior to he becoming a candidate in terms of Section 79 of the Act, is very difficult to countenance; Section 29 as judicially interpreted renders a person candidate for the election after he files the Nomination Papers, is true; as already mentioned above, Petition specifically states the dates when the Returned Candidate or his agents/employees were busy in influencing the voters illegally and these dates are posterior to the filing of Nomination Papes; the contention that some of the paragraphs are scandalous is also not substantiated, after all, what one has to look at is the overall picture that would emerge from the comprehensive reading of the pleadings, as rightly contended by Mr.Vijay Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner; therefore, no ground is made out either for rejection of the Petition or for striking out paragraphs 8 to 30 therefrom. h) The contention that the affidavits sworn to by the petitioner in support of petition averments do not satisfy the requirement of the prescribed mandatory Form and therefore, Petition deserves to be rejected, appears to be too farfetched an argument; the Apex Court in V.Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarsu (2002) SCC 294 observed that a petition alleging corrupt practice is required to be supported by an affidavit and that the election petitioner needs to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of corrupt practice, is true; the reasons for such a requirement are not far to seek; the allegation of corrupt practice is a serious matter and that a challenger to the election who makes such allegation needs to shoulder full responsibility for the same; in R.P.Moidutty supra, it is held that in the absence of indication of source of information relating to corrupt practice, the petition has to be rejected at the threshold; in L.R. Shivaramegowda, (1991) 1 SCC 666 , the Apex Court stated that the non-disclosure of source of information is fatal to the Election Petition; this legal position emerges by a catena of decisions rendered inter alia on the basis of section 83 of the Act and Rule 94(A) of the Conduct of Election Rules, is true; the petitioner at para 2 of the Verifying Affidavit has stated 'paragraph No.1 to 11 and 30 to 33 are based upon my personal knowledge' [sic]; similarly, at paragraph No.3 of the said Affidavit has stated 'the statements made in paragraph 12 to 29 are based upon information which I believe them to be true'; at para 2 of his Affidavit in Form 25 in terms of Rule 94(A), he has mentioned about paragraphs 12 to 27 as being true to his knowledge, although the first sentence in the said paragraph is incomplete; much milk cannot derived by the respondents from this incompleteness, when the reading of whole paragraph makes sense; the Apex Court in Raj Narain v. Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi, (1972) 3 SCC 850 has held that just because a corrupt practice has to be strictly proved would not mean that a pleading in an election petition must be strictly construed. The Court held that it cannot refuse to enquire into allegations made by the election petitioner merely because the election petitioner or someone who prepared his brief did not know the language of law; at para 3 of the Affidavit, he has stated the allegations of corrupt practice contained in para Nos.28 to 30 are based on his information; ideally speaking, these affidavits could have been more articulated and descriptive, is beside the point, as rightly pointed out by Mr.Vijay Shankar; the Verifying Affidavit and Form 25 Affidavit cannot be found fault with on the grounds urged by the respondents, in view of the legal position discussed above. OPERATIVE PORTION a) Election Petitioners application in I.A. No.1/2020 filed under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908 r/w Section 101 of R.P.Act,1951 having been favoured, leave to amend the Election Petition by introducing additional pleadings subject to observations mentioned above, is accorded; b) Election Petitioners application in I.A.No.2/2020 filed under Order XIII, Rules 1 & 2 of CPC, 1908 r/w Section 87 of the R.P. Act, 1951 having been favoured, leave is accorded for producing the enlisted additional documents, in furtherance of Order dated 26.02.2020; c) first respondents application in I.A.No.2/2019 filed under Order VI Rule 16 of CPC, 1908 r/w Sections 81, 83, 86 & 87 of the R.P. Act, 1951 for striking out paragraph Nos.8 to 30 in the Election Petition, and his other application in I.A.No.3/2019 filed under Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) r/w Section 151 of CPC, 1908 for rejection of the Election Petition, are dismissed; d) first respondents application in I.A.No.4/2019 filed under Section 151 of CPC, 1908 r/w Sections 86 & 87 of the R.P.Act, 1951 for striking out Prayer (c) having been favoured, the said prayer is struck off from the Election Petition; e) the petitioner shall file the amended petition within four weeks, whereupon the respondents may file their Addl. Written Statements, if any, within next four weeks; f) the Registry shall send a copy of this Order to the Secretary, Election Commission of India, Ashoka Road, New Delhi, for information and needful action. Post both the Election Petitions for consideration of the applications filed in other connected Election Petition, on 15.04.2020. Costs made easy.